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Summary
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a model of the role of a senior 
management services officer in one part of the National Health Service. It puts 
forward and discusses the deficiencies of other models of this role in order to 
identify parts of the role which a new model must seek to describe more 
adequately. The main parts of the role explored can be described as political 
and the expertise required to carry them out is usually said to be based on 
experience.
The model put forward in the thesis is a two part model. The first part 
consists of a set of categories which describe the events which make up all the 
various aspects of the activities of a management services officer. The general 
properties and characteristics of these event categories are developed. The 
second part of the model is concerned with how such events fit together into 
projects. The main theme of this fitting together of events is the negotiation 
of order in large complex organisations.
The model is based on a record of the change agent activities of one 
management services officer over a long period of time. Because of the 
present lack of understanding of this role and in order to include a wide variety 
of events in the analysis, an unstructured data collection method was used.
- i i  -
Qualitative data is used in this study and appropriate grounded theory data
analysis methods are used in the analysis.
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CHAPTER 1 - THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS AND AN OUTLINE OF THE 
RESEARCH APPROACH ADOPTED
The purpose of this thesis
The successful management of change in large organisations presents 
many problems. Management Services Officers have a special responsibility 
for bringing about change and introducing completely new management methods 
in their organisations. Our understanding of the ways in which they perform 
that task is limited. There are many reasons for the existence of that lack of 
understanding, not the least being the wide variety of organisations and 
circumstances in which these officers must act and solve different sorts of 
problems. The building of our understanding of the task in organisations in 
general depends on better understanding of specific situations. At present, even 
our understanding of specific situations is limited. . This thesis attempts to 
explore how I myself, the Regional Management Services Officer, perform this 
task in one particular organisation, the Pennine Regional Health Authority (the 
RHA) of the National Health Service. Although this thesis does include 
discussion of the generality of the conclusions reached and it is hoped that many 
conclusions will be widely applicable, it is appropriate to stress that the main 
aim of this research is to produce an adequate model of this one particular 
situation.
This chapter outlines the way in which the issue has been approached and 
the way in which the thesis will present the work done. The key concept which 
came to be used to explain my behaviour is the negotiation of order and it is 
suggested that changes of organisations from one state to another involve a 
variety of negotiations among individuals and groups. This thesis is an 
elaboration of that negotiation process as it exists in the Pennine RHA. This
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key concept evolved from the research data and was not part of my early ideas 
about the change process. It  is profitable therefore to trace in outline the way 
in which the ideas developed before putting them forward in later chapters 
within the framework determined by this central theme of the negotiation of 
order.
The evolution of this research
Various explanations or models of the ways in which Management Services 
Officers bring about change seem to have existed in the past. These are 
presented in Chapter 2 and are based on published papers and my own 
experience. That chapter also explores various limitations of those models and 
identifies their lack of close correspondence with the ways in which these 
officers actually do behave as being one of their principal defects. This 
research seeks to remedy that major defect by basing its findings on my own 
actual activities as recorded in a diary over a period slightly longer than one 
year. The methods put forward by Glaser and Strauss (1977) are used to analyse 
that diary data and it was out of this grounded theory, that the key concept of 
the negotiation of order emerged.
I fe lt that my own activities over long periods of time fell into at least 
two groups. On the one hand I often worked on a few large projects in a 
sustained manner for a long period while on the other hand much of my time 
was spent on disconnected and seemedly random activities. For this reason, 
and this is discussed more fully as part of my own detailed research methods in 
Chapter 4, two diaries - one covering a project and the other covering general 
activity were kept. Two separate ideas emerged from these diaries. First, it 
appeared to be possible to give categories to the events in the general diaries, 
and these categories described the nature of the event. Second, the project
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diary consisted of a set of distinct project themes and sets of objectives which 
appeared to be randomly interwoven. These separate themes were fitted  
together by people who did this creatively by making agreements with others. 
The determination of these event categories and the description of the 
interweaving of the project themes are contained in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively, and are the case studies which are the basis of this research.
During the period that the diary data was being recorded and analysed, it 
was becoming clear that, as a manager, I was fitting together my various 
activities into significant behaviour patterns in order to do things. My methods 
for doing this fitting together were not obvious and could not be described 
easily. They were based on experience and skills loosely described as 
"political”. The literature which was most useful in providing an understanding 
of this political activity was Allison (1971), Bailey (1977) and Mangham (1978) 
and (1979). One of the major themes of these books is that people and groups 
interact and come to agreements about the way forward. This coming together 
and reaching agreements, in other words negotiating order, became the key 
concept referred to above. It  became clear that Strauss (1978) provided a 
paradigm for that negotiating process which, apart from its relevance to this 
key concept and the results of this research, provided a framework which could 
be used for the presentation of this work in the chapters of this thesis. This 
presentation method has been adopted but the process used to develop the ideas 
and described above in outline is important since it demonstrates the grounded 
nature of those ideas. In view of its importance it is appropriate to present the 
Strauss work in some detail and this is done below.
However, before presenting Strauss, the way in which I propose to deal 
with Bailey, Allison and Mangham must be clarified. The influence of those
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books on this thesis occurred through their ability to provide insights into 
specific occurrences in my own data and in particular to help define my 
political activities. It  is useful to identify these specific occurrences and to 
relate them to concepts put forward by the authors. That can only be done 
after my own data has been presented in later chapters. Therefore at this 
stage, despite their importance in the development of this research, I prefer to 
say only that these works provided these insights into the nature of "political 
activity". That political activity is described frequently as "using experience", 
"getting things done" and "causing the wheels to turn". This thesis will suggest 
that such activities can be viewed as negotiation and it will show how that 
negotiation occurs in a wide variety of contexts.
Strauss(1978)
As stated above, one of the few studies concerned with the negotiation of 
order in a variety of complex organisations is Strauss (1978) "Negotiations - 
Varieties, Contexts, Processes and Social Orders". It  is particularly relevant to 
this thesis since it argues that negotiation is central to understanding a wide 
variety of social processes, not a subsidiary theme which should be made to 
support other key concepts such as functionalism or game theory. There are 
three parts to the discussion in the book followed by discussion of the 
implications of its theory. First, the parts which negotiation has played in 
other theories are investigated and found inadequate. Second, a paradigm for 
negotiation is put forward and third, the application of that paradigm to various 
case studies is explored. This review starts by describing the paradigm.
The first part of the analytic structure, the paradigm, suggested by the 
author is the description of the negotiation itself. That description would 
include the accompanying interactions, the type of actors and their strategies
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and tactics, some consequences of and, in particular, the subprocesses of 
negotiation which exist. These subprocesses include concepts such as pay 
backs, and types of agreements.
The second part of the paradigm is the structural context of that 
particular negotiation and is an attempt to represent the totality of the effect 
which the context has on the negotiation. For instance, one of the studies in 
the book concerns the negotiation of a new order in a psychiatric institution, an 
exercise in which a variety of professional people were involved and moved a 
long way from the traditional structures which apply in such circumstances. In 
this case, the structural context of the negotiation includes the properties of 
the American medical care system, specialisation among caring professions and 
similar parts of a larger social framework surrounding psychiatric care.
Strauss introduces as the third part of the paradigm the concept of a 
negotiation context. Whilst ward or hospitals and similar entities are concrete 
social units, awareness contexts were developed by Strauss in his earlier 
researches as an analytic social unit used to describe and account for 
similarities in awareness in different wards or hospitals. Similarly, different 
negotiations are amenable to the same sort of descriptions and analysis. The 
kinds of negotiation context identified are:
(a) The number of negotiators, their relative experience in 
negotiating, and whom they represent.
(b) Whether the negotiations are one-shot, repeated, sequential, 
serial, multiple, or linked.
(c) The relative balance of power exhibited by the respective 
parties in negotiation itself.
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(d) The nature of their respective stakes in the negotiation.
(e) The visibility of the transactions to others; that is, their overt 
or covert characters.
(f) The number and complexity of the issues negotiated.
(g) The clarity of legitimacy boundaries of the issues negotiated.
(h) The options to avoiding or discontinuing negotiation, that is,
the alternative modes of action perceived as available.
Strauss insists that a steady focus on both the structural and negotiation 
contexts is necessary. He suggests that researchers have tended to 
concentrate on only one of these and gives example of how the use of the 
paradigm would have improved studies by prompting researchers to fill out the 
other part of their case. He points out the counterbalancing effects which 
more stress on structural context has for studies which concentrate on the 
negotiating process as such. In particular he says "It helps in assessing what 
has been omitted or glossed over in the author's analysis, either because of the 
nature of the data or becase of his particular analytic scheme".
Another issue raised by Strauss in relation to the use of the paradigm is 
the extent to which researchers are aware of actors' assumptions about the 
negotiation process. In the examples which he uses there is a wide divergence 
of awareness. It  is clear that the psychiatrists and other professionals in his 
study of psychiatric wards had little  awareness. But one must assume that both 
the political and the legal case studies revolve round participants for whom such 
considerations were second nature.
Strauss quotes a review of negotiation by Zartman (1976) who identifies 
seven different schools of thought. Zartman says that these schools focus on 
particular interests;
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1) Pure historical description of particular negotiations.
2) Contextual study of the contents of negotiations. Particular 
outcomes are seen as determined by a particular phaseological 
interpretation either of the history of the negotiation itself, or 
of the larger phase of history into which the negotiation fits.
3) Structural. Explanation of outcomes is found in the patterns 
of relationships between parties or their goals.
4) Strategic. Focus is on the element of choice, as determined 
by the structure of the values at stake and also by the other 
parties' pattern of selection.
5) Developing personality types in order to explain negotiation 
outcomes.
6) Behavioural skills as explanations of the outcomes.
7) Process. Negotiation is viewed as a challenge-and-response 
encounter in which the moves are the inputs and negotiating is 
a learning process. Parties use their bids both to respond to 
the previous counteroffer and to influence the next. The 
offers themselves become an exercise in power.
Each of these schools has generated case studies in which negotiating is 
important. But each selects another key concept as its principal analytical 
concept.
In Part 1, Strauss traces some of the ways in which he considers that the 
negotiating process has not been seen to be important by researchers and has led 
them not to concentrate their attention on that process. He traces this lack of 
concern right back to Hobbes and Rousseau who do in fact postulate a form of
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social contract but simply assume some process will bring it into existence, but 
do not explore that process. However, the main thrust of Strauss' analysis of 
the neglect of negotiation in the literature is contained in Chapters 1 to 7 in 
which he takes the studies by Coffman, Blau, Gouldner, Banfield, Ricker, 
Coleman and Morse and attempts to describe the ways in which he believes that 
they have neglected negotiation in preference to other key concepts. 
Obviously, it  is impossible to review all that Strauss says which leads him to 
assert a need to give more emphasis to negotiation, but it is worth picking out 
some of the major points in one paper.
Strauss chooses to analyse Goffman (1961) "On the Characteristics of 
Total Institutions". The main thrust of Coffman's paper is that there exists a 
class of institutions (among them prisons, concentration camps and - to the 
consternation of many psychiatrists -  mental hospitals) in which relationships 
within them are primarily coercive. The principal actors in these dramas in the 
institutions are the staff and the inmates. Goffman concentrates on giving a 
social structural analysis of why people of different status act as they do. 
Strauss insists that Goffman does indeed recognise that inmates and staff are 
involved in relationships involving coercion, manipulation and negotiation. But 
Coffman's main argument is that every organisation has official expectations of 
what each participant owes it. Goffman goes on to recognise that there is a 
complete "underlife" behind and beyond these official expectations. He cites a 
vast array of clique relationships, having buddies, ways of influencing people to 
carry out your wishes and says "these underlie and stabilize a vast complex of 
unofficial, undercover practices". Strauss' main point is that, having recognised 
the existence of these factors, Goffman devotes only three pages out of one 
hundred and forty six to their analysis.
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Strauss argues that Goffman is too much influenced by sociological 
preconceptions concerned with the individual’s actions being at least framed, 
but more probably, structurally determined by their sociological setting. He 
suggests that Goffman does not notice his swinging backwards and forwards 
between the individual and his participant roles. In the final paragraph Strauss 
says:-
"But to return again to Goffman's substantive account of total 
institutions: In his analysis, the personnel are mainly acting, most of 
the time, to maintain the coercive order, and the inmates are either 
playing by the rules, both explicit and implicit, or acting around the 
margins of those rules. Their actions may or may not disrupt the 
ongoing order of events but certainly they do not, ultimately, shape 
anew the nature of social order of the total institution itself. Of 
course, we must readily agree that inmates must come to terms with 
institutional coercion - so must the coercive personnel, in their own 
way -  but we may disagree with Goffman about how they come to 
terms. We may wonder, too, whether they necessarily develop 
selves primarily in reaction against the coercive elements of the 
institution."
By these sorts of arguments and examples and from a variety of points of 
view put forward in his first eight chapters, Strauss makes the case that 
negotiation has not been recognised as being sufficiently important. But in 
some form, it is there in all studies. He goes on to argue for the centrality of 
the negotiating process and puts forward his own paradigm described above.
In Part 2, Strauss applies his negotiating paradigm to a wide variety of 
different case studies. I think that it is worth quoting the wide variety of 
circumstances in which Strauss sees the application of the paradigm -
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(a) Continuous Working Relations in Organisations:
Case: Experimental Psychiatric Wards
Case: Continuous Working Relations in Industrial Firms
. (b) Interplay of Legal and Illegal Negotiations in the Political
Arena:
Case: The Corrupt Judge
Case: Large-Scale Corruption - The Political Machine
(c) Building Co-operative Structures:
Case: Benelux: A Durable Structure
Case: The Nuremberg Trials: A Temporary Structure
(d) Negotiating Compromises Within Social Orders:
Case: Clan Intermarriage and Bridewealth Negotiations 
Case: Negotiation Between Insurance Companies and Claimants
(e) Antagonistic Negotiation Within Changing Structural Contexts:
Case: The United States and the Soviet Union:
Negotiating over the Balkans
Case: Kenya: Ethnic Negotiations
(f) Limits, Silent Bargains, and Implicit Negotiations:
Case: Geriatric Wards and the Silent Bargain
In order to illustrate Strauss' application of the paradigm, it is worth 
following one case study in detail, namely, Continuous Working Relationships in 
Industrial Firms.
This study by Strauss is based on Dalton (1959). During the 1950’s, 
organisational theory pictured industrial concerns as purposeful organisations, 
their policies determined from above and executed more or less rationally by
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the organisation below. Dalton's work spells out a picture of heterogeneity, 
clashing of group and individual purpose, people working at cross purposes and 
there being no sense of unified purpose.
The first thing Strauss does with the Dalton data is to establish a 
structural context. A quotation illustrates this -
"The structural context that bears on these negotiations includes at 
least the following major conditions: 'what everybody knows' about 
American industry and the marketplace, the existence of 
management-labour conflicts within such industries, the existence of 
labour unions, of their agreements with both through negotiation 
with management and through the passage of legislation, and the 
differential status and social class positions and careers or jobs of 
workers and managers."
Strauss then starts to identify the negotiating context in the following 
sorts of terms:-
- Many principal negotiators have repeated negotiation with each
other.
-  One or both negotiators represent others not present, but in fact
represent themselves additionally or instead.
Much negotiation is covert.
-  Ambiguity exists about the legitimate negotiating boundaries.
-  The stakes are different on both sides, though not necessarily
exclusive.
-  The balance of power is variable.
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- There are threats around if desirable outcomes cannot be
negotiated.
- There is no recourse to law or any other mediating force if
failure occurs -
-  But the manipulation of contingent events is often an alternative
or accompaniment of negotiation.
Within these two contexts, Strauss demonstrates a wide variety of 
negotiating stances and action from the Dalton data. At one extreme an
aggrieved person is withholding his union dues from a person who is supposed to 
sort out his problems and who has not lived up to expectations. I think that 
Strauss would relate this to the negotiating contexts concerned with the shifting 
power and the different stakes.
Strauss quotes another example concerning the movement of a day 
foreman:
"Because of their repeated negotiations and cumulative obligations, 
one party may have to work very hard in order to make some 
working arrangement actually "stick" with others who have different 
stakes in those negotiations. For example, a general foreman 
wanted to move a day foreman to the night shift and a night 
foreman to the day shift. But when told this by the general 
foreman, the latter went to the griever to cash in on obligations
owing to him from previous negotiations with the griever. The
griever agreed to counteract the agitation among the workers for 
rotation of shifts, which had been set in motion by the night shift
foreman, who himself wished to move to the day shift. Meanwhile
the general foreman suggested to the griever that a change might be
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good for everyone; the griever agreed but said nothing of his 
arrangement with the day foreman. The griever at first was 
unsuccessful in arguing against rotation with the workers, but 
eventually he succeeded in persuading the night workers and then 
won the general vote on the issue of rotation. The general foreman 
knew that he had been outsmarted but did not press the griever, who 
had previously helped him to obtain a vacation schedule that 
otherwise would have been difficult to get the workers to accept.
That last sentence underscores what Dalton has, quite properly, 
called the "web of commitments" that evolves as a consequence of 
these typically repeated, serial, and linked negotiations."
This is clearly an example of several of the negotiating contexts at work, in 
particular, the two concerned with repeated negotiations and covert 
negotiations.
In summarising his conclusion from this case study, Strauss comments that 
negotiated order seems to be a useful concept and he contrasts this with 
Dalton’s ideas in the following way:-
"In his attempt to conceptualize the structure of relationships within 
these establishments, Dalton leaned, it will be remembered on the 
cementing idea of 'informal relations'. His detailed analysis, 
however, is replete with such terms as the web of commitments and 
overt workable arrangements, which emphasise the continuous 
relationships required to get the organisations' and the men's work 
done. While there is no question at all that a full conceptualization 
of social order of these industrial plants would have to take into 
account such traditional items as hierarchy, authority, and the usual
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terms referred to in tables of organisation, it is also equally clear 
that Dalton's data and its detailed analysis lead one to view that 
social order as much more. These organisations may not be as 
quickly or radically changing as the psychiatric wards discussed 
earlier (those seemed to be changing right under the eyes of the 
researchers, month by month); the web of relationships that sustains 
the work is nevertheless changing continuously and in the most 
subtle, not to say often covert, ways. The term negotiated order 
does not capture everything about the social order of these 
factories, but it does go a very long way in suggesting some major 
features of order."
In putting forward his theory of negotiation, Strauss illustrates the wide 
variety of sets of concepts which can be made to revolve around this theme. 
The concepts used to describe the change process in this thesis is another such 
set. This theme of negotiation and the contexts suggested by Strauss have been 
used as a structure for this thesis.
The structure of the thesis
As stated above, the purpose of this thesis is to describe the role of a 
senior management services officer in one Regional Health Authority. That 
description consists of a model with two main parts. The first part is a set of 
categories which describe and typify the individual actions which the officer 
takes while the second part describes the way in which events which can be 
given those categories are fitted together in projects to bring about major 
changes in the organisation. This two part model provides a refined description 
of those parts of the role which can be described loosely as political or based on 
experience.
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There are other parts of management services work alongside which 
political activity and the use of experience must take place. For example, 
these other sorts of work include technical project work. In Chapter 2, and on 
the basis of my own experience, five models of management services work are 
put forward to illustrate some of these other aspects of management services. 
Not only do they illustrate other aspects of management services, they 
demonstrate a range of states of development in which it is possible to find 
management services organisations. For example, some management services 
departments are principally concerned with project evaluation which is the 
essence of one of the models. The first five models do not represent an in- 
depth analysis of our current understanding, but they are based on my own 
experience of the types of management services activity which can be found. 
The models in Chapter 2 illustrate some conceptions of management services 
which appear to be common at present. The sixth model is a very simple
version of the one to be developed in this thesis. On the basis of these models,
/
Chapter 2 starts to pinpoint the deficiencies of our present understanding of the 
role of a management services officer and to describe the issues with which this 
thesis attempts to deal.
As stated earlier in this chapter, the two parts of the Strauss paradigm, 
the structural and the negotiating contexts, provide two basic parts of this 
thesis. A structural context for the role of a management services officer in 
the NHS is the total set of organisational aspects of the NHS which affect the 
role. Part of that NHS organisational structure is the organisational structure 
created by legislation such as the existence of Regions, Areas and Districts. 
Another part is the particular interpretation of the official structure which 
exists in this Region. A third part is all of the informal organisational 
structure such as groups of people who eat and talk together regularly. In so
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far as management services brings about changes, it occurs within these 
structures which therefore constitute Strauss' structural context. This 
structural context is described in Chapter 3.
The second part of the Strauss paradigm is the negotiating context. This 
corresponds in this thesis to an analysis of the role of the management services 
officer which is viewed principally as negotiating a new order in the NHS. 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are that analysis. In Chapter 5, the individual events which 
made up the activity of a management services officer over a long period are 
analysed and categorised. In Chapter 6, a major project is analysed and an 
attempt is made to explain how events such as those explored in Chapter 5 are 
fitted together in that project. Chapter 7 is the heart of the model put 
forward in this thesis. In it, the categories developed in Chapter 5 are taken 
one by one and an attempt to describe their general characteristics is made. 
Chapter 7 also describes in general terms the process used to f it  together into 
projects individual events such as those given categories in Chapter 5. That 
general fitting together process is based on the actual examples contained in 
Chapter 6. Thus, in these three chapters, a general model of the role of a 
management services officer is developed on the basis of the analysis of real 
data on specific events and projects. An important characteristic of the model 
developed in this thesis is that it is truly grounded on specific actual 
experience.
Chapter 4 explains the analysis methods which are used to ensure that the 
model is a grounded theor^etical model. The chapter takes analysis methods, 
mainly those of Glazer and Strauss, and describes the way in which they have 
been used in Chapters 3, 6 and 7. The basic data used in the analysis is 
contained in two diaries in two appendices. Chapter 4 reviews the use of
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diaries for these purposes, especially the strengths and weaknesses of their uses, 
and the analysis methods which have been used on diaries.
Having explained the way the analysis has been done, and having 
developed the new model in the first seven chapters, the eighth chapter is an 
attempt to relate the work in this thesis to other published material in the same 
field. The comparisons made are confined to the narrow fields of political 
activity and categories developed on the basis of diaries.
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CHAPTER 2 - VARIOUS MODELS OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACTIVITY  
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to formulate a model of the parts of the role 
of a management services officer which are usually described as "political" and 
are based "on experience". Other parts of the role, such as using technical 
skills, are better understood. It  is useful to relate political activity to these 
better understood skills since one way of regarding political activity is as a 
cement which links the others together into useful coherent projects. The first 
five models of management services activity in this chapter are attempts to 
present these other, in the main, non-political skills coherently. The non­
political skills are put together in the first five models in a way that reflects 
the attitudes of management services officers towards the problems they solve, 
the people to whom they must relate and the organisation they must change, i.e. 
the Regional Health Authority. The deficiencies of the five are pointers to the 
parts of the change agent activity which a better model must seek to describe.
Model 6 in this chapter represents the first crude version of the model 
which this thesis attempts to develop. Based on the case study material 
contained in Chapters 5 and 6, Chapter 7 contains the description of the 
developed form of Model 6. Models 1 to 5 are descriptions of various forms of 
management services activity which I believe exist. Each model of this 
activity is described in terms of six variables which seem to go a considerable 
way towards explaining the significance and effectiveness of that particular 
activity for a change agent role. It  could be argued cogently that it is 
impossible to find actual departments corresponding to the five models. One 
reason is that, for the sake of clarity, the features have been charicatured.
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Whether pure examples of these models exist or not, I suggest that by looking at 
real departments with the models in mind, signficant explanations of major 
parts of the activity of those departments can be constructed. These models 
should be viewed in that light.
Ackoff has stimulated a discussion in the OR world concerned with the 
deficiencies of our understanding of how to change organisations, i.e. what is 
wrong with Models 1 to 5. Ackoff also puts forward a new paradigm for 
carrying out OR in large organisations. The chapter uses that discussion to 
clarify still further the problems which the model in Chapters 5 to 7 is seeking 
to alleviate.
Six models of management services activity
The six models of Management Services described in Figure 1 range from 
a very simple model to a very complex model. The first one which has been 
described as the Ivory Tower is one in which the Management Services 
organisation is completely technique orientated and regards the perfection of 
that technique and its use in a pure way as its role. The last one, model 6, 
attempts to start to describe a different sort of Management Services Division 
in which Management Services Officers seek to identify more closely with the 
officers and the organisation for whom they are working and to become fully 
involved in its corporate activity. The last model, number 6, can be found in 
many organisations and is the one which the RHA is attempting to operate. 
Most of the manifestations of that model which I know have leaders whose 
modus operandi is complex. That complexity is not well understood and is 
usually talked about in very general terms such as "experience" or "having a feel 
for the organisation". The major objective of this thesis is to explore some of 
the things which my Division currently does with a view to describing that
- 19 -
Ztlr “  ̂J
nil
I I I  
à s s l
 ̂ I







l :  =
J I
Si










I i-  J
ÎÎ
g g 1:1  
I g l . ‘
- 2-
I I -
l i f l
-g« ® -g -
-"ÎÏ
■ 8 I? o I














til & O 3
t i l
j l i
I i -ii 5  g s s
i i i i
î i l l
a I  e s
S i s  2
I 1 Î S
ii!i;
I P  M li  g  ̂  ̂ S-.S
I !i
i l l
1 E i  















I  I E Ï
s i  i s
-J2 =  g ^
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model more accurately. The thesis also tries to relate that model to the 
complex arguments about methodology and basic paradigms which are taking 
place at the present time in the operational research literature in particular. In 
that literature, the basic paradigm on which operational research has operated 
for a long number of years is being questioned very vigorously. Attempts are 
being made to replace it by a more suitable one. But even the models which 
are currently being discussed in the literature do not reflect the actual 
happenings in the type of Management Services Divisions which I would like to 
create. The models in the literature are still concerned essentially with a 
theoretical approach to doing management services jobs rather than the 
practice of doing those jobs.
In view of this division between what has been described in the literature 
and what actually happens in practice, it is unreasonable to expect to be able to 
describe the varieties of management service activity in a totally clear and 
logical way. Figure 1 sets out in an idealised way six different views of 
management services activity. Each can be observed in practice. Although the 
progression from Model 1 to 6 appears to suggest a development through 
consecutive stages to a more desirable state of affairs, any idea of a ncessarily 
consequential development through those stages or value judgements concerning 
the worth of divisions in particular states should be discarded. Figure 1 and the 
change in attributes between the models are set out in this way merely as a 
framework to facilitate the discussion of management services paradigms in 
this thesis.
Between the first and the last models contained in Figure 1, there are four 
other models of behaviour which can be observed in Management Services 
Divisions. The models in Figure 1 are not intended to define exhaustively all of
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the activities which can be found in Management Services Departments. They 
only seek to illustrate some of the main characteristics which can be detected 
among some Management Services Divisions in the country. Nevertheless, the 
main model characteristics which are described in the first row, are important 
ones and the differences between them reflect important differences in the 
behaviour of those organisations. It  has been useful to also try to illustrate the 
models by talking about the skills and attitudes which seem to prevail in each 
one of them. For both the skills and the attitudes, a useful differentiation can 
be made among the ways in which these are applied to the problems which are 
being solved, the people within the host organisation i.e. the total RHA and the 
parent organisation itself.
Model Characteristics
The essential characteristics described in the top row of Figure 1 change 
from a Management Services organisation which is completely "academic" and 
"detached" in its basic approach to one in which the Division is completely 
"involved" and "concerned" with the changes which it brings about in the parent 
organisation. In Model 1, which is called the Ivory Tower, the problem 
definition tends to get simplified into a form in which it is amenable to 
analytical or at least well defined methods of solution. There is a basic 
difference between that approach and that contained in Model 2 where there is 
an attempt to try to model more precisely the problem which exists. Most 
models of problems tend not to be amenable to analytical solutions and the use 
of more complex techniques such as simulation, error analysis and sensitivity 
analysis become important and much more common. Attempts to obtain a 
solution which will at least work in theory are a feature of the way in which the 
Model 2 Management Services people define and solve problems. However, the
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relationship of these Management Services officers to the organisation and to 
the people within it is still very detached on the whole.
Moving past the stage at which a reasonable problem definition is being 
provided for the user, the field of interest moves towards implementation of the 
solution. Model 3 describes the narrow implementation of solutions in areas 
which immediately surround the original problem area. Sometimes, these are 
very mechanistic implementations of solutions and provide only the lowest level 
training needed to get operators to work the solution. The fact that a 
particular solution of a limited problem has got immediate consequences for the 
larger organisation is ignored as being far too difficult a situation to deal with. 
One of the characteristics of these types of solution is that they tend not to be 
effective in the longer term or, if  they are to be effective, they need to be 
considerably modified, often by the users, when the effects of the solution 
outside the immediate area of application become apparent.
Model 4, the evaluators, moves along much further into a field in which 
the Management Services officers become involved with value judgements about 
whether or not the whole exercise is deemed to be valuable and worthwhile. 
There is a mechanistic level at which the question of value can be answered and 
the associated mechanistic methods concern the identification of specific 
benefits which are said to accrue from the solution. Those benefits are 
formulated in terms of cash benefits, benefits which can be directly measured 
in terms which can be understood by management, or in terms of variables said 
to measure the behaviour of the organisation, for example, attitude surveys. 
But the model does represent a very significant change in the direction of 
Management Services and that change is probably brought home to the full in 
Model 5, the solution architects. In this particular model, the solutions are 
carefully cemented into other management structures which exist within the
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parent organisation, so as to obtain a situation in which the solution is not only 
implemented but is thereafter continually monitored as part of the on-going 
management activity. The continuing realisation of the project’s benefits has 
become important. A t this stage the activities of the probem solvers have 
become quite complex and the implementation of solutions are exceedingly 
involved with the management organisation which can not only implement 
solutions but can keep them working thereafter and evaluate their performance.
An important characteristic of Models 1 to 5 which differentiate them 
from Model 6, the Corporate Innovators, is in the style in which the problems 
themselves come to be formulated in the first place. On the whole in Models 1 
to 5, the problem formulation depends on an analytical approach carried out by 
the Management Services Officer. In Model 6, a much more complex problem 
identification procedure and solution implementation has completely taken 
over. The corporate body of managers is much more responsible for identifying 
the problem, its possible range of solutions, the methods of solution, including 
inter-divisional groups which are to provide a solution, and the way in which 
they are going to restructure their own procedures to encompass that solution.
In order to explore these six models a little  more, the following three 
sections discuss the problem, people and organisation aspects of the models 
contained in the Figure. The discussion covers both the skills which are 
deployed and some of the attitudes which seem to be prevalent in the six types 
of management services activity.
Skills with and attitudes towards problems
The additions to the problem skills as one moves from Model 1 to Model 6 
are numerous. Even the change between the first two is marked. The
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difference between a neat, simple, analytical solution and one involving 
probabilities say in Model 2, especially if  the statistics concern the use of "real" 
data, is large. The set of technical skills associated with evaluation work is 
different from the problem solving technical skills. As the emphasis switches 
towards better implementation, the need for skills associated with people and 
the organisation described below starts to build up, but they must not be 
allowed to displace completely the skill to provide a "correct" technical 
solution.
The attitude change towards the problem is important and full of issues. 
It  may be that Model 1 over-values the technical problem definition and is 
prepared to make unwise compromises about reality in order to achieve that 
degree of definition. But it is also true that the deals and compromises 
inherent in Model 6 can destroy the value of the proposal. Model 2 probably 
presents the best statement of problem to be solved. Models 3, 4 and 5 all 
represent a need to compromise amongst sometimes conflicting attitudes 
towards problem definition, implementation and value judgements about what is 
worthwhile in any case. In particular, it is often true that implementation 
necessitates making compromises about the problem to be solved, and basic 
attitude changes are necessary if  the new sort of solution is to be made to work. 
Similarly, the change to the evaluation Model means that the value systems 
which underpin the work being done must be radically different.
In the last Model, number 6, the whole problem of who in the organisation 
is seeing the different facets of the problem, can make a radical difference to 
the problem which gets solved. The feasibility of a particular set of actions, 
the political atmosphere surrounding the situation and similar considerations, 
help to determine the problem to be solved also. Who owns the problem 
eventually can become a major issue. But, despite these influences, all of the
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skills involved in Models 1 to 5 ought to get carried forward into Model 6. For 
example, Model 6, to be effective must bebuilt on solid technical problem 
solving foundations, but these are not in themselves sufficient. Perhaps the 
most difficult set of attitudes about problems in this model concerns the 
willingness to make compromises among the different facets of problem solving 
other models, the ability to contemplate the possible outcomes of those 
compromises and the determination to push that set of possible outcomes to the 
lim it in order to bring about change.
Skills with and attitudes towards people
The people skills which are deployed in the six models show a similar 
development to those concerned with the problem above. At one extreme, 
ivory tower personnel can simply be nice ordinary people; while at the other 
extreme, their ivory tower can be used often to excuse appalling behaviour. On 
the other hand, a Model 6 operator needs to be very skillful with people.
A useful way of gaining understanding of the models of management 
services being discussed is to identify some of their negative characteristics and 
to try to compare the models from those viewpoints. Two such characteristics 
seem to me particularly important.
It seems almost inevitable that there is a mismatch between what change 
in organisational behaviour a Management Services Officer thinks is possible 
and the views of his customer. The first is accustomed to living with change, 
the second is less used to it. The frustration seen in Model 1 often arises from 
the intellectual arrogance and narrow world view which many ivory tower 
dwellers possess. For example, a mathematical demonstration that all the 
facilities and supply of raw materials exist to reach a given level of production 
is often accompanied by a lack of understanding of the difficulties of achieving
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those production levels in practice. At the other extreme, Management 
Services Officers who have a good grasp of the basic elements of managing 
people in a change process can become very angry in private about the lack of 
management skill which seems to characterise senior managers who are their 
customers, and who are often highly paid in comparison with themselves. It  is 
common for line managers not to have time to learn modern basic skills 
required for their own job. For example, few capital project managers have 
even an elementary grasp of the use of PERT for capital project control. This 
frustration disappears slowly, if  ever, to be replaced by an acceptance of people 
as they are.
The other problem which seems worth identifying in a discussion of these 
models is the clash of basic value systems which can destroy completely the 
fruits of good project work. The difference in value system between a medical 
and a lay administrator illustrates the point. Whereas a lay administrator will 
set great store on the orderliness of a particular management arrangement in 
bureaucratic terms, a medical administrator will tend to see any new 
arrangement from the traditional medical freedom and power viewpoint. Both 
value systems may clash with the efficiency viewpoint of management services. 
For example, the control of drug usage is a classical case of this conflict. The 
three viewpoints are manifestly incompatible and the various forays into this 
particular field, even when backed by high powered individuals or groups, 
achieve very little .
The development of skills with people as one passes through the Models 
shows the sort of development one would expect. Greater involvement with 
real change means involvement with people. Thus the abilities to train, 
motivate, negotiate and the whole range of inter-personal skills come into play
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sooner or later. Perhaps the one characteristic of management services 
projects is the high degree of training skill which is involved. Model 5 depends 
on very high quality training in systematic management for a successful 
outcome.
Skill used in dealing with and attitudes towards the functioning of the 
organisation
The relationship of Management Services Officers operating the first five 
models to the organisation shows the same sort of development as does their 
relationships with people and problems. That development reflects the dawning 
realisation that in order to implement change in a complex bureaucratic 
organisation, a considerable amount of social engineering is required, i.e. a 
complex relationship with the organisation, its people and its structures must be 
built. Again, it is characteristic of the development of that relationship that 
there are stages within it when frustration is very deeply fe lt. It  seems to be a 
feature of Management Services organisations and their becoming more 
involved with the people outside its own boundaries, that they grapple with that 
involvement problem in a comparatively naive way. For example, they do not 
study the problem of effectiveness and their relationship with their own parent 
organisation using their own problem solving techniques. A characteristic of 
the development of the relationship with the organisation is the growing 
knowledge of how the formal and informal structures within the organisation 
can actually be made to work. The growing appreciation of the power, window 
dressing, status, and the many other facets of various committees, groups and 
other parts of the structure with which one has to deal is part of that process. 
Another important change which occurs alongside both of the people and the 
organisation rows in Figure 1, is the change from an interest in the problem
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formulation to a determination to get things done. That development can be 
seen in the columns of the Model but it is a most difficult thing to describe in 
detail.
One of the characteristics of the work done in this research project is to 
examine the nature of the end product of the changes described in Figure 1. 
Model 6, the corporate innovators, is described in the table using terms which 
lack precision such as trusting relationships. Trust relationships among groups 
of people can be talked about easily but to actually construct them within an 
organisation in which differing value systems motivate people to move apart 
from each other is a very different thing from talking about them. Trusting 
relationships (Golembiewski 1976) are important and are reviewed in Chapter 7. 
Actually understanding what value systems exist in the organisation and how 
they differ fundamentally from the ones which apply within the Management 
Services Division is complex. It  often relies on being able to wonder how a 
certain person became what he is and to piece together an explanation of that 
process and its result. That understanding can transform the customer's set of 
obdurate stances and the operation of seemingly senseless value systems into 
ones which make sense. Knowing that there are informal methods of getting 
things done and knowing that 'front stage' negotiation is not usually a good thing 
to do is completely different in kind from being able to use that knowledge. 
Even knowing what are the real informal routes for getting things done and 
where the power lies within the organisation, can be quite complex. The ability 
to have open discussions with other senior officers is a subject which is talked 
about at length and not achieved very often. To describe these skills in general 
terms is not very useful. What appears to be needed is a framework which can 
be used to structure the activities of senior managers as they try to operate as 
change agents in this way.
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Examples of the models of management services activity
A perfect example of Model 1 is the collection of papers published on 
queuing theory, for example. The Economic Service Rate, W K Grassman (1978). 
The paper considers the problem of finding an optimal or economic service rate 
in queues regarded as a birth and death process. Various costs and the revenue 
gained from each customer are considered and it presents graphs which aid the 
solution of the problem. The paper compares similar explorations of the same 
problem from somewhat different viewpoints which have been presented 
elsewhere. The paper is in an applied research journal, but it actually consists 
mostly of applied mathematics. Generalisations are suspect, but most queues 
in business tend not to conform to the underlying birth/death model in this 
paper. In particular, shift changes and similar features disrupt arrival and 
service patterns in a systematic way. Managers must re-arrange the order of 
items in queues to serve their important customers. The relevance of advanced 
queuing models to such situations is very questionable.
An excellent example of Model 2 is a paper given at the 1960 Oslo OR 
Conference by K D Tocher and G Guest. It  concerns a complex simulation of 
the flow of steel through a steel plant and attached to the plant model was a 
simulated set of heuristic control algorithms, the purpose of which was to 
increase throughput. The superiority of the simulated control over the existing 
managers was demonstrated by an equally complex gaming model which allowed 
managers to control the flow of the same lot of steel through the plant model 
and this they did. The problem and solution definition was very good, but the 
work, which consumed many years of effort, was not implemented.
Examples of narrow solution implentors are many. One of the most 
common must be the narrow use made of payroll data bases. That information
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data base has considerable potential for manpower planning and control. And 
yet, for example in the NHS, the preparation of plans depends on the tedious 
and costly manual extraction of manpower data from payroll computer print 
outs designed for other purposes. This is only a small part of the problem of 
attempting to relate together all of the major computing systems in the NHS, 
for example, payroll, accounting, patient care activity statistics as well as 
manpower data. The drawbacks of the lack of integrated design concepts were 
known at least a decade ago, and yet no effective action has been taken to 
rectify the problems created by narrow implementation. And the attitude still 
persists.
Examples of Model 4 evaluation activities can be found in most 
management services papers, since one of the principle reasons for many of the 
projects is a "saving" of some sort. It  is important to note that there is an 
almost continuous tension between the accountants who claim to be expert in 
this field and the OR scientists about the basis for this type of work. The 
principle arguments seem to be about what type of costs are appropriate to the 
different calculations, M F Cantley (1979). This paper is a plea for better 
understanding by accountants and OR scientists of each others approaches to 
basic money calculations. For example, different attitudes towards set up 
costs and inventory holding costs are explained. One of the regular areas of 
disagreement is the use of marginal costs, an example of which has been the 
pricing of steel on the over-supplied export markets. Private paper. Cost Model 
(1968). In the NHS, the best example of evaluation work is that concerned with 
the National Experimental Computer Programme. This is still the basis of 
much work. Handbook for the Measurement of Performance Criteria, Head 
Office (1979). It  purports to be a detailed set of methods for calculating the 
benefits which a Health Authority can obtain from a whole set of computer
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control routines for running hospitals.
Examples of the Monitored Solution Architect's work are harder to find. 
A prime example in the work of the Division is the control of catering standards 
throughout the Region, Catering Monitoring Programme, RHA (1978). Catering 
has been split into eight main areas of concern, e.g. waste. Detailed objectives 
and standards have now been set. For another aspect of catering, patient 
services, there are over a hundred aspects of serving meals to patients which 
have been identified and for which an acceptable practice has been agreed. A 
whole method of measuring performance has been created, comprehensive 
training programmes for all staff in each aspect of their work exists and 
managers throughout the Region have been trained and appear to be motivated 
to make this work. The management must report performance to their 
Authorities in a prescribed manner and levels of performance are being raised. 
There is no doubt that the whole system was built into the very structure of 
power and authority at all levels in the Region.
Another example, Doyle and Fenwick (1979) concerns the development and 
monitoring of the network of local bank branches. Again the performance 
variables, e.g. number of personal accounts, and the control variables, e.g. 
location features, are identified and a relationship model established between 
them. On the basis of this model managers can define and monitor
performance objectives for each branch and the network as a whole.
Model 6, the corporate innovators, presents many more problems for the 
person seeking to provide a description. The literature tends to deal with 
particular and fairly narrow aspects of this type of work but does not seem to 
try to deal with the process of changing practices in a large complex 
organisation. For example, in the above banking project it must have been very
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difficult to negotiate the required change with the hundred and eighty branch 
managers. The stereotype of a local bank manager suggests a person of 
extremely conservative nature. A tantalizing set of unanswered questions 
surrounds these negotiations and the author does not appear to wish to provide 
those answers. If  the process is discussed, then it seems to take place in a 
somewhat theoretical way rather than be based on ordinary actual experience. 
The best developed example of that type of discussion is occurring in the OR 
world at the present time and important contributions to the JORS, Ackoff 
(1979) have served to crystalise the debate.
Some difficulties associated with Model 6
In theory, the basic paradigm underlying OR work has been clear for a 
long time and is printed in every copy of the Journal of the OR Society.
"Operational Research is the application of the methods of science 
to complex problems arising in the direction and management of 
large systems of men, machines, materials and money in industry, 
business, government, and defence. The distinctive approach is to 
develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating 
measurements of factors such as chance and risk, with which to 
predict and compare the outcomes of alternative decisions, 
strategies or controls. The purpose is to help management 
determine its policy and actions scientifically."
It  states that analysis leads on to the formulation of a model on the basis of 
which predications about the future can be made and from those predications a 
solution is chosen and implemented. Ackoff suggests that this "predict and 
prepare" position should be replaced by "designing a desirable future and 
inventing ways of bring is about". From the point of view of this thesis, the 
most important parts of the papers concern the change in process for doing OR 
that is entailed. For the first paradigm a machine age mechanistic set of
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attitudes is appropriate. But, for the second, recognition of the "mess" with 
which managers deal, and in particular, the effects of that "mess" on processes 
designed to bring about changes and improvements, becomes important. Ackoff 
describes in vivid terms the way in which the analytical tools, in the main 
pieces of applied mathematics, have come to be taught as straight techniques in 
colleges and universities and, in that process, OR has become essentially 
unidisciplinary, i.e. the OR discipline. He argues that this, and other factors 
have had the effect of changing the involvement in and the approach to the 
problem which the customer wishes to be solved. The machine age, 
reductionist OR man cannot cope with a "mess".
The second Ackoff paper describes various facets of designing a more 
desirable future, i.e. how to cope with a "mess", in a word, planning. It  
develops the idea of a five step interactive planning process.
formulating the mess
selecting organisational goals, objectives and ideals and the
means of pursuing them
providing the resources required by the pursuit
implementing and controlling it.
/
The hallmark of this planning is participation by those for whom the plan is 
being made and the whole process is a development of ideas already published, 
Ackoff (1970).
Ackoff then goes on to suggest changes in the practice of OR, the way 
education for OR should change and the way in which its professional society 
should function in order to support this new activity. He goes on to describe
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the way in which this type of approach has been realised in the Busch Centre in 
which Ackoff works.
There is no doubt that the Ackoff papers represent a simulating challenge 
to existing OR methodology and practice. But the reaction of the OR world to 
them has been cautious. This was exemplified by a Seminar at Bath University 
which took the Ackoff papers as its theme. Many aspects of the approach were 
discussed but, the theme important to this thesis concerns the necessary types 
of skill used to bring about change. Two particular points were made. First, 
despite the fact that a major theme of the Ackoff papers is that the machine 
age analytical approach had severe drawbacks, it was defended strongly. 
Second, whilst acknowledging that implementation did depend on "political" 
skills, there was a marked reluctance to analyse those skills. Experience or 
personal native wit were deemed to be the main, if  not the only, prescriptions 
for success. It  would be wrong to say that the Ackoff papers dismiss those 
aspects of practice based on the new paradigm with the same ease as the 
Seminar appeared to do. Ackoff identifies six aspects of his interactive 
planning process which come near to discussing the skills to be used:
participation by the stakeholders
incorporation of the aesthetic values of stakeholders
generating a concensus among participants
releasing creativity and focussing it on the development of the 
organisation
mobilising the crusading spirit of participants 
expanding the participants concept of feasibility.
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These six points demonstrate a fundamental characteristic of the papers, 
optimism and the paper describes the process as being "fun". Obviously Ackoff 
would have much to say about the serious business of negotiating change but he 
does not do this in the paper. But lying beneath these differing views on the 
nature of the change process lies an important problem and there appears to be 
a gap in the literature. What are the set of processes which facilitate change 
and how do senior OR managers operate day by day to bring about change ?
Summary
The main aim of this chapter has been to discuss the deficiencies of our 
present understanding of the role of a management services officer in the NHS. 
Five models of our present understanding have been given and a crude version of 
a sixth, the one to be developed in this thesis, has been put forward. A major 
characteristic of the first five models is that they place great reliance on 
analytical techniques and tend to undervalue or not represent at all the political 
skills needed to make project work effective. The above discussion which uses 
the Ackoff debate about management messes as a central theme suggests that 
insufficient attention has been given to understanding and modelling the actual 
activity of change agents. It  is still common to use very theoretical models of 
how to change big organisations and such models seem to be inadequate.
The sixth model is the main concern of this thesis. The research is based 
on the idea of refining Model 6 by answering the question "What do management 
services people actually do ?". The approach depends on the ideas of Glaser 
and Strauss (1976) in their book, "The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Strategies 
for Qualitative Research". The way in which the research has been done is 
described in the next chapter. The research seeks to describe more fully the
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actual processes involved in applying Model 6 above - "The Corporate Activist", 
It attempts to base that description firmly on what actually happened over a 
long period of time and to synthesise the categories used in that description 
from a detailed record of the actual experience. The research attempts, 
although to some extent it must fail, to ignore preconceived and existing models 
of what "ought" to be happening.
In the next chapter, there is an attempt to describe the context within 
which NHS management services people must work. As explained in Chapter 1, 
these NHS structures are equivalent to the structural context of the Strauss 
paradigm. That structural context influences greatly what a change agent can 
attempt to do. The description of the NHS structures in Chapter 3 has 
therefore an important influence on the role of a management services officer.
Following that description of the structural context in Chapter 3, 
Chapters 4 to 7 take up the development of Model 6. Chapter 4 describes the 
development methods to be used. Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies. Chapter 7 
is the general statement of Model 6, in so far as it has been possible to develop 
it in this thesis and is based on data from the case studies.
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CHAPTER 3 - NHS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AND THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO MANAGEMENT SERVICES
Introduction
The Strauss paradigm in Chapter 1 requires one to describe a structural 
context for the management services processes being investigated. That 
context consists of the regional organisation surrounding change agents. Model 
6 from Chapter 2 is also greatly influenced by that organisation. This chapter 
attempts to meet both of these needs for a full description of the NHS 
management structures.
The major part of this Chapter is a description of the NHS management 
organisation as set up by Acts of Parliament. Each Region has interpreted 
those Acts in a slightly different way and so some understanding of the local 
implementation of the Acts is necessary. Other major influences on change 
concern certain basic attitudes which types of individuals and groups exhibit and 
so these informal aspects of management need to be borne in mind. In order to 
complete this picture of the customer for management services, a very brief 
account of the geography of the Region and its major client services have been 
included.
The official NHS management structures
The NHS was established by Act of Parliament. Not only was it 
established and reformed in this way, health and related subjects have been the 
subject of fairly plentiful legislation since 1800. Apart from setting out the 
major parts of the organisation within which NHS officers must work, its legal 
framework means that it is impossible to suggest certain sorts of development 
common in industry, because they are precluded by law. Thus, the basic 
functions of the various levels of administration are fixed and it matters little
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whether they contribute to or detract from efficiency. Whether or not it is 
efficient to process a birth registration as it is now done is irrelevant, it is the 
law, and maternity hospitals must comply with it. There are many such cases 
of the NHS being constrained not only at a policy level but also at the detailed 
level in the way in which it can or cannot perform a particular function. One 
of the basic rules for carrying out management services work is that problems 
should be looked at in their entirety if  at all possible, similarly, solutions should 
not be constrained unnecessarily. Unlike other public and nationalised bodies, 
it can be argued that the framework of law, and in particular the present 
interpretation of that law by DHSS, precludes fundamental change and thus 
restricts the change process.
One of the main effects of the various Acts of Parliament relating to 
health matters is to set down the basic structure of the Department of Health 
and Social Security, Region and Area, including Districts, within which the 
service must work. That structure is shown in Figure 2. Among other things, 
that structure influences management changes since it establishes the line 
relationships which exist and, of equal significance, those which do not. Line 
relationships exist from the Secretary of State to the actual Authority 
consisting of Members at Region, and from the Regional Authority to the Area 
Authorities in that Region. Officers at all levels are responsible through an 
appropriate officer management structure to their own Authority or Secretary 
of State only. Area and District officers are separately responsible to Area 
Authorities. Officers at one level are in no sense responsible to officers at 
another level. From a Management Services project point of view this means 
that obtaining terms of reference or implementing work can involve incredibly 
complicated sets of negotiations across these boundaries. Even if  one 
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in these days the health service structures do not help the process of change. 
Most projects do actually spread across the Authority boundaries at some stage 
in their development, whether they be policy projects or operational systems. 
A project connected with policy will almost always impinge on the operational 
service eventually and it will be the job of management services to negotiate 
both the policy and its consequences. Similarly, projects at the operational 
level often impinge on policy of some sort and the effect on that policy must be 
negotiated through the higher tiers of management.
While line relationships between similar officers at different levels do not 
exist, the functions which they perform overlap considerably. In a sense, the 
functions of DHSS, Region and Area, including District, are all planning and 
monitoring progress against plans, the difference being that they are working on 
different timescales. Thus, although DHSS is almost completely a policy body, 
or should be, any DHSS policy statement ricochets through all of the levels, 
even in its formative stages. The Region is also a policy and planning body but 
there again its work cannot be independent of DHSS or Area. Just as the lack 
of line relationships between levels adds to the difficulty of undertaking change, 
the confusion of roles among levels adds to the difficulty of negotiating changes 
in any project. The best example of this confusion concerns Strategic Planning. 
Both Region and Area prepare such plans but the ways in which these two plans 
f it  together is ill-defined and leads to conflict.
Because the Regional and Area levels have independent officer structures, 
the firm decision on a major change can become one at Authority level quite 
rapidly. Authorities are lay member bodies which tend to meet at most bi­
monthly and, as such, their decision making is slow and at a fairly high level. 
Members tend to be active on one or two fronts only, with only the Chairman of
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the Authority taking an overall interest. But the interest which an Authority 
takes in a particular piece of work will always have its unexpected side. Thus, 
even a relatively technical piece of work of a fairly straightforward nature will 
require careful consideration if it is at all likely to find its way to the 
Authority.
The structure which exists below both the Member Authorities splits 
immediately into the professional interest groups, medical, nursing,
administrative, treasurers and works. The same split is reflected in an even
more complex form in DHSS. Each function reports separately to the 
Authority. Within Area, even the reporting of the same professional groups at 
Area and District is split. Within the medical function, most senior people are 
of consultant status and enjoy the appropriate degree of independence. 
Although these various disciplines join together in consensus teams, the most 
important being the Regional Team of Officers, Area Team of Officers and 
District Management Team, official resolution of problems if  no consensus 
agreement exists can occur at Authority level only. The pressure on officers to 
find agreement is great, but that process can be slow. For management 
services projects, the need to get the different disciplines all to agree to change 
and the need to get the support of consensus groups complicates project
negotiations.
Apart from being clearly differentiated in the management structure, 
both the medical and nursing groups have representatives on advisory groups 
which report directly to the Authorities. Their advice is usually in the form of 
collective wisdom and it would be rare for them to be involved in their own 
project work, although they would almost invariably comment on other people’s 
work if  it were sufficiently important. These advisory groups are influential
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and, in addition to their official communication routes with the Authority, 
usually have at their disposal the most effective influencing channels in the 
Service. For example, their members often have direct access to or are 
themselves authority members. The effect of these groups on any piece of 
work must be taken into account for any management services project.
Clinical freedom must be included in any review of the official 
management structures, although at first glance this may seem odd. Various 
aspects of the relationship of the clinician with his patient are part of the law 
and the clinician is held responsible in the courts for some parts of his practice. 
Clinical freedom is the fundamental basis on which practitioners will often base 
their objection to particular changes in their way of working. It  would be rare 
for a management services project to founder on this rock in its final stages, 
but it is almost certain that any project will have been greatly influenced by 
these sorts of considerations in its formative stages.
A simplistic view of management services activity might be:
(a) obtaining project work from customers
(b) carrying out the necessary studies or other work 
and (c) implementing the results.
Management structure is important in that it determines formally who has the 
right and power to commission projects and to change things. That is not to 
say that the only or the most effective way of introducing change is through 
these structures. It is true that if  a part of the organisation has not played its 
'rightful' part in any change process, then the risks of some destructive and 
possibly cataclysmic intervention by that part at a late period in the work of 
the project has increased. Therefore, a reasonably full understanding of these
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structures is essential if the full working through of a project is to be 
understood. Within the official structure described above, each Region has set 
up a local structure and it is necessary to understand that local situation and its 
effects on management services.
The regional interpretation of the official management structures
Within the outlines laid down in the Grey Book (Management 
Arrangements for the Reorganised National Health Service) each Region has 
had freedom to create organisations which seemed to it best. In Wessex these 
were set down in the Blue Book, as it is known locally. Each Chief Officer has 
a set of officers responsible to him and for the most part, these come from his 
own discipline. Under each Chief Officer, there are divisions, there being two 
responsible to the Treasurer, three to the Works Officer and four to the 
Administrator. The Administrative Divisions of Personnel, Planning, 
Management Services and Secretariat provide the main support to doctors and 
nurses, there being only very small numbers of doctors and nurses at HQ. Most 
HQ projects spread across not only the administrative divisions but the others 
also. Most project work is done by the less senior people in the Divisions. For 
example, the technical methods to be used in the 1979 Strategic Plan have been 
developed by a team from all divisions led by the Regional OR Officer. This 
inter-departmental team was a new departure for the RHA and was an attempt 
to overcome a strong tendency for issues to be given to one Division only, or 
even worse for them to be followed up by different Divisions or groups 
completely independently but for exactly the same purpose. The divisional 
structures means that for any project, management services must be careful to 
get all of the appropriate people involved at an early stage, no matter where 
the work originated.
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Each Chief Officer meets his own subordinates at regular intervals, in the 
case of administration once a fortnight. On the alternate week, the Heads of 
Administrative Divisions meet as a co-ordinating group with the major purpose 
of making sure that we have not each been asked to do the same thing and to 
discuss what is going on. These meetings are of key importance since as a 
group of four we decide what issues must be sorted out and this usually means, 
what people have got to be sorted out. The meeting is informal, full of soft 
information and can often have an important effect on most issues. Soft 
information includes rumours, how people fe lt that a particular suggestion had 
been received, what troubles projects have run into that is not yet common 
knowledge and similar pieces of intelligence. Their other important function is 
to decide what matters get pursued vigorously with the Regional Administrator. 
Heads of Division, as it is called, must talk about all management services 
projects since this is a prime way of determining whether or not the projects 
are heading for trouble. No high level multidisciplinary group made up of 
doctors, nurses, administrators and treasurers exist and this is an important 
feature of the RHA.
The other important group in HQ is ’D' Group. Originally, this was only 
the divisional meeting of the Development Division but, since planning has 
always been an important and established part of Region's work and since 'D' 
Group came into existence long before any other, it attracts to itself all sorts 
of activity. It  is also important because it is carefully administered and 
agendas, minutes and so on exist. In the case of the other divisions, their 
meetings are strictly private and fairly informal affairs. 'D' Group is inter­
disciplinary and this gives it an edge since it is the only truly inter-disciplinary 
group that functions continuously on site. Its importance to management
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services is that many major projects will find their way through ’D' Group 
eventually.
The business of HQ and other headquarter sites, e.g. Blood Transfusion 
Service, is co-ordinated by the Headquarters Management Team (HMT) and 
there is continuous conflict between the RTO and HMT. The main, but not the 
only, reason for this is that the RTO will change the plans constructed by the 
HMT without considering the wider consequences of the change. Thus, for 
example, additional capital from outside the budget, must be found for an RTO 
favoured project such as a computer terminal for Treasurers. HMT's 
importance to management service work is not great, but it can on occasion be 
crucial, for example, in battles for facilities or space.
Apart from the recognised groups, at any particular time there will be in 
HQ many groups meeting on particular topics. Some of these groups will be 
recognised by the RHA. Most of them will have no structured impact on the 
work of management services whatsoever, but in a random sort of way, each 
can go down paths which affect management services interests. It  is highly 
probable that any such group will call for information at some stage and that 
means work for Statistics Department. Much more time consuming will be the 
fact that the group often does not know what to do with the information when it 
receives it. In a similar way, groups are liable to raise a wide variety of 
management issues and problems and, through lack of appropriate advice or 
guidance, suggest some odd ways of tackling them. For example, officers 
outside management services may not know that a computer system exists 
which will provide information of a given type and will put forward complex 
methods of getting it from districts. That must be corrected. Information 
about the way people in such groups are thinking, as well as hard fact about
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what is going on in such groups in general is vital to running the Management 
Services Division.
One of the features of HQ is that project work and, often, detailed 
knowledge about any subject starts at the third level down in the staff 
organisation. It is imperative that one recognises the need to talk to the person 
near to the action when formulating projects and implementing results. It  is 
also important to recognise that this is where the power of the RHA to do work 
lies and it needs to be carefully nurtured. Management services project work 
relies on the co-operation of these third level officers.
One of the features of the present HQ organisation is the difference in 
level of sheer technical expertise which there is between management services 
and other Divisions. Apart from management services, the basic training of 
the other parts of HQ, except Works, is administration, with relatively simple 
and established technology as a sideline. Only Management Services 
understands and can use much of the new management technology such as 
computers. This is a dangerous situation and I spend a great deal of time 
reassuring people and slowly teaching them different ways of working and 
behaving. Old fashioned administration, such as keeping good files and dealing 
with committees is still highly regarded, much more so than new management 
skills. Some of the rest of the RHA believe that management services officers 
ought to want to excel in this sort of field, and the fact that I do not value such 
skills above those of my own people can cause tension. A balance must be 
struck between remaining acceptable to the rest of the RHA while at the same 
time remaining a strong advocate of the new technologies.
The last point to make about the local structure is that their complexity 
adds to the communication problem. NHS objectives as such really do not
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exist, but are replaced by a whole series of sub-objectives, each hungry for 
resources and each backed by its own followers. Even on a fairly simple 
project, one can guarantee that, having succeeded in limiting the brief to 
something which we believe can be handled, then the whole process of making 
sure that people know what you intend to do and what expectations they must 
not entertain, can be most difficult. One of the important features of the 
research described below is the negotiation of order in project work.
The divisional structures
In most organisations such as the RHA, a quite specific operational role 
for it exists. The Regional tier of the National Health Service is peculiar in 
this respect since must of the operational services to patients are managed by 
the Districts. The Regional headquarters sees its role in terms of development 
mainly and one of its main Divisions is a Development Division for the whole of 
the Region. The Development Division provides a capital development, i.e. 
mainly building, and a service planning function. But the other main Divisions 
in the RHA also see themselves as having a development role and being 
responsible for planning the future rather than managing the present. For 
example, most of the work of the Personnel Division is concerned with the 
formulation of future Regionwide policies in the personnel field. In these 
circumstances, the introduction of new management ideas into the working of 
the NHS throughout the Region tends to become a set of integrated exercises in 
which all of the Divisions are playing a part. The contribution to this process 
by the various Divisions is a reflection of the skills possessed by their top 
managers, e.g. participative learning from the Training Department. In effect, 
it is the Head of Division who chooses to develop particular parts of the service 
which his Division offers. In 1974, the Heads of Divisions were all new in their
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posts and this removed many of the historically entrenched attitudes towards 
the division of work. Combined with the ability of Heads of Divisions to choose 
their roles and their wish to introduce new roles, this removal of many 
historical precedents has made it possible to fashion a new pattern of Divisional 
roles at the RHA. In the early days of the RHA, and to some extent ever since 
that time, the various Divisions negotiated their own particular contributions to 
the management of the Region. Thus, the role of Management Services 
Division has been determined by myself in that negotiation and I was able to 
make and carry through quite specific choices.
The change agent role of Management Services Division at Regional 
headquarters has been formulated only in general terms by the RHA. Those 
general statements concern the provision of various types of services which are 
thought to be part of the Management Services function. For example, there is 
a specific objective to provide an O & M service to the RTO and to advice 
members of the RTO and to advise members of the RTO on the development of 
that function throughout the Region. This definition by the RHA of the 
purpose of Management Services never gives any detailed specification of the 
type of work to be done. Another mechanism, the promulgation of national 
policy, has defined two work areas, participation in the national standard 
computer programme and the introductionof incentive bonus schemes. Such 
other definitions as exist have consisted of lists of tasks which the Division 
itself proposed to undertake during a specific year. Some of those tasks have 
been fairly general in their nature whilst others have been quite specific. Thus, 
the RHA's definition of what it  requires of Management Services is very broad 
indeed but that definition has been supplemented by task lists which cover most 
of the work to be undertaken using the resources which the Division possesses.
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Management services projects involve change to existing procedures and 
the operators of the systems are at the third and lower tiers in the organisation. 
These tiers lie within the divisions and, for the most part, a strict 
compartmentalisation of the RHA is operative at this level. The compartments 
are the departments which exist within Divisions and Figure 3 gives details.
The Medical Division tends to work by outposting its officers to 
administrative divisions and the same is true of some Nursing Officers.
Doctors and nurses advise teams of various types on planning and one doctor is 
attached to Management Services. It  is only very recently that officers from 
several divisions have been put into a team nominally under the "control” of one 
officer. This was for the production of the 1979 Strategic Planning Methods 
and the Plan. But this is a rare event and cut right across established methods 
of working. In general, it would be true to say that most project work is done 
using the head of the department i f  not the division or chief officer as the 
means of discussing the work to be done.
There are several officers in the RHA who can have considerable
influence on project work and who are not attached to Divisions. These are:
The Regional Scientific Officer 
The Regional Supplies Officer 
The Regional Ambulance Officer 
The Regional Pharmaceutical Officer
All are attached to some chief officer. In some management services projects 
these officers are key participants.
Despite the fact that Region is nominally primarily a planning
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developments such as management service projects, most of the divisions have a 
great deal of operational activity concerned with running the service. Below it 
is suggested that the business of the NHS is much more complex than that of 
other organisations. Much of that work has a random nature because the NHS 
is basically a responding service. MPs, local situations and many other factors 
disturb the ordered working of HQ. The divisions provide the basic response to 
these "random" disturbances and development work takes second place to these 
disturbances.
Divisions tend to become established in their way as time passes and the 
opportunity to change gets more difficult to find. Management services work 
often demands quite radical organisational changes. It becomes especially 
difficult to find homes for new activities if  no precedent exists. Such is the 
case for monitoring which, apart from being slightly distasteful in any case, was 
not mentioned in any definitive way in the Grey Book. It  is proving difficult to 
determine what division should manage the RHA monitoring activity. The 
same was the case with networks for capital project control.
One problem for management services in the labyrinth of divisional 
structures is where to try to make and maintain contacts for any project. It is 
too costly to cover all interested parties, yet not to do so can alienate people 
whose co-operation will be required in the future.
Informal parts of management
Despite the richness of the recognised structure, the unrecognised parts of 
the structure are probably the most vital parts. Work scheduling meetings are 
occurring all the time and these mesh together to give progress. That meshing 
together involves all sorts of deals between groups and individuals and "deals" is 
the right word. Pressure is exerted, user requirements are relaxed, law is laid
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down and so on, and so on. Each department tries to organise its own "patch", 
and when satisfied, sends out emissaries to negotiate. In general, work slips 
around within timetables set by senior managers. But in this loosely controlled 
situation it is the unofficial structure which really decides what work can 
actually get done. This applies just as much to management service projects as 
to any other.
Apart from the work scheduling group and person to person contact, much 
important work is done in what might appear to be "social calls" or "over lunch". 
It  is necessary to break up the "whiz kid" image of the technical management 
services officer. If, during coffee after lunch these management services whiz 
kids are seen to talk about car repairs or decorating, they recapture something 
of their human face in so doing and become more approachable. Also, sipping 
coffee, looking very like an ordinary human being, is often the best position 
from which to try to persuade customers to accept new ideas. Managers meet 
other Divisional Heads over lunch as well and can obtain friendly advice given 
by someone with a different point of view. Such activity is often powerful in 
the fight to persuade people to support a management services approach.
Another important aspect of this unofficial activity is its ability to 
circumvent status problems. Front stage performances in which medical 
officers lose face to a management services officer do not help, no matter how 
gentle the encounter. It  is often in the low key private session where the 
actual stumbling blocks can be explored.
O fficial methods determined by set procedures or a senior officer decision 
are supposed to deal with most issues. But issues float away from such 
procedures very easily and it is common to find them being dealt with in 
unexpected ways. One reason is the practice of "confetti" management by
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chief officers - "scattering" the issue or parts of it like confetti across the 
organisation in an unco-ordinated way. The principle of "confetti" management 
appears to be that if  you ask enough people the same question, you must obtain 
an answer, possibly by taking the "average" of all those requested ! This is one 
way in which issues "float" in the total management structure. It  is only by 
using the unofficial mechanisms that the extent of the confetti can be judged 
and remedial action taken. Issues "float" in other ways also and sometimes
possess no effective owner. It  is important to know what "confetti" is around 
and what issues are being handled ineffectively if scarce management services 
resources are to be conserved.
In many unexpected places one can encounter the interests of staff which 
will be affected by change. On the whole staff and unions are amenable to new 
ideas. But it would be foolish to overlook a possible staff interest in any 
change.
People and groups
As a crude generalisation, management services can be said to be about 
various types of efficiency. Clear objective setting, careful thought about 
what those objectives mean and clearly defined, carefully constructed ways of 
reaching them are the essence of management services work. But, the raison 
d’etre of the NHS is the sick person who needs individual attention, cannot be 
put into neat categories and might not fit  into pre-determined patterns for 
dealing with patients all of the time. The vast majority of staff in the NHS are 
orientated towards patients and it is only with great difficulty that they adjust 
to the "management roles" to which they graduate in the course of their career. 
The contrast between the education process which fits them for the first task, a 
doctor say, and that used for their second career is enormous. The first is well
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tried; the second scarcely exists. For example, courses for Specialists in 
Community Medicine have only just started and contain very little  "practical" 
management. Thus, it is often the case that change must be achieved through 
people who have obtained what management skill they have through 
"experience", most of which is fundamentally opposed to basic attitudes 
drummed into them by the quite efficient patient care education system during 
their early formative years.
A fundamental part of that early training for doctors was "clinical 
freedom" in the interests of the patient. The responsibility of the doctor to the 
patient and for his own actions is enshrined in practice, law and the whole ethos 
of the NHS. There is a fundamental, almost untramelled freedom to use as he 
thinks best all of those facilities, services, drugs and other things which he can 
make available. A t the point of care the practitioner has no need tor consult, to 
agree, to obey or to participate in any way, as long as the patient will go along 
with him. Discipline, agreement with colleagues and related themes are not a 
part of the "fundamental" behaviour patterns of these people, although this is 
not to say that they are awkward. Individuality, if  not encouraged, certainly is 
not frowned upon. It  is not a long step from clinical freedom and individuality 
to a state of bemusement, less than even tempered and, in some cases 
downright hostility felt towards a management system whose fundamental job is 
to restrict and to form into some manageable coherent pattern, not only the 
resources they use, but in the final analysis their own activities as well. A 
management orientated change agent has got to be very good, to persuade 
people that, even if  he is not the bearer of largesse from on high, which is the 
fundamental image of some regional officers such as capital planners, he can 
help these individualists to make better use of existing resources in ways 
acceptable to themselves.
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The service demanded from the NHS is always far greater than its 
potential to provide and the variety of that service is large. Given these two 
factors and the individuality described above, it is not surprising that getting 
agreement about what the priority issues are proves difficult. With extreme 
ease, individuals can claim prior commitment to other work, a difference of 
opinion on clinical priorities and a thousand other reasonable things when being 
asked to participate in a management services project. Even if  it were 
desirable, coercion is very difficult and even the power of their own peer group 
to influence them can be ineffective. Such is the power of the individual that 
the change agent's power of persuasion is sometimes sorely taxed in projects in 
which doctors and nurses become involved.
It  has been stated above that the professional groupings, i.e. 
administrative, nurses, doctors, treasurers and works, do not come together as 
an integrated corporate management system. Each of these groups has got its 
own specific identity, its own beliefs and its own education systems which have 
ingrained in them patterns of behaviour peculiar to themselves. Statements of 
their own particular group interests are very common. Each of the professional 
groups has got a powerful professional organisation associated with it. Each of 
these professional views is almost inevitably in conflict with the views of others 
including Parliament on how the service should or should not be run. All 
professional groups will view a management services project from its own point 
of view and any regard paid to other viewpoints will be secondary. An 
integrated project is often at its best when it appears to be all things to all 
men.
One of the features of the NHS is that it tries to do a large variety of jobs 
which do not form an integrated whole and this permits a variety of conflicting
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views to coexist. Many of the NHS objectives conflict with each other and 
some of these conflicts are reflected in the professional groupings. For 
example, violent disagreements exist about the appropriate level of nursing 
expertise required for specific care groups and the use of resources to obtain 
that expertise.
Change is seen from different points of view and often the direction in 
which different professional groups wish to take the service is completely 
different. Administrative efficiency often conflicts with a view of personal 
medical care. Good financial practice often conflicts with new methodology 
for providing research or care. Good nursing often conflicts with various types 
of medical practice in which high technology is involved and so on. Given these 
conflicts, it is inevitable that the change process is viewed from different 
points of view and requires much negotiation.
The work of the NHS
Defining "health" is a wellknown pastime and most health service 
managers have given up the game. It  is usual to pretend that it is a fruitless 
exercise and maybe this is true. What is not at issue is that the quantity and 
variety of activity carried out by a health service is vast. There are about a 
dozen major classes of patient and twenty to thirty others each seeking 
independent recognition. Apart from the actual caring side of the NHS which 
is very complex, the hotel and industrial business, the technical support service, 
the transport business are vast. Figure 4 gives a breakdown of the service 
which demonstrates its complexity.
A brief description of the region
The Region covers several counties, and within that area there are several
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Services for Children 
Services for the Elderly 
Services for the Mentally 111 
Services for the Mentally Handicapped 
Services for the Disabled 
Maternity Services




a) General Surgery j) Ophthalmology s) Dermatology
b) Urology k) Neurosurgery t) Radiotherapy
c) Gynaecology 1) Neurology u) Infectious Diseases
d) ENT m) Thoracic Surgery v) Physical Medicine
e) Dental Surgery n) Chest Diseases w) VD
f) Orthodontics P) General Medicine x) Rheumatology
g) Orthopaedics q) Cardiology y) Plastic Surgery




a) CSSD f) Supplies 1) Medical Records
b) Laundry g) Domestic Services m) Computer Services
c) Catering h) Porte ring n) Staff support
d) Transport j) Building & Eng. P) Voluntary Services
e) Ambulances k) Administration
Medical Services
a) Theatres f) Speech Therapy 1) Chiropody
b) Pathology g) Hydrotherapy m) Blood transfusion
c) Pharmacy h) Chemotherapy n) Health education
d) X-ray j) Occupational Therapy
e) Physiotherapy k) Artificial Limb Service
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hundred points at which service is provided. A county corresponds to an area 
health authority. Four of the areas become involved in the project work 
described later. Even if  one counts only major hospitals, there are about forty 
of these. In between the RHA and the actual point of service are all the 
Region, Area and District structures. Any proposal which recommends a 
widespread change in hospital practice probably means changes in this whole 
structure and there are bound to be problems in transforming a proposal into 
practice. A large education process which must take place to transform the 
activities of so large a community. The net of management relationships 
within that structure does not lend itself to change. The sorts of factors which 
are described above are at play throughout the layers in a random manner. It  is 
almost certain that the problems arising in one part of the structure will be 
different from those in another part. Any proposal to change is usually met by 
all the difficulties described above, if  only because one can guarantee that all 
of the component parts will react differently.
The particularly vulnerable project is the one that relies on various 
activities going on systematically throughout the Region. For example, 
catering monitoring relied on there being reasonable agreement that there were 
eight basic aims for the catering services. Tacit, even explicit, agreement that 
this was true did not imply that these were the goals which middle managers 
pursued or knew about in any objective systematic way. There is a basic 
conflict between management devolution with systematic management.
Summary
This chapter describes the NHS organisation, and in particular its local 
interpretation, within which a management services change agent must operate. 
The importance of this description in the context of this thesis is twofold.
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First, these structures form the structural context of the Strauss paradigm 
being used in this research. Second, the development of Model 6 - the 
Corporate Activist -  in Chapter 2 is the main method by which this thesis will 
seek to define the role of a management services officer. Chapter 2 has 
already attempted to show, and the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 will 
demonstrate further the influence of the organisation on the change process. It 
will be claimed that the developed version of Model 6 contained in Chapter 7 
which is based on the case studies in Chapters 5 and 6 is a general model. 
However, it must be stressed that in this thesis the general model in Chapter 7 
has been shown to work within the context described in this chapter. Further 
work would be necessary to demonstrate its applicability outside that context.
Having defined in this chapter the first part of the Strauss paradigm used 
in this thesis, namely the structural context, the research will now concentrate 
on the negotiation context of the paradigm. As explained earlier, within the 
NHS structures described above, a grounded theory answer to the question 
"What do management services people actually do ?" based on the use of diaries 
is being sought. In the next chapter, the methods of grounded theory as they 
came to be applied in this research are described. The case studies generated 
by that analysis and the developed version of the Corporate Activist Model are 
contained in the following three chapters.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THIS THESIS
The objective of this research was to develop a model of the ways in 
which one management services officer attempts to bring about change in one 
organisation. The method used was to keep diaries and then to analyse them by 
methods suggested by Glaser and Strauss, Before describing my use of these 
analysis methods in detail, it is useful to review the use of diaries in 
management research and the Glaser and Strauss analysis methods.
The application of diaries to management research
Mintzberg (1973), as well as reporting an extensive diary study carried out 
by himself, devotes a considerable portion of his book to reviewing diary 
research. Part of a table of studies which used diaries contained in this book is 
reproduced in Figure 5, In this chapter some of those diary studies are 
reviewed together with the major studies by Mintzberg and Stewart (1967), 
The Mintzberg diary study is relevant to the event categories developed in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis and for this reason, special attention has been given to 
his research.
The first significant diary study was Carlson (1951), It  was a structured 
diary and is used below to illustrate this type of diary, Carlson was the first of 
a long list of researchers who tried to identify what managers actually did do 
with their time. In his research, communications appeared to be one of the 
prime activities of senior managers, in his case, directors of companies. From 
the point of view of my thesis, it is interesting to note that the difficulty of 
coding events appeared so early in the use of the diary methods. Despite the 
use of a form to try to obtain specific data, the directors concerned did not use 
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contradictory. What one director regarded as operations, another coded as 
development. A recurrent theme of all the diary work is the possibility of 
seeing situations from different viewpoints, e.g. Burns (1954). Many 
explanations, e.g. straight misunderstanding or a genuinely different viewpoint, 
have been offered, but there is no doubt about the existence of the phenomenon.
There are several main themes and purposes which can be identified in the 
diary studies, perhaps the most common being attempts to identify the content 
of the work as in Carlson's research. A more difficult issue is "why are they 
doing it ?". The types of analysis vary from how time is spent at the activity, 
e.g. Mintzberg, through to a high level statement of the FOUR type, Horne, 
Lupton (1965). FOUR stands for formulating, organising, unifying and 
regulating. The FOUR theory illustrates the link backward in time of the diary 
studies to more classical work concerned with the description of the major 
functions of management and that is discussed briefly below also. Another 
main theme whch started to emerge in the Lupton work was the wide 
discrepancies between different organisations and managers' jobs. One of the 
important issues in the diary work is the extent to which the various ways of 
looking at the activities of management support each other. Apart from listing 
the studies, Figure 5 gives some of their characteristics and shows that the 
extent of their mutual support for each other is debatable.
It is worth pausing in this review of diary work, and especially the codes 
such as FOUR which people have put forward, to attempt to put them into an 
historical perspective. The basic functions - planning, organising, co­
ordinating, commanding and controlling were suggested by Fayal (1916). Gullick 
and Urwick (1937) produced POSD CORB, Planning, Organising, Staffing, 
Directing, Co-ordinating, Reporting and Budgeting. Barnard (1938) defined the
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executive function as "first to provide the system of communication, second to 
promote the securing of essential efforts and third, to formulate and define 
purpose". There are great differences between the ways these sorts of 
classifications came to be developed and those of the diarists like Stewart and 
Mintzberg. The diarists produce actual data on content and activity which is 
lacking in the earlier works. But is is interesting to note that some of the basic 
themes of the earlier work have remained almost completely intact.
Although the methods by which the various codes have been established 
vary, this typography is now common. The categories suggested by these 
earlier writers and confirmed by diarists are used by managers. Thus, if one 
were to ask what were the main functions to be supported by senior RHA 
managers, the answer would be "planning and monitoring".
Types of diaries
Essentially two types of diary have been used in management research. 
They are based on structured and unstructured data collection. 1 think that one 
must draw a distinction between structured intent and structured "data 
collection" and it is easier to start with data collection.
Carlson used structured data collection and, as part of his study of 
directors used the form reproduced in Figure 6. He attempted to record the 
significant separate events in the activity of these directors. It  can be seen 
from the form that it contained a restricted set of data only. However 
carefully that restricted set is prepared, it necessarily represents a statement 
that those elements of data are the important ones from the point of view of 
the research. Even the most complex forms used only about fifty  distinct 
pieces of data. Thus the data is restricted and pre-defined, at least to some
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Fig,6 : Diary recording form designed by
Carlson
Date: “i / l l  49
Time: /o:49 — //-oS
Place (other than own office): 
Person: .
Telephone: In I I Out |__J
Manuf. dir. Comptr. Adv. dir.
Works man. A Account. Pen. dir.
Works man. B K Sales dir. Swed. Assistant
Organ, dir. Sales dir. exp. Sccr.
A. Question handled Kind of action
Finance, legal Getting information
Accounting Systematizing information
Buying Taking decisions



















extent. These appear to me to be the two major characteristics of the 
structured diary. However, structured data does have the advantage in theory 
of being analysed more easily than that available in the unstructured diary, but 
even that need not be the case in practise.
Structure of "intention" seems to me a more important issue. It  is 
probable that a diary with structured content does presuppose that the purpose 
of collecting that particular data is understood, although that need not be true. 
Of course, the general purpose of keeping the diary at all must be known. But 
the unstructured diary acknowledges that we know very little  about the higher 
levels of management and there is a need to gather data just to attempt to 
establish patterns of behaviour and intention. It  is necessary to focus on issues 
in research if  it is to be worthwhile and, to some extent, that must require 
structure of "intention" if not data. The concepts of the Discovery of 
Grounded Theory discussed earlier are relevant to this issue and it seems more 
realistic to allow results to emerge from the data, rather than attempt to pre­
define them. The movement towards a structured intention by those grounded 
theory methods also has the advantages that there is no need to freeze the data 
format into a relatively inflexible state at an early stage in the research.
Two problems in using both structured diary data and unstructured data 
are their interpretation and reliability. These aspects of data collection are 
discussed below. But it is important to stress that due mainly to human frailty, 
structured diaries do not overcome either problem completely.
One other issue raised by Burns (1957) and Stewart (1967) is the need for 
managers to record continuously, and by this, I believe them to mean not to 
leave out significant items. Even in studies of comparatively short duration.
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they both stress the difficulty of achieving this. Most researchers agree that 
all managers work fast, change activities swiftly and do not spend long doing 
any one thing. In this thesis, I will introduce the concept of "frantic action" to 
illustrate the need for fast reaction in managerial tasks. In the context of 
activity data collection of any type, and diaries are included, it is inevitable 
that factual data is omitted when people act quickly. The loss of data in this 
way is also noted by Marples (1967).
Completely unstructured diaries of my own type do not appear to have 
been put together for research purposes. They do exist in other fields, 
especially politics. Prime Minsters and cabinet ministers appear to publish 
them automatically nowadays. Presumably, they intend to record that which 
appears to them to be significant at the time. This was the intention behind 
my own diary, except that my own field of interest was more limited. There 
are interesting parallels between my own and this type of diary and although it 
would not be appropriate to dwell on the similarities, two are worth mentioning. 
First, both are full of fast moving events and crises. For example, MacMillan 
(1971) devotes whole chapters to the conduct of unexpected and uncontrollable 
activities. Secondly, significant illuminating events emerge from the content 
of the diary in a random unplanned way. That significance relies often on 
MacMillan's interpretation of the events. It is this sort of event recording plus 
interpretation which shows the unstructured diary at its most potent when 
trying to construct a set of categories to interpret significance. Apart from 
emphasising the ability to recognise the juxtaposition of events which have this 
characteristic I do not know how the interpretation is accomplished. But it is, 
and the possibility of doing this seems higher if  the unstructured diary is used.
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The Stewart diary
Stewart published one of the most influential diary studies in 1967, 
"Managers and their jobs". The main aim of her study was to discover some of 
the similarities and differences in the ways managers spend their time. These 
were to be related to the actual jobs rather than the individuals carrying out 
that job. Stewart suggests that two of the measures of activity of particular 
interest are the amount of time he spends on particular activities and the 
frequency with which he does something. She goes on to suggest that some of 
the main questions which one might ask are:
(a) How specialised is the job ?
(b) To what extent does the job involve working with others ?
(c) What kind of contact does the job involve ?
(d) What form do most contacts take ?
(e) What type of work pattern does the job tend to impose ?
(f) What kind of decisions does the job involve ?
(g) How much time is spent on different aspects of the manager's 
work ?
(h) How much and what kinds of variety are provided by the job ?
Three methods were considered for carrying out a study with the above 
sorts of objectives. These were:
(a) to ask managers how they divide up their time
(b) to ask a manager to keep a record of activity himself
(c) to obtain data by observation
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The book discusses all three methods but it is probably only useful to quote the 
comparison of the last two methods.
"The main advantages of the diary method compared with observation are:
1. It  is less time-consuming, less expensive and much less 
restricted in locality. Hence many more managers can be 
studied over a wider area of industry and locality.
2. It  is easier to record the activities for a longer period, as with 
the observation method the longer the period of observation 
the fewer the number of people that can be studied.
3. Classification is made by a man who knows what he is doing.
For some types of analysis the observer would have to ask the 
manager what he was doing.
4. All time can be recorded, whereas an observer may be 
excluded from confidential discussions.
The main disadvantages of diaries is that they greatly lim it both the scope 
and the content of what can be studied. The scope is limited because the 
manager cannot devote much time to the recording, and the content because it 
is difficult to get managers to record in the same way if  the item being 
recorded allows much scope for differences in interpretation.
The main advantages of observation compared with diary keeping are:
1. The observer has time to make more detailed and 
comprehensive recordings.
2. The record is likely to be more complete and the observer is 
much less likely to omit a recording through pressure of work.
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3. He can apply a consistent standard when recording the 
activities of different people."
On the basis of this reasoning the diary method was developed. Seminars 
of managers considered the designs of structured diaries and tried to use 
versions of it. From this experience the four structured diaries shown in 
Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10 were developed.
One hundred and sixty managers took part in the research study and 
collected data for four weeks. They represented a wide spread of managers 
and their co-operation was obtained through professional management bodies, 
the Institution of Works Managers, the Institute of Marketing and Sales 
Managers and the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants. In addition, the 
Institution of Production Engineers approached a more specialised selection of 
managers and some large companies were approached. Thus the design 
permitted the comparison of similar jobs using a very wide and varied sample of 
people.
In the analysis of the data a variety of techniques were used to check the 
quality of the data. All of these techniques are interesting but the cluster 
analysis which was used to deal with the mass of data generated in this attempt 
to obtain comparable data deserved special comment. The statistical basis for 
this work is described in the book. What is important is that this technique was 
used to delineate five basic job profiles from her twenty five variables. These 
were:
Group 1 : The Emissaries. These managers spend much of their 
time away from the company, dealing with and entertaining 





























































Fig.8 : The Stewart Diary 2 - fleeting contacts
F L E E T IN G
Personal
C O N T A C T S
Telephone Interruption ?
Boss o o o
Secretary
I 1 I




External 4 4 4
FOR CONTACTS OF UN DER 5 M IN U T E S
Please enter in Fleeting Contacts section below.
There may be a number of such fleeting contacts during the main 
incident that you have recorded above, or before you start a fresh sheet. 
So you can have a number of ticks in this section.
When recording a fleeting contact no entries should be made in the 
main section of the diary, but a tick should be put in the adjoining 
column if this interrupts what you were doing.
Source: Stewart (1967)
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Fig.9 : The Stewart diary 3 - Work Priorities Diary
Column X 
Time





Was this something 















Fig.10 : The Stewart diary 4 - Analysis of
Fleeting Contacts
Column I  
Type of contact
Column 2  
Who was it with?
Column 3 . 
Who initiated 
it?
Column 4  
Was it an 
interruption? ■
Personal Telephone Self Other
Source: Stewart (1967)
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fragmented than most. Typical of this group are the sales 
managers and senior manager who act as public figures.
Group 2 : The Writers. These managers who spend a greater share 
of their time in writing, reading, dictating, and figure work.
They are solitary "only by comparison". They tend to work 
shorter hours and are less subject to day-to-day pressures. By 
all appearances, these are the staff specialists or those who 
manage them - the assistant manager of a computing branch, 
the chief electrical engineer, and so on.
Group 3 ; The Discussers. These are the average managers. They 
spend much time with other people and particularly with their 
colleagues, and they carry out a diverse range of activities.
Many types of managers fit in this group.
Group 4 : The Trouble Shooters. These managers must spend more 
time coping with crises, hence their work is most fragmented.
They spend much time with subordinates and less with peers.
A relatively large share of their time is spent on inspection.
Most of the production people fall into this group.
Group 5 : The Committeemen. These managers spend a great
share of their time in committee meetings. Their contacts 
are both vertical and horizontal but not outside the company.
In the study these managers were found exclusively in larger 
companies.
In addition to using her data to obtain the clusters referred to above, 
which do seem to have a similar flavour to the Mintzberg roles and my own
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categories, a very comprehensive set of statistical tables and diagrams was 
produced to illustrate the wide range of management activity which she 
described. It  is worth quoting a list of these, see Figure 11, to demonstrate the 
breadth of the study. I do not have the ability to select from this set of results 
the most valuable, especially in view of the variety which they represent. 
However, Mintzberg does select and it is worth quoting his views.
"Each finding of this study is presented in the form of a histogram.
Many of these suggest that most managers, but never all managers, 
exhibit a number of common work characteristics. Listed below are 
some of the main findings of this study with the figures representing 
arithmetic averages;
The managers averaged 42 hours of work per week. 75 
percent of their time was spent in their own 
estabiishment, and 51 percent in their own offices.
60 percent of their time was spent in discussion -  43 
percent informal, 7 percent committee, 6 percent 
telephoning, and 4 percent social activity.
34 percent of their time was spent alone; 25 percent 
with their immediate subordinates, 8 percent with 
their superiors, and 30 percent with peers and 
others (of this, 12 percent with colleagues 
reporting to the same superior, 8 percent with 
fellows doing similar work elsewhere in the 
organisation, 5 percent with other internal 
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Fragmentation in work was great, according to each of 
the three measures: in 4 weeks, the managers
averaged only 9 periods of 30 minutes or more 
without interruption (and 4 out of 5 managers had 
less than 15 such periods); the managers averaged
12 fleeting contacts per day (i.e. less than 5
minutes duration); they averaged another 13 diary 
entries per day, for a total of 25.
A manager's job is a varied on e..................in the place of work,
in the contacts, in its activities and in its content."
The Mintzberg diary
This work is described in Mintzberg (1973). The study was limited to 
chief executives of substantial experience in medium to large organisations in 
various industries. A pilot run was done on three men who were the President
of a small engineering firm, the Dean of a Management School and the Vice-
Chairman of a large food retailing chain. A fter that the five people to be 
studied were selected. These were:
(a) Chairman and Chief Executive of a major consulting firm
(b) An Engineer who had become President of a firm carrying out 
research and development
(c) The Head of a large urban hospital
(d) The President of a firm producing consumer goods
(e) The Superintendent of a large suburban school system.
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The common characteristics of these men were four.
(a) their position - the Chief Executive
(b) both large staff and line organisations reported to them
(c) the organisations were a success
and (d) all were experienced and had college education to a very high 
management level.
The study reveals that there was very little  known about "content" of 
managerial work. This study therefore concentrated on:
(a) the job rather than the man
(b) basic similarities in their management of the work rather than 
differences
and (c) the essential content of that work.
The diary relies mainly on structured observation but Mintzberg 
supplements this with anecdotal and other material. Also, he accepts the 
limitations of the short duration of the diary preferring instead an in-depth 
study. He comments on the difficulty of deciding how to combine his various 
types of data in one analysis. It  was his policy to develop his roles during the 






For each manager studied, he collected one month of scheduled 
appointments, information about the organisation and information about the 
manager. In the major part of the diary two types of data were collected. The 
first was the anecdotal diary type material which I collected and he did this in 
considerable depth for given incidents. He collected also the chronology record 
and this was supported by the mail record and the verbal contact record. Each 
evening the data on the three records were tabulated.
Mintzberg gives an example of the type of material collected. It consists 
of precise items, the way he greets his secretary, the way detailed information 
starts to flow in, all the telephone calls he makes and all the mail. It is not 
only the important incidents which are included, it is each and everything which 
he is doing. Figures 12, 13 and 14 are examples of the chronology record, the 
mail record and the contact record. The mail record contains seven items and 
this includes all sorts of trivia. The chronology record contains thirteen items 
between 8.20 and 1 o'clock. Some of these items last some time, e.g. a tour, 
while others, e.g. a telephone call, are short. The contact record contains ten 
items.
Figures 12, 13 and 14 illustrate also the way in which Mintzberg analyses 
the data and the types of results which he obtained. The paper claims that the 
one week periods were representative of each man's work, that these men were 
typical chief executives and that important basic similarities exist between 
types of jobs studied here and those found elsewhere.
An analysis of the differences follows and Mintzberg summarises his 
results as follows. Clearly, this analysis is far from conclusive. The research 
was not designed to compare or categorise different types of manager's work. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does suggest that a number of variables influence the
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F ig .12 : llin tzserg Oiary - the cnronology record
Tine '•leoiuiii Reference* Juratio i
8:20 Call A 0.02
8:22 Jesk worx 1-7 0.3
9:40 Jnscheduled neeting 3 0.2
8:55 Call C 0.1
9:00 Scheduled meeting 3 0.5
9:30 Unscheduled neeting E 0.5
10:00 Jesk work (5) 0.2
10:10 Tour F 0.1
10:40 Tour G 0.2
10:45 Call H 0.2
10:55 Call 1 0.1
11:00 Scheduled neeting J 2.0
1:00 End o f meeting - -
Cross references to items in Figs 13 and 14
F ig .13 : Mintzoerg J ia ry  -  the mail record
Fore Sender Purpose Attention Action Taken
1 Latte r Trade organisation Request to speak Read
Cl loping Salesman Sol ic i ta tion Skim
3 Lette r External board Notice of meeting Read
4 Periodical - Business news Skim Forward advertisement to
production supervisor
Meao Foreign vice president Request resolve s ta ff c o n f lic t  Read Reply: sixpla in
C Reoort C on tro lle r Financial data Skim -
■7 Lette r R S 3 vice president Request signature ■ Sigo
Fig. 14 : Mintzoerg J ia ry  - the contact record
Medium Purpose P artic ioants In it ia t io n Duration Place
Call Informed (event) Manufacturing manager Opposi te 0 . 0 2 O ffice
Unscheduled Informed ( l.C .) Assistant Gpposi te 0 . 2 O ffice
meeting 2
Call Informing ( l .C .) Chairman Self 0.1 O ffice
Scheduled Ceremony R etiring  employee: Opposite (personnel 0 . 5 O ffice
meeting 3 Personnel s ta ffe r s ta ffe r)
Unscheduled Informed Treasurer Self 0 . 5 O ffice
meeting 2 (ac tion  taken)
Tour Observation Plant employees Self 0 . 5 Medical p lan t
Tour Informing (idea) Assistant superintendent Self 0.1 Plant
Call Strategy Executive vice president Opposite 0 . 2 O ffice
Call Informing C on tro lle r Self 0.1 O ffice
(decision)
Scnsduled Negotiating Assistant, consultants Clock 2 . 0 Board room
lee tin g  4
Source; Mintzberg (1973)
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work of managers and these include the following;
(a) the nature of the industry
(b) the nature of the particular organisation
(c) the nature of the particular man's style
(d) the needs of the moment
Mintzberg develops a wide ranging theory in his book. It  covers the 
characteristics of managerial work, various roles which they play and the 
variations which exist In the work which they do. It is impossible to review all 
of this material but a comparison of the roles with my own categories is carried 
in Chapter 8 after my own categories have been described. Some other 
observations on this work are given below.
It  is interesting to note some of the difficulties experienced in this work, 
especially In the use of structured data. Four of these are listed below.
(a) Problems of data collection
In the context of diary use in general, Mintzberg's 
comments on his own problems of collecting data are 
interesting. These are:
(I) it is not possible to hear the other end of a
telephone conversation
(II) work in the evening could not be observed
(III) activities away from the office were difficult to 
observe
(iv) many meetings were missed for various reasons
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(v) Some of the meetings were very complex entities.
Unsatisfactory solutions to all of the above points were found. It  is 
characteristic of this type of work that compromises on data collection 
are necessary.
(b) Effects of the presence of researcher
Mintzberg claims that he had no effect whatsoever on the work of 
the chief executive. He produces no evidence for this statement. Diaries 
ought to disturb managers less than other data collection methods. But I 
think that the very act of recording something will change at least 
attitudes. To record necessitates devoting more time to an activity and 
that can be used to reflect on the action.
(c) Hectic pace of work
Mintzberg recorded approximately five hundred pages of 
preliminary data in this study of one week's activity for each person. The 
neat categories required for diary recording are not characteristic of 
managerial work and managers are far too busy to record things 
exhaustively and properly. Mintzberg doubts whether any of the studies 
even lists the amount of work covered by managers adequately. He 
suggests that It would be foolish to over-estimate even our understanding 
of what managers do, without any consideration of their reasons for doing 
It.
(d) Problems of coding
The first problem considered by Mintzberg is whether or not any 
particular happening is worthy of a record. The second is that a lot of
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contact was purely social, e.g. talking to his wife.
Mintzberg found it difficult to classify things like a tour or an unscheduled 
meeting since one often merged into the other. Again, it was often difficult to 
say whether the executive was skimming, reading or studying mail. The 
duration of contacts was not timed except to the nearest 10 minutes. Deciding 
who the participants in any interchange were and whether they were important 
was difficult. Deciding who initiated a particular contact presented problems. 
He tried to record the functional area, e.g. marketing or manufacturing, to 
which any particular event belonged and did not succeed. They belonged to 
several sometimes. Mintzberg admits that his categorisation of purpose was 
weak. In discussing a purpose, he distinguishes five types of a situation which 
presented categorisation problems;
(i) Sequential purpose. Here the question was to distinguish
which of several issues discussed in sequence was the real 
purpose of the meeting.
(ii) Overt-covert purposes -  here the problem is one of "double 
talk".
(ill) Ostensible purpose -  having gained access on one issue the real 
purpose is to discuss another.
(iv) Multiple purpose - people usually deal with many things almost 
simultaneously.
(v) Changed purpose - this is common, especially being 
"sidetracked".
Mintzberg then goes on to enunciate the rules to be used for coding 
purpose.
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(a) Incidental information flow should be ignored.
(b) Ostensible and overt purpose of an event was to be used unless 
the covert purpose was obvious and suspected to be important.
(c) The most important of several purposes for an event was used.
(d) He has a complex rule for deciding who was giving or getting 
information.
(e) If  an event focussed on one area but appears to be equally
important in others, it became a review session.
(f) He as prepared to change the categorisation if  some instant
communication changed the course of an event.
Mintzberg goes on to develop roles using his diary data and these are 
compared to my own categories in Chapter 8. However, before leaving this 
initial survey of his work, it is worth quoting his conclusions about diaries;
"In conclusion, let me emphasise my strong belief that with 
our present understanding we cannot rely on the indirect 
methods of research, such as diaries, questionnaires and 
interviews. Managerial work is complex; we know too little  
about it. Once we have an appropriate theoretical 
understanding of managerial work, the diary method may 
prove useful to collect data efficiently and to compare many 
types of managers. But first we must have the basic 
understanding. Early use of the highly structured forms of 
research that pre-suppose much knowledge of the subject and 
that do not enable the researcher to create new structure as
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he goes along is likely to perpetuate the naive views that we 
now have 6f managerial work."
Having surveyed the use of diaries in management research, it is useful to 
describe the methods which I used to analyse my own diary. These are 
described next.
The application of grounded theory in the development and analysis of my own 
diary
The method described by Glaser and Strauss (1976) in the Discovery of 
Grounded Theory and subsequently developed in Theoretical Sensitivity by 
Glaser (1978) are the methods which were used in the development and analysis 
of the basic diary. This section outlines my use of that theory and the ways in 
which the theory influenced the data. A description of my own diary occurs 
later in this chapter.
The basic theme of the grounded theory approach is to allow the theory 
relating to the social process being investigated to develop and emerge as the 
research progresses. It  is assumed that coding of data will be one of the main 
research activities and that the codes which are used will be those which 
"emerge" from the data. In the second book quoted above, the way in which 
this emergence of codes should happen is described in detail. It  is necessary to 
consider the extent to which the categories in this research did emerge from a 
study of this data in the way described.
I have been working in the management services field for a long time and 
have been interested in the methodology of running large projects for at least 
ten years. Despite the fact that up to the time of starting this research I have 
not attempted to describe the total process of running management services in
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detail, certain parts of it were clear to me. For example, it was inevitable 
that there should be some categories concerned with the control of work within 
the division. Equally, I knew that my own management style predisposed me 
towards a greater degree of learning on the job than might be true of other 
managers. But the fact that such categories did not wholly emerge from the 
diary data does not alter the fact that they were well and truly grounded in 
experience over the last twenty years. What is clearly new about the work is 
the way in which the definitions of even those categories which were known to 
exist beforehand have been refined in the thesis. Further, the process by which 
all of my categories fitted in to the master category of "negotiation of order" is 
completely new and has been developed almost completely from the evidence 
within the data. Although that master theme is developed in other parts of the 
literature, those papers and books were not known when I was developing this 
theory. Further, that master theme does not appear to have been applied 
specifically to management services anywhere in the literature.
Considerable attention is given in Theoretical Sensitivity to the way in 
which data is used to develop emergent categories which are then checked over 
by reference to other data as it is processed. This concept of rechecking and 
refitting the categories seems to be central to the grounded theory process. 
There are various levels of detail at which this process of refitting and checking 
back is described. I think that it would not be correct to claim that that total 
process of checking back and rechecking the categories occurred in my work. 
One of the reasons for this appears to me to be that the categories used in this 
thesis are essentially strategic ones. They are intended to provide a macro 
picture of being an RMSO, and do not describe, as is more usual, the more 
detailed make-up of the work of a person. The constant reshaping and
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refitting, together with a theoretical possible abandonment of strategic broad 
categories probably would not have worked. What really happened was that 
each example from the diary data provided a certain nuance of the main theme. 
Those main themes which became the twelve categories were developed by 
sorting and resorting the event card early in the analysis process. For example, 
most of the events which became categorised as learning were identified in the 
early sorting process but were very varied in their nature. But the master 
category learning, did apply to them all and each event provided a part of a 
more detailed definition.
As stated above, the nuances and refinements of the definition of 
"learning" did emerge by a process similar to refitting in Glaser. A 
complication in the development of category definitions was that many of the 
events contained in the diary were very rich in content. For example, an 
Objectives Meeting was often reduced to one or two categories. But an 
Objectives Meeting is a complex meeting in which all sorts of issues and 
activities are being processed at the same time. The richness of the detail is 
not recorded and, in fact, a very selective sample of the actions taking place 
appear in the diary. One of the objectives of this research is to try and to deal 
with the total picture and all of the richness of activity and to simplify it in 
such a way as to show the total pattern of the activity rather than appreciate 
its individual parts in detail. Glaser does describe a way in which micro 
activities are regrouped into larger categories. Given the variety and extent of 
the data used in this diary, the use of such a process was not possible within an 
acceptable timescale. The reverse method of amplifying a macro type 
category by example was more appropriate.
Another criteria which should be applied to categories in the grounded
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theory approach is that they must "work". Again it is important to interpret 
that at the macro level and not the individual activity level. At the individual 
categorisation of event level, my categorisation does not cover all aspects of an 
event. An example is the Objectives Meetings mentioned above. It  is probable 
that in order to explore the detail, all of the categories put forward as part of 
the macro model could be the basis of an intense research programme in its own 
right. For example the diary, the analayis, and the definition and general 
characteristics of learning which are developed in this thesis do not do full 
justice to learning as a process in the life of an RMSO. But the analysis does 
establish beyond any doubt that the various types of learning which are 
described are an important part of the process of running a management 
services division. This is another aspect of the difference between using 
grounded theory at the macro and the micro level of activities. I believe that 
this thesis has shown that the model of negotiation plus event categories can be 
made to work at the macro level.
Another issue raised by Glaser and Strauss is the extent to which the 
theory developed in this thesis is a substantive or a formal theory. I believe 
the theory is a substantive theory but that the evidence presented is insufficient 
for it to be regarded as a formal theory. The ideas have only been developed in 
one context and that context was peculiar to the particular Regional Health 
Authority concerned. In Chapter 8 I have considered whether or not the 
analysis would apply to other RMSOs, other Regional Health Authorities and 
other sorts of organisation outside the National Health Service. Those 
considerations suggest that more work must be done before the generality of 
this model and therefore the formal status of the theory has been established.
Another issue discussed in Theoretical Sensitivity is the sampling methods
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which are used to gather data. Considerable emphasis is placed on the need to 
use an inductive method for deciding what data should be gathered. That 
inductive method starts with a specific dissatisfaction with current theory and 
that was certainly the case for this thesis. The basic process used to collect 
data enabled me to modify the collection of data on the basis of experience. I 
analysed the data which had been collected up to that time in order to make the 
modifications. The way in which data was collected for my diary certainly 
developed as time passed and this is clear by comparing the initial entries with 
those which occurred at a later stage. During the collection of the diary data 
it became obvious that certain types of data were more illuminating and 
important for the development of the type of negotiating theory which was 
being put forward towards the end of the exercise. Nevertheless, I think it 
would not be possible to claim that the modification of the data collection was 
done in a systematic way using well established criteria for the change. Indeed, 
I am not clear how that would have been possible in this particular case. Even 
now it would be difficult to define in general terms the type of data which 
proved to be useful for this type of research. It  is true that senior managers do 
feel that they know when they are involved in a significant event and all of 
their "antennae" used to collect different signals and wits will function well in 
those circumstances. Antennae and wits are appropriate words in the 
description of this process. It  is debatable whether those processes can be 
modelled, reflect a real juxtaposition of significant acts or are plain post hoc 
rationalisations. But processes like these do seem to exist and I believe that as 
the collection of diary data progressed, they influenced its content.
Theoretical Sensitivity suggests that the secondary analysis of data is an 
important part of checking back on the categories being developed. A heavy
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reliance on secondary analysis of data occurs in this thesis. The major 
categories emerged during the secondary analysis, or at least became 
substantially well established during that process. The major ideas on 
negotiating had started to be established before the secondary analysis took 
place. But it was a second data analysis which established negotiation as a 
main theme. However the process of establishing emergent theory does not 
seem to live up to the very high standards which are described in Glaser's work 
which seems to require a much more systematic approach. It  is not obvious to 
me how I might have improved the analysis to meet Glaser's standard.
The coding section of Theoretical Sensitivity suggests that there are three 
basic questions which should be asked continuously during the coding process, 
namely:
(a) What is this data a study of ?
(b) What category does this particular incident indicate ?
(c) What is actually happening in the data ?
The book develops the idea of open coding which depends on the use of these 
three questions in a systematic manner. It  further suggests that an analysis of 
the data line by line is required to develop this type of theory. Given the 
amount of data contained in my diary, there was no possibility that such a 
diligent analysis of that data could have been undertaken. Nor do I think that 
it  would have been profitable from the point of view of the objectives of the 
thesis. It  seems more important to ask questions like "what is going on 
strategically in this incident ?" and "what in the total picture has got strategic 
importance ?". The emphasis on the strategic model even at the coding stage 
was important, and this has influenced the types of codes and categories which
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have been developed.
Checking with other analysts is recommended by Glaser. No checking 
with other people other than the discussion of the results as they became 
available was possible. There was little  discussion of what to do with 
particular pieces of data although there was a great deal about the general 
picture which was emerging. To this extent, the checking of the results was 
once again at the strategic model level rather than the interpretation of 
individual pieces of data.
Lastly, the Methodology of Grounded Theory describes at length 
development of the core of the theory and ways of making sure that the data is 
being used to the best effect and that the categories being suggested are 
'saturated'. Although I believe that the categories which have been developed 
are at the very centre of the role of RMSOs who work in a manner broadly 
similar, I think that it would be wrong to suggest that the data has been used to 
its maximum in this theory. There is a great deal more which could be 
obtained from the diary by analysing it possibly from other directions. But I 
think that the macro picture is developed as well as it would be supported by 
the research diary. The core of the theory does appear to be there and is, in 
my view, substantiated by the analysis.
McCall and Simmons (1969)
Before proceeding with the detailed description of my own research 
methods, it is worth placing the methods of Glaser and Strauss in a wider 
context. There are two relevant underlying research issues, the nature of 
observations made in the type of diary study in this thesis and the use of case 
study qualitative data as opposed to quantitative data. Both issues are
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discussed in McCall and Simmons (1969), Issues in Participant Observation and 
in particular in the articles in that book in Chapter 1 by Zelditch, "Some 
Methodological Problems in Field Studies", Dean, Eichorn and Dean, 
"Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods" and Strauss, "The 
Process of Field Work".
The first chapter is about participant observation in general and makes 
the point early on that many techniques are given that name. They include 
direct observation, counting events, interviews, many types of face to face 
interaction and studying documents from and histories of organisations. Some 
researchers prefer to reserve the term for those activities in which the 
researcher becomes deeply and personally involved in the activities being 
studied. However, all the techniques are used to produce case studies 
containing and based principally on qualitative data. These techniques differ 
from other methods which produce quantitative data which has been subjected 
to statistical analysis of various types. The disputes between researchers using 
these two types of methods were at their height in the 1920's and 1930’s but 
McCall and Simmons claim that such disputes tend now to centre on participant 
observation. He suggests that it is more profitable to attempt to understand 
the nature of the results which can be obtained from case nature of the results 
which can be obtained from case studies rather than take part in partisan 
arguments and this is the purpose of the three sections of Chapter 1 mentioned 
above.
Early in the chapter, the point is made that any form of participant 
observation relying on observation by the researcher must be supplemented by 
other methods since:
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(a) organisations exist in several places
(b) organisations have existed before the observer starts his
research
and (c) direct observation can only show up certain parts of the
organisation
To overcome (a) and (b) informants must be used and for (c) respondents must be 
used. Informants, and this term can be used to cover documentary evidence, 
are persons who act in the same way as the researcher acts, e.g. to observe, 
whereas respondents are persons who provide expert advice on the organisation's 
function, or some part of it.
Zelditch takes up the discussion of the type of work and data produced by 
studies. First he suggests that there are three types of data in case studies:
(a) descriptions of single events which fit together into histories,
(b) enumerations and frequency distributions,
and (c) statements of known rules or statuses which apply in the
organisation.
He goes on to suggest that three types of method exist for obtaining such data:
(a) participant observation as defined above,
(b) informant interviewing,
and (c) taking samples or enumerating cases.
He suggests that a research method can be described as a combination of data 
and method and that there are standard combinations, or prototypes, of
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methodologies which are found frequently. He also suggests that one should 
associate two criteria of goodness with any research method, namely;
(a) information adequacy - is it accurate, precise and complete 
for example ?
and (b) efficiency - in essence, is the method costly ?
Zelditch discusses many aspects of the different prototypes and research 
methods which can be generated within the above framework. Although it is 
clear that some methods are more efficient for certain tasks than others, the 
results produced by the less efficient ones are not necessarily wrong. Different 
methods produce different and often complimentary insights into a problem. In 
no sense does any approach produce a "whole" or a "better" result. To insist on 
particular methods, e.g. a statistical sample must always be taken, say to find 
the answer to a status or rule issue, is to raise false methodological issues. The 
advantages, disadvantages, and the type of conclusion or model which I have 
tried to generate from, a diary are discussed later. It  is relevant to bear in 
mind the analysis suggested above in that later discussion. It  seems to me that, 
for reasons given later, the diary method used in my research was appropriate 
and efficient.
Dean, Eichorn and Dean put forward a number of advantages and 
disadvantages of the use of qualitative data. Although it is not possible to 
include their argument, it is worth listing the points which they make:
Advantages
(a) Observation and interviewing deals with non standardised data 
whereas more structured methods have difficulty in doing this.
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(b) Better use can be made of relationships which the researcher makes with 
informants.
(c) A researcher can structure a problem as he proceeds.
(d) Misleading questions and issues can be avoided more easily.
(e) Impressions of field workers can be used to classify events and are often 
more reliable than techniques such as an index based on questionnaires.
(f) It  is possible to use better qualified staff on the data gathering.
(g) The researcher can ease himself into situations and thus explore .the more 
delicate ones.
(h) The researcher can modify his categories almost continuously to make 
them fit better.
(j) The research can select informants who can provide relevant data as the
research progresses.
(k) Depth material can be obtained more easily.
(1) The researcher absorbs valuable information as the research progresses
and can modify his approach.
(m) The researcher can move between data gathering and analysis.
(n) Data that is difficult to quantify does not get distorted by qualitative
methods.
(o) Surveys, etc. used to obtain quantitative data are more expensive.
Limitations
(p) Non-standardised data is difficult to process, especially by statistical
methods.
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(q) Researchers can build bias into observation more easily with
unstructured than with structured data.
In the article by Strauss, participant observation is approached much more 
broadly. He begins by emphasising two facets of the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. First, casual relationships are 
at best only part of the set of propositions about an organisation which a 
researcher must produce. Second, all the parts of the set of propositions tend 
to improve if they are allowed to develop during the research. In his argument 
for the broader, developing approach, Strauss suggests that there are three 
phases to field work:
(a) general observation
(b) making sense of the flow of events
and (c) pinpointing specific hypotheses
He is obviously very much in favour of this route for developing theory as an 
entity grounded in experience and observation.
Participant observation and its relationship to this research
I would not necessarily agree that the above summary of Chapter 1 of 
McCall and Simmons puts forward a balanced view of the merits and limitations 
of research methods based on the use of quantitative and qualitative data. This 
is not the place to develop that argument. However, its positive description of 
the advantages of participant observation and the use of qualitative data are 
relevant to this thesis. Below, more specific issues concerning my use of the 
diary data are discussed and it does seem useful for that discussion to take 
place within a more general context given above.
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The advantages of using the diary method for this research
Although the diary method for my particular research appeared to be the 
best available, there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with 
using it for this work. This section records these advantages and disadvantages 
and other ways in which the thesis has been affected by the choice of the diary 
method.
One of the objectives of this diary was to facilitate reflection on the 
purposes behind the various actions which I have recorded in a diary. I selected 
a method of recording data which allowed this to happen in as free a way as 
possible. The diary was an attempt to record the significance, of any type 
whatsoever, as well as the form of the action and it is difficult to see that any 
other method would have made this possible. It  would have been difficult to 
have systematised and coded beforehand even the types of purpose which I 
would have during a twelve month period. Such a code would probably have 
been required if  other methods had been used.
None of the material which is recorded in other research of this type 
appears to have been orientated towards my particular purpose, i.e. 
constructing a model of a change agent. Since there was no guidance in the 
literature on how to collect such data, it was appropriate to adopt a method 
which allowed a free style of recording data such as the unstructured diary. 
The diary does record reflections, feelings and many other intangible factors 
concerned with an event. It  talks about the purpose of the action, things which 
were causing difficulties or making actions easier to take, as well as the 
feelings and reactions of participants as I saw them. The ability to identify and 
record significance in this way and to associate with those all these different
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types of record things which I thought about later, was an advantage of the 
diary.
In my diary, no attempt was made to use the structured type of recording 
used in other research. People such as Mintzberg and Stewart pre-selected the 
type of data that they were going to record and they have often associated it 
with other structured data collected at the same time. In my view, the 
structured diaries and the structured forms which they used tend to emphasise 
the mechanistic part of the work of managers. I do not think that these 
mechanistic interpretations of the activities of managers, however senior they 
might be and however helpful the structure might be, would have allowed me to 
investigate the models used to describe management services activity.
. My diary permitted a wide range of topics to be recorded. Although the 
variety does make the analysis of the data difficult, it does reflect the richness 
and the variety of the work which I do. The extent to which it has been 
possible to deal with this variety using the analysis methods of Chapters 5 and 6 
is debatable, but it is probable that any data collection method which would 
have excluded this variety of data from the start would have produced a biased 
and unrealistic interpretation of the activity of a change agent.
Unlike other diaries, this diary has attempted to cover a long period of 
time as well as a wide variety of experience. Any method of collecting data 
over this length of time and in the variety of circumstances covered by the 
diary would produce a great deal of data. I doubt if  that amount of structured 
data could have been collected and analysed. Although difficult, it is worth 
restating that, despite all the difficulties of processing the data, the diary 
contained the facts which did seem significant at the time. This is a very
- 98 -
important quality. I think that the thesis has shown that it is possible to take 
diary material of this type and analyse its significance using the methods in the 
two case studies.
The variety of incident which is covered by this diary suggests that it 
would have been impossible to negotiate the use of any other medium within a 
reasonable time scale. For example, to have used a tape recorder in all of the 
variety of meetings which are covered in the diary would have been far too 
difficult to negotiate with the groups concerned. Altough it is claimed that 
people do rapidly settle down even when their meeting is being recorded, the 
type of meeting which is included in this diary was such that that might not 
have been the case. Often, very senior officers were involved and they would 
not accept interventions of this type in their meetings. In contrast to the 
difficulty of using methods such as tape recorders, the diary has involved no 
disturbance whatsoever to the incidents being recorded. There is no observer 
interference of which other people were aware.
A major advantage of the diary method was that it allowed the use of an 
inductive methodology which facilitated the discovery of things which were 
completely unknown at the start of the exercise. I did not know specifically 
what I was looking for. The diary allowed me to move the research forward 
and to record things better as time went on. The diary does show a significant 
improvement in the quality of data suitable for this research purpose after the 
first few weeks. Mintzberg stresses the need for an inductive method and 
Glaser emphasises this theme in his books on the Discovery of Grounded Theory. 
My research gained from this inductive method also.
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The disadvantages of using the diary method for my research
However, the diary method is not without problems and it is worth 
recording the limitations of diaries. One of the major ones must be the missing 
material which has been leftout of the record of events. Because of the length 
of time which the diary covered and the variety of incident recorded in it, it 
may be that there are examples of most of the activities which occur during 
twelve months. But that is not certain. Several varieties of relevant material 
do appear to be missing. On the whole, the diary makes no reference to the 
visual communications, the expressions on faces, and other indicators of mood 
which add to communication between people. Mintzberg in his analysis of 
diaries records desk work, telephone calls, scheduled meetings and tours as 
being useful ways of analysing his chronology records of chief executives. That 
set of classes of event reflects some of the missing material from my diary. 
Some important social calls are also missing from the basis such as those that 
one pays to friends. There must be other elements missing from the diary as 
well. Some of these are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
One problem of the unstructured diary is that it generates different levels 
of detail. Thus, some of the events recorded have long entries while others get 
a passing mention in one sentence. The structured methods of recording 
impose some measure of control over levels of detail. This diary does not 
impose any such discipline. Many factors, such as my mood or the time 
available to make the record, influence the quantity and quality of the diary 
entry.
Another part of this analysis states that the RHA is subject to major 
influences such as reorganisations which extend over a particular period of
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time. But there is also an annual cycle of such activities in the life of the RHA 
which has not featured in the diary. For example, the flow of the planning 
cycle and the way its parts fit into the various parts of the year, had 
considerable influence on the timetabling of some of the events in this analysis. 
Other regular RHA activities had a similar effect on the events recorded. Such 
RHA activities must have had a formative influence on the actions taking place 
within headquarters at any time. The pressure which such timetables bring to 
bear on negotiations is not reflected in this diary.
The diary must be regarded as a particular slice through the very varied 
and rich activity of the regional headquarters. The diary probably represents a 
very peculiar way of slicing through and selecting from that whole activity. 
Any other way of collecting sociological data would also have given at best a 
partial view and allowed a partial analysis to have taken place. One of he
peculiarities of the diary is that the way in which it selects from that RHA 
activity is not very precise. The only criteria for getting into the diary was 
that the event seemed to me to be significant at the time it was recorded. 
Although that criteria was a useful one to adopt, problems arise when one is 
trying to assess and establish the validity of the conclusions which have been 
drawn from the analysis of such material.
In the next two sections, I shall attempt to demonstrate the use of diaries 
in my research. Some of the features described above are illustrated by these 
studies.
The application of these methods to my own diary
The main objective of this research is to explore the nature of the last 
model of management services activity proposed in Chapter 2, i.e. the
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Corporate Activist, and to put forward extensions to it. Successful 
management services activity depends on having a range of specialised skills 
available and being able to use them within an organisation to bring about 
actual change in the ways the executive part of the organisation works. The 
discussion of the six models in Chapter 2 shows that changing organisations 
requires a wide variety of skills, some of which are not understood. The 
structure of skills and other factors concerned with change is complex and this 
is the subject matter of the studies in Chapters 5 and 6. It  is not sensible or 
possible to exclude completely any part of that change process from these 
studies, but the studies have been biased away from the numerical/technical 
activity and direct interpersonal interactions which are used to design and 
implement new systems. These studies are concerned more with making it 
possible to do project work in the first place and the processes through which 
one goes to make them an accepted and used part of the management system.
In the last model of management services proposed in Chapter 2, a degree 
of corporate activity is present. One of the main effects of this is to start 
breaking down the barriers, between the different Divisions of the RHA. Thus, 
as will become clear from the second case studies, inter-divisional teams start 
to be very important. In the same way, the laboratory project relies on 
teamwork, albeit of a different type. There is a lot more to making these 
teams work than having the right group or interpersonnel skills. Their political 
significance, relationship with other parts of the organisation, the way in which 
they change the power structure, their effects on status and pride, and so on, 
are all aspects of teamwork which need to be understood. Another aspect of 
corporate activity is the individual's set of meta-objectives. For example, if  
someone believes that a fundamental need is to change the power structure say
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in a given way, this will probably be more significant than his interest in 
facilitating group discussion or making the project work. The problem of 
refining the model of management services is explored from these and similar 
points of view in this research.
My own diaries
The basic research method has been to keep a diary of the activities of a 
Regional Management Services Officer over a period of fifteen months and to 
analyse that activity. All of that activity in the diary can be described as top 
level activity and a staff of over one hundred, forty of whom are technically 
qualified, exists to provide support for it. It  was not possible or useful to use 
tapes for direct recording for a variety of reasons. The diary covers a wide 
variety of circumstance and it would not have been possible to negotiate the use 
of tape. In any case, the period of time to get back to normal behaviour would 
have been prohibitive in this wide ranging project. Also, the data for this 
project was collected from a random set of events in order to get the necessary 
width of view into the analysis. The method of writing or dictating the diary 
immediately after the event suited this purpose better than tapes. The data is 
unstructured and there was little  point in considering the use of structured data 
collection such as questionnaires.
There are three different things which could have been done with the 
diary material. First, there is a great deal of detail about activities in the 
diary and a macro-study of the inter-personal activity involved would have been 
possible. Secondly, because of the time period covered by the diary, 
longitudinal studies of projects as they develop through time are possible. 
Thirdly, a macro-study of the pattern of the whole year's work was possible. On
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the whole a study of personal behaviour seemed unlikely to contribute greatly to 
understanding the strategic behaviour of a change agent and so the analysis of 
the data was orientated towards the other two possibilities.
The diary evolved during the period of the study. A definite attempt to 
record all the significant events on one project concerned with laboratory 
computing was made. At the end of the study the Laboratory Diary (Appendix 
2) was separated off from the Main Diary (Appendix 1). The only reason that 
an event became part of the diary was that it seemed important to me at that 
time. The diary does not purport to be an exhaustive or in any real sense 
structured or comprehensive account of the period covered. It  was written 
under a variety of circumstances, usually immediately following an event but 
sometimes several days later. Some of the diary was taped, some dictated and 
some prepared in longhand, depending on circumstances and the availability of 
time and recording material. Recording the material as soon as possible after 
the event was given a high priority. It  was thought useful to incorporate a 
small amount of material written for other uses because it illustrated specific 
issues.
The analysis of my diaries
The study described in Chapter 5, the analysis of my activities over long 
period is complex and is described below. However, the laboratory study does 
not require a lengthy introduction in this chapter and so I have chosen to 
introduce that study first so that the thread of this chapter remains clear.
The study of the laboratory services in Chapter 6 attempts to follow a 
very complex project over the fifteen months period. It  is an attempt to tell 
that story in the way it happened. The diary reflects the unstructured way in
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which the project was pushed and pulled between different sorts of objectives, 
value systems and other formative influences. The interplay of strong 
personalities, different perceptions of what is important and the need to fashion 
compromise all appear in the mixed up, random nature of the diary. The 
evolution of that project could not have been forecast accurately enough to be 
useful at the start of that work. The analysis of the project has two parts. 
The main themes of the work are separated from each other and then the major 
lessons to be learned are described. The study includes commentaries on the 
activity of the major participants, especially in so far as that activity is related 
to the factors mentioned above and is of particular significance for the 
development of a better model of management services activity.
The first study in Chapter 5 attempts to answer the question "What does 
an RMSO do over a period of fifteen months ?" The diary attempted to pick up 
all significant activity - but I feel sure that it failed to collect everything. 
However, the variety of the record is still very full and the study has attempted 
to put some structure into the activity which is recorded. The basic method 
was to split the diary into events, to construct categories of event and then to 
analyse the events in a given category.
For the first study, having the diary available made it possible to study 
the material and to try to put it in order. On the basis of that careful study, 
and taking into account certain predispositions of my own, a set of event 
categories was constructed. I then attempted to split the diary into events and 
to give these events categories. This appeared to confirm that the exercise 
was feasible. In order to facilitate subsequent manipulation of event data, a 
card was designed, see below. TYPE and BOOK refer to the source of the 
material in the original diary, one half being typed and the other hand written in
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a book. DATE of the event and EVENT were used to describe the event. It was 
thought that it might be possible to describe the objective of most events in 
GOAL but this proved not to be the case. Many events have elusive objectives. 
GOALS were used to extend the description of the event.
Figure 15
GG PROJECT ANALYSIS
DATE 28.4.78. TYPE 8EF 7B
EVENT First meeting of Planning Methods Team
GOALS 1. Give project some momentum
2. Clarify jts  status and importance
3. Clàrify my own intentions and role
4. Start getting the group together
E104 Paras. 159/160
' 1 1 2 : 4 7 or 9 10 IT 12 13 14
CRATE 1 LLUffi ETHOS RELATE 816 joPPORT»« H*TAIH FACIL. CONTROL OIL TROUBLE takeoverI
The categories 1 to 12 on the card were circled in order to provide an 
event categorisation. An event could have more than one category if  this
seemed appropriate. Not giving an event a category was also allowed. The
categories had the following definitions at the start of the exercise after the 
initial study of the diary material.
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To start a new pattern of thinking or actions. Often, 
simply to think about how to do these things.
Apart from conventional learning about new techniques, 
etc. from books and lectures, to watch and listen to 
people, groups and organisation behaviour in general. If  
possible to systematise that knowledge.
To change attitudes about what is acceptable or 
unacceptable. To change the organisation's culture.
Use or reinforce a personal or group relationship.
To pursue by all possible means some very important 
objective, often not possible without an ethos change.
To spy a chance to do something non-routinely and to 
take it.
To keep in repair and working order projects and 
organisations which are essentially all right and to make 
your ongoing concern for them known.
Make an agreed course of action work, especially by 
providing a resource or removing an obstacle in a way 
that only yourself càn do.
Pour oil on all kinds of troubled waters.
To keep control of a set of actions, occasionally in 
contradiction of my own delegation principles, because 
difficulties have occurred. If  the project is big enough, I 
manage it.
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11. Troubleshoot Togo and deal with a problem at any level if  I
judge it necessary.
12. Takeover To take back delegated control if  I think it
wise.
The order of these categories is important since it represents my considered 
view of their importance. They fall into three groups: 1 - 3, 4 -  8, and 9 -  12. 
These groups seem to me to be associated with three macro-activities:
(a) making new things possible;
(b) getting things done; 
and (c) getting out of trouble.
The criteria for classifying events
The purpose of this research is to develop a model of management 
services activity and a major part of that development is the set of categories 
described briefly above. It  was only after the completion of the analysis of 
data that a fuller definition of the categories became possible and that fuller 
definition is contained in Chapter 7. Although the categories evolved from the 
diary data, the initial definition of them was in general terms such as those 
given above and the criteria used to group events together were not precise. 
The events given a particular category seemed to f it  together within an 
appropriate set of umbrella-type concepts. It  is inappropriate to believe that 
the recognition of the similarity can be explained easily. This difficulty is 
strictly analogous to the logical problems of making computers recognise 
patterns which to human beings are obvious.
Some of the ideas behind the grouping of events are described below.
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Category 1 - creative thinking
A large proportion of management situations have occurred many times or 
are similar to ones which have. Although the set routines for dealing with 
them might involve senior management, they are fairly well established routines 
in which the risk factors are all low. Creative thinking must occur when no 
such set of routines exists or when the pattern for bringing together routines 
which do exist is very novel. Very often creative management thinking is a 
step by step manoeuvre concerned with what is at first sight, and possibly is in 
fact, an intractible problem. For example, trying to reorientate the National 
Review of Statistics presented organisational problems which had never been 
solved before and somehow several sets of ingrained patterns of national review 
behaviour had to be changed. Being clear about the objectives of my 
intervention and the way of achieving results demanded new and wise thinking.
Category 2 - learning
Organisations are always changing and adaptation to new circumstances is 
always occurring. It  is particularly important for mistakes to be recognised 
and for alternative and more appropriate responses to be devised. But it is also 
necessary to try to improve even the best performance. Learning appears to be 
most useful when it is feeding into the body of knowledge which can be used 
systematically to improve performance and this applies to both the new routines 
of individuals and the organisation. The variety of learning which should be 
occurring is very great and I do not think that it is useful to set down areas of 
learning which are more precise than those given above. It may be worth 
emphasising the breadth of the category by noting that much learning is based
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on just being aware of what is happening around one all of the time. Watching 
can be learning if  one wishes to make it such.
Category 3 - ethos creation
Ethos is the characteristic spirit of a community or organisation. It 
determines what is acceptable and how things can be done. Making it possible 
to manage differently and if possible, making an organisation want to improve 
continuously, is very important. Different people have different visions of 
what is desirable and what should be acceptable. If  an event is placed in this 
category, apart from its immediate interpretation, it should have an underlying 
significance concerned with organisational attitude. Thus, although arguing 
about nomination to the Technical Committee has an immediate importance in 
its own right, it has significance for ethos since it seeks to replace a "let's 
balance the disciplines" principle by "let's get the best technical advice".
Category 4 - relate
In a sense, one cannot do anything without relating to another person, 
except work by oneself. And so the category may seem at first sight to be 
redundant. However, logical encounters with other people purely about work 
simply do not occur. Other factors intrude and it is necessary to spend a great 
deal of time understanding and assessing the impact of them. Understanding 
the behaviour of other people and designing appropriate responses, i.e. relating 
to each other, is the context within which work proceeds. For an event to be 
classified as "relating", a significant part of that event should be about 
understanding the immediate approach of that person, responding to it and 
attempting to place that encounter within a longer term context. For example,
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being assessed by a boss might include a significant review of work done but it 
is really an encounter in which each is trying to get at what the other expects 
of him and, on that basis, to negotiate a future relationship.
Category 5 - big
Defining "big", the project that must succeed and represents a very 
significant achievement, is a key top management activity. Putting priorities 
on work is one of the things for which senior managers are paid their salary, and 
if  their judgement is in error, major organisational problems are inevitable. If  a 
project is given this classification, then added attention must be given to every 
aspect of that work and senior management must institute sufficient controls to 
ensure that the possibility of trouble is minimised. A wide variety of reasons 
can place a project near the top of the priority list. For example, I believed 
that if  the nature of the RHA Objectives could be changed, the whole Region 
could veer off in a new and better direction. But that was my judgement.
Category 6 - opportunism
Creative management is concerned with pushing forward to take 
advantage of the unexpected. To persue an objective which takes an 
organisation beyond its present limits implies taking risks because it is usually 
impossible to preplan every aspect of the project. Filling in some of the 
missing parts of a plan can depend on taking opportunities which just present 
themselves. I knew for certain that these were deep rooted objections to 
evaluation work. It was straightforward opportunism that got round those 
difficulties. The chief criteria for this category is the existence of an 
unexpected chance. Such opportunity taking justifies the event classification.
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Category 7 - maintain the division
The process of keeping in order all the routines necessary to make the 
Division work is a major task. Unfortunately, it did not get recorded in the 
diary to any great extent.
Category 8 -  facilitate action
In most management hierarchies, the necessary power and authority to get 
most things done is given to middle management. But projects do require the 
intervention of senior management to take action which removes certain types 
of blockage. Once the blockage has been eliminated, control should return to 
the lower level manager. The most common example of facilitate is the 
agreement to the provision of resources or the renegotiation of the appropriate 
level of resources for a particular job. Facilitate is different from Control 
because the responsibility for the work is and remains delegated.
Category 9 -  control
The criteria for deciding that an event is controlled rather than 
facilitated is the extent of power to direct work which is retained by myself. 
For example, interfering with the course of catering monitoring to an extent 
that required to obtain a response from Areas and Districts was control. I did 
not simply set a goal to be achieved. I took action designed to achieve it in a 
way which I selected.
Category 10 - oil the works
The range of actions taken by a manager can be regarded as being on a
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scale at one end of which are those for which he has clear responsibility and 
timescale and at the other no acknowledged responsibility at all. Being helpful 
outside one’s own area of responsibility is not necessarily a good thing and it 
costs time and effort. I do not feel obliged to make it up with someone after a 
difference of opinion but sometimes it is worthwhile.
Category 11 - troubleshoot
Troubleshoot is an event category used mainly for corrective project 
management or the avoidance of unforeseen or randomly generated events 
which will cause trouble. The essential features present for a situation to 
require this type of action is that it is outside a plan and that it has 
considerable actual or potential nuisance value. The examples of actual 
mishaps on projects are obvious but judging that an event is potentially 
dangerous, e.g. taking decisions on systems development into a national forum, 
is one of the less obvious cases for this category.
The origin of the categories and criteria for classifying events
As stated above it is very difficult to describe the precise process by 
which these categories came into existence. To some extent the three major 
groups of categories, making new things possible, getting existing work done 
efficiently and getting out of trouble, have been part of my management 
philosophy for a long time. Once the event cards had been created for an 
experimental sample of events a sorting process into these three piles was 
inevitable. In the same experimental sorting procedure some events had 
obviously to be separated out from the other, e.g. learning, controlling and 
troubleshooting. All three represent deeply ingrained personal behaviour 
patterns. The more subtle distinction, such as the one between ethos and
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create, were based on a much more intense look at the data. Although they are 
closely related, there are important differences between them and these are 
brought out in Chapter 5. It  was really during the sorting of the experimental 
cards that the differences between related categories started to emerge. Thus, 
once control and troubleshoot existed, it was inevitable that facilitate should 
slot in between them. Some events did not f it  into the emerging scheme. For 
example, it became apparent that "oil the works" was another of my activities. 
Although this concept is now a much better recognised part of my own activity, 
it was not a major part of my own conceptual management framework before 
this research work was undertaken.
I do not think that it is possible to describe how the conceptual framework 
of categories evolved in more precise terms, without running grave risks of 
post-hoc rationalisation. The categories evolved to some extent before the 
research started, but to a much greater extent during the sorts of searches for a 
pattern in the experimental event cards described above.
Sorting events into lists with the same category
Following categorisation, all of the events were split into lists with the 
same category. Events with more than one category were put in all the 
appropriate lists. In a given list, three groups exist, those with a single 
category, those in which that category is the most important, i.e. the lowest 
numbered, given to the event and the rest in order of the most important 
category given to the event. For each list, the event characteristics are 
discussed and two events from each list are discussed in detail. The events 
which were not categorised are discussed also. The implications of the event 
analysis for the set of categories and the general lessons to be drawn follow.
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During this process, it became apparent that 'Takeover' was associated 
almost exclusively with the major project discussed in Chapter 6. In the 
discussion contained in that chapter, considerable attention is given to the 
takeover process and consequences. Any good example of takeover discussed in 
Chapter 5 would almost inevitably have been taken from the Chapter 6 material 
and this would have been probably confusing and certainly repetitious. For this 
reason, takeover is not discussed in Chapter 5.
Summary
The basic research methods used in this thesis have been described in this 
chapter. The first part of that method was to keep two types of diary, one 
covering all of the significant events on the work of a management services 
officer, the other covering one long project. These two sets of data were 
analysed using grounded theory methods to produce sets of event categories and 
a description of the way in which events of these type were linked together into 
major projects. The first step in both studies was to split the diary into events 
and an event card was filled in for each event. From these two case studies, 
general properties of the event categories and the negotiating processes which 
link such events together into major proejcts were developed. The two case 
studies are contained in the next two chapters while Chapter 7 describes the 
general characteristics of both the set of event categories and the negotiating 
process.
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CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY 1 - THE NATURE OF THE RMSG WORK OVER A 
ONE YEAR PERIOD
Introduction
This chapter contains the first of the case studies described in Chapter 4 
and starts to put together the first part of the developed version of Model 6 
which is described briefly in Chapter 2. This case study is an attempt to 
describe the total activity which made up the work of the Regional Management 
Services Officer over one year excluding that described in the Laboratory 
Project.
The next section describes the way in which the event classification given 
in Chapter 4 has been used to analyse the diary events. The year's events are 
then described in simple statistical terms. The following eleven sections 
consider for each category the events falling uniquely into that category, and 
also events to which several categories were assigned including the section 
category specified. Apart from listing the relevant events, the sections discuss 
their main characteristics, the associations among categories, the event type 
variability and level of importance of the events as well as their relationship to 
the category as defined initially. Despite the care given designing the
categories, many events were not given categories and these events are 
described. A discussion of the issues raised completes the chapter. These 
categories are the first part of my main model.
The process of analysing data for this case study
Chapter 4 discusses the basic research methods used in this project. This 
Section explains some of the finer details of the methods used and the 
construction of later parts of this Chapter.
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The part of the diary used in this section consists of 247 events. These 
exclude laboratory project material. On average this represents 1.2 entries per 
working day and it is clear that a very selective process chose these events 
from those which made up the complete year. At various points in the 
Chapter, the nature of some of the missing material is discussed. Intentionally, 
the laboratory project received a disproportionate amount of attention in the 
diary during the year. The most significant events are not necessarily those 
receiving greatest space and, seemingly therefore, attention in the diary. 
However, at the time of being recorded, all the events did seem to be 
sufficiently significant to be recorded.
For data recording convenience three types of diary note existed, 
handwritten notes, dictated notes and typed early notes. All of these were 
read, and split into "events". An event is a set of activities which seem to fit 
together. Several events can happen in any given meeting or encounter. Each 
separate event, itrs date and reference to original diary was transferred to a 
separate Analysis Card. The event description on card was written at the time 
of transfer to cards. The Diary Event Reference Number used in the typed 
thesis diary at the beginning of paragraphs and in any event listing at the 
beginning of each of the category section below is the number of the event card 
in date order. The events were given categories on three different occasions, 
corresponding to the transfer of the three parts of the diary to cards.
During the process of selecting categories for events, some of the 
inadequacies of the codes became apparent. Apart from those events left 
uncategorised, the categorisation of events was based on judgement and it was 
felt that compromises were being made and information was being suppressed. 
The notes made during this process and discussed in the last section were
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important in using this analysis to refine the model of Management Services 
activity.
Statistical analysis of diary events
Figure 16 shows the number of events being given each category uniquely 
and being given each category along with others.
Category
Figure 16
Single Category Multiple Category Total
1 Create 3 9 12
2 Learn 34 19 53
3 Relate 3 20 23
4 Ethos 19 42 61
5 Big 13 40 53
6 Opportunism 3 0 3
7 Maintain 0 0 0
8 Facilitate 9 25 34
9 Control 11 23 44
10 Oil 0 4 4
11 Troubleshoot 10 14 24
12 Takeover 0 0 0




Single category events 
Double category events 
Triple category events 















Figure 18 shows the incidence of events with a single category and with 































Perhaps the most significant statistic is 25.5% for unclassified events. 
The commentary below shows that a significant proportion of these are 
concerned with defensive actions and with feelings of passive reaction to other 
peoples' initiatives, e.g. frustration. It is however significant that my own 
preconception and initial analysis of the job of RMSO did not admit that 
initiative does lie outside our control to this extent and that all that can be 
done is to react. The extent of the unclassified category also suggests that the 
job contains even greater variety than originally envisaged and this is confirmed 
below.
Apart from "learning", the statistics confirm that a large proportion of 
effort is spent on getting major pieces of work through the management system. 
Thus "big", "relate", "facilitate" and "control" are all high in both single and 
multiple category events.
"Learning" features high on both lists in table 3, and this confirms my own 
feeling for the importance of this activity. Although a significant proportion 
of this learning activity is of a very personal type, e.g. books, much of it is 
concerned with learning about how people act and how the RHA behaves as an 
organisation.
Although fairly low in the tables, I consider "creative thinking" and 
"changing the ethos of the RHA" to be important. The events in these 
categories contain the most far reaching parts of my activity.
Although surprising, the position in the table and the low number of 
"opportunistic activities" may reflect the actual situation. However, the 
statistics on "maintenance" must be misleading. A great deal of time is spent 
just chatting to management service staff, giving advice, discussing how things 
are going and performing similar activities. But they are mainly small
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activities in the office, meetings in corridors, chats over lunch and coffee, 
monthly reporting sessions and similar activities. These do not feature in the 
diary.
The statistics on multiple activity are interesting. Learning can be 
removed as a personal activity mainly and creating a particular change in the 
ethos is often a very deliberate action. Trying to get a "big" project launched 
can be a very single-minded activity. But, on the whole, multiple objectives 
can and must be pursued in most situations. In difficult situations, or open 
opportunistic settings, it is essential that each situation is used to the full. It  
would be surprising if the diary revealed otherwise.
Category 1 events -  Creative Thinking 
Table of Events
R e f .  No. D a te C a teg o ry E ve n t
65 5 . 4 .7 8 . 1 T a lk  t o  G i f f  R eynolds a b o u t how to  s o r t  
• o u t p roblem s co n n e cte d  w i t h  lu k e  Downs
85 1 7 .4 .7 9 . 1 T h in k  a b o u t th e  need  t o  g e t  e v a lu a t io n  o f  
p r o je c ts  on a f i r m  f o o t in g
129 2 3 . 5 . 7 8 . 1 T h in k  ab o u t p rob lem s co n n e cte d  w ith  
com p u ter s t r a te g y
143 1 0 . 6 . 7 8 . ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) Henry Jacques says t h a t  th e  C hairm an is  
a llo w e d  to  have two bees i n  h is  bonnet 
p e r  y e a r
165 3 . 7 .7 8 . ( 1 , 2 , 4 , 8 ) A t y p i c a l  Henry Jacques O b je c t iv e s  m e e tin g
95 2 4 . 4 .7 8 . ( 1 , 3 ) D iscu ss  th e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  s m a ll d e p a rtm e n ta l 
u n i t s  w it h  G i f f  R eynolds
236 2 1 .1 1 .7 9 . ( 1 , 3 , 5 ) T ry  t o  f i x  th e  R e g io n a l O b je c t iv e s  f o r  1979
21 5 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . ( 1 , 3 , 6 , 1 0 ) H enry Jacques f l o a t s  th e  id e a  o f  h a v in g  a 
d e p u ty . Get ny c o lle a g u e s  to  see i t  as 
an o p p o r tu n ity
77 1 3 .4 .7 8 . ( 1 , 4 , 5 ) C op ing  w ith  n in e  d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  o u t o f  
th e  Management S e rv ic e s  C o m m ittee , a t  
l e a s t  f i v e  b e in g  q u i te  im p o r ta n t
51 2 8 .3 .7 8 . ( 1 , 4 , 5 ) A g ree  th e  s e p a ra t io n  o f  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  
and th e  methods f o r  re d u c in g  th e  1979 P la n  
w it h  Henry Jacques
239 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 1 , 4 , 5 , 6 ) D is c u s s in g  th e  consequences o f  in t e g r a t e d  
w o rk in g  f o r  th e  1979 O b je c t iv e s  and g e t t in g  
H enry Jacques t o  a c c e p t them
78 1 3 .4 .7 8 . ( 1 , 5 ) B e in g  h ig h ly  c r i t i c a l  o f  head o f f i c e  f o r
t h e i r  a t t i t u d e s  to w ard s th e  N a t io n a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  R eview
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Analysis of Category 1 events
As defined originally, it was thought that part of being the RMSO would 
be initiatives which had very little  stimulus from sources other than my own 
thoughts. the twelve events do have that characteristic. At least two 
distinct types of initiatives can be distinguished;
(a) those which are work orientated, both at Regional and 
Head Office level; and
(b) those which are concerned with transforming situations 
in which a personal or social relationship of a long lasting 
variety causes difficulty.
Others exist, but they do not appear to have any particular characteristic.
These events are all "difficult" situations. This is especially so when they 
refer to people and the need to bring about radical change in a person's attitude 
or activity which is frequently the case. For example, the process of 
introducing a new evaluation methodology into the Region is difficult because it 
is perceived as useless and irrelevant, taking over "my patch", being too 
technical and so on by RTO members. The nature of what constitutes "creative 
thinking" in this instance is important. As well as having the original idea, such 
ideas must be framed in terms which particular individuals will grasp and with 
which they have sympathy. Known animosities and dislikes must be avoided. 
That requires careful thought.
Despite the fact that the list of Category 1 events is short, I am con­
vinced that some of them contain the seeds of radical transformations of the 
RHA role. The adoption of the ideas by the RHA and their subsequent develop-
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ment to a stage at which they could survive on their own require careful 
planning beforehand and nurturing during their early life. Equally, they require 
protection from the inevitable attacks when they are most vulnerable. Two are 
chosen from the list to illustrate their possible seminal character and the 
process by which their survival was engineered. These are the transformation 
of the nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives and the introduction of evaluation 
into the Region.
The 1979 Objectives were quite different from those of 1978. In 1978 
they had been put together in such a way that the actual objectives were those 
of the administrative divisions only. They had more to do with methods rather 
than with ultimate objectives of the RHA which should concern the care of 
patients. For example, planning and monitoring methods had featured very 
prominently. There was considerable frustration around RHA Headquarters 
because people like G iff Reynolds and myself fe lt that we must get nearer to 
the "sharp end of the business" of providing care rather than "bother about" 
methods all the time. "Sharp end" and "bother about" carry many overtones 
and reflect accurately our conversation at that time. It was therefore 
important that the way in which people, Henry Jacques in particular, thought 
about objectives and their nature was changed.
The first step in doing this was to provide a power base from which to 
influence both the medical and administrative sides of the Headquarters. It was 
clear that I would have to work through Giff Reynolds and Ralph Bains. When I 
opened up the subject privately with G iff Reynolds, he was in a state of 
disillusionment and frustration about Henry Jacques' attitude. My first job was 
to make him see that it was possible to make Henry Jacques change his 
approach this year, providing we played our cards right. We then fixed the
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nature of the paper which had got to be put to Henry Jacques to achieve this. 
It  was also clear that the approach had got to be constructed in such a way that 
it met G iffs  own personal requirements for work fulfilment. That approach 
must allow G iff to get to the front line positions in Districts and to work with 
people concerned directly with care groups. During that meeting we discussed 
the inter-authority problems which were bound to arise if an integrated project 
was launched which would not only plan events, such as the construction of a 
mental handicap policy, but would bring them to fruition in Districts. And so 
we did a private deal on nature and the way in which any approach was to be 
carried through. The deal was the form and content of the paper to be given to 
Henry Jacques, written by ourselves, and the way in which our meeting with him 
and other divisional heads was to be handled.
With Ralph Bains, the matter was entirely different. A perfectly good 
project existed and could be placed in the RHA Objectives providing it was 
possible to cut down the project in size, to sharpen up its definition and to 
remove it from the clutches of a committee. Achieving that was what we 
discussed. We knew that the committee would flounder until someone put 
forward a substantial piece of work. Promoting that project in a specific form 
was the tactic which we decided to adopt. Methods of dealing with the 
committee were agreed also.
G iff Reynolds and I then talked to our fellow Heads of Divisions about how 
we would play the meeting at which this new type of objective was discussed 
with Henry Jacques. We all tried to anticipate the problems which would arise. 
This was after G iff and I had talked them into this sort of approach for 1979. 
This was fairly easy because they were all rather tired of planning in isolation 
at a high level and never seeing any part of the real results of the planning
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coming into being at the District level. Armed with these preparations, we 
went to see Henry Jacques.
In fact, much to everyone's surprise, Henry Jacques provided no 
obstruction whatsoever, once it became clear that he was facing a viewpoint 
held strongly by all Heads of Division. Except that, as G iff Reynolds pointed 
out later, he did not accept specifically that this meant that all of "his pet 
things" like "staying in HQ" were going to have to be altered if  we were to 
negotiate this through the total Regional organisation. G iff noticed this. 
Despite the fact that Henry Jacques accepted the approach, he was in fact 
quite tough about the way in which such an integrated approach might be 
carried through and there was a lot of hard bargaining about how everyone 
would have to play their parts.
Similar tactics were used on the other 1979 Objectives. The result of this 
work is that the 1979 Objectives have quite definitely changed their nature. 
They are no longer only about development of management in Headquarters. 
They are wide ranging projects in which Districts must participate and, as a 
result of which, direct patient care should change in the fairly near future.
The introduction of an evaluation team financed from Research and 
Development Head Office funds is a complete contrast to the above work. 
Head Office wished to do this work in order to show the benefits of some 
standard computer systems by comparing them with ordinary manual systems. 
Head Office wished us to choose two hospitals in the Region and to measure 
performance there over a period of eighteen months. I was very keen on this 
work because of my own interests and background and because it was a way of 
getting more definite objective setting associated with the performance of our
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own manual systems. For a variety of reasons I had to negotiate this 
introduction of the evaluation staff through the system most carefully and this 
event illuminates the difficulties which occurred.
The event was getting the proposition through the RTO. Almost 
immediately in that RTO meeting there was a split between the Works Officer 
and the Nurse and the Treasurer and the Medical Officer. The former two 
were in favour of the work, especially if  it could be done at new hospitals where 
we would then have the benefit of using that data to design the operational 
systems for the new units. The Medical Officer was right against any such 
proposal because it came from R <5c D funds in Head Office, which he hated, 
having been associated with a committee concerned with R & D work for 
several years. The Treasurer disliked the suggestion intensely because he was 
trying to get extra staff and could not find a way around the staff control 
procedures. There was a violent argument about it being possible to launch HO 
R <5c D projects when their own favoured projects, the Treasurer's in particular, 
could not be funded. I had to point out how irrelevant that argument was, that 
we could not cut off our nose to spite our face and that we could not miss 
opportunities of this type. But the important feature of the meeting was the 
obvious heat that was going into the argument on an emotional level and in my 
view it represented the pent up feelings of these people against any 
development of an administrative division when their own was being, in their 
views, restricted and kept to a very low level indeed. They insisted that we 
approach the two Districts concerned and get their blessing, a foregone 
conclusion, but I am sure they were hoping that in some sense these Districts 
would refuse to have the work done. Of course, the Districts accepted the 
offer without hesitation and the project was launched. The RTO event 
demonstrates vividly the need to consider carefully what boulders will slip or be
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pushed into the way of a new project when it is being launched.
I went round to see Freda Simm afterwards just to make sure that at the 
following week's meeting we had a much smoother ride and that she tried to 
remove some heat out of Martin's objections before we came across them again.
Category 2 events - Learning 
Table of Events
R e f. No. Dace C ategory Event
37 1 7 .3 .7 8 . 2 P erso n a l re a d in g  o f  books
42 2 0 .3 .7 8 . 2 M a r t in  W illia m s  Is  t r y in g  to  p re p a re  Oncology 
M o n ito r in g  In  h is  own model r a t h e r  Chan Che R eg io n 's
45 2 1 .3 .7 8 . 2 Go and lo o k  around a n o th e r R e g io n 's  com puter 
b u ild in g
49 2 4 .3 .7 8 . 2 More p ers o n a l le a r n in g  books
66 3 1 .3 .7 8 . 2 Go o ut to  c o n s u lt  E l iz a b e th  about how to  r e la t e  to  
Freda Slmm
60 1.4k. 78 . 2 G a th e rin g  a comment ju s t  f o r  ny In s t r u c t io n
63 5 .4 .7 8 . 2 L earn in g  by re a d in g
68 7 .4 .7 8 . 2 P e rs o n a l le a rn in g  books
76 1 2 .4 .7 8 . 2 W atch th e  W il l ia m  Lee p e rfo rm  a t  th e  M o n ito r in g  Panel 
a t  Region
80 1 7 .4 .7 8 . 2 W atch Che* Chairm an gun f o r  one o f  Che m a jo r b u ild in g  
ex te n s io n s  a t  an Im p o rta n t DGH
87 1 9 .4 .7 8 . 2 L is te n  to  th e  Areas exp lo de on b e in g  re c o n s u lte d  by 
Henry Jacques ab o ut th e  com puter s tra te g y
93 2 1 .4 .7 8 . 2 R eading books, e .g .  th e  BBC one
109 2 .5 .7 8 . 2 S e l f  e d u c a tio n  on Crossm an's d ia r ie s
118 1 5 .5 .7 8 . 2 Henry Jacques sup po rts  th e  com puter b u i ld in g ,  l e  a 
s e p a ra te  m achine and a  b u ild in g
126 2 1 .5 .7 8 . 2 l i s t e n  t o  D av id  James t a lk in g  ab o ut M a r t in  W illia m s  
p e rfo rm in g  a t  th e  P la n n in g  P an e l
141 5 .6 .7 8 . 2 C o n s id e rin g  my own tru n c a te d  s t a f f  assessment by 
Henry Jacques
144 1 2 .6 .7 8 . 2 l i s t e n  to  R a lp h  Rains q u e s tio n in g  th e  p o l lC lc ln g  Chat 
Is  g o ing  on on p a t ie n t  c a re  and I t s  re le v a n c e
154 2 2 .6 .7 8 . 2 W atch ing  th e  R e g io n a l S c ie n t i f ic  Comm ittee
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Category 2 events - Learning 
Table of Events
Ref. No. Date Category Event
156 2 7 .6 .7 ^ . 2 L is te n  to  David James t a l k  about n o rm ative  p la n n in g  
in  th e  1960s
157 2 7 ,6 .7 8 . 2 L is te n  to  G i f f  Reynolds t a l k  about h is  a t t i tu d e s  on 
c o n f id e n t ia l i t y  in  p a r t ic u la r
164 2 9 .6 .7 8 . 2 The R & D N a tio n a l Committee push th ro ug h  the  
computer s tra te g y  in s p i te  o f  any o b je c t io n
171 2 4 .7 .7 8 . 2 Luke Downs comes down w ith  a ta k e o v e r b id  f o r  th e  
A ccounting  Systems Development
179 2 7 .7 .7 8 . 2 L ia is in g  w ith  M a r t in  W illia m s  over th e  use o f  norms 
in  p la n n in g
185 1 .8 .7 8 . 2 S e lf  e d u ca tio n  by r e la t in g  A l l is o n 's  book to  th e  
s ig n a l l in g  going on w ith  West Area
193 7 .8 .7 8 . 2 T h in k in g  about b ran d is h in g  san c tio n s  from  th e  
R egiona l le v e l
194 1 7 .8 .7 8 . 2 More thoughts and examples o f  s a n c tio n  b ran d is h in g
207 1 7 .1 0 .7 8 . 2 Watch A u th o r ity  Members d e a l w ith  th e  M ental Handicap  
Review . L is te n  to  W a lte r  Arne saying  th a t  Henry 
Jacques has gone c o n tro l  mad
214 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . 2 G if f  Reynolds and I  d iscuss th e  c o n tra ry  RTO feedback  
w hich we re c e iv e  from Henry Jacques and Luke Downs
2 1 6 " ' '2 3 .1 0 .7 8 " . 2 '  .......... W a lte r  A m e  says t h a t  Henry Jacques cannot t e l l  
anyone w hat he w ants c o h e re n tly
219 3 .1 1 .7 8 . 2 Go to  S a lto n  M ee tin g  o f  A d m in is tra to rs  about 
th e  t h i r d  d r a f t  o f  th e  Computer P la n
220 3 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  9 ) P ic k  up th e  Newton com puter problem  a t  S a lto n
240 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . 2 A t lu n ch  G i f f  Reynolds p o in ts  out th a t  Henry 
Jacques d id  n o t ac ce p t th e  in t e g r a t io n  
consequences o f  th e  1979 O b je c tiv e s
136 5 .6 .7 8 . (2 , 3 , 4 , 8) T y p ic a l O b je c t iv e s  M eetin g
84 1 7 .4 .7 8 . ( 2 . 3 , 8 ,1 1 ) Get Henry Jacques to  a c c e p t th e  Manpower P la n n in g  
systems co s ts  and th e  s t a f f in g
61 3 .4 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  5) F i r s t  m e e tin g  w ith  F reda Slmm
155 2 6 .6 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 ) Mark W ill ia m s  is  e x p re s s in g  deep concern  ab o u t me
209 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 ) R eact to  Henry Jacques t r y in g  to  r e - e s t a b l is h  
c o n tr o l  a f t e r  h is  fo r e ig n  t r i p
94 2 4 .4 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  5) T a lk in g  to  Henry Jacques on th e  com puter s t r a te g y
108 2 . 5 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  5) R e ce iv e  th e  N a t io n a l OR Group papers
105 2 8 .4 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  9 ) P e te r  T ibbs v i s i t s  th e  D e n ta l Comm ittee about 
m o n ito r in g  and re p o r ts  back to  me
143 1 0 .6 .7 8 . (1 . 2 ,  3 ) Henry Jacques says Chairm an is  a llo w e d  two bees 
i n  h is  bonnet p e r y e a r
165 3 .7 .7 8 . ( 1 , 2 , 4 ,  8) A t y p ic a l  O b je c t iv e s  M ee tin g
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Analysis of Category 2 events
If an essential feature of a management services division is to be a change 
agent, then knowing the likely response of people and parts of the organisation 
to types of proposals is important. Learning is about how to anticipate those 
responses. The number of events in this category confirms the relative 
importance of this category of event in the Management Services Division. It 





books, etc. ( 8 events)
-  reactions, support,
feelings (16 events)
- committee activity
and authority action ( 8 events)
-  big issues only ( 5 events)
Learning from books may reflect a personal disposition on my part, but it 
also reflects the type of Division which I wish to run and the type of RHA I wish 
to work for. In a variety of ways, I put pressure on the Division to take pride in 
being better informed and more technically and managerially qualified than 
their counterparts in other Regions. The Departments in the Division have 
book and training budgets, and I enquire about their use. I have put one 
manager on a three months course this year. I prompt people by asking "Have 
you read 'X' ?".
Having systematic knowledge about how other officers will react to types 
of suggestion or paper is at the heart of being a change agent. Often that 
knowledge is obtained through others, e.g. G iff Reynolds and I discuss feedback 
from the RTO. Knowledge of another's past, e.g. what did Martin Williams do 
with normative planning in the past ?, can be a key to playing the development
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of planning methods. G iff Reynolds' observation that Henry Jacques had not 
accepted the operational consequences of the 1979 RHA Objectives had 
bypassed me completely and the effect of that observation was salutory.
Knowing how the organisation will react is the third class of event. 
There are two aspects of this, groups such as committees and different 
organisational layers, i.e. Region, Area and District. Any officer is continually 
using groups and organisation levels to achieve his objectives. The extent to 
which their reaction can be anticipated is a major determinant of the success of 
the project work.
Learning about how work is progressing in the Division is very under- 
representated by the five events listed. The diary does not contain the almost 
daily contact which I have with my own divisional managers on work issues. 
The basic attack on all problems, especially those connected with management 
services tasks, is to learn about the situation so that alternative courses of 
action can be evaluated.
On reflection, the number of events categorised as learning only must be 
regarded as misleadingly high. Despite the fact that the diary recorded a group 
meeting as a learning experience, other reasons for being there must have 
existed. One reason could be that simply operating the system which 
constitutes RHA procedure takes up a large amount of effort in its own right - 
and none of that effort is recorded. For example, I go to six Member 
committees per year whether they are considering our project work or not. 
There does not appear to be anything particularly significant in the mixture of 
categories in multi-category event, possibly reflecting the fact that every event 
is a potential learning experience.
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Selecting from the list of learning activities is not easy but one of the 
events, namely, listening to the Regional Scientific Committee must be a 
choice. Even the written record of the meeting from paragraphs 233 onwards 
in the diary give the impression of the power which most of those people on that 
Committee exerted. The Committee advises the RHA itself directly and as 
such no officer has a right to stop its Minutes reaching the Members. At this 
particular Committee, it happened that there had been a flagrant ignoring of 
the advice which the Committee had given on the disposition of major scientific 
equipment. The fact that the money had been spent in the way chosen by 
management meant that there was less to be spent on Committee members' own 
larger departments in DGHs. The language used to express their disapproval 
and the way in which they chose to minute their feelings leave no doubt that 
they were very annoyed. The fact that they were not members of the 
management teams and therefore they did not determine the priorities which 
would be used to determine the disposition of new equipment was put to them. 
But the fact that their advice could be ignored, gently but specifically brought 
to their attention by the RMO, was not a statement which they were prepared 
to accept easily. Advice which did not carry the force which they thought 
appropriate to it  meant that they were going to threaten to resign, not to meet 
and withhold their further advice, etc., etc. The language used, the force 
behind their own contribution to the discussion, the parading of their own 
status, all reflected their power as they wished to see the situation.
It is interesting to note that in these exchanges the officers servicing that 
Committee did show due deference. Despite the fact that they were putting 
the managerial point of view, it was clear that they were handling the whole 
affair with kid gloves. Thus the remarks of the Committee were to be
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"transmitted to the RHA", and "their views would be carefully considered", and 
so on. That sort of statement was typical of the way in which what was being 
said on this Committee was handled.
I had gone there principally to introduce a set of technical papers on the 
new plan ning methods. It  was not clear why these particular papers had gone 
to the Committee in any case. It  appeared to be part of the "consultation 
routine" designed to ease in the new system. But, this is not a Committee to 
be dealt with routinely. Matters were not helped by the fact that this 
Committee had been left out of the published consultation timetable. Their 
disapproval of the papers was made quite plain and it was clear that they 
thought that I should do something about their remarks. The fact that these 
were only working papers as opposed to ones which had been put together 
specifically for them did not please them either and the English and everything 
else which they could not understand underwent a great deal of criticism. The 
other side of the coin was that if  they had not been consulted about these 
methods, then that would also have been a major issue that they would have 
taken up later on. The papers contained planning models and so two of the 
model minded members decided that they could criticise the work whether they 
understood it or not. They proceeded to do this using all the technical terms at 
their disposal. I chose to go on the attack pointing out to them that they were 
only working papers and the object of my coming to their Committee was 
simply to te ll them that methods of this nature would be used this year.
But perhaps the most interesting part of the meeting was concerned with 
their own papers. These were all couched in positive and almost aggressive 
terms. Arguments were not contained in the papers, no matter what course of
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action was being discussed. It was clear that, from their point of view, all they 
had to do was to write down the conclusion to which they had come. Matters 
such as the financial viability of their proposals or their acceptability to other 
professional groups were not even mentioned. There was never any question of 
the weight of the argument being in favour of a certain course of action, it was 
always that their considered opinion was that this was what ought to be done. 
Their papers stated clearly that their role was to be the wise men of the 
Region, adjudicating and deciding action and that other people's role was to 
take that advice and to act on it without question.
A totally different sort of event in the listing is that in which I obtained 
from David James information about planning methods in the 1960s. The event 
was a short exchange over lunch and was part of a general conservation. These 
planning methods were based essentially on normative methods in which 
provision was calculated on the basis of the population and the provision per 
thousand heads that you were supposed to give. There are all sorts of 
arguments which can be put against this type of method and many refinements 
to such methods have been developed over the last ten to fifteen years. The 
new planning methods being used in the Region are of a very different character 
than this rather simplistic approach. The important thing about these old 
methods is that they were the methods in use during the time that our own RMO 
was an active planner in his heyday. He has never moved beyond those methods 
except to refine very slightly the nature of the norms being used. As I listened 
to David talking about the use of these methods a decade or so ago, different 
aspects of the problems which we are having with Martin at the present time 
started to fall into place. It  was clear that any suggestion that normative 
planning of this nature was "old hat" and "prone to many many errors which just
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had to be avoided" would be quite unacceptable to Martin. In the same sort of 
way that David James had come to see the new planning methods as a 
development of his own planning technology, somehow or other we must show 
Martin that these new methods fall in with his somewhat older ideas. No 
solution to this problem has been found. With the support of the Chairman and 
Members, the new methods are being used, whether Martin likes it or not.
Category 3 events - Ethos Creation 
Table of Events
Event
Take F reda Sima around my own D iv is io n
1 am g e t t in g  s te a d i ly  more angry w ith  th e  Henry Jacques 
r e p o r t  on N a tio n a l S t a f f  Com m ittee and S t a f f  Developm ent
I  v i s i t  two RMSOs to  t a l k  about th e  S t a f f  Developm ent 
r e p o r t  and p rep are  comments f o r  o u r com m ittee
D is a s tro u s  sem inar w ith  th e  D iv is io n
Have a  pub lun ch  w ith  two com puter managers and t a l k  
ab o ut how to  fo rw ard  com puting i n  th e  MHS
T a lk  to  Henry Jacques about th e  com puter c l i e n t  groups
Go to  Bath to  t a l k  to  th e  A ir s in g  Group
S t a r t  f i x i n g  th e  n a tu re  o f  th e  1979 RHA. O b je c tiv e s
Go on f i x in g  th e  1979 O b je c tiv e s  i n  more d e t a i l
( 3 ,  4 , 3 , 6 )  G et th e  e v a lu a t io n  team  th r o u ÿ i  th e  RTO
Go to  th e  T e c h n ic a l Committee about p r in c ip le s  and  
RCSO n om inations
T a lk  to  Henry Jacques about com puter s t a f f in g  p o in ts  f o r  
th e  coming y e a r 's  s tra te g y
M eet N e i l  Moore and W i l l  C u rry  t o  push home th e  need o f  
th e  T e c h n ic a l Committee to  in v e s t ig a te  SPS i n  a n o th e r  
Region
Go to  th e  extended  Developm ent Group t o  ease i n  th e  new 
p la n n in g  methods
F ix  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  p la n n in g  methods o f  D avid  Jamces o ver  
lu n c h
M eet D avid  James to  fH x  th e  1979 p la n n in g  a c t io n  and  
t im e ta b le  f o r  methods t r a n s f e r
R e f. No. D ate C ategory
132 2 6 .5 .7 8 . 3
135 4 . 6 .7 8 . 3
218 2 .1 1 .7 8 . 3
33 3 .2 .7 8 . (3 ,  4 )
67 7 .4 .7 8 . (3 ,  4 )
120 1 5 .5 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 ,  5 )
170 2 0 .7 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5 )
228 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5 )
238 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5)
175 2 7 .7 .7 8 . 5 .
113 1 2 .5 .7 8 . (3 .  5 )
119 1 5 .5 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  5 )
169 1 4 .7 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  5 )
106 2 . 5 .7 8 . ( 3 .  5 . 8 )
241 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . (3 ,  5 , 8 )
243 6 .1 2 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  5, 8 , 9 )
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: No. Date
123 1 7 .5 .7 8 .
95 2 4 .4 .7 8 .
236 2 1 .1 1 .7 8 .
215 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 .
136 5 .6 .7 8 .
84 1 7 .4 .7 8 .
143 1 0 .6 .7 8 .
Category 3 events - Ethos Creation 
Table of Events
Category Event
( 3 ,  11) Henry Jacques gets  o th e r RAs in v o lv e d  in  th e  n a t io n a l  
systems resources problem
(1 ,  3) Discuss th e  v i a b i l i t y  o f  sm all u n its  such as t r a in in g ,
w ith  G i f f  Reynolds
  (1 ,  3 , 5) F ix in g  th e  1979 RHA O b jec tives  ag ain
[1, 3 , 6 , 1 0 )Henry Jacques f lo a ts  the id e a  o f  having a deputy -  
o p p o rtu n ity
,2 ,  3 , 4 , 8) A ty p ic a l  re v ie w  in  O b jec tiv es  -  f ly in g  k i t e s ,  l i a is in g ,  
re v ie w in g , e tc
[2, 3 , 8 ,1 1 )  G e ttin g  Henry Jacques to  accept th e  n a t io n a l systems 
costs and s t a f f in g  f o r  them
(1 ,  2 , 3 ) Henry Jacques says th a t  the Chairman is  a llow ed  two bees 
in  h is  bonnet p er y e a r
Analysis of Category 3 events
One of my main strategic aims in the management of my Division is to 
create a management atmosphere in which improvement and change and the 
seeking for these two things is part of the ordinary way of life. It  is important 
to spread that way of looking at things to other parts of the RHA as well as my 
own Division. Because of this part of my basic attitude, all of the activities 
listed in the diary will have made some contribution to that steady 
transformation of the way in which the RHA behaves. But some activities are 
more influenced by this strategic aim than others. Those listed above seemed 
to me to fall in that class at the time of coding the events. It  was difficult to 
choose events to illustrate this category because of the above reasons and 
because it is hard to judge which events really are significant. However, there 
are two events which seem to deserve to be selected as the ones to illustrate 
my concern to transform peoples' attitudes and the way in which they regard 
both officers and the contributions from them which they value most highly.
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The first is the effort which I made to introduce a new RTO member to the 
Division, while the second concerns the activities surrounding the Report of the 
National Staff Committee.
The diary records that I went to great trouble to engineer a meeting with 
Freda, the Regional Nurse, at which I was well informed about how to approach 
Freda and how to discuss important issues with her. That being accomplished, 
the next step was to take Freda round the Division and to show her some of the 
things which we did. I made sure that this was not just a "nice trip" with 
everyone saying "Hello" at the right time. We went through a few of the things 
which were going on in each room and their possible relevance to those issues 
which she would be concerned about. Each manager was given the chance to 
make his mark and to say something of the top-level skills which he could put at 
her disposal. Ideas were floated, contacts were made. The exercise was a 
two-sided affair. A ll members of the various sections were introduced, at least 
as a group. During the whole of the visit, it was being made clear that we 
would like to contribute to nursing development in a unique way and the 
possibilities were being opened up. That visit was designed to influence Freda's 
attitudes to management services for a very long time to come.
The second event was much more positive and could be described as 
traumatic. The National Staff Committee, of which Henry Jacques is a leading 
member, had set up a sub-committee under Henry Jacques as Chairman, which 
had issued a report on the development of administrators. It  was completely 
biased towards the general administrator, or so the various specialist groups 
under administration such as personnel and management services thought. We 
considered it to be a disaster. Apart from being incredibly arrogant about the
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skills which they thought the generalist possessed, which we would dispute 
heatedly, it put forward a view of the future of specialist services which 
seemed almost designed to be rejected by them and to provoke their anger.
The first reaction was an explosion. I wrote my views in a report for our 
own management services and made sure that a copy went direct to Henry. 
G iff Reynolds and all the other specialists did likewise. Although not recorded 
in the diary at length, an Objectives meeting followed at which Henry was taken 
to task. He opened by explaining that he had worked hard to cut down the 
excesses of some of his generalist colleagues. This caused hoots of derision and 
unfunny laughter. Henry was nailed for ’using' specialists and then denying 
them their place in the sun. He wanted to use their skills but not to encourage 
their competition for his job. The exchange was hard-hitting and blunt.
My second reaction was to consort with my fellow RMSOs in order to get 
a considered reaction into the Staff Committee. Much effort went into making 
that document a wise, responsible comment which stood some chance of not 
being ignored. Given the make-up of the National Staff Committee, that is 
probably a pious hope. The wise comment was put together privately and the 
best political and drafting skills were brought together to do it. Even Henry 
Jacques would be unable to ignore points made in that memorandum specifically 
for his benefit.
These two contrasting events illustrate that changing the basic attitudes 
of the NHS takes many forms. Most of them are based on helpful and gentle 
interventions, but this is not the case invariably.
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Category 4 events - Relate
Table of Events
R ef. No. Dace Category Event
10 3 0 .1 1 .7 8 . 4 A r e c o n c i l ia t io n  w ith  Luke Downs
36 2 8 .2 .7 8 . 4 Ralph Rains and I  t r im  down M a rtin  to  t a l k  about our 
D iv is io n a l Work Programme
50 2 8 .3 .7 8 . 4 Luke Downs is  t r y in g  to  g et a p o s it io n  on Che Wessex 
Data P ro te c tio n  Member Group and workings
52 2 9 .3 .7 8 . 4 R e la tin g  to  Wayne Cook on computer s tra te g y  and 
m o n ito rin g
71 1 1 .4 .7 8 . 4 L ia is e  w ith  M a rtin  and Ralph about work f o r  the  
D iv is io n
73 1 1 .4 .7 8 . 4 Try to  get Henry Jacques to  do something and to  see 
sense about Domestic M o n ito rin g
75 1 2 .4 .7 8 . 4 L ia is e  w ith  Steve Todd on computing and c h i ld 's  p ro je c t
107 2 .5 .7 8 . 4 G e ttin g  ho ld  o f  Henry Jacques o r ra th e r  f a i l in g  about 
th e  p lan n in g  o f  the p lann ing  methods papers fo r  the RTO
116 1 2 .5 .7 8 . 4 L is te n in g  to  M a rtin  and B arry  Hunt going on about th e  
Region, our Head O f f ic e ,  th e  s c ie n t i f ic  m arket, e tc
125 2 1 .5 .7 8 . 4 T ry in g  to  understand  M a rtin  on p la n n in g
130 2 3 .5 .7 8 . 4 A s t a f f  assessment w ith  Henry Jacques
133 2 6 .5 .7 8 . 4 Take my own s t a f f  out f o r  a b ir th d a y
138 5 .6 .7 8 . 4 Henry Jacques g ives the go ahead fo r  th e  West and South 
Area computers p ro v id in g  the Areas pay
183 2 8 .7 .7 8 . 4 Commiserate w ith  David James on th e  behaviour o f  th e  RTO
192 7 .8 .7 8 . 4 A d v is in g  P e te r  Tibbs on making h is  name on p lan n in g
196 1 1 .9 .7 8 . 4 L ia is e  w ith  th e  Head O ff ic e  OR S erv ice  and South D orset 
p ro je c t
208 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . 4 Heads o f  D iv is io n  d iscuss RTO and how to  d e a l w ith  i t
212 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . 4 M a rtin  is  going on and on and on about re search
213 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . 4 A g g ravation  w ith  Henry Jacques o ver cover and h is  own 
s e c re ta ry
14 5 .1 2 .7 7 . (4 ,  5) O b jec tiv es  m eeting to  f i x  1978 RHA O b jec tiv es
15 5 .1 2 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) T a lk  to  Ralph and M a r tin  about th e  1978 O b jec tives
53 2 9 .3 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) Agree th e  methods and th e  p ro d u ctio n  s p l i t  w ith  David  
James
113 1 2 .5 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) V is i t  P ro fes so r Pat Roberts about th e  N a tio n a l OR 
Committee
173 2 7 .7 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) A tra u m a tic  RTO t r y in g  to  g et th e  e v a lu a tio n  team 
through i t  and o th e r th in g s
174 2 7 .7 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) A tra u m a tic  RTO connected w ith  th e  la c k  o f  computer 
s t a f f
189 4 .8 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) Meet Freda and W in n ifre d  to  d iscuss th e  Nursing  
Development Group
198 1 4 .9 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) A p r iv a te  RMSO m eeting
200 1 8 .9 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) An O b jec tiv es  and a S eniors O f f ic e r s ' m eeting -  a 
ty p ic a l  one
201 2 6 .9 .7 8 . (4 ,  5) T a lk  to  Henry Jacques about computer s tra te g y  a f t e r  
h is  re tu rn  from th e  S ta tes  to  get him to  see more
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R e f. No. D ate C a te g o ry
13 5 .1 2 .7 7 5 , 8 )
54 3 0 .3 .7 8 5 , 8 )
111 8 .5 . 7 8 . ( 4 ,  5 , 8 )
190 4 . 8 . 7 8 . 5, 9 )
245 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  6 )
134 2 6 . 5 . 78 . ( 4 ,  7 , 8 ,1 1 )
12 1 .1 2 .7 7 . ( 4 ,  8 )
35 1 2 .2 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  8 )
100 2 5 .4 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  8 )
20 1 7 .1 2 .7 7 . ( 4 ,  8 , 1 1 )
16 5 .1 2 .7 7 . ( ^ 9 )
55 3 1 .3 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  9 )
57 3 1 .3 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  9 )
186 1 . 8 . 7 8 . ( 4 ,  9 )
247 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  9 )
81 1 7 .4 .7 8 . (4 ,  1 1 )
82 1 7 .4 .7 8 . ( 4 ,  1 0 )
77 1 3 .4 .7 8 . ( 1 ,  4 ,  5)
165 3 . 7 . 7 8 . U ,  2 ,  4 ,  8 )
51 2 8 .3 .7 8 . ( 1 ,  4 ,  5)
239 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 1 ,  4 ,  5 , 6 )
61 3 . 4 . 7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 )
155 2 6 .6 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 )
209 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  4 )
33 3 . 2 . 7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 )
67 7 .4 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 )
120 1 5 .5 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5 )
Category 4 events - Relate
Table o f Events
Event
F in a l  m e e tin g  w i t h  D a v id  James and H enry Jacques to  
ta k e  o v e r  th e  p la n n in g  m ethods n e x t y e a r
A g ree  th e  p la n n in g  m ethods and th e  p la n  p r o t e c t io n  
w it h  th e  RTO •
R e - w r i t in g  C om puter S tr a te g y  f o r  H en ry  Jacques
Feed back to  P e te r  T ib b s  h is  e f f e c t  on F re d a  by h is  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  w i t h  h e r  m e e tin g
A week f u l l  o f  p a r t ie s
The N a t io n a l  System  C om m ittee  w i t h  H en ry  Jacques  
and Luke Downs and a l l  th e  r e s t  o f  them
G et th e  U s e r Group C ha irm an  o n to  Tony P e e r 's  s id e  
o v e r  th e  C om puter S tr a te g y
Lack o f  c o -o p e r a t io n  fro m  Com puter S e rv ic e s  on my 
f i r s t  P h .D
Send memo t o  H enry  Jacques on th in g s  we a r e  n o t  
c o m m u n ica tin g  a b o u t
 Get th e  Newtown co m p u ter re p la c e m e n t th ro u g h  th e  RTO
T a lk  t o  L io n e l  Dunn ab o u t h is  g i r l  in  s t a t i s t i c s  
whom we em ploy
A m e e tin g  o f  Heads o f  D ep artm e n t
R e -a s s e r t  my c o n t r o l  o f  d e p a rtm e n ts
S ig n a l l in g  to  Graham P a te  t h a t  I  mean b u s in e s s  on 
C a te r in g  M o n ito r in g
C o n s o r t in g  w i t h  R a lp h  on th e  m a jo r  in fo r m a t io n  p r o je c t
Respond to  ru d e  summons by Luke Downs on a c c o u n tin g
A r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  w i t h  Luke Downs a f t e r  a c c o u n tin g  b low  
up r id e  d o w n h il l
C op ing  w i t h  n in e  d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  o u t o f  th e  Management 
S e r v ic e s  C o m m itte e , a t  l e a s t  f i v e  b e in g  s i g n i f i c a n t
A g ree  th e  s e p a r a t io n  o f  th e  p ro d u c t io n  and m ethods f o r  
th e  19 79 P la n  w i t h  H enry Jacques
f o r  1979 O b je c t iv e s  and g e t t in g  H enry Jacqu es to  
a c c e p t some w h ic h  he does n o t l i k e
F i r s t  m e e tin g  w i t h  F re d a  Simm
M a r t in  i s  c o n c e rn e d  a b o u t me.'
R eac t t o  H en ry  Jacqu es  t r y in g  t o  r e - e s t a b l i s h  c o n t r o l  
a f t e r  A m e ric a n  t r i p
A d is a s t r o u s  s e m in a r  i n  th e  D iv is io n
A pub lu n c h  w it h  tw o RCSOs a f t e r  th e  T e c h n ic a l C om m ittee  
T a lk in g  to  H en ry  Jacqu es  a b o u t C l ie n t  Groups
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Category 4 events - Relate
Table of Events
Ref. No. Date Category Event
170 2 0 .7 .7 8 . (3 ,  4 , 5) V i s i t  to  B ath  w ich  nurses
228 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5) F ix  th e  n a tu re  o f  Che 1979 O b je c tiv e s
238 2 4 ,1 1 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5) F ix in g  th e  1979 O b je c tiv e s
175 2 7 .7 .7 8 . ( 3 ,  4 ,  5, 6) G et e v a lu a t io n  th ro u g h  Che RTO
136 5 .6 .7 8 . ( 2 ,  3 ,  4 , 8) T y p ic a l O b je c t iv e s  M eeting
Analysis of Category 4 events
Relating to other people and groups is a key activity for a change agent. 
It  is not therefore surprising that it appears frequently in the diary. The variety 
of the relationships created is interesting and the picture presented by the list 
of events is complex. A possible breakdown of the group of events would be to 
rank them according to the degree of aggression which they show. At one end 
of the scale, these events show a sympathetic, helpful stance; at the other a 
very distinctly defensive or hostile attitude is apparent. It  appears often that 
the attitude adopted is a positive response to the perceived stance of the other 
party to the relationship, whilst on other occasions, a positive position has 
obviously been adopted as a matter of policy.
The verbs and other words which have been chosen inadvertently to record 
in the diary and to summarise on card each event, reflect the reality of relating 
as part of being effective. The positive course of action aspect of the work 
produces words like "re-assert", "cope with", "fix", "get X through Y", "agree 
the method". Negotiating situations produce "signalling", "consorting", 
"reconcile", "discuss", "talk to", "liaise with" and "relate to". Frustration 
produces "rewriting", "lack co-operation", "commiserate". The "typical
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objectives meeting" sums up a very complex negotiation on quite high level 
topics. The "private" RMSOs meeting is only one instance of many hard 
bargaining meetings. "Trauma", "aggravation", "going on and on" are 
appropriate words. A "pub lunch" is at the opposite end of the spectrum from 
"a lunch with important nurses in Hillbury in an oak panelled historic room", but 
both occasions are a negotiating lunch. The texture of relate is rich, violently 
varied and would be lost if  transformed into analytical terms.
The range and variety of relationship contained in the diary is very large. 
Cementing Divisional relationships at a birthday or Christmas drink meeting, 
talking to an immediate subordinate or superior, doing deals with equals, getting 
the support of outside agents and many other types of activity are all events in 
this category. It  must be possible to analyse the activities called relating into 
a more structured order but that structure would be complex. The descriptions 
identified in the above paragraph give a clue to the further categories which 
might be used. But, it would probably be a mistake to believe that relating is a 
highly structured activity. Given a particular set of objectives, an 
organisational setting and particular individuals in a given mood, each such 
situation must be managed creatively even if  particular patterns of behaviour 
from the past do shed light on the way forward in a given setting.
Two examples to illustrate "relate" have been chosen from the above list 
of events. They are happenings at completely opposite ends of the spectrum. 
In the first case, I am attempting to talk to a professor at a very high level who 
is going to sit on a national committee. It  is my strong view that he may be 
able to help me to do something on that committee which will be very difficult 
for me to achieve by myself, I think that he will be sympathetic to the course 
of action which I want to follow but it is absolutely vital that we have a degree
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of understanding and sympathy before the operation starts. At the other end of 
the spectrum I am describing one small event in a running battle with a man in 
the organisation, Luke Downs. Despite the fact that he is a top person, he is 
irratic in the extreme. At one time he will be all that is reasonable and at 
another time the course of actions which he is proposing and is taking could be 
so disastrous as to be unbelievable. In the first case the event records a very 
positive action on my part which took a great deal of trouble to arrange and 
cost me a day out of the office. In the second case, the event was one of those 
random happenings which occurred at the drop of a hat one morning.
As stated above, the background to my visit to this professor was that I 
wished him to support a course of action which I was trying to follow on a 
national committee. It  was not a foregone conclusion that he would do this but 
in my view there was a good chance that he may choose to do so. The event 
itself was a lunch for the two of us in a private roof garden. We had a sherry in 
the roof garden and started with all the usual pleasantries. Amongst those was 
his conversation with the butler who was serving us about the local football 
team which they both supported. It  was clearly important that I should help 
that conversation along and I did this. And so a relaxed atmosphere was set up. 
The next phase of the operation was to establish my credentials. Of course this 
was not done in an open manner, simply that we got round to talking of times 
past. I established that I had worked for several wellknown figures in his field 
whom I knew that he would respect. I also knew several of his friends and they 
were mine as well and we talked about them in a kindly manner. He knew that 
I had done things for the Society of which we were both members in the past 
and all this was gently reviewed.
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Over lunch we actually got onto the problem that we wished to talk about. 
I had given him some warning in a letter about the nature of this and so we 
started to explore it very very gently. I made the point that we really did 
require more active participation by the person concerned, and that this had not 
been forthcoming for a very long time. I explored the reasons why I thought 
that this might be the case, especially his position in the organisation and the 
position of that organisation with respect to the NHS. Pat listened and nodded 
and then proceeded to add some facts which I did not know. I made it quite 
clear that I could see that there might be very little  that he could do, on the 
other hand there might be very much that he could do because of certain types 
of entree which I did not have. We parted, Pat saying that he was not sure what 
he could do but he would think over things. But much more important than 
that, we parted good friends and this has been proved by the fact that 
subsequently I have had two invitations to his more important seminars.
The other event referring to Luke Downs and myself is at the very 
opposite end of the spectrum. One morning I received a phone call summoning 
me in a non too polite way to attend immediately because he wished to talk to 
me about a problem. I was told that he had two people with him, whom he did 
not identify, nor did he identify the problem. The tone of his voice and all that 
he said put me in a bad mood and so, despite the fact that I was doing nothing in 
particular, he was told that I could not come for a quarter of an hour. I sat 
there more or less wasting time because of the irritation that I had suffered. I 
arrived in his room to find two senior officers and to discover that they were all 
talking about a well rehearsed, wellknown problem concerned with one of the 
standard computer systems. Luke proceeded to harangue me and rail on about 
lack of progress on this particular issue. A t first I was fairly reasonable and
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just pointed out what the facts were, despite the fact that he already knew 
them or at least had been told them. A variety of problems were contributing 
to the delay and I had established that they were all beyond our control. I was 
getting more and more angry at being shown up in front of two people. And so 
I decided quite firmly to shut him up by shouting at him. And this I proceeded 
to do, interrupting him in as rude a manner as he had interrupted me formerly. 
If he shouted lounder, I shouted lounder. The two visitors were obviously 
embarrassed and started to join in on my side, since they themselves knew the 
facts equally as well as either Luke or myself. I proceeded to talk reasonably 
to them and shout at Luke at the same time.
There were no winners in this interchange, but equally there were no 
losers either. The interview ended by my walking out leaving the situation 
exactly as it was when I walked in. I imagine that both of the visitors changed 
their opinions of both of us, they have certainly treated me somewhat 
differently since. They both realise that I am prepared to fight if  necessary 
and they test by reaction to proposals more often and with more circumspection 
than used to be the case.
Later that night, Luke passed me on my regular walk home down the hill. 
I decided that I had better accept the lif t  which he offered and we then passed 
two or three minutes just chatting to one another as normal individuals, as if  
nothing had happened. Somewhat sheepishly he did say that he had got over the 
thing. And so we started talking to each other normally again. Til the next 
time !
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Category 5 events - Big
Table of Events
s f . No. Date Category Event
501 2 4 .1 1 .7 7 . 5 The v i s i t  to  'D ' Region about th e  N a tio n a l S t a t is t ic s  
Review
22 1 8 .1 2 .7 7 . 5 Meet Head O f f ic e  w ith  two RMSOs to  t a l k  about th e  
N a tio n a l S t a t is t ic s  Review . They w ere n o t In  a s ta te  
to  do th is
66 7 .4 ,7 8 . 5 Push my v e rs io n  o f  th e  T e c h n ic a l C om m ittee's comments 
on th e  R & D S tra te g y
102 2 7 .4 .7 8 . 5 V i s i t  Birmingham to  d r a f t  s tra te g y  f o r  com puting f o r  
th e  T e c h n ic a l Committee
103 2 7 .4 .7 8 . 5 F orm u la te  an NHS v ie w  on O p e ra tio n a l Research
114 1 2 .5 .7 8 . 5 Go to  th e  OR Committee fo llo w in g  my v i s i t  to  
P ro fe s s o r P at Roberts
127 2 3 .5 .7 8 . 5 Henry Jacques e d i ts  and "adds to "  th e  Area comments 
on th e  Computer S tra te g y
191 4 .3 .7 8 . 5 Meet W in n ifre d  B lack  and Freda Simm In  my o f f ic e  to  
f i x  th e  f i r s t  m eeting  o f  Che Nurse Development Group
197 1 3 .9 .7 8 . 5 Go to  th e  T e c h n ic a l Committee in  London
224 8 .1 1 .7 8 . 5 G et th e  s tan d ard  p a y r o l l  o rd ered  and away a t  Che 
T e c h n ic a l Committee
230 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . 5 Try to  g e t th e  In fo rm a tio n  p r o je c t  f o r  1979 launched  
w ith  Henry Jacques
234 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . 5 T e c h n ic a l Committee d iscusses C entre  o f  R e s p o n s ib il i t ie s  
c o n tra c ts  f o r  work
237 2 1 .1 1 .7 8 . 5 F ix  th e  P o s it iv e  H e a lth  O b je c t iv e  f o r  1979
104 2 8 .4 .7 8 . ( 5 ,  8) F ix  th e  f i r s t  m eetin g  o f  th e  P lan n in g  Methods team
181 2 7 .7 .7 8 . ( 5 ,  8) T a lk  t o  l io n e l  Dunn about E v a lu a tio n  Team work in  h is  
A rea
235 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 5 ,  8) T ry  to  g e t s o lu t io n s  to  s e rio u s  s t a f f in g  problems  
th ro ug h  complex R eg io n a l and N a tio n a l m achinery
58 1 .4 .7 8 . ( 5 ,  8,  9 ) d e a r  th e  P la n n in g  Methods e f f o r t  w ith  P e te r  Tibbs
231 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 . (5 ,  9 ) Get th e  D iv is io n a l  Heads to  a g re e  th e  1979 In fo rm a tio n  
P ro je c t  w ith  GG I n  c o n tro l
242 3 1 .1 1 .7 8 . (5 ,  9 ) F ix  th e  f i r s t  P o lic y  Group by m eeting  Henry Jacques 
and Tony Peers
112 8 .5 .7 8 . (5 ,  11) Heads o f  D iv is io n  d iscuss cm nputer b u ild in g  and th e  
1903T rep lacem en t
178 2 7 .7 .7 8 . (5 ,  11) D r lp p ls h  Freda su p po rt f o r  th e  E v a lu a tio n  Team o u ts id e  
o f  th e  RTO m e etix^
236 2 1 .1 1 .7 8 . ( 1 .  3 , 5) F ix  th e  1979 RHA O b je c tiv e s
51 2 8 .3 .7 8 . ( 1 ,  4 , 5) Agree th e  s e p a ra tio n  o f  th e  p ro d u c tio n  o f  and th e  
methods f o r  th e  1979 P la n  w ith  Henry Jacques
77 1 3 .4 .7 8 . ( 1 .  4 , 5) Cope w ith  n in e  d i f f e r e n t  th in g s  coming o ut o f  th e  
M augem ent S e rv ic e s  Com m ittee, a t  le a s t  f i v e  o f  w hich  
a re  s ig n i f ic a n t
239 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 . (1 ,  4 , 5 , 6) D iscuss th e  consequence o f  in te g r a t in g  w orking  f o r  
th e  1979 O b je c tiv e s  and t r y  to  g e t Henry Jacques to  
accept th is
78 1 3 .4 .7 8 . (1 ,  5) G ive Head O f f ic e  a l o t  o f  s t ic k , on th e  S t a t is t ic s
Review
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Category 5 Events - Big
Table of Events
Ref* No. Date Category EvenC
136 5 .6 .7 8 (2 ,  3 , 5 , 8) T y p ic a l O b jec tives  M eeting
94 2 4 .4 .7 8 (2 , 5) T a lk  to  Henry Jacques about the Computer S tra teg y
108 2 .5 .7 8 (2 , 5) Receive th e  N a tio n a l OR Group papers
120 1 5 .5 .7 8 (3 , 4 , 5) T a lk  to  Henry Jacques on the C lie n t  Groups fo r  
Computing
IZO 2 0 .7 .7 8 (3 , 4 , 5) V is i t  H i l lb u ry  w ith  th e  nurses
228 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 (3 , 4 , 5) F ix  the n a tu re  o f  th e  1979 O b jec tives
238 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 (3 , 4 , 5) F ix  th e  1979 O b jec tives
175 2 7 .7 .7 8 (3 , 4 , 5, 6) Get the E va lu a tio n  Team through th e  RTO
115 1 2 -5 .7 8 (3 , 5) Go to  the T echn ical Committee
119 1 5 .5 .7 8 (3 , 5) T a lk  to  Henry Jacques on computer s ta f f in g  p o in ts  
fo r  th e  P lan
169 1 4 .7 .7 8 (3 ,  5) Meet N e il  Moore and W i l l  Curry to  push in  Head 
O ffic e  the a u d it  v i s i t  on p a y ro ll
106 2 .5 .7 8 (3 ,  5, 8) An extended 'D* Group on P lann ing  Methods
241 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 (3 , 5, 8) F ix  th e  p lann ing  systems t r a n s fe r  over lunch
243 6 .1 1 .7 8 : (3 , 5, 8, 9) Meet David James to  f i x  the 1979 p lann ing  a c tio n  
plus methods and th e  t r a n s fe r  t im e ta b le
14 5 .1 2 .7 7 (4 , 5) An O b jec tives  M eeting to  f i x  th e  1978 RHA O b jec tiv es
15 5 .1 2 .7 7 (4 , 5) T a lk  to  Ralph Rains about M a rtin  W illia m s  and th e  
1978 O bjec tives
53 2 9 .3 .7 8 (4 ,  5) Agree the methods and p ro du ctio n  s p l i t  w ith  David  
James
113 1 2 .5 .7 8 (4 , 5) V is i t  P ro fesso r Pat Roberts about the N a tio n a l OR 
COTnnittee
173 2 7 .7 .7 8 (4 , 5) A tra u m a tic  RTO t r y in g  to  get th e  E va lu a tio n  Team 
accepted
174 2 7 .7 .7 8 (4 ,  5) A tra u m a tic  RTO on th e  lack- o f  computer s t a f f
189 4 .8 .7 8 (4 , 5) Meet Freda and W in n ifre d  to  d iscuss th e  Nurse 
Development Group
198 1 4 .9 .7 8 (4 , 5) A p r iv a te  RMSOs m eeting to  f i x  Head O ffic e
200 1 8 .9 .7 8 (4 , 5) O b jec tives  M eeting and Sen ior O ff ic e rs  M eeting
201 2 6 .9 .7 8 (4 ,  5) T a lk  to  Henry Jacques about th e  Computer S tra teg y  
a f t e r  h is  re tu rn  from the USA
13 5 .1 2 .7 7 (4 ,  5, 8) F ix  a m eeting w ith  David James and Henry Jacques 
to  take  over th e  p lan n in g  methods
54 3 0 .3 .7 8 (4 , 5, 8) Agree p lann ing  methods and pro du ctio n  o f the P lan  
w ith  th e  RTO
111 8 .5 .7 8 (4 ,  5, 8) R e -w r it in g  th e  Computer S tra teg y  by m yself
190 4 .8 .7 8 (4 , 5, 9) Feed back to  P e te r Tibbs on h is  e f f e c t  on Freda 
by h is  In te r fe re n c e  in  h e r m eeting
245 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 (4 , 6) A week f u l l  o f p a r t ie s
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Analysis of Category 5 events
It is good to see a large number of events being given category 5. In these 
events, my involvement is that of a top level technical support manager. 
Concentration on top level activity reflects the positive attitude which I adopt 
towards delegation and I refuse to work at detailed levels in most projects. 
About two thirds of these activities are at Regional level, two ninths at 
National level and one ninth at Area level. The national activity and a large 
proportion of Regional activity is about the direction of developments and the 
major ways forward to be taken by the three Departments in the Division. At 
national level, the OR Committee, the Statistics review and the Computer 
Technical Committee are all about major developments over the next decade. 
At Regional level, changing the planning methods, the nature of 1979 RHA 
Objectives, getting evaluation onto a firm footing are major initiatives. 
Staffing problems and building a new computer building are difficult problems 
to solve.
The most important Regional activities were to change the whole nature 
of the planning methods used in the 1979 Plan and to change the nature of the 
1979 RHA Objectives. There is no sense in which the Division played a passive 
role such as just saying what might be possible and responding to initiatives 
from "management". Careful persuasion was used to make both ideas 
acceptable and non-threatening. The timing and the social processes 
associated with both developments were carefully conceived and followed 
through. Once both activities were rolling forward, I withdrew and watched 
from a distance. But, they were watched very carefully indeed. This is a 
common pattern for "Big" projects to follow.
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Category 5 events cover a wide variety of happenings. Among other 
important things about these events is the degree of power which I possess to 
influence the outcome. This can be seen by comparing the work for the 
Nursing Development Group and that connected with the National Statistics 
Review. In the former case, my position was strong, whilst in the latter case, 
my position was weak. These are the two events described below.
Senior nurses are still fundamentally patient care orientated and their 
natural habitat is in those areas of work which traditionally belong to them. 
Thus, whilst they possess almost extreme power in the nursing hierarchy which 
depends on strong line relationships, this contrasts strongly with their relative 
weak position with respect to doctors in management positions alongside 
themselves. That relative weakness applies not only to doctors but also to the 
top administrators with whom they have had to deal over the decades and with 
whom, on the whole, they have lost most battles. That having been said, the 
nursing service consumes 40% of the revenue of the Health Service and so 
management development work ought to go into this management area. Much 
against the wishes of Henry Jacques, I was determined to get that development 
into the Management Services work programme. Henry Jacques contends that 
because of the lack of middle management skill in nursing such effort will be 
wasted, and there is an element of truth in that statement.
I had selected a simple nursing information project to be put into our work 
programme, since it would start to improve the level of control which nurses 
had over their staff complements. I had designed the project so that it came 
out as a monitoring project, one of the things which Henry Jacques wished to 
support. So the essence of the manoeuvre was to hoist Henry on his own 
petard. A part of this project launching process was a meeting between Freda
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Simm, Winnifred Black and myself and its purpose was to fix the outcome of the 
Nursing Development Group discussion which we had jointly set up to get 
development work in nursing moving. The meeting was really concerned with 
briefing Freda and giving Winnifred, who was the Chairman of the Group, 
sufficient material to get the Group to agree to this particular project and its 
orientation as a monitoring exercise. By getting the approval of this Nursing 
Development Group, it was inevitable that the project should go up through the 
Nursing Group straight to the Regional Nursing Advisory Group and into the 
RHA direct. This avoids interference by other RTO members. It  was a very 
gentle interchange which worked perfectly.
The above activity contrasts with the Statistics Review meeting in London 
with two Assistant Secretaries from Head Office and two other RMSOs. On 
this Statistics Review, the NHS side were in a weak position because Head 
Office already had all of the initiative and the power. It was important to get 
that project re-orientated so that the NHS objectives became more important 
than those of Head Office. This meant toppling the declared priorities and 
replacing them upside down and every ounce of my skill would be needed to do 
this. A vital meeting in this process happened near Christmas and my two 
RMSO colleagues turned up in a seasonal mood. They proceeded to give way 
point after point after point. "Yes, of course, we must have Head Office 
predominance of the Committee", dressed up in another form, but they gave the 
point away. "Yes, of course, the reporting mechanism should be through the 
Head Office structures", and again the point was given away. A major issue 
was the degree of technical support to be fed into that Review and I had 
carefully structured the committee so that that would be high. This was not in 
the interests of Head Office and of course they opposed it. My colleagues did
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not come to my side. I spent the meeting watching them more carefully than 
the people I was seeking to beat on the other side of the table. Due to their 
mood they were bubbling on and on slipping in the odd joke and doing all sorts of 
irrational and unwise things. I ended the meeting in sheer desperation trying to 
get the final agreement back into the main committee of the RMSOs. Instead 
of having gone forward with a carefully worked out programme of objectives 
being achieved as agreed, we ended up in a state of disarray due to the fact that 
they could not see what political points were on the table at any one time. The 
result was a catastrophe.
There is usually a degree of risk associated with any major undertaking, 
especially in its early formative stages. That risk can be controlled when you 
have the power to place the pieces on the board beforehand. It  is usually 
foolish to enter arenas when the outcome is unsure, but sometimes it is 
unavoidable. In the above examples, the course of events was almost certain in 
the first, whilst in the second, a rogue elephant appeared on the scene 
immediately the curtain went up. Risk taking is a major part of top level 
management, even in a management services activity. When things do start to 
go wrong for the change agent in most organisations, usually it is not possible 
for him to go back to a former stable state. This is unlike many operational 
tasks where an option exists in most cases to go back to the old way of doing 
the job. Quick thinking and acting is needed if  one is to stand any chance of 
getting the problem into an alternative arena in which you can control the 
outcome.
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Category 6 events - Opportunism
Table of Events
R ef. No. Dace Category Event
2 2 4 .1 1 .7 7 6 V is i t  to  a N orthern  Region and p ic k  up M a r t in 's  
" l i t t l e  book"
131 . 2 6 .5 .7 8 6 Get Henry Jacques to  agree to  th e  Head O ff ic e  
E v a lu a tio n  Team
222 6 .1 1 .7 8 6 Get Wayne Cook to  ta k e  a c t io n  on Domestic M o n ito rin g  
by c o n ta c tin g  him a t  th e  K in g 's  Fund
215 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 (1 ,  3 , 6 , 10) Henry Jacques f lo a t s  th e  id e a  o f a deputy
175 2 7 .7 .7 8 (3 ,  4 , 5, 6) Get th e  E v a lu a tio n  Team through th e  RTO
245 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 (4 , 6) A week f u l l  o f  p a r t ie s
Analysis of Category 6 events
I do not believe that there were only six occasions on which opportunism 
played a significant part in my activities for one whole year. A possible reason 
for some of the under-recording of opportunistic behaviour is suggested below, 
but it does not seem to be a complete explanation.
There are at least two types of opportunism in management. It  is only on 
the right occasion that it is possible to get something difficult and big to start 
moving forward. That demands opportunistic behaviour of the first type. For 
example, getting evaluation into the Region depended on my launching that idea 
at the right time in a variety of places. No amount of planning could have 
provided the wit to see that the idea could be slipped into the water and 
launched successfully at the time it occurred. In the same way, once people 
are prepared to contemplate organisational change, many different ideas 
become runners. Spying the chance and having a sufficiently rehearsed set of 
routines associated with the launch, come together to make that which was 
formerly impossible possible.
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But, if  anything, another type of opportunism is more important. It  is the 
passing remark that reinforces a need, an opportunity, an attitude or any of a 
dozen other aspects of a situation. They slowly transform an ethos and peoples' 
attitudes. I am sure that both the transformation of planning methods and the 
change in nature of the 1979 RHA Objectives depended on a succession of such 
small happenings - despite the fact that they did not get recorded in the diary.
The two contrasting events which illustrate opportunistic behaviour are 
chosen because of the background which brought them about. For one of them, 
namely, how to get the evaluation team into the Region, I had been trying to 
solve the launching problem for a long time. The second one was based on a 
purely random event concerned with a visit to Northern Region about something 
completely different from the event listed.
I had strolled back with Henry Jacques from a meeting which had gone 
exceedingly well. We had gone to his room and we were sitting down con­
gratulating each other on the way things had gone. He had offered me a drink 
and this reflected our mood. The meeting had been about various aspects of 
control and this subject appealed to Henry's systematic mind. It  was inevitable 
that we should start talking about how objectives had been set for the control 
procedure in that particular exercise. And so, we went on to discuss ways of 
making sure that those objectives were met. How did one measure the degree 
of achievement ? It  was an almost natural development to start talking about 
the methods which had been used by the computer evaluation teams throughout 
the country over the past decade. As an aside, I slipped in an enquiry about 
whether or not he had had the opportunity to think about the team coming in 
from Head Office. He connected the two things. He saw the advantages in a 
new light in relation to his own objectives at that particular moment in time.
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The only reservation he had v/as about whether or not these people could be 
fitted into the staff control scheme and I said that they were outside it. 
Somehow or other, I avoided the issue of what we did with them when this job 
came to an end in fifteen months time and he then agreed that I could go ahead. 
The most important thing which allowed me to use the opportunity was the fact 
that I had rehearsed the facts very carefully before it started and I knew them 
off by heart. The mood, the drinks, the pre-preparation of the material, the 
opening, everything lent itself to this particular move at that particular 
moment.
The other event, collecting the Guide to Statistics from Northern Region 
was completely different. The actual book appeared on the table during a 
conversation about the National Statistical Review because the book was their 
statistics showpiece. It  didn't really matter what I thought of the book itself 
but I saw its importance immediately to the Henry Martin situation. The 
RMSO of that Region went on at length about the way in which this book had 
been used as part of their planning procedures. I knew that those planning 
procedures had been medically dominated and he confirmed that fact. I had to 
get hold of that book at whatever cost. Fortunately, the other RMSO there 
came in on another tack saying that he was interested in book because they 
might present their own statistics in that way. He was having problems with 
his presentation of that particular data. I joined in that conversation saying 
how difficult the problem was, whether I believed this or not. And so both of 
the visiting RMSOs were offered this book which was the pride and joy of the 
North Region Statistics Department. I could not wait to look at it and to find 
out what it was that so inspired our new RTO member.
Both of these illustrations have an important thing in common, the
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determination to exploit the occasion. No matter how it had been achieved, I 
would have le ft Northern Region with that book. Having seen the connection 
between my evaluation team and the objectives conversation, I would have kept 
that topic alive until I had at least talked about the team. Opportunities are 
very rarely a question of just changing tracks in the middle of a conversation. 
They are more like seeing a train running on a track with other parallel ones 
alongside. It  takes a lot of skill to see the approaching points and to switch 
track without derailing the locomotive.
Category 7 events - Maintain the Division 
Table of Events
R « f. No. D ata  Cacegory Event
134 2 6 .3 .7 8  ( 4 ,  7 , 8 , 1 1 ) Jn  Room 108 have a  n a t io n a l  s ta n d a rd  m e e tin g  w ith
—  Henry Jacques and lu k e  Downs
Analysis of Category 7 events
I do not believe that only one divisional maintenance activity took place in 
the year. This is an extreme case of the selectivity of the diary. Maintenance 
is composed of several sets of activities, many of which are of very short 
duration and scattered amongst other activities. Since most direct 
management of activity is delegated, three Heads of Department carry prime 
responsibility for maintenance, but I carry out some direct maintenance activity 
and two are worthy of note, although they are unrecorded.
Despite the size of the Division, I do know what work is being done within 
it  and who is engaged on what projects. I make it a principle to get regular 
verbal reports on all work and major written reports at least quarterly. Also, I 
talk about parts of that work to people below Heads of Department level. This
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is not allowed to detract from delegated responsibility of Heads of Department 
but it does allow me to talk to members of the Division in a natural way. In a 
similar vein, I sit with staff over lunch frequently and I talk about problems and 
relate generally to them.
The second action of mine significant in this field is to put pressure on 
Heads of Department to adopt positive staff development and involvement 
policies. For example, the Division had a good staff assessment scheme going 
before any other part of the RHA, and I make the Division take this seriously.
Category 8 events -  Facilitate Action 
Table of Events
R ef. No. Dace Cacegory EvenC
70 1 0 .4 .7 8 8 Coccage acconmodacion noc on fo r  Che compuCer
83 1 7 .4 .7 8 8 RelaCe Co Henry Jacques on accotnmodaclon fo r  compuCers
89 1 9 .4 .7 8 8 RelaCe Co G i f f  Reynolds and Henry MarCin abouC Che 
n aC io na l syscem re so u rce s . Memo Co Henry Jacques
98 2 4 .4 .7 8 8 Geccing a n a c io n a l syscem memo inCo Henry Jacques' 
hands
142 1 0 .6 .7 8 8 Dorothy Pines is  f ix in g  Che cash paymencs f o r  Che 
n a c io n a l syscem from Head O ff ic e
145 1 9 .6 .7 8 8 TransacC a d e a l wiCh G i f f  Reynolds re g a rd in g  G arry Kay
204 2 6 .9 .7 8 8 Moving G arry Kay o ut o f h is  p res en t p o s it io n
225 9 .1 1 .7 8 8 S o rt out Che n aC io na l syscem design g rad ing
227 1 3 .1 1 .7 8 8 Try Co sCrengChen our C ra in in g  nurse f o r  our own work
23 2 1 .1 2 .7 7 ( 8 , 9 ) SeCCing up Che CompuCer L ia is o n  Groups
62 3 .4 .7 8 ( 8 , 9 ) Anocher P lan n in g  Methods m eeting
64 5 .4 .7 8 ( 8 . 9 ) A n a t io n a l system management m eeting
168 1 4 .7 .7 8 ( 8 , 9) A m eeting w ich Heads o f  Departments in  my own D iv is io n
182 2 8 .7 .7 8 ( 8 . 9 ) S tra ig h te n in g  out C a te rin g  M o n ito rin g
139 5 .6 .7 8 ( 8 , 9, 10) A m eeting o f my Heads o f Departments
96 2 4 .4 .7 8 ( 8 , 11) W atching Che Oncology through Ralph R a in s ' eyes
165 3 .7 .7 8 ( 1 , 2 , 4 , 8) A t y p ic a l  O b je c tiv e s  M eeting
84 1 7 .4 .7 8 (2 ,  3 , 8, 11) G e ttin g  Henry Jacques to  accept standard  n a t io n a l  
system costs  and th e  s t a f f in g  o f  i t
136 5 .6 .7 8 (2 ,  3 , 4 , 8) T y p ic a l O b je c tiv e s  M eeting
106 2 .5 .7 8 (3 ,  5, 8) Extended 'D ' Group.on P lan n in g  Methods
241 2 4 .1 1 .7 8 (3 ,  5, 8) F ix  th e  p lan n in g  systems t r a n s fe r  over lunch
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Category 8 events - Facilitate Action
Table of Events
Event
M eet D avid  James to  f i x  th e  1979 p la n n in g  
and th e  methods t r a n s f e r  t im e ta b le
F in a l  m eeting  w ith  Henry Jacques and Davie 
to  ta k e  o ver th e  p la n n in g  methods i n  1978
P la n n in g  methods o f  Che p ro d u c tio n  o f  th e  
to  th e  RTO
( 4 ,  3; 8 ) R e -w r it in g  Che Computer S tra te g y  a g a in
Jacques and lu k e  Downs
G et th e  U ser Group C ^ irm a n  onto  Tony Peers * s id e  
o v e r th e  Computer S tra te g y
Lack o f  c o -o p e ra t io n  from  Computer S erv ices  o ver  
my f i r s t  Ph.D
Send memo to  Henry Jacques about th in g s  on w hich  
we a re  d e f i n i t e l y  n o t com m unicating
re p la cem en t
F i r s t  m eetin g  o f  th e  P la n n in g  Methods team  
^ l l^ ^ o ^ U - o n e l  IXinn about th e  e v a lu a t io n  work l i
s e rio u s  s t a f f in g  prob] 
th ro u g h  complex re g io n a l  and n a t io n a l  m achinery
Analysis of Category 8 events
In a large Division, it is necessary to delegate most activity, but there are 
things which either only I can do or I can do much more easily than others. The 
actions are designed to facilitate the work of others for the most part.
Most Regional activity is inter-divisional and a Heads of Division 
agreement is a precursor to activity on projects. The planning methods, the 
national computer systems and most monitoring projects are typical examples. 
Having agreed the outline goals and resources. Heads of Divisions leave the 
scene of action but that initial agreement can be made only by Heads of 
Division.
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Ref. No Date Category
243 6 .1 2 .7 8 ( 3 ,  3 , 8 , 9 )
13 3 .1 2 .7 7 ( 4 ,  3 , 8)
34 3 0 .3 .7 8 ( 4 ,  3 , 8)
111 8 .3 .  78 ,
134 2 6 .3 .7 8 ( 4 ,  7 , 8 , 1 1 )
12 1 .1 2 .7 7 (4 ,  8)
33 2 8 .2 .7 8 ( 4 .  8)
100 2 3 .4 .7 8 ( 4 ,  8)
20 1 7 .1 2 .7 7 (4 ,  8 , 11)
104 2 8 .4 .7 8 (5 ,  8)
181 2 7 .7 .7 8 (5 ,  8)
233 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 (5 .  8)
38 1 .4 .7 8 ( 5 ,  8,  9 )
Apart from the initial launch, projects require support when unseen 
problems occur. Intervening on catering monitoring or talking to Areas about 
evaluation are typical examples of unlocking situations by management 
intervention. Facilitation can be having the right and power to call people of a 
given status together to make a deal. Calling together the chairmen of the 
computer user groups or the first planning methods meeting is such an action. 
In these cases, facilitation consists of using status to make deals which allow 
other people, especially subordinates, to carry out agreed tasks. The diary 
reflects my activity as a facilitator on many occasions.
The event listing shows a close association of the work categories "big" 
and "facilitate". This reflects my own belief that I try to help the important 
projects more than the other work of the Division.
Facilitate covers many different types of actions and it would be possible 
to take many pairs of different types to illustrate the category. One of the 
chosen events represents the use of my position to help the action of one of my 
managers whilst the other one concerns a situation which was complete outside 
my control getting emmeshed in a long series of actions which I was trying to 
take on a particular topic. The first event was nudging catering monitoring in 
the Region over a particularly nasty hump, whilst the second one was a major 
public flare up that occurred whilst I was trying to persuade Henry Jacques to 
sanction new accommodation for computing.
The monitoring work had got into severe difficulties in West Area in 
particular due mainly to the lack of a catering manager in one district. The 
result was that the Area was not meeting promises which it had made about 
giving documents summarising the state of catering in that Area to the RHA.
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Apart from the fact that monitoring was one of the things on which Henry 
Jacques had set much of his reputation, the RHA members were becoming 
annoyed at the lack of co-operation from the Areas. This had been the theme 
of two of their discussions and they had started to insist that we make the 
exercise go forward more quickly. I phoned up the man in charge in the Area 
to try and get the facts about the situation straight. I explained to him that 
there was no way in which the RHA was going to be put off, whatever the 
opinion of the Area officers happened to be. I spelled out the fairly dire 
consequences of their lack of action stating that our Chairman was likely to 
become involved personally. Somehow or other, he had got to get the facts 
through to his own chief officers and make them take effective action in this 
matter. With one word I was threatening, and with the next word I was 
offering whatever help we could. He was signalling loudly to me that I must do 
my best to call off my own officers and members and I was telling him that 
there was no way I would do it even if  I could and that in any case I couldn't. 
There was a combination of offering help and putting on pressure which ought to 
bring about their co-operation and this was the aim of the phone call. Although 
this event is one of the clearer examples of this type of negotiation, there are 
many occasions on which negotiations have a similar character.
Somehow, without having any authority, I was trying to help my own 
manager to do his job. It would have been very difficult for me to have gone 
back to my member committee to ask them to bring West Area to heel. But I 
reckoned that by using a combination of persuasion, pulling rank and sabre 
rattling, I could get West Area to move.
The second example, computer accommodation, is a very confused one.
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The diary records an almost continuous effort on my part to persuade Henry 
Jacques to allow this building to be designed and built. Apart from establishing 
the need, all I could do was to persuade various parts of the organisation to take 
steps for which they had no real authority. Accommodation had become a 
matter about which the Staff organisation and the Union were becoming irate. 
In their view, no effective action was occurring. It  came to a point at which 
the Joint Consultative Staff Committee in which management faces staff, and 
in particular Henry Jacques faced members of the computer staff at its lower 
levels, started exchanging views on the problem. Staff Side explained the 
problem in graphic terms. Henry said that he had no idea that the problem was 
so serious. He had been told of the problem many times. When I heard that 
report, I was flabbergasted. And that was precisely the reaction of the Staff 
Side in this meeting and the whole situation blew up in his face. For the next 
few weeks it was as if  someone had thrown a large bomb into the middle of the 
computer accommodation situation. I scarcely dared to mention it without 
seeing the whites of Henry Jacques' eyes start to blaze.
Direct effective control over all the parts of the organisation involved in 
a problem is an easy situation in which to obtain a solution, but it is rare. For 
the most part, one helps to push the RHA towards a better position by making 
small movements in the right direction possible. The movements forward 
depend on all kinds of maneouvres, often not backed by any authority or real 
power. When situations go wrong and explode, there is little  to be done except 
wait for the storm to subside and try again.
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Category 9 events - Control
Table of Events
No. Date Category Event
21 1 7 .1 2 .7 7 9 Get the R egion 's  te rm in a l in to  HQ on economic basis
28 1 3 .1 .7 8 9 Force Dorothy Pines and Henry M a rtin  to  t i e  up the  
ends o f th e  n a t io n a l system p ro p e rly
29 1 3 .1 .7 8 9 S ort out the n a t io n a l system ag a in
30 2 2 .1 .7 8 9 Stop Henry Jacques in t e r f e r in g  w ith  P e te r  Tibbs agreed  
work
48 2 3 .3 .7 8 9 Get back c o n tro l o f  Tony Peers ' work u s ing  s t a f f in g  
c o n tro l
160 2 9 .6 .7 8 9 D ec is io n  to  fo rm a lis e  th e  Heads o f Departments 
m eeting
162 2 9 .6 ,7 8 9 T ig h ten in g  c o n tro l o f  work in  th e  D iv is io n
163 2 9 .6 .7 8 9 A d iscu ss io n  o f " p r iv a te  and in  co n fid en ce" w ith  
d ep artm en ta l heads
223 8 .1 1 .7 8 9 P ro v id in g  b its  and p ieces  f o r  Henry Jacques' computer 
p o lic y
229 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 9 Agree w ith  Tony Peers on th e  n a tu re  o f  my c o n tro l
110 4 .5 .7 8 (9 ,  10 , 11) P re ve n tin g  D iv is io n a l s t r i f e  on th e  OR/Computing 
boundary problem  e x is t in g  in  the D iv is io n
34 3 .2 .7 8 (9 , 11) S o rt out th e  D iv is io n 's  w ork w ith  Henry Jacques and 
stop h is  in t e r f e r in g  w ith  P e te r  Tibbs
148 2 1 .6 .7 8 (9 , 11) Make Tony Peers v i s i t  S h e ila  about Eastbury and the  
nurse a l lo c a t io n  p ro je c t
202 2 6 .9 .7 8 (9 ,  11) S ort out th e  t im e ta b le  f o r  th e  p a y r o ll  and th e  
accounting  s tand ard  systems •
244 1 0 .1 2 .7 8 (9 ,  11) V is i t  Newton Computer S te e r in g  Committee to  in v e s t ig a te  
th e  work programme
105 2 8 .4 .7 8 (2 ,  9 ) P e te r  Tibbs v is i t s  th e  D e n ta l Committee about c o n tro l  
and re p o rts  back
243 6 .1 2 .7 8 (3 ,  5, 8 , 9) Meet David James to  f i x  th e  1979 p lan n in g  a c t io n  
and methods t r a n s fe r  t im e ta b le
190 4 .8 .7 8 (4 ,  5, 9) Feed back to  P e te r  T ibbs h is  e f f e c t  on Freda Simm 
by h is  in te r fe r e n c e  in  h e r London m eeting
16 5 .1 2 .7 7 (4 ,  9 ) T a lk  to  L io n e l Dunn about th e  s t a f f  th a t  we have in  
S t a t is t ic s  f o r  h is  Area
55 3 1 .3 .7 8 (4 ,  9) A m eeting o f  my d ep artm en ta l heads
57 3 1 .3 .7 8 (4 , 9) A ssert my c o n tro l a t  th e  m eeting  o f  d ep artm en ta l heads
186 1 .8 .7 8 (4 ,  9) S ig n a ll in g  to  Graham P ate  in  West Area th a t  I  mean 
business on C a te rin g  M o n ito r in g
247 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 (4 ,  9) C onsorting  w ith  Ralph Rains on th e  1979 In fo rm a tio n  
P ro je c t
58 1 .4 .7 8 (5 ,  8, 9 ) C le a r p lan n in g  methods e f f o r t s  w ith  P e te r  Tibbs
231 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 (5 ,  9 ) Get the Heads o f  D iv is io n  to  agree th e  In fo rm a tio n  
P ro je c t  w ith  m yse lf in  c o n tro l
242 3 1 .1 1 .7 8 (5 , 9) F ix  th e  f i r s t  Computer P o lic y  Group m eeting by ta lk in g  
to  Henry Jacques and Tony Peers
23 2 1 .1 2 .7 7 ( 8, 9) S e ttin g  up th e  Computer L ia is o n  Groups
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Category 9 events - Control
Table of Events
Ref. No. Date Category EvenL-
62 3 .4 .7 8 ( 8 , 9) Another p la n n in g  methods m eeting
64 5 .4 .7 8 ( 8, 9) A n a t io n a l system management m eeting
168 1 4 .7 .7 8 ( 8, 9) A. m eeting w ith  th e  Heads o f  Departments
182 2 8 .7 .7 8 ( 8, 9) S tra ig h te n in g  out C a te rin g  M o n ito rin g
139 5 .6 .7 8 ( 8 , 9 , 10) A m eeting w ith  th e  Heads o f  Departments
96 2 4 .4 .7 8 ( 8, 11) W atching Oncology through Ralph R a in s ' eyes
Analysis of Category 9 events
My basic policy in the Division is to delegate control of work to the Head 
of Department. This being so, the category 9 events tend to fall into groups 
which reflect specific positive supplementary activities superimposed on this 
policy.
The largest sub group of category 9 events is the set of regular meetings 
of my own Heads of Department. The main purpose of these meetings is to 
agree patterns of work, especially those which involve more than one of the 
Departments. Also, the meetings are a forum for talking about things in 
general, especially my own relationships with Henry Jacques, the RTQ, the RHA 
and its panels. It  also forms a forum within which to launch a "big" project and
I
formulate a pattern of attack.
The second biggest sub group is the national system Management Meetings 
for which both G iff Reynolds and myself carry joint national responsibility. 
Organisational and work decisions are made which affect other Regions and 
trouble in other Regions can escalate to RTQ and Head Office levels quickly. 
I t  is appropriate to keep a fairly tight control of this project.
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Five events are given in category 11, troubleshoot, also. When severe 
problems are being encountered, I must become involved if those troubles 
cannot be resolved satisfactorily.
The other major activity, and I feel that this is under represented in the 
diary, concerns events in which Henry Jacques interferes with our work 
unnecessarily and not through me. Priorities set for the Division’s work 
programme can be disturbed by his actions and it is possible for major conflict 
to occur.
The other large group of category 9 events are those in which I am putting 
pressure on the system using the weight which I have over and above my own 
managers. This involves control in the sense that I determine how to interfere 
and where to apply persuasion or pressure. The monitoring examples are good 
ones since they were very specifically designed to ease specific blockages in the 
work flow for that project. Oncology monitoring was another example in which 
a specific set of possibilities depended on putting together an appropriate 
pattern of events and being able to make them happen.
It  is significant that category 8 - facilitate action - is the most common 
category associated with control. This reflects the process of handing back the 
action to other people in the Division to complete the task.
The two contrasting events used to illustrate "control" are chosen because 
of the different sizes of action which is recorded. In one example and from a 
limited viewpoint, the issue appears to be trivial, whilst in the other, a major 
intervention occurred on my part to straighten out a number of things which 
were going distinctly wrong from my point of view.
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The first event concerned the use of 'private' and 'in confidence', 
especially when used for meetings of the Heads of the Departments. Tony 
Peers had got into the habit of releasing such information to his own lieutenants 
and carrying out a full discussion of it. Apart from the fact that this 
information was leaking all over the Division and embarrassing other Heads of 
Department it was becoming impossible to talk things over and to get a 
management view about them without having it discussed throughout the 
Division. At this particular meeting, both Simon and Peter were annoyed by 
the action which Tony had taken on a number of issues. As the point of the 
discussion became clear, Tony became defensive and then he became 
belligerent, trying to make out that he couldn't possibly discuss issues like this 
in the "inner cabinet" and then keep them away from his members of 
management teams. This inflamed the feelings in the meeting because he 
appeared to be giving more importance to his own managers than to the group in 
which he happened to be at that time. He threatened to do the same thing with 
another issue that had been discussed that morning and that caused a major row. 
I ended up by issuing a quite distinct order that he was not to do this. In a 
sense the whole incident had got out of hand. It may have been that the 
original mis-use of information had been an accident but it certainly did not 
appear that way during the meeting and so direct intervention became 
inevitable.
The other event concerns a NATSYS management meeting in which for a 
change I was in the chair. The project had not been going particularly well due 
to a variety of issues which simply were not being resolved. I had the problem 
of having two fairly senior managers who should never have allowed two or 
three things to drift. Some of the things which had drifted were administrative
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issues such as obtaining project money from Head Office. One concerned not 
having made sure that Head Office had completed some important national 
negotiations. Others concerned internal management matters which had 
become slack. Both G iff Reynolds and myself were responsible for actions in 
this project but he was not there. And so I decided to go straight through these 
laying down the law on what had got to happen. I also made quite sure that 
each decision that I had made was minuted so that it could be checked through 
at the next meeting. The two senior managers resented my interference and 
attempted to play down the issues and pretend that I was unreasonable. It  is 
tempting to believe that good management on my part would have avoided this 
situation. But I would contend that it is more efficient to have the occasional 
row rather the attempt to preplan and control everything all the time. There is 
a sense in which action of this type becomes vitally important just to show that 
officers are never free agents but are responsible to higher authorities for the 
courses of action which they are taking or failing to take. The level of feeling 
expressed in this meeting was high and afterwards many comments were made 
about the mood that I appeared to be in. In a sense, this event was a crude use 
of power.
Category 10 events - Pour Oil on Troubled Waters 
Table of Events
R e f. No. Dace C a teg o ty  Event
215 2 3 .1 0 .7 8  ( 1 ,  3 ,  6 , 10 ) Henry Jacques spreads Che Id e a  o f  a dep uty
82 1 7 .4 .7 8  ( 4 ,  1 0 ) R e c o n c il ia t io n  w ith  lu k e  Downs a f t e r  th e  a c c o u n tin g
b low  up
110 4 .5 .7 8  ( 9 |  10 , 11 ) S o rt out th e  OR/Computing boundary problem  w it h in  th e
D iv is io n
139 5 .6 .7 8  ( 8 , 9 ,  10 ) A m eeting  o f  Che Heads o f  D epartm ents
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Analysis of Category 10 events
The rather surprising thing about this list of events is that it is so short. 
On reflection, this probably reflects the situation as it exists in 1978/79. 
Within the administrative divisions of the Region, an understanding has built up 
which permits fast direct communication to take place across the many 
organisational boundaries which exist. Within these parts of the RHA, people 
are not hyper-sensitive any longer.
The four events are significant. A deputy for Henry Jacques, even though 
he would be from within the existing Heads of Division, and the choice is 
obvious and would not be resented, would represent quite a ripple in the 
organisational pool. The ramifications might have seemed obvious but could 
turn out differently. And so, much discussion took place in many private 
conversations, only one of which is recorded.
Luke Downs, although well meaning most of the time, is a source of 
considerable irritation. Only one oil pouring event is recorded and the con­
clusion must be drawn, and is undoubtedly correct, that I chose not to do 
likewise on many other occasions.
The other two events refer to an inter-Departmental squabble which 
breaks out intermittently in the Division. People in one department believe 
that others in another department are doing "their" work. On the whole I 
choose to ignore the squabble, sometimes show irritation and very occasionally 
pour on a few drops of oil.
The first event chosen to illustrate this particular category of work is an 
action undertaken for one other person and is a purely personal matter. The 
other event is surrounded by lots of organisational issues which have not been
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resolved.
Relating to Luke Downs was always troublesome and will continue to be. 
The rate at which a reconciliation was forged after any particular row was a 
measure of his nuisance value more than anything else. Probably he will 
continue to annoy me in an ineffectual way over many years and it is probably 
best to clear up the mess as quickly as possible after each event. Accepting a 
l if t  home is against my principles, because I walk home for the exercise. But 
when his car drew up on Sleepers H ill it was clear that the opportunity would be 
there to make pleasant conversation and to pretend that a row that had 
occurred that morning really didn't matter all that much. That is what I did.
The floating of the idea of a deputy for Henry Jacques was a much more 
complex matter. In the first case, it could consume staff control points for 
new staff, or at least on the face of it that might be the effect. In the second 
place, it introduced a new person into the set of top administrators in the 
Region, and that was not something that people were going to allow to happen 
without due consideration. The other top administrators, especially G iff 
Reynolds who was in charge of the staff control procedures, reacted violently to 
the suggestion that another top administrator should be slipped in. David 
James became worried because the new position would have affected his 
relationship with Henry Jacques. Everyone except myself could have been very 
effected by the new man. And everyone jumped to the conclusion that Henry 
Jacques intended it to be a new person, despite the fact that he had not said so 
explicitly. I had to work exceedingly hard to make them see that with another 
man there, we could get Henry off our backs. It  suddenly dawned on them that 
if  we could get Henry to give the new deputy those parts of his job which 
represented interference with ourselves, life could become much more simple.
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Furthermore, we could probably get Henry to concentrate on the political 
aspects of his own job and there would be distinct advantages in that for us. It 
would probably succeed in removing the Chairman's influence one stage away 
and we were all quite fond of grumbling about the effects of that upon us. But 
the outrageousness of using the staff points required to recruit working staff in 
their Divisions blinded them all to the possible advantages which there might be 
in it  for us and for the organisation. And so I did some fast talking to calm 
them and to persuade them to use this as an opportunity to get improvements.
Category 11 events -  Troubleshoot 
Table of Events
R e f. No. D ate C ateg ory Event
7 2 9 .1 1 .7 7 11 A row w ith  lulce Downs and Tony P eers  on th re e  
s e p a ra te  to p ic s
59 1 .4 .7 8 11 A n t ic ip a te  p la n n in g  methods d eb a te  w ith  Areas
72 1 1 .4 .7 8 11 S o rt o u t M a r t in  W ill ia m s  on Oncology M o n ito r in g
124 1 7 .5 .7 8 11 N e il  Moore o f  Head O f f ic e  t r y in g  to  fo rc e  G i f f  
Reynolds and m y s e lf to  ta k e  on a n o th e r R e g io n 's  
comments on th e  n a t io n a l  system
128 2 3 .5 .7 8 11 C o lla re d  by M a r t in  W illia m s  on th e  E astbu ry  
In te n s iv e  C are O b it  com puter
149 2 1 .6 .7 8 11 R eact to  D oro thy P ines  g ru m b lin g  about Tony Peers  
and t a l k  to  G i f f  Reynolds
150 2 1 .6 .7 8 11 S tra ig h te n  o u t th e  s a la ry  p a y r o l l  supplem ent from  
Head O f f ic e
161 2 9 .6 .7 8 11 S ta r t  G a rry  Kay on a  new jo b
195 1 1 .9 .7 8 11 D e a l w ith  a  d e la y  to  s ta n d ard  systems and s o r t  
o u t lu k e  Downs f o r  Tony Peers
221 6 .1 1 .7 8 11 Henry Jacques jum ping up and down ab o ut s tu p id  
te le p h o n e  c o v e r ,e tc ,  e t c i
84 1 7 .4 .7 8 ( 2 ,  3 ,  8 , 11 ) Get Henry Jacques to  ac ce p t th e  n a t io n a l  system  
co s ts  and s t a f f in g
123 1 2 .5 .7 8 ( 3 ,  1 1 ) Henry Jacques g e ts  o th e r  RAs In v o lv e d  i n  th e  
n a t io n a l  system  re so u rce s  problem
81 1 7 .4 .7 8 ( 4 ,  11 ) Respond to  a  ru d e summons by lu k e  Downs to  
d is cu ss  a c c o u n tin g
134 2 6 .5 .7 8 ( 4 ,  7 , 8 , 11) A n a t io n a l  system  m e etin g  w ith  Henry Jacques and 
lu k e  Downs and o th e rs
20 1 7 .1 2 .7 7 ( 4 ,  8 , 11 ) G et th e  Newtown com puter re p la cem en t th ro u g h  th e  
RTO
112 8 .5 .7 8 ( 5 ,  1 1 ) Heads o f  D iv is io n  d iscu ss  th e  new com puter
b u ild in g  and th e  new com puter
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Category 11 events - Troubleshoot
Table of Events
ef. No. Date Category Event
178 2 7 .7 .7 8 (5 , 11) GeC F re d a 's  su p p o rt f o r  th e  E v a lu a t io n  Team 
o u ts id e  Che RTO
96 2 4 .4 .7 8 (8 , 11) W atch ing  Oncology th ro u g h  Ralph  R a in s ' eyes
34 3 .2 .7 8 (9 , 11) S o rt o u t th e  Management S erv ice s  D iv is io n  w ork w ith  
Henry Jacques and scop h is  In t e r f e r in g  w ith  P e te r  
T ib b s
148 2 1 .6 .7 8 (9 , 11) Make Tony P eers  v i s i t  F reda about th e  E astbu ry  
com puter p r o je c t  on n urse  a l lo c a t io n
202 2 6 .9 .7 8 (9 , 11) S o rt o u t th e  p a y r o l l  and acco u n tin g  system tim e ­
ta b le s  s l i p
244 1 0 .1 2 .7 8 (9 , 11) V i s i t  th e  Newtown Computer S te e r in g  Committee
Analysis of Category 11 events
These twenty-two events are very much a part of the role of a Regional 
Management Services Officer. I feel strongly that one of my main roles is to 
avoid trouble, while another is to judge when subordinates and others need to be 
extracted from trouble by my intervention.
The words used even in the event summary reflect the character of the 
Troubleshoot activity. "A row", "sort out" (three times), "react to", "straighten 
out", "deal with", "get through" and "force" are a true reflection of the 
underlying aggressive attitude which troubleshoot often implies. This activity is 
about using status and weight, often in conflict and invariably in poor 
management situations. Sometimes, the events do not have these 
characteristics but, for the greater part, they do.
The list shows that troubles occur in a variety of different circumstances. 
It appears to be most common as a one to one conflict with another person but, 
on the other hand, some of the most important of these events are formal group 
activities. The level of event varies from interaction with Head Office to
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direct action with subordinate staff.
On the whole, the success rate for troubleshooting is high, but there are 
gross examples of running battles which are very like wars of attrition. There 
are at least four interpersonal relationships in this list which will ensure that 
disputes will continue no matter how good a work contract or project 
management scheme is devised at the beginning of any project. Even if  it were 
possible, it is unlikely that it would be economic to attempt to remove 
troubleshooting from the methods used to run the Division.
The two events chosen to illustrate this particular category of work are 
different in the following respects. The first concerns a row with an individual, 
Luke Downs, and it is typical of the fact that this individual acts completely 
outside the rules of the game in a maverick style are often. On this particular 
occasion he had overstepped the mark on three separate issues, in the space of 
two days and I had decided that all three had got to be sorted out. And so I had 
said to Henry Jacques that a meeting must be arranged to do just that. The 
second event concerned the national system costs which had been put to Henry 
Jacques and appeared to come to him as a complete surprise. This was despite 
the fact that he should have been aware of them for at least twelve months.
As stated above, Luke Downs had stepped right outside the agreed 
procedures for getting things done on three different occasions. All three of 
them were directly in my line of business, represented an outright challenge to 
my managerial responsibilities and further represented incursions into my 
territory that he had been warned about. The meeting in Henry Jacques' office 
got off to a grand start right from the word go, despite the fact that Henry 
thought that he was going to keep it calm. Unlike a previous occasion 
described in this diary, there was no attempt on my part to explain the situation
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reasonably at the start of this meeting. It was my strong view that Luke knew 
what he was doing and had done it on purpose and so I fe lt justified in getting 
stuck into the essential points immediately. These concerned the fact that he 
was taking decisions which he had got no right to take and that he was taking 
over my part of the HQ. The whole tone of the meeting was filled with 
belligerence and I had no hesitation in raising my voice or thumping the table or 
taking advantage of every slip of the tongue which he made. If  Luke dared to 
claim that he had got some rights as a chief officer, I immediately denied this, 
despite the sheer unreasonableness of my statement. Henry was trying to hold 
the ring. I was pushing my decisions onto Henry without any consideration of 
his feeling whatsoever. I was rude and I shouted. Henry was trying to get 
back to principles of good administration all the time and was continually 
pointing out when things were not a matter of policy or had not been decided in 
the proper manner. I was concentrating on hitting out in a way which even 
Luke Downs could not possibly misinterpret. It  was a straight battle in which 
the only message that I wished to get across to him was 'keep off my patch'.
The national system costs was an entirely different matter. Henry had 
been told and should have known these costs but he claimed not to have 
assimilated them. For some odd reason, he had decided that he could not 
persuade the appropriate members and committees to accept them and it was 
clear that we had come across a major stumbling block which could cause 
considerable delays unless I could get rid of it somehow. During the whole of 
the meeting I was keeping my temper very much under control despite the fact 
that I was of the opinion that Henry should not have got us into this state. 
What I eventually did was to negotiate with him a different formula for putting 
the actual cost down on paper. It  was still all there but it was split up under
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different headings and in different timetables in such a way that he thought 
that he could cope with it politically. Some of the more irritating parts of the 
figures from his viewpoint were lost in more acceptable classifications. The 
whole essence of this piece of maneouvring came down to adjusting this cost 
statement in such a way as to make it manageable from his point of view.
There is no doubt that trouble is always best dealt with quickly. But it is 
not possible to do this always. Festering sores erupt sometimes. They have to 
be accepted and the eruptions dealt with as best may be done. Troubleshoot 
degenerates into defensive action on some occasions, and although selfish, this 
may be the best that can be done.
Events in the "Unclassified" Category 
Table of Events
Event
Heads o f  Departm ent d is c u s s io n  on how to  use R alph  R ains  
to  b e s t advantage
lu k e  Downs makes a  ta k e o v e r  b id  f o r  p a r t  o f  ny D iv is io n
I  p e rc e iv e  Wayne Cook as p re s e n t in g  m a jo r problem s
P u z z lin g  ab o ut how to  ru n  th e  D iv is io n  and do re s e a rc h  on i t
T a lk in g  to  M a r t in  W ill ia m s  ab o u t com puter s t r a te g y  g o in g  to  
th e  RTO
D is c o v e r by a c c id e n t  t h a t  p a y r o l l  i s  g o in g  to  be l a t e
An RTO f a r c e .  C o n s id e r com puter s t r a te g y  w ith  Tony Peers  
to  see lA a t  we can do about i t
lu k e  Downs t r i e s  y e t  a n o th e r  m o n ito r in g  programme th ro u g h  th e  
M o n ito r in g  P ane l
Get Computer S tra te g y  th ro u g h  th e  M o n ito r in g  Panel 
A b re a e tio n  and la c k  o f  f a i t h  i n  th e  RTO to  g e t th in g s  done 
A d is a s tro u s  RTO t r y in g  to  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  Henry Jacques  
T d iy  P eers f i x i n g  th in g s  b eh in d  my back -  7202 and IDA 
T ro u b le  w ith  Tony P eers
M a r t in  W ill ia m s  does n o t a t te n d  a m a jo r m o n ito r in g  sem inarJ
P re ve n t W il l ia m  Lee a ix is in g  my re v ie w  o f  L io n e l Dunn's D epartm ent 
and team
Henry Jacques w i l l  n o t t a c k le  C h ris  Judd about accommodation  
i n  a n earb y  c o tta g e
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R e t. No. D ate
3 2 5 .1 1 .7 7
4 2 6 .1 1 .7 7
5 2 6 .1 1 .7 7
6 2 8 .1 1 .7 7
8 2 9 .1 1 .7 7
9 3 0 .1 1 .7 7
11 1 .1 2 .7 7
17 1 4 .1 2 .7 7
18 1 4 .1 2 .7 7
24 2 .1 .7 8
2 5 5 .1 .7 8
26 5 .1 .7 8
27 1 1 .1 .7 8
31 2 8 .1 .7 8
32 3 1 .1 .7 8
38 1 7 .3 .7 8


















117 12 .5 .78
121 15 .5 .78
122 17 .5 .78
137 5 .6 .78
140 5 .6 .7 8
146 19 .6 .78
147 19 .6 .78
151 21 .6 .78
158 29 .6 .78
166 4 .7 .7 8
167 10 .7 .78
172 26 .7 .78
176 27 .7 .78
Events in the "Unclassified" Category
Table of Events
Event
R e f le c t io n s  on th e  lo s s  o f  0  & M a t  Region
O b je c t iv e s  M ee tin g  w ith  Henry Jacques ab o ut reso urces  f o r  
th e  M id d le  E ast
Defend Wessex P la n n in g  Methods a g a in s t Head O f f ic e  -  b u t ag re e  
to  do t h e i r  s i l l y  form s
Y e t  a n o th e r ep iso de in  th e  n earby  c o tta g e  accommodation saga
R ecord th e  d e t e r io r a t in g  r e la t io n s h ip s  w ith  lu k e  Downs
P u z z lin g  w ith  R a lp h  R ains and Tony Peers about an  R & D CP 
p r o je c t  w hich  we f a i l  to  g e t th ro u g h
M anoeuvring  f o r  e x t r a  s t a f f  w ith  G i f f  Reynolds and D avid  James
M a r t in  W ill ia m s  on Oncology m o n ito r in g  -  t r y in g  to  s o r t  him
S p e c u la tin g  ab o ut M a r t in  W ill ia m s  and Oncology m o n ito r in g
D is c u s s in g  w ith  Head O f f ic e  t h e i r  ta k in g  In c e n t iv e  bonus schemes 
s t a f f  o u t o f  th e  c o n t r o l  system
T ty in g  to  f in d  ways around s t a f f  c o n tro l
H elp  Norman D a le  in  a n o th e r  Region to  s o lv e  top management problem s  
G et an g ry  a t  th e  dead hand o f  a d m in is t ra t io n  
O u tb u rs t on s t a f f  c o n t r o l  and bureau cracy
N a t io n a l  system  bus in ess in t e r r u p t s  w ork a t  home on th e  house
T a lk  to  o u r new spaper r e p o r t e r  about c o n f id e n t ia l i t y
T ry  to  g e t  some com puting is s u e s  s t r a ig h t  w ith  Henry Jacques
Another expression o f sheer fru s tra tio n
T a lk  to  a  researcher on m ental handicap about m onitoring  
programmes
Receive from W alte r Ame an account o f how Henry Jacques 
denied knowledge o f bad computer s ta f f  accommodation/
T a lk  to  W a lte r Am e about the school accommodation fo r  
ccoqmters
Dorothy Pines Is  p reparing  a  n a tio n a l computer system paper 
fo r  th e  RTO
T a lk  to  the  headquarters personnel man about s ta ffin g  m atters
Argue w ith  G if f  Reynolds and W alte r Ame about accommodation
T rying  to  avoid re w ritin g  the Cooqsuter S trategy
Chaos a t a Regional Management Services seminar
Tony Peers does no t tu m  up fo r  one o f ay im portant meetings
Force a p a y ro ll review  a t the Technical Committee
lis te n  to  Dorothy Pines ' tro u b le  w ith  her users o f the  
n a tio n a l system
M a r t in  W il l ia m s  and  lu k e  Downs s q u a b b lin g  a b o u t g o in g  t o  
H ead O f f ic e  a b o u t c o m p u te r s t a f f
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Events in the "Unclassified" Category
Table of Events
Ref. No. Date Event
177 2 7 . 7 . 7 8 A t y p i c a l  day o f  u t t e r  mess u ps o f  one s o r t  and  a n o th e r
180 2 7 . 7 . 7 8 R e f le c t io n s  on th e  c h a o t ic  s t a t e  o f  h e a d q u a r te rs  a t  t h e  moment
184 1 . 8 . 7 8 H o l id a y  seaso n
187 4 . 8 . 7 8 M e e t th e  A re a  A d m in is t r a t o r s  w i t h  D a v id  James
188 4 . 8 . 7 8 D e a l in g  w i t h  A re a  comments on c o m p u te r s t r a t e g i e s
199 1 5 . 9 . 7 8 Tony P e e rs  b ra n d is h e s  AHA g o in g  d i r e c t  t o  RHA o v e r  s t r a t e g y  I n  
f r o n t  o f  me
203 2 6 . 9 . 7 8 H e n ry  Jacq u es  an d  G a rry  Ray c la s h .  I n  p u b l ic  on c o u n t e r  s t a f f  
acco m m od atio n
206 2 6 . 9 . 7 8 Go t o  a  R e g io n a l S t a f f  A p p e a l
210 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 D is c u s s  c o n s u lt in g  H e n ry  Jacq u es  on a  v a r i e t y  o f  Is s u e s
217 2 3 .1 0 .7 8 D is c u s s  th e  C h a irm a n 's  a t t l t i i d e  to w a rd s  P a n e ls  an d  C o m m itte es
226 1 3 .1 1 .7 8 H e n ry  J a cq u es  I s  s tu d y in g  d e s p a ir  I n  t h e  o r g a n is a t io n  a b o u t  
s t u p id  th in g s  l i k e  f i l i n g  and  c o v e r
232 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 Toiqr P e e r s '  r e a c t io n  o r  la c k  o f  I t  t o  th e  In f o r m a t io n  p r o je c t
233 2 0 .1 1 .7 8 Thanks t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  c o m p u te r sy s te m  has e v e n t u a l ly  em erged  
fro m  I t s  summer o f  d is c o n t e n t
246 2 1 .1 2 .7 8 H e n ry  Jacq u es  does a n o th e r  C h ris tm a s  1 9 7 7  on th e  P la n  and  
d r iv e s  e v e ry o n e  s p a re
Analysis of Unclassified events
There is a sense from the thesis point of view in which this set of events is 
the most important of all the event categories since it represents that for 
which, not only did existing models of management services not cope, but 
neither did the new one suggested as a basis for this analysis. About a quarter 
of the diary events fall into this class and although, on reflection some 
unclassified events could be fitted into the categories, this is not so to any 
great extent. There is reason to believe that this 25% is the tip of a much 
larger iceberg since the analysis given below will suggest that some of the 
events must be part of a much greater set.
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A cursory glance through these events confirms that the construction of 
the event categories was a very biased set of actions, although not perceived as 
such at the time. The categories worked out during the initial sorting of the 
diary data dismiss the work which straightforward administration of the 
Division represents and, on reflection, so does the diary. Working the system, 
member panels, staffing matters like appeals, staff conditions, getting reports 
in on time, helping other Regions as well as the unrecorded daily answering of 
letters, taking phone calls and other activities are a significant burden. More 
important, they are the things by which an important section of customers and 
others form a view of the Division.
The establishment of categories was weak in one other respect also. It  
tended to concentrate on the positive aspects of the job. The unclassified 
events reveal at least two important negative aspects of the job. Thirteen of 
these events express frustration and probebly under-represent by a large margin 
this aspect of work. Only four can be described as defensive but again, that 
must be an underestimate. Both of these sorts of experience must be common 
in divisions responsible for creating change. Lack of frustration would suggest 
that sights have been set too low; lack of defensive actions would suggest that 
raiding expeditions by outside bodies were not worthwhile because the quality of 
the prize was inadequate. Both would be incompatible with my own basic 
attitudes.
At least five of these events fall in the category "watching helplessly". 
Even though at least one of these events was going to have disastrous 
repercussions on the Division and my own personal relationships, there was 
absolutely nothing I could do except watch it happen. This is an extreme case 
of the part of organisational existence which is passive. These "watching
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helplessly" activities become frustrating insofar as a great amount of effort 
which I have put into an activity can be made ineffective. But is is frequently 
the case that, despite having been advised strongly to do something, other 
officers do not do the expected things, often to the extent of substituting 
actions which I judge to be unwise, foolish or stupid.
There is only one instance in this list of counselling and this is grossly 
inaccurate. Giving advice, on work and on career, on particular situations and 
in general, on personal and organisational issues, is a regular part of my 
activity. It is given on a wide variety of occasions both in groups and on a one 
to one basis.
Just being a part of the NHS in an unstructured way is part of being RMSO 
also. Chief and senior officers phone or write seeking specialist knowledge on 
a wide variety of topics. Ad hoc lectures, seminars and other meetings occur. 
Although only one such instance is recorded but they occur much more 
frequently.
It  is impossible to pick out all of the features of this diary. But perhaps 
it is worth pointing out that, however inadequately, the unclassified events 
cover more personal reactions than seem to be the case elsewhere. Most of the 
event recordings in the list contain an emotive word phrase. This seems to 
suggest a very heavy personal involvement which I believe is an essential 
feature of being an effective change agent.
It  is not possible to choose events from this list with a view to illustrating 
the nature of the events, since they are so diverse. However, two have been 
described in more detail in order to show that these events are significant, 
despite the fact that they fell into no preconceived way of life or emerged as a
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significant pattern during the initial examination of the diary data.
Earlier in this chapter working the Avon management system was 
identified as a major activity, and in many cases a chore. Beating the system, 
or at least attempting to or finding ways round it, is a constant pre-occupation. 
This can be trivial in nature or involve important issues. Although recorded 
explicitly in this list only once, a constant theme in the diary is getting round 
the staff control procedures. They were devised by Henry Jacques some time 
ago as part of work done nationally by leading Regional Administrators to avoid 
crude cost controls imposed by Head Office. Whereas, anything which Head 
Office designed would have died its death quickly, this particular form of 
control has an inner life of its own, and is fed and nurtured by Henry. To have 
actually helped to place this noose around our necks, especially since it does 
little  to move staff into more useful jobs as time passes, is seen by myself to 
have been the height of folly, despite the fact that some cogent arguments can 
be put forward for some form of staff control.
There are various ways around this system, and it is widely believed in 
Avon that other Regions, whose leaders are not so committed to control, use 
them. This is a source of irritation. But there are a few legitimate routies to 
be taken among these, the most important being to get a "Research and 
Development" label attached to any activity. The events concerned with the 
introduction of evaluation into the Region used Head Office funds is one such 
example. Another source of uncontrolled funds are the charities.
Not only must one attempt to get new resources, it is vital to secure what 
one possesses already. As posts fall vacant, their priority is supposed to be 
assessed calmly and the points used to the best advantage of the RHA. Clearly 
this cannot be allowed to happen, especially when the criteria for determining
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"RHA advantage" are ill defined. Equally, such a system requires commitment 
to higher principles and those would need to be sold to the staff carefully. This 
has not been done. In the best of all possible worlds, Management Services 
would be prepared for this system to operate since we believe that we would not 
suffer. But that world of fairness and objectivity does not exist and as such, 
we seek to avoid the consequences of the system. In particular, any post which 
can be classified as "operational" -  needed for some vital part of the RHA task 
such as paying people is shot through the system at full speed and not 
questioned. Very little  becomes available for redeployment. A great deal of 
energy goes into working this system to best advantage.
An unusual event in this list is the talk with a care evaluation research 
man about monitoring. Monitoring consists of many parts but two are relevant 
to this event. It  is useful to have a set of standards of performance to apply to 
our care group services and it is necessary to make managers use this 
information to raise their own levels of performance. Many researchers have 
useful insights into the setting of standards and the subsequent attainment but 
few are interested in making management act in accordance with their insights. 
The purpose of this meeting was to persuade this person to become more 
involved in this second activity.
Apart from the fact that my division is the main driving force behind 
monitoring, I was talking to this person because of my own personal interest in 
this type of research. It was thought that my known interest would influence 
this person. Properly speaking, it was the job of the Regional Medical Officer 
to launch this monitoring exercise. It  is common for people to be asked to do 
jobs for which they have special aptitude rather than it being their
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responsibility. This incident illustrates a continuous activity concerned with 
getting square and round pegs into the right shaped holes as far as work is 
concerned. The round peg is never quite round, nor is the hole. An important 
top level management activity is to try to juggle staff so that the most 
appropriate people do particular jobs.
Discussion of the analysis
The above analysis of the diary events does confirm that the categories do 
provide further insight into the way management services function. The 
discussion of unclassified events suggest that at least the following sets of 
activities also occur;
administration of the Division and working the RHA/NHS 
system
dealing with a high level of frustration 
defending the Division 
watching helplessly 
counselling
helping other parts of the NHS
Consideration of these and the event categories defined originally 
suggests that it is possible to add to the most advanced model of management 
services in chapter 3 in the following ways.
(a) Effectiveness depends on knowing and learning about the host 
organisation. This is a complex activity but the need to watch 
and to study how the organisation reacts is very great and is 
best done positively and systematically.
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(b) Management services is not purely a reacting management 
needs. Technical and organisational creativity are helpful.
At least management services must feed in its own initiatives 
and alternatives so that wider choices of working methods 
become available to management. It  is possible to become 
more involved in the management process and to start shaping 
the future positively.
(c) The relationship of management services with the host 
organisation does not necessarily have to be only that of 
possible servant plus seller of new ideas. It  can enter into a 
complex negotiating position in which the future evolves as the 
result of not only technical work and feeding in new ideas but 
also a change in ethos and motivating the whole organisation 
to want to change. The way in which systematic change and 
change in social arrangements and inter-personal relationships 
contribute to the moving forward of the RHA is complex. But 
all of these various parts of the interface between the RHA 
and management services can be regarded as a complex 
negotiation which can be analysed using the event categories 
as extended above.
Probably the major problem raised by this analysis is how to create and 
maintain a large change agent group based on these ideas and the more 
conventional management services skills and attitudes. Creation of Divisional 
attitudes is a long process. It is easier to do this when a new Division has to be 
created that when an existing one needs to be transformed. Also it is a 
function of the available personnel, not all of whom can or want to make such a 
transformation.
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Any change in management services role has an effect on the RHA itself. 
The extent to which other parts of the RHA can retain a conventional posture, 
e.g. the traditional RTO leadership role, is open to debate. The planning 
methods project upset all of the conventional planning roles in the RHA and 
they will never return to anything resembling their original form. Those 
changes are part of a much larger study but the issue is raised by this study.
The implications of this analysis for the models of management services 
discussed in Chapter 2 are discussed in Chapter 6.
Summary
In this chapter individual events have been given categories and an 
analysis of the properties of the categories has been started. In Chapter 7, 
that analysis will be carried further and the general properties of the categories 
will be built up from the data contained in this chapter. One of the 
characteristics of the analysis so far performed is that it illustrates the richness 
in many types of quality of the personal and social interactions involved in being 
a management services change agent. The general characteristics which will 
be set out in Chapter 7 will tend to lose some of that richness in the generality 
of the statement of a category characteristic which must then be made. It  is 
therefore important to remember the rich quality of events which are contained 
in this chapter and are being illustrated by the general model.
It will be remembered that the analysis in this chapter is the first of two 
parts of the developed version of Model 6 first described crudely in Chapter 2. 
This first part is the definition of categories which typify the character of 
events which make up the life of a management services change agent. Before 
generalising both parts of the model in Chapter 7, it is necessary to generate a
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grounded theory version of the second part of the developed version of Model 6. 
This is done in the next chapter. This second part of the model shows how 
individual events of the type described in this chapter are fitted together into 
large projects.
The emphasis in the second part of the Model in Chapter 6 will be on the 
fitting together process. It  would have been possible to attempt to give the 
events in Chapter 6 categories in the same way as has been done in this chapter, 
but that would have confused the fitting together issues in my view. In 
Chapter 7, there is reference to an important check that was made to ensure 
that events in the next chapter can be categorised. But this was only a check, 
and it is in this chapter that the important work on the definition of event 
categories has been done.
- 181 -
CHAPTER 6 - CASE STUDY 2 - THE INTRODUCTION OF PATIENT REPORT 
HANDLING COMPUTERS INTO LABORATORIES
The relationship of this case study to the main theme of the thesis
Proposals for the development of the second hqlf of Model 6 - The 
Corporate Activist -  from Chapter 2 are described briefly on page 36. A major 
part of this second half is the interaction between the management services 
officer and the NHS structures given in Chapter 3. Laboratories are part of 
that structure. These interactions make up the processes which fit together 
events of the type which are given categories in Chapter 5 into projects. This 
chapter is a case study concerned with that fitting together.
Both the case study in this chapter and the one in Chapter 5 are stories of 
encounters in real life. Although it would have been possible to have related 
these stories using neutral terminology, an important part of their character 
would have been lost and the encounters recorded would have seemed insipid. 
The nature of the encounters is a fundamental part of this research and this 
justifies the use of accurate colourful descriptions.
The case study lasts fifteen months. It  covers only part of the work 
carried out by the Division during that period, and it covers only part of the 
history of the project. The action is complex and, for that reason, it is split 
into five subthemes. These sub themes represent different parts of the way in 
which laboratory computing policy for the whole Region is being formulated. 
Each subtheme is built up in layers. First, the relevant parts of the laboratory 
diary have been identified and then brought together as a Subtheme Synopsis. 
Then, Subtheme Commentaries have been constructed which draw out the main 
conclusions for that Sub theme. Although an attempt to present the complete
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picture of the project events is made below, it is probably better to read this 
analysis in conjunction with the actual diary in Appendix 2. An attempt to put 
the conclusions together is made in the last section of the case study.
This case study occurs within a history of laboratory computing which 
lasted a long time and the story which unfolds is complex. It is useful 
therefore to sketch in that background and to outline the main project story.
Management issues in laboratory computing
Health Service laboratories exist principally to analyse samples taken 
from patients and to feed back an analysis of the sample to doctors responsible 
for the care of the patient. Typical samples are blood and urine and typical 
results are a set of twelve proportions of various chemicals in a sample. 
Samples from inpatients, outpatients and general practitioners in a district with 
a population of half-a-million are often processed by one laboratory since the 
automatic analysers used to process samples are costly to buy and run. The 
ability to send back results quickly can be critical and, in any case, performance 
criteria relevant to timing and quality control are important. For these 
reasons, the handling of samples and results, i.e. data processing, in laboratories 
have become difficult problems.
For various reasons, there is a good case for believing that computer 
processing in hospital laboratories became essential by any standard a decade 
ago. For two computer generations at least, attempts have been made to 
develop a system and both previous generations have existed in this region. 
These systems were part of the national initiatives by Head Office. The second 
one was a definite attempt to produce a standard system based on parallel 
development work in three laboratories each of which had had a first generation
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system. It was completely financed by Head Office from research funds and 
staffed by research people outside Regional structures. The three laboratories 
and Head Office determined the system development route to be followed with 
no more than a somewhat naive acquiescence from local Health Authorities. 
The beginning of this case study is the collapse of this project, the withdrawal 
of Head Office support and the consequent emergence of a series of problems 
which were fairly and squarely placed in Region's lap accompanied by the 
somewhat shamed faced statement by Head Office and very reluctant 
acceptance by Region that the problem was ours in any case. This acceptance 
by Region was with a complete lack of grace due to the fact that, in any case, 
the Head Office controlled R & D budgets were resented and for their use to be 
accompanied by abject failure was rubbing far too much salt into open gashes.
The two issues raised by the collapse of the Head Office project were;
(a) What to do about the immediate problem in the laboratory 
concerned
and (b) How to construct a system for all District laboratories, i.e. a 
replacement Head Office system.
There are many Districts in the Region each of which provides a 
laboratory service in pathology, haematology and microbiology. Several are 
very large laboratories and their need for computing support before 1980 
appears to have been accepted. At least five of the others could make a 
reasonable case as well. The basic theory behind the Head Office system 
replacement was that a trial of an existing system would be carried out in a 
quieter laboratory and that system would become the core of a Regional 




The major participants in this case study are the personnel of the 
laboratories themselves. In each of the Districts, at least one laboratory in 
each of three fields exists, pathology, haematology and histology and with each 
of these topics is associated at least one consultant. Many of these consultants 
have qualifications in their own field (e.g. PhD chemists) rather than being 
medically qualified. Beneath the consultants are technicians of various levels 
and these are the people who actually do tests to make the system work and 
know its intimate details.
The consultants form part of the ever growing ranks of the Scientific 
Services in the NHS (X-ray, ultra sound, radiotherapy, etc., etc). As a group 
they take bigger and bigger slices of capital and revenue and are sufficiently 
important for there to be a Regional Scientific Committee which advises the 
RHA directly. Over the years, this group has been one of the most active 
pressure groups in the Region. The Medical Scientific equipment field develops 
at a rapid rate, is very lucrative commercially and its products provide the main 
route by which these consultants can do their work, improve the quality of their 
service and, since they are for the most part still active scientists, fu lfil their 
own personal and professional needs to develop.
Another part of the system of control and development of scientific 
services is the Regional Scientific Officer. Among many activities, his main 
relevant activities are forming Regional policy and controlling the capital 
budget. The various types of discipline in the Scientific services show little  
sympathy towards each other, especially if  they are contending for the same 
piece of money. He is at the centre of a web of influential people and bodies
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and his lot is not an easy one. From both the capital and policy viewpoint, he 
has a major interest in laboratory computing.
The third important influence on laboratory computing is the Computing 
Services Department, part of Management Services. This Department has 
acquired interests outside batch data processing activities only in recent years. 
Its image is still one of the large machine doing payroll, despite the fact that 
this is not true. Characteristically, it is still very much a young organisation 
concerned about its own internal workings and its status in the outside world. 
Professionalism is a word that comes rapidly and easily to their lips, and they do 
not understand that others care little  for their standards and other professional 
paraphanalia. It  is also a department which is on the sidelines of the NHS. Its 
members do not see their careers in the service but in computing.
Hovering over these four entities, each of which does have a grasp of at 
least part of the laboratory computing problem, is the NHS management 
structure. All of its parts, Head Office, Region, Area and District view 
laboratory computing with alarm. It has consumed relatively large amounts of 
resource over the last decade and there is little  to show for it. And yet, 
powerful groups and important people continue to support laboratory computers. 
This presents management with a dilemma - should they support it or not.
The rescue operation
Given the collapse of the Head Office Project, it was inevitable that 
Region should be asked to mount a rescue. Having nodded its blessing at the 
project, despite their state of abject ignorance of the consequences of success, 
having accepted some sort of commitment to and responsibility for it, having 
abdicated effective control to outside agencies, the day of reckoning arrived.
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The so-called experts had "boobed". Of course all of this was put in different 
terms at that point in time. There was no way in which I as a new RMSG was 
going to accept any blame and I determined to enter this arena on my terms. 
At that point in time, the justice of any statement regarding blame for the 
catastrophe was not talked about. If  you arrive at the end of a project with a 
system which is too complex to make work, too big for the effort available and 
too slow to meet the requirements, it is unlikely that effective control was 
exercised over the user requirement or that technical development had been 
adequately supervised. For someone to have been blamed was reasonable.
I was determined to control all aspects of the rescue project during its 
development period, the machine, the people, the work programme, everything. 
This was anathema to the local District people, especially the Consultant in 
charge of the Laboratory, who thought direct control should be vested in him. 
Second, and much more potentially explosive, I was determined that the user 
requirement would be cut down to something that we could produce in a 
reasonable time. That meant that all fancy realtime applications and all the 
more exotic applications in the system must be scrapped. Third, the user 
requirement was going to be set down in an unequivocal way before work began. 
I did not have very good people in the team inherited from the Head Office 
work and these sort of restrictions were essential. The consultant concerned 
squealed. How dare an administrator (a term to which I object violently) come 
along with conditions like these. But I did, and over a pint which I bought for 
him, I explained that I was prepared to go to the Regional Authority and 
recommend that he be allowed to get on which it himself -  no help, no rescue, 
no nothing. And so the rescue deal was accepted.
In the meantime, the other two parts of the Head Office project in
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laboratories outside this Region went their own ways. The consultants refused 
to co-operate with each other.
The next hurdle was to make sure that Head Office paid for the rescue. In 
fact, because of the simplicity of our proposal, no difficulty occurred, until 
later in the game, when Head Office decided that they could slide out from 
under just a bit too soon. Without any form of negotiation, a letter to Region 
arrived informing us of their intention to withdraw their financial support 
before the project was completed. There was only one way to deal with that, 
namely, to put the sort of letter on their files which they could not ignore. I 
made a mistake by not copying it to quite the right people and we had to take 
emergency action to deal with that. The letter was carefully drafted and listed 
the known sins of Head Office regarding the management of the original project 
before it accused them of sabotaging a successful rescue. The Head Office 
Regional Liaison Officer was livid about the disruption of good relationships 
especially since he had more important issues to keep straight. Head Office 
extended the support very quickly when he received his copy of the letter.
Part of the deal with the Consultant was a vague statement that we would 
review the extension of the system after our promised first phase worked but it 
was surrounded with caveats about resources being available, priorities being 
set by District and so on. It saved his face and he still grumbles about promises 
never met or, never made, depending on whether he or I tells the story.
Somewhat later than we had hoped this phase 1 interim system went into 
the laboratory and provided a service without which the consultant would have 
the utmost difficulty in running his service.
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The main system - the story and the actors
Effectively, after the politics of the rescue of Head Office project, I went 
to sleep on this project. A smaller laboratory was selected as a suitable place 
for the pilot regional system and a system was selected which was supposed to 
work. All of the rituals which surround a computer purchase were performed. 
Knowledgeable phrases about tests and bench marks were used and a pilot 
system was bought. Suddenly the pilot system was crashing in its parent 
laboratory outside this Region and everything that could go wrong was going 
wrong. I had to take an interest.
The analysis of the main story
The main story of this case study is about an attempt to formulate 
Regional Policy for Laboratory Computing. As stated above, the story has 
been split into Subthemes, each of which is described in a Synopsis of Events 
and a Subtheme Analysis on those events. The Subthemes are:
1. An attempt to replace an experiment by a turn-key contract
2. Forcing through the original experiment
3. The entry of another possible major supplier into the arena
4. Another important experiment on transferring systems
5. Other subthemes in the case study
In order to facilitate the analysis of these subthemes later in the chapter, 
it  is worth giving the main story of each and linking them together.
As stated above the aim of this project was to find a replacement for the 
national system by carrying out an experiment in a smaller quite laboratory. I 
started taking an interest when, for no good reason that I could discern, that
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experiment failed. Almost in a panic, my own computer people persuaded me 
to allow another company to provide a packaged solution. Subtheme 1 is the 
story of the rejection of the suggestion. A series of complex negotiations 
brought this about and the sub theme tells of the moves and countermoves in the 
battle.
I was unhappy about abandoning the original experiment. No good reasons 
for its failure were apparent. And so I determined that either the original 
equipment would be made to work somewhere or I would obtain a coherent set 
of reasons for its failure. Many different people were trying to force computer 
services to make it work. Others were attempting to undermine the 
experiment. Subtheme 2 is about these manoeuvres.
For some reason which I could not determine, one major equipment 
supplier had been excluded from the contract. A fter much consideration I 
determined to reinstate that company. The third subtheme is about my 
achievement of that aim. My actions were opposed and I had to overcome 
many obstacles.
Late on in the project, an opportunity arose which persuaded one 
pathologist that he could transfer a working computer system into his 
laboratory cheaply. The fourth subtheme is about the many difficulties 
encountered in that transfer.
The fifth subtheme is an attempt to collect together all the other 
happenings in this major project.
These subthemes do not exhaust the diary material nor do they represent 
the only or possibly the best way of analysing that data. It  could be argued 
that the relationship between people, departments and parts of the advisory
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machinery would form a better analysis. The reason for the choice made was 
that it is task orientated in the sense that each of the first four subthemes is 
about a genuine task that was being attempted by Region.
In analysing this data into subthemes, an artificial order is being placed on 
the data. The diary itself represents much better the disorderly nature of and 
relationships between events which make up this story. The extent to which 
the subtheme analysis represents post-hoc rationalisation is an important issue 
since the analysis camouflages a great deal of ad hoc ingenuity, chance and 
opportunity taking and genuine creative management in a difficult situation.
In order to understand the subtheme analyses, it is necessary to know the 
roles of the participating characters. These are described below.
The scenes and the cast
The Region consists of many Areas, four of which become involved in this 
case study. These have been called East, West, North and South. Many 
Districts become involved, three of which are important in this story. Ralton in 
West Area is the place where the original experiment was carried out, Eastbury 
in North Area must be provided with a working system for its very large 
laboratory in the near future and Sleeton in East Area has used the laboratory 
computers for a long time and wishes to replace its system with a better one.
Dr. Hunt is the Regional Scientific Officer. He is an Adviser on the staff 
of the Regional Medical Officer and his basic responsibility is for all aspects, 
including the purchase, of scientific equipment throughout the Region. 
Officially his position is only an advisory one but it would be very rare for that 
advice to be over-ruled and for equipment which he had not suggested to be
- 191 -
bought. In the rapidly expanding field of scientific equipment in the Health 
Services, he performs a very lonely and exposed job. He is surrounded by 
powerful consultants of several varieties, each of whom wants infinitely more 
than he can have due to lack of resources. He has no assistance and is 
therefore overworked. He is a fairly brusque, forthright character, very 
pleasant in many ways but certainly not liked by many people. This is probably 
because of the nature of the job which he does and the way in which he maybe 
has to perform it. Laboratory computing has been a vale of miseries for the 
past decade and Barry is aware of the fact that he cannot afford any more 
major mistakes. This probably accounts for the fact that he is looking for cast 
iron protection, well documented on files, in this particular activity. His major 
"hang up" on this project is that he and Tony Peers, the Regional Computer 
Services Officer, have clashed violently and his memory is proving to be a long 
one. He does not like Computer Services.
Dr. Pat Hills is the Pathologist from Newton who came there from a 
laboratory in which computing was well established. He has used a District 
computer to provide a very elementary laboratory computing system for some 
time. His experience of computing is wide and he is a member of the Newton 
Computer Steering Committee. Pat is a quiet sensible character, who tries to 
get useful action taken in any particular circumstance.
Dr. John Jarratt is the most experienced laboratory computing person in 
the Region, having been associated with it in a practical sense for the past ten 
years at least. He had the first and second generation of national machines in 
his laboratory. This means that he must be a very able politician. His present 
machine is about three years old. He does not particularly like the system 
which he has been provided with, according to his design. He badly wants a 
better system in his laboratory at Sleeton.
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Dr. Max Hart is the Pathologist from Eastbury, This is one of the biggest 
laboratories in the Region - full of specialist work of various types. According 
to Barry Hunt he is the wiliest and cleverest pathologist in the Region. 
Unfortunately in the middle of this study, he was taken ill. He knows very 
little  about laboratory computing. He plays a very canny game and behaves 
quite sensibly.
Dr. Alec Johns is the Pathologist in charge of the Ralton laboratory. 
Ralton is a laboratory in a new hospital and for various reasons, has been 
provided with automated equipment which means that he finds it quite easy to 
get through the medium sized workload that it has got. He seems a very nice 
fellow but on the whole, obviously does not carry a great deal of weight.
Dr. Smiley is the Salton Pathologist. A young chap, obviously active in 
many respects but for some odd reason, he has not chosen to become involved 
much in the main laboratory computing issues. He has, however, put little  
machines onto his equipment.
Mr. Sam Earle is the Technician in the Ralton laboratory, who has co­
operated with the Computer Department in designing the details of the 
Regional Specification.
Tony Peers is the Regional Computing Services Officer and is in charge of 
computing throughout the Region. Most of this is on large machines but two 
years ago we decided to become involved in laboratories following the collapse 
of the Head Office project in Sleeton. He knows very little  about this type of 
computing. More important, he was a recruit to the NHS and has had difficulty 
in coming to terms with the sort of organisation that it is. On the whole, he 
has not found it easy to accept Public Service activity nor in my view has he
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found the negotiation with the total set of Pathologists in the Region at all 
easy. Most important, he has succeeded in clashing with Barry Hunt to the 
extent that they have ended by shouting at each other and that relationship has 
never been anything but sour.
Robert Jones is the Senior Designer and has been concerned with 
laboratories for a long time. I suspect that he knows quite a lot about them by 
now. For some odd reason, he does not get on with Barry Hunt either. His 
main work down in Sleeton up to about three years ago, was on the Head Office 
project.
Garth Boles is a Computer Systems Designer who has been working on 
laboratory systems over the past two years, on and off with other things.
Willy James is a Systems Designer/Programmer who has been working in 
this field as well. He is very concerned about prospects and professionalism 
and on the whole does not understand the NHS.
Graham Pate is the Area Management Services Officer in West Area. He 
has been the Chairman of a Working Party in West Area responsible for the 
design of much of the system for the Ralton laboratory.
Hugh Robins is the District Administrator of the Woodbury District and 
this is where Dr. Jarratt has got his laboratory. Although a medical matter, 
the whole business of laboratory computing in a District should be one of the 
principle concerns of the District Management Team.
Dr. Martin Williams is the Regional Medical Officer to whom Dr. Hunt 
reports. He came to this Region a short while ago from the Northern Region. 
Martin has had problems settling into this Region especially in view of the fact
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that the Regional Administrator, Henry Jacques, is well established in his seat 
and is a very powerful person.
Henry Jacques is the Regional Administrator to whom I report. Insofar as 
the Management Services Division is concerned with any activity, Henry 
Jacques should be concerned to keep it on the line at the most senior level.
Dr. Ralph Raines is attached to the Management Services Division from 
Martin Williams. He is not really concerned with medical computing in 
laboratories but he does follow this interest generally. I talk to Ralph quite a 
lot about this topic.
Charles Poole is one of the Specialists in Community Medicine in the West 
Area Health Authority. Insofar as an Area doctor has become involved in 
laboratory computing in Ralton, it has been Dr. Poole.
Dr. Harry Rees is the Pathologist in charge of the Limpton laboratory to 
which one of the laboratory systems has been transferred.
Dr. Wood works at a London Hospital. He was a participant in the Head 
Office project and has designed the Alpha system. This now works and is the 
basis of most of the laboratory computing developments throughout the country.
Dr. Bates is the Regional Scientific Officer in Region 4. Limpton is part 
of that Region and Dr. Bates is therefore connected with the Limpton transfer 
of Alpha.
Bill Acton is the Sales Manager of Orion Computer Systems whom I know 
from a long way back in my career.
There are companies who have become involved in this tale;
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London Company is a supplier which does not normally operate 
in this field. They proposed a turn-key solution with 
themselves doing all of the development and 
implementation work.
National were the providers of the original hardware at 
Sleeton for the original national project and as such the 
Alpha system in London has been developed on their 
equipment.
Delta computers were bought on a fairly large scale by 
laboratories throughout the country. In particular, the 
Alpha system is being transferred to a Delta situation in 
Burnage in another Region.
Orion are the suppliers of the Limpton hardware. There are 
other manufacturers in this field and they appear in 
various bits of the story.
The subthemes of the main story
Subtheme 1 -  an attempt to replace the delta computer development by a turn­
key contract
Subtheme 1 Synopsis
Sub Date Diary Event
Theme Ref.
Ref.
1 Feb 78 1 Tony Peers promises to  give me case fo r getting
r id  of the Delta
2 16 Feb ■ 2 London Company propose 6 machines and get r id  of
two D eltas.
3 Feb 3 Regional Specification  discussed throughout Region
  4 6 tfer 4 Oldtown comments on Regional S p ecification .
5 7 Mar 5 Newton comments on Regional S p ecification .









7 13 Mar 7 Consolidated North Area comments -  th ir ty  four 
points ra ised .
8 15 Mar 9 Barry says North Area accept S pecification  except 
fo r  a few minor d e ta ils .
9 20 A p ril 14 Tony Peers strongly recommending London Company 
(memo)
10 20 A p ril 15 Tony Peers claims au thority  to design standard 
system. . Barry Hunt says th is  is  not tru e .
11 April/May 16 At some stage Head O ffice  say no a lte rn a tiv e  to  
London Company.
12 4 May 17 Big meeting of pathologists accepted. London Company.
13 8 May 24 Robert Jones rep lies  to comments.
14 15 May 26 Barry Hunt says London Company cannot be accepted.
15 19 May 27 Barry Hunt came in  spec ia lly  to say London Company 
cannot be accepted.
16 21 May 28 I  t ry  to persuade Henry to take up London case.
17 23 May 29 Meeting w ith  M artin  to  persuade him to  take London 
case.
18 23 May 34 Long memo to  Henry to  try  to get him involved.
19 '25 May 48 RTO sent a recommendation.
20 25 May - 49 S t i l l  try in g  to  get Henry involved, he is  not 
playing.
21 25 May 50 Memo to  Henry s t i l l  try in g  to  get London Company in  
on a "no lose" contract.
22 5 June 55 GG avoiding Barry Hunt.
23 9 June 61 West Area meeting, they have not even seen the 
London quotation.
24 10 June 63 fee lin g s .
.  -  -
12 JWe ~ 7 5 Suddenly the West Area need disappears and I  give in.
26 14 June 95 Barry says th a t reason fo r  re je c t in g  London Company 
Is  th a t he is  not convinced.
27 14 June 96 London Compaiy s t i l l  try in g  to get con tract.
28 14 June 90 At Limpton talkabout London Conpany not doing w e ll 
on AIPHA.










31 13 Nov 191 Barry Hunt disagrees over R alton.
32 20 Nov 193 I  f i x  West Area to  push th e ir  case.
33 21 Nov 195 Pub meeting Graham Pate to  f i x  Cook/Jacques 
m eeting. I  b r ie f  Jacques. The meeting doesn't 
happen.
34 23 Nov 197 Paper w ith  case fo r  Ralton and o thers.
35 24 198 I  fo rce  my paper on Jacques. As a r e s u lt ,  Barry 
shrxeics BUT he has my paper on HIS f i l e .
Analysis of subtheme 1
The regional replacement for the national standard system had been 
devised by Computer Services. It was based on a Delta computer system which 
was supposed to work but did not do so. Suddenly there was a rush to sell off 
the Delta and get the London Computer Company to do the whole job for us.
Even if  the attempt to replace Delta in this way had been wise, Dr. Hunt 
had to be persuaded that this was so in private. Perhaps the most important 
lesson concerned with the London Company contract is that the Computer 
Department completely misread the part which Barry Hunt would have in this 
decision. Right from the start, it should have been quite clear that his position 
would be one of the most important factors deciding the course of action that 
should be taken. Instead of playing the game accordingly, the whole action was 
played out in committees of insubstantial power. It  was stated by Computer 
Services again and again that agreement to proceed along the new Regional 
Specification lines had been obtained in these committees. It was not 
acknowledged that Barry Hunt probably would never say in open committee
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what his position was, if it had not been agreed beforehand. This complete 
misreading of the power position is right at the heart of the problems of this 
project.
The basic philosophy of the Ralton laboratory experiment was that Ralton 
was a fairly quiet laboratory in which it would be possible to carry out an 
experiment without undue pressure. In the event, this philosophy went sour and 
one of the contributory factors was that Ralton did not actually need a 
computer. The need to compromise about their "needs" was not very great and 
so they stuck out for their full requirement. Consultants are completely 
independent operators in their prime patient care roles and they do what they 
believe best for the patient. Compromise is not part of their normal lives. In 
practical development projects, the need to compromise is always there and if  
the pressure on the customer to do this is insufficient, many problems are likely 
to occur. That pressure can be of various types but in the NHS it is very 
unlikely that the need to conform to management pressure will be enough if the 
need for that project is questionable.
Although London Company did take part in the original bidding for the 
project at Ralton, it was always felt that London Company as a company was 
not there by right but because of some bureaucratic rules about who should be 
invited to tender together with the disposition of the Regional Computing 
Services organisation towards that company. The Laboratory Consultants have 
never considered London to be in this field. For some odd reason which no one 
understood and about which everyone was very suspicious indeed, London 
produced a turn-key bid. I had to appear at a meeting of Pathologists to try to 
coerce them into agreement about that bid, against their better judgement and 
instinct. In addition to this, they were completely unfamiliar with a situation
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in which a system was to be produced according to a specification on a piece of 
paper. Their whole approach had been to see a system working before they 
even started to think of buying it. The acceptance of this particular 
contracting procedure based on a written specification was completely contrary 
to their usual pattern of behaviour and alien to them.
One of the features of this case is the totally different approach which 
was being adopted by the Computer Department and by the users of the system 
and the RCSO. The Computer Department was sticking by its
"professionalism" and its approach to doing computer systems. The 
specification was only a small part of this difference in the basic approach. 
The Pathologists were subjected to all sorts of "funny talk" about "bench marks" 
and "documentation" and "testing" and so on and so on. The Computer 
Department perceived it as necessary that these people should understand and 
adapt to the computer way of life. There is no clear reason why this should be 
the case.
One of the interesting features of the project was the way in which North 
Area tried to behave as a unit. This is a typical behaviour pattern. North 
Area's consolidated comments were dealt with at a special meeting much more 
precisely and expeditiously than any other set. It is intriguing to note this 
despite the fact that this system was being developed at Ralton in West Area. 
The Ralton Laboratory Consultant only got invited to that meeting by a default 
procedure by which he succeeded in inviting himself. Region always seems to 
listen to the North Area voice rather more than any other voice, despite the 
fact that it claims to be unbiased.
If  one neglects the fact that the Management Teams and all the other 
parts of the management structures that should have been involved in this
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decision did not take part, it is possible to distinguish four major parts of the 
organisation interacting. These are;
(a) The Pathologists in various groupings outside the Headquarters
(b) The Regional Scientific Officer
(c) The Regional Management Services Officer
and (d) The Computer Services Department
All four of these groups or individuals were acting separately and independently 
in a variety of ways. Their interpretation of the goal to which they were 
moving was fundamentally the same but there were important differences in 
their interpretations of what that goal meant. All of them wanted computing 
in the laboratories throughout the Region. But all of them felt that the 
important issues which had to be dealt with and the principles which should be 
built into the overall solution, should be their own ones. Each of them had a 
particular power base from which they were working and a particular point of 
view. Right up to a very late stage in the development of this project, they 
were on collision courses of various types due to the fact that they all perceived 
different things as being important. The bureaucratic machinery consisting of 
management teams, advisory committees and working parties did not resolve 
these conflicts. The necessary 'off stage' negotiation went sour, even if  it was 
perceived to be needed at all. The roles which the participants played either 
by intention or by accident did not constitute a conciliation procedure and so in 
the end, this particular solution to the problem - even if  it had been correct - 
would have had to go through on the basis of the power of the Regional 
Scientific Officer. An agreement to use that power did not exist and the main 
reason it was not there was that this solution made him vulnerable from many
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points of view. In his exposed position, such risk taking simply was not possible 
even if  had felt motivated to support this course of action.








1 Pre-Feb 1 Barry Hunt bought Ralton equipment to  f i t  In  D e lta .
2 Feb 78 1 Tony Peers promises me the case fo r  g e ttin g  r id  o f 
D e lta .
3 Apr 78 10 Barry Hunt gunning fo r  Computer Services try in g  to  
blame them fo r  D e lta .
4 A p r i l 11 Barry Hunt try in g  to  b u lly  me, who is  responsib le  
fo r  D e lta .
5 23 May 31 I  am w orried  about Graham P ate 's  re a c tio n .
6 23 May 31 I  agree to  meet West Area. Barry Hunt comments 
"M ajor West Area e r ro r" . Graham Pate s t i l l  on my mind
7 23 May 34 I  inc lude D e lta  co llapse in  memo to  Henry Jacques. 
Disposal o f D elta  d i f f i c u l t .
8 8 June 60 Salton t r y  t o a t e a l  D e lta . .
9 9 June 61 V is i t  to  West Area Consnittee f a i t h  in  me to  s o rt th is  
o u t.
10 12 June 75 I  app rec ia te  th a t  R alton does not r e a l ly  need the  
system.
11 14 June 94 Barry Hunt says R alton requirem ent has not disappeared.
12 20 June 98 I  say one la s t  t r y  o f R alton .
13 26 June 116 Oldtown t r ie s  to  s te a l a Ralton Video te rm in a l.
14 27 June 118 Tony Peers is  try in g  desperate ly  to  get from under PAC. 
. R alton bought o f f .
15 30 June 121 RTO accept Ralton la s t  t r y .
16 4 July 123 See M artin  W illiam a about RTO recommendation -  
t ry in g  D e lta  fo r  la s t  tim e .
17 28 June 125 GG gets g r i l le d  by Computer Services.
18 12 July 128, Try ing  to  get from Tory a l i s t  o f Alpha drawbacks.
19 14 July 129 Tony Peers ta lk s  th re a tin g ly  about s o lic ito rs  and 
PACs.
20 19 Ju ly 136 Sleeton t r ie s  to  s te a l D e lta .
21 4 Aug 146 Tony Peers wants to  put D e lta  in to  H illb u ry .







23 17 Aug 149 Meeting Boles and Jones to  know what needs to  be 
done a t  D e lta  to  f i t  R alton (Quick Report a rr iv e s  
4 /1 1 ) .
24 27 Aug 160 Press Jones fo r  a simple D e lta  re p o rt.
25 14 Sep 166 Boles produced overview -  not asked fo r ,  NOT what 
I  want
26 25 Sep 171 Boles claim s not to  have understood my 17 Aug 
requestJ
27 26 Sep 1170 Boles is  try in g  to  get D e lta  In to  H l l lk ir y J  
I  fo rce  R alton date and b r ie f  on Boles.
28 1 Nov 47 Jumping up and down fo r  R alton re p o rt.







Conspiring w ith  Graham Pate and Wayne Cook a t Kings 
Barry Hunt asks fo r  my opinion o f London Company.
31 30 June 121 RTO recommendation (London Company o f f i c i a l ) .
32 4 Ju ly 123 Barry and I  see M artin  about Salton tra n s fe r .  
D e lta  la s t  time attem pt, In te r-R e g io n a l co - * 
operation  and we t a lk  London Company.
33 10 Ju ly 125 Account o f my m eeting computer se rv ice s . 
E xplain  London Company -  no chance.
Analysis of subtheme 2
The basic Delta subtheme is simple. A small but nevertheless significant 
lead-in experiment to the main laboratory computerisation activity went wrong. 
The actual money involved was not significant in comparison with the other 
issues which were at stake. These were:
(a) If  the exercise was to be abandoned, then the reasons for that 
abandonment must be solid, clear and understood and the 
alternative action must be agreed.
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(b) If  the exercise was a failure, then the reasons for that failure 
must be known so that they were avoided in the future.
(c) The impact of failure on both the reputation of management 
service and the morale of laboratory staff needed to be 
assessed and these effects dealt with in a constructive way.
When I decided to become involved, an undignified, unhelpful series of 
squabbles was going on, the main participants being the Computer Services 
Department and the Regional Scientific Officer. The Delta story is an attempt 
to return to more rational decision making and to stop individuals indulging in 
defensive behaviour.
The hardware from Delta never presented problems. The software 
system was to be obtained from Region 9 which had bought many such systems. 
Despite the fact that such an investment ought to have been without problems. 
Computer Services should have gone through a routine designed to ensure that a 
working, transferable system was available. Somehow a computer was actually 
bought with insufficient regard to these needs and safeguards. In panic almost, 
a second supplier Region was contacted, which fortuitiously existed and this 
time the total sequence of acceptance and performance tests was carried out. 
They failed. Not unnaturally the condemnation by our Region of the system did 
little  to cement a good relationship between the supplier of this second system 
and ourselves. The fact that the system collapsed in its parent laboratory a 
few weeks later was too late to influence the bad feeling generated in the 
manufacturing Region. But the basic fact is that the Computer Services did 
not deliver a working transferable system. It was never possible to get them to 
accept any part of the blame.
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The move to get rid of Delta by Computer Services appeared as an 
orchestrated attempt to avoid blame. Such reasons as did exist for the failure 
were not made clear. Senior managers, myself included, were harangued by 
Computer Services for not accepting meekly "technical jargon" and 
"professional advice" connected with the failure and the way forward. The 
"rational top managers" escape route was paraded by Computer Services and 
pushed hard, namely that we should invest additional money in a turn-key 
solution from the London Company proposition. Or so it seemed. Right in the 
middle of this was my stubborn belief that laboratory computing was essentially 
a simple computer job which I could have put on a first generation process 
control machine fifteen years ago. I never got a set of coherent reasons to 
explain the difficulties because, as time showed, they did not exist. In the 
meantime, spectres wandered around. A Public Accounts Committee enquiry 
could never have affected computer staff and yet "independent legal advice" 
was sought by Computer Services. Tirades on the lack of "effective 
management action", by other people of course, poured from the lips of 
computer personnel. All of this verged on being hysterical.
A similar episode occurred over the reasons why Ralton could not accept 
from the second parent site the system which eventually worked, it took three 
months in order to obtain the list of amendments needed for the District to be 
able to accept it. There was no sensible reason for this delay.
Many other diversions concerning the possible use of Delta occurred. 
"Hillbury would take it" - but West Area could not even confirm that Hillbury 
had been visited or were interested. Sleeton needed it. The whole business of 
forcing the Ralton issue to a decision was beset by the intrusion of irrelevant 
issues. Hillbury, the London Company, Public Accounts Committees and so on
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were irrelevant to the main issue - "Why can't Delta work in Ralton ?"
Management Team participation in the Delta exercise has been negligible. 
I have not been aware of any DMT activity whatsoever. An Area Medical 
Officer representative stated, quite genuinely that "he would rely on my 
judgement". Despite efforts by Graham Pate and myself, no administrative 
view of the Ralton project has been put forward. The RMG intervention was 
never sustained although he was embarrassed by having two idle Deltas in the 
Region. All negotiation has been informal usually between two people at a 
time, though occasionally within a small group. Theoretically, all the relevant 
decisions require Management Team approval.
Ralton's attitude to compromise is important. A meeting of top people 
occurred to explain that there was no way in which we could meet their final 
demand. In order to keep the negotiation open and free, nothing was written 
down. And yet, the letter making their demands was sent to Region. A half- 
hour 'phone call explained to their "honest broker" that the reply would reject 
their request and that Region could find another home for the Delta. No 
change in negotiating position occurred. And yet, experience says that 
normally, the computer would have been taken followed by a fight to reverse 
the decision and obtain the required cumulative report by some means or other. 
Ralton have plenty of equipment and are not under pressure. Perhaps the lesson 
is that development work should go to the lean and hungry or the avoracious and 
clever. ^
An analysis of this type loses a great deal of the flavour of the interaction 
of people and organisations. The anger of Barry Hunt at being exposed tends 
not to be apparent. Dr. Johns showed his frustration and helplessness. 
Computer Services felt hurt, defensive, angry, frustrated - one of its members
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left. I fe lt as though I trod on ice. I resented the lack of support from Henry 
Jacques. Smoothing relationships - making them survive, these were the 
essence of the negotiating and other processes.
The extent of the loss of credibility among laboratory staff by the 
Computer Services Department is difficult to judge. Dr. Hunt played on this 
aspect of the situation. In the end, I was playing a mixed role of "honest 
broker" and effective "undercover manager" of the operation. Both roles 
should have been handled by Computer Services. The fall back position for 
Management Services Division, i.e. the existence of a second Region which 
could supply a Delta system, in the face of initial disaster was fortuitous. On 
the whole. Computer Services did not deserve a second chance, not because of 
the mistake, but because of their subsequent attitude and failure to accept, 
responsibility. If Computer Services do not support an NHS built package in 
the long run, it will cost Region a great deal of money. And yet their ability to 
fulfil that major role in such the long term is in jeopardy because of this set of 
encounters.
Subtheme 3 - the entry of another possible supplier
Subtheme 3 Synopsis




1 14 A p r i l 12 Dr Hunt on phone about Orion.
2 19 May 27 Dr Hunt says Orion or N ational are  p re fe rre d  to  
London Co.
3 23 May 34 Memo to  Henry Jacques. Orion is  f lo a te d  as an 
a lte r n a t iv e .
4 25 May 48 Orion put forward f i r s t  hardware proposal.
5 5 June 55 I  t r y  to  avoid Barry who is  only try in g  to  f i x  
Limpton v i s i t .
6 14 /15  June 78 V is i t  to  Limpton.










8 26 June 114 MeeC Barry In  c o rr id o r  a fc e r  Che v i s i t .
9 4 July 124 GG pushing Orion.
10 10 July 125 GG accused o f jumping Co conclusions re  Orion.
11 10 July 125 GG aCCacked by CompuCer Services.
12 10 July 126 GG and MarCin on Che C ra in .
13 14 July 131 Tony Peers Cold o f my Orion inCenCion.
14 20 July 1417 Harry FeCers Cries Co make lo c a l c a p ita l  ouC of 
Avon inCeresC.
15 27 July 144 AcCing RA David ra is e s  co -operation  w ith  Region 6.
16 9 Aug , 148 Head O ffic e  C e lls  Avon abouC LimpCon p o s itio n .
17 11 SepC 164 Boles goes Co Cambridge.
18 20 SepC 167 MeeC Tory in  WesC A rea, go Co H illb u ry .
19 25 SepC 174 My aCtiCudes -  Tony Peers aC lunch.
20 11 Occ 177 Leccer co Region 4 asking Cheir Delca philosophy.
21 20 Dec 178 Region 4 re p ly  Co 11 OcC leCCer on co-operacion.
22 26 OcC 180 V is ic  Co Region 4 abouC co-operaCion.
23 3 Nov 184 V is ic  Co H illb u ry . LeCCer from O rion.
Analysis of sub theme 3
It is not clear why Orion were not in the competition to supply a system 
right from the start. I was told that it was because they had not get a 
laboratory system to offer. There was an element of truth in this but it was 
wellknown that they were working in Limpton on the transfer of Alpha 
laboratory system and that they were being supported by Head Office. It was I 
who decided that Orion must be involved in this contract. I had known Orion 
from my own project days, when they were somewhat unlucky not to obtain a 
major contract from me. My main reasons for wanting them in was that they
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are a big company in comparison with the other British company and they were 
being backed by Head Office. Moreover, the Limpton work had Regional 
support. It  was much better to have a Regional backing than any other sort of 
backing in the NHS. Most other projects were being done at District level with 
no Regional commitment whatsoever.
Once it had been made plain that I intended to get involved with Orion, 
the reaction of the Computer Services Department died down. No helpful 
comments about Orion were ever made. Various types of sniping continued 
concerning, for example, Orion's Cambridge demonstration, the very small 
faults which could be picked up from the Limpton visit and the way in which I 
was thought to be jumping on that particular band wagon too quickly. These 
reactions became more muted as time passed and the only really viscious attack 
occurred during my early meeting with my own Computer Services, following 
the rejection of London Company (see para. 125 of diary). However, I was told 
on several occasions that the Orion affair was mine and that was not meant in a 
particularly kindly way.
There were only two attempts to get Orion to tell us about the work which 
was being done in Limpton. One was the visit to Limpton and the other was 
their visit to us. The Limpton visit lasted two days and it was eventful in 
terms of reactions between people. During that visit, I established my right 
among Pathologists, among my own people and with Limpton, to question 
actions and to have a major say in this decision. This questioning was done on a 
technical level on purpose. I also spent a great deal of time talking to people 
on trains and trying to get them to change their attitude. One of my major pre­
occupations was to try to get the Company itself to take the work sufficiently 
seriously. They had been involved with the NHS in other matters and had
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decided that it was much too complex a way of making a living. But there 
must be something like a hundred laboratories who want systems costing 
between £30,000 and £100,000 and this is a big market for any company. 
However, it was only with reluctance that they eventually decided to put their 
own people onto the transfer of the complete Alpha and the sale of it to that 
market.
The attempt to get this work launched on an inter-Regional basis has been 
a failure. Region 4 were exceedingly wary about getting involved and 
becoming responsible for anything outside their own Region. This was in the 
wake of their bad experience as Centre of Responsibility for another large 
system for the whole country. This may be understandable but it appears to be 
typical of the NHS that having encountered problems of inter-Regional co­
operation, no attempts were made to solve the problem. Instead, regions 
retreat to much surer ground. It is a pity that Region 7 based near to us 
appears to be so much further behind in laboratory computing. Co-operation 
based, say, on a centre in Hillbury, would have been to both of our advantages. 
The negotiation of such an arrangement with Region 7 was not helped by the 
attitude of both Regional Computer Services Officers who decided to get 
embroiled in the detail rather than settle the principle of co-operation at a very 
early stage. In my view, unless one can build up an adequate relationship before 
you start exploring problems, which I admit exist, then those problems will 
appear to be overwhelming.
Once again the whole of this subtheme is full of reactions between people. 
I was continuously negotiating to get the various main actors to accept Orion 
and to go along with that Company. Oiling the works included long periods of 
talking with Dr. Hunt, talking over the 'phone with Harry Rees and making re-
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assuring noises, becoming involved with Head Office and making sure that their 
people were happy with the approaches which were being made, trying to get 
the Pathologists like Peter Hills and John Jarratt amenable to the suggestion 
that Orion was a suitable supplier for the main machine. It is significant that 
the Orion affair had an honest broker/negotiator in the middle of it right from 
the start. Of course the trying time for Orion has not come, namely, the
delivery of a system. But everyone is being fairly co-operative and are willing 
to give them the benefit of their doubts. The odd thing is that, unlike London 
Company, which were regarded as an outsider in this particular work, Orion is 
not being regarded in this light. And yet it is a fact that Orion have never put 
a system into a laboratory. This acceptance of Orion is perhaps one of the 
most significant differences between the Orion and the Delta and National 
experiences. The main person with whom I have worked, who was left out of 
other negotiations, was Dr. Hunt. It could be that his power is such that the 
former two courses of action would inevitably lead to trouble in the long run for 
this reason.
Subtheme 4 - an experiment in transferring systems






1 8 June 56 V is i t  to  London Teaching H o s p ita l.
2 12 June 69 I  t e l l  Barry and M artin  th a t  Alpha must be supported.
3 May/June 69 John J a r ra t t  wants Alpha.
4 22 June 101 At S c ie n t if ic  Committee I  t e l l  John J a r r a t t  th a t  
he is  about to perform a m ira c le , e tc .
5 23 June 112 Barry Hunt asks fo r  help fo r  S leeton.
6 30 June 121 RTO accept t ra n s fe r .
7 10 Ju ly 126 I  ta lk  to  M artin  about Orion on t r a in .




Theme D a te  p  . Event
R e f .
9 10 J u ly  127 Dr J a r r a t t  t o ld  Yes t o  t r a n s f e r .
10 12 J u ly  128 I  a s k  f o r  Tony P e e r s ' comments.
11 17 J u ly  133 Dr J a r r a t t  t e l l s  B a rry  t h a t  Wood a g re e s  to  t r a n s f e r .
I  w arn  B a rry  o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
12 20 J u ly  "142 I  t r y  to  amend S c i e n t i f i c  C om m ittee M in u te s  to  g e t
more a c c u ra te  v e r s io n  o f  w hat I  s a id .
13 21 J u ly  143 V a r io u s  h u s t le s  o v e r t r a n s f e r  l e t t e r s .
14 27 J u ly  161 L e t t e r  to  Hugh R ob ins g o es .
15 29 J u ly  161 R o b in s  a c c e p ts  t r a n s f e r  te rm s .
16 25 S ep t 170 W oodbury C osts -  a d is c u s s io n .
17 27 S ep t 175 B a rry  H unt la y s  down la w  on s c i e n t i f i c  equ ipm ent
to  Hugh R o b in s .
18 24 Oct 179 John J a r r a t t  t e l l s  B a rry  t h a t  Wood ca n n o t s u p p o rt
S le e to n  t r a n s f e r .  John J a r r a t t  w ants S o csys.
19 1 Nov 182 Wood re a s s u re s  John J a r r a t t .
20 13 Nov 191 John J a r r a t t  w i l l  ta k e  A lp h a  as i t  s ta n d s !
21 20 Nov 193 John J a r r a t t  a f t e r  P ad d y .
22 21 Nov 195 W oodbury -  a d is c u s s io n .
23 22 Nov 196 V i s i t  S le e to n  a b o u t t r a n s f e r  by Dr H unt and GG.
Ana lys is  o f  sub them e 4
D r .  J a r r a t t  in Sleeton had separated f ro m  A lpha a long t im e  ago. He had 
accep ted , som ew hat re lu c ta n t ly ,  the help o f fe re d  by C o m p u te r  Services and his 
own Phase 1 system  was now ava ilab le . Why then did the  t ra n s fe r  o f  A lpha to  
Sleeton becom e a m a jo r  a c t ive  issue ? There is l i t t l e  doubt th a t  once D r.  
J a r r a t t  had seen A lpha in London, he would  w a n t  i t .  I t  was b e t te r  than his own 
sys tem . He knew th a t  his own equ ipm en t had s t i l l  go t a l i f e  o f  several years 
and so, even i f  he did become e l ig ib le  fo r  the Regiona l system  even tua l ly ,  he 
had a long t im e  to  w a i t .  Once D r.  J a r r a t t  had s ta r te d  down the road o f  g e t t in g  
the A lpha system  t ra n s fe r re d  to  h im , i t  was in e v ita b le  th a t  he w ould  use every
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means within his power to achieve this. A convenient rationalisation by Dr. 
Hunt that a Sleeton transfer would help to convince the other Pathologists of 
the value of Alpha. Dr. Hunt's statement that there was nothing to be lost by 
the transfer was not necessarily correct but it did avoid fights, it did keep him 
in with Dr. Jarratt, and it did serve other sub-objectives which he had. Early 
on, 1 was giving public warnings, warnings to Martin Williams, warnings to Barry 
Hunt, warnings to everyone that the transfer would cause problems. Despite 
such warnings, it is doubtful whether the management teams would have 
deliberately said 'No' to this transfer. Being as generous as possible about the 
process of rationalisation, one is forced to the conclusion that Dr. Jarratt's wish 
to have that system was the driving force behind the transfer.
The way in which Dr. Hunt and 1 attempted to tie up in writing the terms 
of the transfer from Wood's laboratory to Sleeton was very interesting. The 
letter is the only attempt that 1 am aware of to tie up all of the small details 
and to make sure that the District and Dr. Jarratt understood quite clearly our 
reaction to the transfer. Region did supply a small amount of money to oil the 
works but our basic attitude was to stand off. In my view, the transfer was 
never possible without adequate Computer Services Department support and we 
were not in a position to give that. There really was very little  that we could 
do which would have influenced the support available from Wood. It  never was 
possible for Wood to actually support the transfer in the way that would be 
required. There was no inducement which we could have offered in any case. 
In a sense, the letters which attempted to tie up the deal, were a protection 
mechanism for the Region against the inevitable difficulties which would be 
encountered.
As the transfer proceeded, it is interesting to note the difference between
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Dr. Jarratt and the Ralton Delta situation. Dr. Jarratt started off with all 
sorts of little  things which he would like to have done to the Alpha system to 
tailor it to his laboratory. At the end of the day when it was clear that he 
could have only small things which were absolutely vital, he was willing to give 
way all along the line, if  it made the transfer possible. No sticking out for this, 
that and the other. That could all be negotiated later. Although outside the 
timescale of my diary, Dr. Jarratt did get all his changes made.
When in fact the miracle transfer by Wood did not materialise and the 
troubles and misfortunes started to appear, very, very much later than the 
original completion date, all sorts of interesting things could be observed. Dr. 
Jarratt was almost frantic to get help that would enable him to get the transfer 
going. Help from Computer Services Department, which he had rejected a 
little  while earlier, was necessary and he fought to get that support. When it 
was becoming apparent to Dr. Jarratt that Wood really couldn't support this 
transfer, despite his wish to do so, 1 had to make sure that no untoward foolish 
action was taken because Wood is essential to my longer term development of 
Alpha in the Region. 1 believe that the development of Alpha over the next 
few years depends on Wood and 1 could not afford to have Dr. Hunt or Dr. 
Jarratt denouncing Wood in public or even saying uncharitable things about him 
in private. If  Wood could have helped with the Sleeton transfer, he would 
probably have been delighted to do so, but he does not have the resources. The 
only possible way of oiling those particular works was to support a deal between 
Wood and Head Office to get additional money to either pay his existing staff a 
little  more or to get another person into Wood's laboratory and this 1 attempted 
to do. 1 failed.
During the whole of this process and indeed ever since 1 became involved
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in laboratory computing, Dr. Jarratt has, on a number of occasions, introduced 
into the discussion a version of Alpha called Socsys. It is claimed that this is 
fully documented and easily transferred. There is little  point in discussing 
Socsys at length but it is interesting to note that Dr. Jarratt was desperate to 
get something into his laboratory which would put him back with the leaders of 
developments in laboratory information. Soccys, if  he could have got that, 
would have been acceptable. How that situation develops in the long run and 
how Region deals with Dr. Jarratt's wishes and needs will be interesting.
There was slightly more District Management Team involvement in this 
part of the laboratory exercise than was the case in other parts. There are two 
main reasons for this, namely, that Region insisted on negotiating the terms of 
the transfer with the District and not with Dr. Jarratt and, that Region 
succeeded in overcharging the District in the middle of the exercise. This 
completely irrelevant action provoked infinitely more interest on District's part 
than any of the major issues concerned with laboratory computing policy in the 
Region. In any negotiation, it is quite difficult to keep attention focussed on 
what we regard as the main issue.
The contrast between Dr. Jarratt's attitude of wanting to get hold of 
Alpha almost at any price and the Ralton attitude is very interesting. If  the 
Alpha transfer occurs it is Dr. Jarratt's attitudes which will force it through, 
despite his management team's inaction in the long term.
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1 March 8 Dr Hunt t r ie s  to  get me Involved in  a b ig  way.
2 A p r il 10 Dr Hunt gunning fo r  Computer Services about D e lta .
 ̂ 3 20 A p r il 13 John J a r r a t t  t ry in g  to get Phase 2.
4 3 May 16 O ff stage noises from Head O ffic e .
5 12 May 25 M artin  and Barry g e ttin g  i r a te  w ith  Head O ff ic e .
6 21 May 28 Try to  get Henry Jacques invo lved .
7 23 May 29 Try to  get Henry Jacques invo lved .
8 25 May 49 - S t i l l  t r y  to  get Henry Jacques invo lved .
9 10 June 64 General comment on my fe e lin g s .
10 14/15 June 78 Llmpton v i s i t  and general comment on people.
11 22 June 105 The Socsys system.
12 22 June 111 Tony Peers does not l ik e  my in te r fe re n c e .
13 26 June 115 Barry Hunt wants John J a r r a t t  in  Regional d ec is io n .
14 26 June 115 An example o f  th e  many sided conversations going  
on in c e s s a n tly .
15 30 June 120 AIC en te r th e  arena.
16 3 Ju ly 122 AIC w rite s  in .
17 10 Ju ly 125 An example o f Computer Services h is t r io n ic s .
18 17 Ju ly 137 John J a r r a t t  try in g  to  get unusable 8R.
19 17 Ju ly 138 Salton p ath o lo g is t, and Boles go to  Region 3 .
20 23 Aug 159 Woodbury overcharging.
21 12 Sept 165 Dr Hunt and I  agree to get Region 6 to  support Alpha
22 20 Sept 167 H illb u ry  v i s i t  about Alpha.
23 21 Sept 168 Head O ffic e  re g is te r  o f lab o rato ry  computing.
24 21 Sept 169 Dr Hunt -  secre t v i s i t  o f AIC to  S a lton .
Analysis of sub theme 5
In a complex exercise such as the laboratory project, a multitude of small 
sideshows are being staged all of the time. This subtheme is an attempt to
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gather together some of the more interesting of them.
In the examination of the main themes detailed earlier in this thesis, it is 
very easy to overlook the inter-action between the main players. Dr. Hunt and 
1 spent a considerable amount of time in each other's offices doing deals. Some 
of those deals were done at almost frantic speed, such as the need to stop John 
Jarratt doing anything specific when he thought that Wood would not support his 
transfer. Other inter-actions with senior officers were in fact complete 
failures, such as the attempts to get the RTO to take an intelligent interest in 
the work and to intervene in certain basic decisions. Many inter-actions were 
full of acrimony such as those between Computer Services and myself. 1 
carried on despite their objections, not with the support of that team. 
Although Head Office were quiet bystanders once their Sleeton project had 
died, 1 was very careful to keep them involved and, if anything, my relationship 
with Head Office Senior Executive Officer has become much stronger.
Although the diary does not show it, 1 have used our own Specialist in 
Community Medicine as a sounding board and someone with whom 1 could 
discuss privately most of these developments. In the same way, you can 
observe Barry Hunt talking to people like John Jarratt and the Salton 
Pathologists quietly and secretly and trying to get the decisions and attitudes 
accepted widely. 1 spent a long time one morning on the 'phone to the 
Pathologist in Limpton making soothing noises when he thought that everything 
was going wrong. He obviously had his own furrow to plough and needed us to 
make capital locally. Although not a major influence, both the Regional 
Scientific Officer and the Regional Computer Services Officer from Region 7, 
helped to form the attitudes of Barry Hunt and myself. It  is clear from the 
record that train journeys played an important part in the inter-personnel
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contacts which occurred. It would be wrong to underestimate the effect of 
these journeys on the views of the people involved.
It was almost inevitable that the Pathologists themselves should "drag in" 
various versions of solutions which they thought might work. AIC was an 
example, a foreign company from the Continent was another and so on. By far 
the most important one must have been the manufacturer of laboratory 
equipment - American Instruments. The intervention from American 
Instruments was used in a variety of ways. At one stage. Dr. Hunt was using 
their intervention as an "answer to a miaden's prayer" to provide a system that 
would be used in due course. It  was used as a threat to Computer Services as 
being a demonstration that there were organisations that could do Dr. Hunt's 
will. 1 used their involvement to extract from the Company a very complete 
picture of the financial consequences of not doing the project properly 
ourselves. The Pathologists used them as an example of "goodness and purity 
and wellbeing" to which we should all aspire and, in particular, a means of 
attacking the "would be suppliers" namely, the Computer Services. These other 
parts of the project illustrate its complexity.
Although not recorded in the diary, Barry Hunt was always seeking to 
involve his colleagues, especially in some sort of private committee decision. 
Sometime in the future, he has got to go to the Regional Scientific Committee 
and get them to agree a proposal for a Regional system. 1 am quite sure that 
he works quietly on this sort of issue most of the time in private meetings with 
Pathologists and in their sub-committees. There must be a whole network of 
contacts which have been established over the years between the Pathologists 
and which are being used almost continuously. That network exists not only 
within the Region but on the national level as well. The meetings of Chemical
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Pathologists to discuss their own particular interests cannot be completely 
filled with the scientific papers which are the official substance of the meeting. 
There must be many other nets of information which are being used in major 
and minor ways on this particular subject. I feel sure that the manufacturers, 
for example, are talking to Head Office in ways which are not known outside 
Head Office. Therefore, the picture which is being drawn in all of the 
subtheme analyses is a very partial one. It is probably completely impossible to 
paint that total picture. Equally the interpretation of the actions which take 
place, must be very peculiar to the people who must interpret them in their 
immediate local situation. All of those must in fact be sub themes in the total 
picture of laboratory automation in the Region. Most of them are completely 
'off stage' but it would be quite wrong not to acknowledge their existence.
Summary
Despite the complexity of the analysis into subthemes, the actual muddle 
is represented more satisfactorily by the diary. The extent to which the 
project was steered by rational decision as opposed to other negotiating 
positions and factors cannot be determined. It is certain that the strands of 
the project which became the subthemes were not preplanned but evolved. No 
one could have predicted even the rough course which the project would follow 
at its inception.
Another major feature of the analysis is that it demonstrates the 
involvement of management services in the project process. Any suggestion 
that management services played a detached, advisory role is obviously untrue. 
Even within management services, radically different positions were taken up 
and held to tenaciously.
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In the end, a negotiated way forward was followed. The extent to which 
that way forward was the "best" whatever that means leaves much room for 
debate.
In this chapter, the second part of the developed version of Model 6 - The 
Corporate Activist - has been described. Models 1-5 in Chapter 2 suggest that 
projects have simple objectives which are persued in a fairly rational way. This 
chapter shows that complexity not simplicity is the characteristic feature of 
the objectives of a project. In addition, the method by which a project moves 
forward is by complex negotiation, not necessarily rational decision making.
In Chapter 7, a general version of the lessons of this chapter will be put 
foward alongside the general characteristics of the categories derived from 
Chapter 5. These will be the two parts of the developed version of the 
Corporate Activist Model first described briefly as Model 6 in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 7 -A  DESCRIPTION OF THE CORPORATE ACTIVIST MODEL 
BASED ON THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
Introduction
In Chapters 5 and 6, aspects of my work as an RMSO are investigated and 
analysed. The purpose of those analyses of my actual activities was to relate 
them to the models of Management Services activities described in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 2, model 6, known as the Corporate Activist, was described in 
general terms. The purpose of this chapter is to use the results concerned with 
the actual activities of an RMSO from Chapters 5 and 6 to fill out the 
description of the Corporate Activist and to obtain a better understanding of 
the way in which an RMSO acts out this role.
This thesis does not claim to investigate fully the Corporate Activist 
model because that is too complex a task. This thesis attempts to define an 
overall set of event categories in order to describe the model from a wide point 
of view. It  then shows for one project, the Laboratory Case study, how such 
events fit  together. In this chapter, an attempt is made to take both these 
case studies and to generalise the lesson which they contain. Some of the 
material contained in Chapters 5 and 6 will be repeated but this seems 
necessary if a balanced and complete picture of the role is to be presented.
Chapter 5 analysed a large proportion of the total activity of the Regional 
Management Services Officer over a period of fifteen months into events and 
gave those events categories. Those categories were developed by examining 
the recorded events and trying to use the ideas of the Discovery of Grounded 
Theory to develop categories which definitely reflected the character of the 
data rather than being preconceived. Given that the original categories were
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grounded in this way, the next step should be to generalise the properties of the 
categories.
Category groups and extensions
The first important point about the categories is that they seem to fall 
into groups. It  was possible to recognise three groups of these categories:
creative management, 
managing project work, 
and -  rescue management.
Part of the analysis was to identify events which did not fit  easily into 
categories as they developed during the analysis. In the latter part of Chapter 
5 these events without categories were later recognised as falling into the 
following groups:
administration of the Division and working the 
RHA/NHS management system, 
dealing with a high level of frustration,
-  . defending the division,
watching helplessly, 
counselling, 
and - helping other parts of the NHS.
It  is possible to argue that these new activities with the exception of watching 
helplessly, fall easily into one of the three main divisions of categories 
identified above, namely, managing project work. "Watching helplessly" could 
be thought of as being related to the passive element in rescue management in 
which very little  can actually be done by myself.
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The basic twelve categories are very different in nature. In particular, 
the creative management group tend to be less well defined than the rest of the 
categories. This accords with the intrinsic nature of creative management.
The definition and general characteristics of the twelve categories 
Category 1 - Create - General Characteristics
New Id e a  re q u ire d
c re a te  o r im port a new id ea  
extend e x is t in g  ideas
extend and ju g g le  p a rts  o f e x is t in g  ideas
New p a tte rn s  o f work and o rg a n is a tio n  re q u ire d
examine and change boundaries  
co n s id er p a tte rn s  o f work and people  
f i t  problems to  resources
Consider th e  re a c t io n  to  a change
Having a new idea is much more likely if  an organisation seems to want its 
officers to do new things. The actual process of having new ideas and using 
them is difficult to define. It  is rarely having brand new thoughts but is much 
more likely to be the recognition of a justaposition of problems, situations and 
old solutions or ones available from elsewhere which make it possible to do 
something new. A major characteristic of creative thinking is to put together 
a new situation in which the natural aptitudes and energy of people can be 
released and activities transformed. Attemps have been made to describe this 
process in the literature, for example, D A Schon (1978). A major part of 
"create" is concerned with the stage beyond actually having the glimmer of an 
idea and "create" is mainly about how the idea gets developed. The "create" 
process considers implementation at an early stage and it begins to consider the 
feasibility of a plan which will bring about the new situation.
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The first feature listed above in the general characteristics of the 
category is anticipation. Anticipation must be applied both to what can go 
right as well as what can go wrong. Attempting to anticipate the relationship 
that people and different parts of the organisation will develop towards a new 
initiative is demanding. What other people will see as relevant to the issue or 
important to get right will not correspond in all cases with one's own views. 
What they see will depend on their own value systems and past experience and 
usually these are not well understood by other people. At the least, 
anticipating incorrectly and acting accordingly makes corrective action 
necessary and can make progress impossible.
For an idea to have a chance to work, the way in which it is launched must 
be thought out carefully and that launch must be executed efficiently. It  is 
usual to start to build up a power base of people who are in sympathy with the 
new development fairly early in the life of the idea. Later in this chapter it 
will be maintained that objectives and the way forward in a project are being 
changed all the time. If  the project is to move off in approximately the right 
direction it must get powerful backers early in its life. Negotiating 
agreements about support will come early in the launch process and creative 
thinking must include how that will be done. The nature of that initial power 
base and its probable influence on the directions in which the project might be 
diverted need consideration. This initial support has got to be stable in the 
early life of a project. Consideration of influences of this type must surround 
the initial launch of the idea.
Apart from mounting a power base consisting of supporters it is also 
necessary to think out the organisational aspects of the launch. Getting it 
accepted by the various groups in the organisation, taking account of their
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relative power must be thought out. There are different ways of launching 
ideas organisationally, and the consequences of each must be at least 
appreciated even if one cannot always use the route which one would prefer.
At a fairly early stage in the launch, one wishes to see the idea rolling 
forward with organisational and personal backing which will ensure its continued 
existence. It  is helpful if  the idea has been adopted generally throughout the 
organisation and continuing personal "ownership" of it by myself is often a bad 
sign. It is inevitable that, during that process of adoption by the organisation, 
compromises will be made and some of those will be more acceptable than 
others. The anticipation of the results of all these compromises constitutes the 
major part of creative thinking and this should influence how the idea ought to 
be launched.
Category 2 - Learning - General Characteristics
C o n ventional le a rn in g  -
seven such events a re  reco rd ed , most concerned w ith  th e  p o l i t ic s  o f  
o rg a n is a tio n s
People in  s itu a t io n s
hoŵ  people f ig h t  the system 
know how o thers  do th in g s
seek personal knowledge from a resp ected  person  
w atch  personal perform ances and d i f f e r e n t  s ty le s  
observe the use o f power
le a m  to  a n t ic ip a te  re a c tio n s  by w atch ing  them happen 
w eteh people produce t h e i r  own funny lo g ic
w atch people duck a p o lo g e t ic a l ly  when they do n ot l i k e  something
w atch  people d e a l w ith  something they do n o t l i k e
l i a i s e  w ith  an o pp osite  va lu e  system and re c o g n is in g  i t
compare d i f f e r e n t  feedbacks from same s itu a t io n
le a m  how in d iv id u a ls  re a c t  to  o thers
s iz in g  up someone
le a m  about your fr ie n d s  and e s ta b lis h  m utual re s p e c t and sympathy 
l e a m  about q u irks
G ath erin g  in te l l ig e n c e
In t e l l ig e n c e  -  p ic k  up gossip and scraps o f in fo rm a tio n
le a m  in  a t a l k  about something b ig
le a m  about a d is a s te r
g e t in te l l ig e n c e  and feedback
Becoming w ise
seek w ise counsel 
absorb a w ise saying
reco g n ise  and le a m  th e  n a tu re  o f  a p o in ted  question  
l e a m  to  reco gn ise  danger in  i t s  many forms 
ta k e  lessons about th in g s  you missed
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Category 2 - Learning - General Characteristics
Learning background and history
leam a historical background to a situation and its formative influences
Absorbing group behaviour 
observe the use of power
leam to anticipate reactions by watching them happen
watch power group behaviour and leam to know what they might do to you 
pick up an illuminating bit of history
watch ruthless use of power to gain one's own end - people + group 
watch the authority playing with an issue outcome uncertain 
watch a group deal with an issue watch a group 
watch a group act
The analysis of learning in Chapter 5 identified four parts of it;
personal learning
learning about people
learning about the organisation 
and -  learning about the work being done.
There are many ways of looking at learning. Another possible grouping of the 
learning activity is given in the above table. The view put forward in the table 
is based on the need to know what is going on throughout the organisation and is 
very important. Having such knowledge and being able to use it has 
advantages. To be available for use, such knowledge needs to have been 
carefully sifted so as to provide to its user well understood ways of viewing 
events. Knowledge which has not been systematised in this way tends to be 
less useful. Much learning is concerned with the progress of project work. 
Knowing what has been accomplished both within your own and other Divisions 
may seem an obvious requirement but it can be difficult to acquire such 
knowledge. The different interpretations of what has been accomplished
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require careful sieving if a suitable way forward is to be found. It may not be 
politic to press one's own view of the progress made but it is vital to know what 
you believe the situation to be.
The groups of learning types contained in the above table can be used 
more widely than just learning about work progress. They apply to learning 
about people and the organisation equally well. For instance, gathering 
intelligence about people's attitudes towards issues in general is a crucial 
activity for a senior manager. It  can affect all of his activities. The major 
groupings in the table are not a correction of that suggested in Chapter 5 and 
quoted above. They are an equally valid alternative way of understanding the 
complex phenomenon of learning.
Personal learning from books and various other sources of a similar type is 
a straightforward activity. It  is worth recording that the range of learning 
from these sources which a senior manager thinks worthwhile varies 
enormously. 1 think that my senior managers should be more concerned with 
"wisdom" literature rather than technique. It  is difficult to identify what is 
worth reading and building into a systematic body of knowledge which can be 
used by a senior manager since the range of such literature is enormous. More 
and more 1 prefer to read autobiographical and other records of the practice of 
senior managers. It may be that this is an important choice in relation to the 
type of Division which 1 wish to create because this variety of knowledge does 
affect my view of the ideal.
Learning about people by gathering intelligence, knowing the background 
and analysing their behaviour becomes almost automatic. The scene is always 
changing and so is one's prediction of people's behaviour. The forces acting on 
individuals develop, vary from situation to situation and determine to a very
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large extent the range of action which which the other person can take. It is 
necessary to have up-to-date information in these fields. The whole process of 
project negotiation is heavily dependent on that understanding.
Category 3 - Ethos - General Characteristics
Note: The order In this table moves from the use of gentle persuasion to
forceful action.
flying kitesmaking management services better known as a set of people whose help 
can be soughttalk to nurses to persuade them to change their attitudes towards change
work on Regional Administrator’s understanding of issues
appreciate what can be countenanced
trying to uplift the sights of my own staff
try to improve customer relationsagree arrangements privately so that computing has a brighter future 
change the nature of RHA businessestablish sets of principles to guide NHS work in computing 
ease in "new” planning methods then transfer into other division 
slide in a new set of methods in another division 
discuss how to get in new developments in the organisation 
getting resources switched
push for tougher national project managementattacking the anti-specialist forces (training and development of staff)
Ethos is about the fundamental nature of an organisation, its culture and 
what is possible within that culture. The major property of an event which has 
been given the ethos category is that it should change that culture so that more 
things become possible and things which were unthinkable at some stage become 
more acceptable. In this thesis, ethos change is concerned primarily with 
transforming the acceptability of management services methods throughout the 
RHA.
The above table contains a list of the characteristics of activities which 
have been put into the ethos category in their general forms. On the whole, 
changing the nature of an organisation like the RHA occurs fairly slowly and 
gradually but is nevertheless an activity which 1 have pursued relentlessly. But 
a gradual change is not always appropriate or what happens. The above table is 
arranged so that the first entries rely on persuasion while the last ones concern
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direct conflict aimed at destroying activities which would militate against the 
RHA accepting management services. The nature of activities in the central 
portion of the table is different from those at either end. These activities are 
concerned with bringing suggested changes to fruition and pressing home gently 
those things which have been agreed or achieved. These activities in the middle 
of the table rely for the greater part on project work being completed 
successfully and the broader lessons being drawn from these changes. Thus, not 
only were new planning methods made effective in the RHA but they are made 
quite definitely the property of the receiving Division and real intellectual and 
managerial responsibility for them was passed over to that Division. At the 
bottom of the table, the activities concerned with the creation of ethos are 
definitely defensive and active in character. For example, attacking the anti­
specialist forces refers to the conflict with general administrators over the way 
in which the organisation should view management services people from a 
training recruitment and advancement viewpoint. This was a conflict situation 
in which views which would have diminished the acceptance of management 
services were being attacked. There was no other way of dealing with this 
situation other than to attack.
Category 4 -  Relate - General Characteristics
o n g o in g  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t io n s  
p in  down p e o p le
s to p p in g  a  pow er g a in  by in d iv id u a ls
o b t a in in g  m u tu a l u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f  p o s it io n s  on~an is s u e
t r y  t o  g e t  c h i e f  o f f i c e r  com m itm ent (w o rk  programm es and m o n ito r in g )
n e g o t ia t e  how to  p la y  d i f f i c u l t  s i t u a t io n s
become a c c e p te d  by l i s t e n i n g
t r y  t o  u n d e rs ta n d  a p e rs o n
t r y  t o  t a l k  a b o u t m o t iv a t io n ,  e tc  -  th e  deep  th in g s  
h a v e  fu n  and  be human 
g e t  a  d e c is io n
be s y m p a th e tic  and h e l p f u l  i f  p o s s ib le  
e n c o u ra g in g  and a d v is in g  someone 
g e t  someone t o  u s e  t h e i r  pow er 
a g re e  t o  an  a l l i a n c e  
s w itc h  o f f
s u p p re s s  a g g r a v a t io n  
u s e  an  a l l i a n c e  
c o n s p ir e  t o  do so m e th in g  
p e rs u a d e  someone to  u s e  h is  pow er 
f i g h t  f o r  a p r o je c t
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Category 4 - Relate - General Characteristics 
f i x  a  d e c is io n
n e g o t ia t e  w i t h  f r i e n d l y  c o lle a g u e s
a t y p i c a l  w eak m e e tin g
t r y  t o  c o n v e r t  someone
c o n c lu d e  th e  ag re em en t
an  a c t io n  a g re e d
make s p e c i f i c  w ork  ag re em en ts
b i t e  b ack  re s e n tm e n t and f r u s t r a t i o n
fe e d b a c k  a l l  s o r ts  o f  th in g s  t o  s u b o rd in a te s
h ave  fu n
b eh ave  re a s o n a b ly  d e s p i t e  b i t t e r l y  r e s e n te d  in t e r f e r e n c e
t a l k  a  g ro up  on o u r s id e
f e e l  p e rs o n a l h u r t
g e t  d r iv e n  t o  ex tre m es
g e t  a  w o rk  p ro p o s a l a c c e p te d
en co u ra g e  a n d /o r  command s u b o rd in a te s
o r d e r  a s e t  o f  a c t io n s
t r y  d e s p e r a te ly  t o  change som eone’ s c o u rs e
a g re e  m a jo r  a c t io n  i n  p r i v a t e
keep  c o o l i n  th e  fa c e  o f  p ro v o c a t io n
p a tc h  up a  s i t u a t i o n
a c t in g  as a  s o p h is t ic a t e d  p o s t box
d o in g  a r o u t in e
a g re e  w ork
s e t  up  a  co m p lex  d e a l  on w o rk  
c a r r y  th ro u g h  a  d e s ig n e d  f i r s t  m e e tin g  
r e a c t  t o  som eone’ s f r i e n d l i n e s s  
r e a c t  a g a in s t  in t e r f e r e n c e  
e s t a b l is h  p e rs o n a l c o n ta c t  
d e a l in g  w i t h  d i f f i c u l t  to p ic s  
m eet new g ro up s and  in d iv id u a ls  
a g re e  a  c o u rs e  o f  a c t io n
This attempt to define "relate" more accurately must be difficult. The 
variety of circumstances in which a senior manager must act is large and the 
relationships which will develop in those circumstances vary enormously. The 
type of relationship which he must build up with customers, other people, and 
with groups depends on the individual circumstance.
In the above table, the events recorded and given the category "relate" 
are taken individually and a general statement about how they come to be 
categorised as "relate" is made. It  has not been possible to produce these 
generalisations in a particularly systematic way and there does not appear to be 
any helpful suggestions in the literature. I have generated these 
characteristics by thinking of the type of event which I believe occurs fairly 
often in my work and which is similar to the particular event. This general 
characteristic should reflect the essence of that event.
- 230 -
Given these generalisations I thought that a pattern would emerge which 
would allow me to group the characteristics in a similar way to previous 
categories. This did not happen and so the analysis of general characteristics 
has taken a different form. In the paragraphs below, I have attempted to 
identify the main features of the general characteristics. They are somewhat 
arbitrary and other people may choose other features as being more important.
An obvious feature of these characteristics is that they split between 
relating to individual people and relating to groups of people. The relationship 
with a group depends, among other things, on the nature of the group and 
purpose for which it meets. Within those groups are individuals with whom 
individual relationships exist and so there is an overlap between relationships 
with people and relationships with groups. The relationships with a group tend 
to have many more formal characteristics than those which exist with people.
The time over which a relationship exists influences its general 
characteristics. Passing contact with either an individual or a group makes very 
different demands from those which are 'on going' contacts which will have to 
be sustained possibly over many years. For both friendships and fights, there is 
a difference between those which are part of a continuing relationship and those 
which are not. Some sort of an accommodation between the parties must be 
found or will emerge in a continuing relationship.
The word 'Relating' suggests a positive relationship. Many management 
scientists would argue that it is necessary to have reasonably good relationships 
with people if  change is to happen. But it would be wrong to idealise situations 
or to pretend that it is always possible or necessary to "get on well" with people 
who are involved in project work. Relationships vary from those which are
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completely aggressive and destructive to those which are extremely helpful and 
constructive. Although most people would tend to be courteous on most 
occasions, that should not be mistaken as a commitment on their part to have 
positive relationships with oneself all of the time. The ability to deal with 
many types of relationship must be characteristic of a senior manager. In the 
majority of cases, a manager must be relatively indifferent towards any contact 
which is occurring since they will have very little  effect on the work which he 
actually does.
One of the more useful scales for categorising a relationship is the amount 
of ease with which it is being conducted. This scale starts with the very easy 
going cases and moves through normal contacts into those which are getting 
difficult and on still further to those which must be regarded as being distinctly 
aggressive. It  is a mistake to automatically connect the relationships which 
are difficult or aggressive with ones which are less productive. It  is often the 
case that when a big issue is being resolved, difficulties are unavoidable. When 
a major policy switch is occurring and values are being challenged, acrimony 
will occur. The total range of this particular scale must be accepted by 
managers.
A feature of any relationship is the degree of purpose which it possesses. 
A large proportion of attempts to relate to people or groups concern 
agreements to do specific pieces of work. But some events are concerned only 
with cementing an on-going human relationship. For instance, it is important 
to maintain a friendship and one of the ways of maintaining relationships which 
are fundamentally good is the simple process of having fun. People relate 
much more easily to individuals who have got human characteristics and human 
faults as well, as long as those faults do not hinder purposeful activity. These
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are two of the many aspects of just being human in a relationship. The 
purposefulness of any relationship will be on the same sort of scale as that 
described above in relation to the amount of aggression present.
Purpose in an event can also be related to events outside project work, 
e.g. obtaining agreement to a deal of some type, say about training. The 
importance of the subject matter of the event influences participants' commit­
ment to the meeting. This depends on the individuals' values and it is often the 
case that participants show different levels of commitment to an interchange. 
Circumstances may be such that particular individuals "switch off" completely. 
Either they are simply paying no attention and are not bothered about the 
outcome, or they have decided that their disagreement with the main trend of 
the discussion is such that they wish to disassociate themselves from it. Often, 
they do this literally by switching off. Recognising the state of commitment 
among a group of people at any time can be very important and can determine 
whether or not it is useful to progress to another stage in the development of an 
idea or subject.
An adequate definition of establishing relationships in a senior 
management role would require more intense research than has been possible in 
this thesis. However, it has been possible to show that the creation and 
maintenance of relationships is a part of the top management function of a 
change agent which must be cultivated.
P r e - p la n n in g
Category 5 - Big - General Characteristics
o b t a in  e s s e n t ia l  b ack g ro u n d  u n d e rs ta n d in g
n e g o t ia t e  h ig h  l e v e l  c o - o p e r a t io n
t r y  to  g e t  ag re em en t on a  v i s io n  o f  th e  f u t u r e
t r y  t o  im pose o r d e r  on a  huge s e t  o f  p r o je c t s  by n a t i o n a l  n e g o t ia t io n
c r e a t e  t h e  r i g h t  fra m e w o rk  f o r  a  b ig  p r o je c t
n e g o t ia t e  th e  la u n c h  o f  a  b ig  p r o je c t
g e t  th e  r i g h t  re s o u rc e s
g e t  i n t o  a p o s i t io n  o f  p o w er
f i x  h ig h  l e v e l  s u p p o rt by n e g o t ia t io n
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Category 5 - Big - General Characteristics 
g e t 'a n  id e a  a c c e p te d
c a r e f u l l y  s e p a r a te  o u t th e  im p o r ta n t  p a r t s  o f  w o rk
t r y  t o  g e t  m a in  con sequ en ces a c c e p te d  e a r l y  on
t r y  to  r e l a t e  th e  p r o je c t  t o  v i s i o n ,  e t c  -  a  w id e r  c o n te x t
g e t  in t o  p la c e s  o f  in f lu e n c e
f e t  re s o u rc e sorm a l l ia n c e s  t o  rem ove d i f f i c u l t  o b s ta c le s
L a u n c h in g
p ush  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  c o u rs e  o f  a c t io n  a g a in s t  th e  odds 
n e g o t ia t e  f o r  y o u r  v ie w
f i x  th e  f i r s t  m e e tin g  o f  an  im p o r ta n t  g ro u p
sm ooth th e  w ay , e s p e c i a l l y  i n i t i a l l y
p r e - p la n  and n e g o t ia t e  th e  la u n c h
n e g o t ia t e  th e  p la n
d o n 't  m is s ' th in g s  -  w a tc h  m e e tin g s
f i g h t  f o r  a  p r o je c t
u s e  th e  a g re e d  m a c h in e ry  c o m p e te n t ly
n e g o t ia t e  f o r  y o u r  v ie w  o f  th in g s
f i x  th in g s  n a t i o n a l l y
j o i n  i n  im p o r ta n t  m e e tin g s  t o  m a in t a in  in f lu e n c e  
la u n c h  th e  id e a  
n e g o t ia t e  th e  b ig  ch an g e
f i x  s p e c i f i c  is s u e s  by p e rs o n  t o  p e rs o n  n e g o t ia t io n
f i x  im p o r ta n t  e v e n t t im e t a b le s  an d  m o n ito r  them
g e t  th e  p r o je c t s  th ro u g h  th e  managem ent sy s te m
c l e a r  th e  g ro u n d  w i t h  im p o r ta n t  p e o p le
f i x  d e t a i l s
u s e  p o w e r fu l  p e o p le
f i g h t  f o r  th e  p r o je c t
f i x  g ro up  m e e tin g s
u s e  th e  m anagem ent sy s te m  p r o p e r ly
n e g o t ia t e  w i t h  c h i e f  o f f i c e r s
n e g o t ia t e  th e  la u n c h
c o n t r o l  y o u r  own re s o u rc e s
E n s u re  i t s  s u r v iv a l  
cope w i t h  a  c r i s i s
t r y  to  w ard  o f f  f o o l i s h  in t e r f e r e n c e  
k e e p  b ig  p r o je c t s  on t r a c k
c a r e  f o r  la r g e  p r o je c t s  and d e fe n d  them  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e i r  e a r l y  l i f e  
push  f o r  c o r r e c t iv e  a c t io n  i f  th in g s  go w rong  
r e w r i t e  a g re e d  docum ents
A constant cry from management services people and change agents in 
general is that they are not allowed to do the really important work. Those 
processes by which management services divisions get such work and undertake 
it are therefore important. Before one can expect to be given important work, 
a Division must become recognised as creative thinkers and people who can 
contribute to 'big’ projects. In the definition of the first two categories, create 
and ethos, some of the characteristics of creating new possibilities and putting 
together an environment in which ideas will survive have been explored. Those
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two activities form the essential atmosphere within which 'big' projects exist. 
Another important feature of 'big' projects for the customer is that they remain 
practical. It is not easy to maintain the practicality of project work and yet 
ensure that both the vision which inspires the project remains in tact and the 
heights to which it aspires are demanding. These factors influence the parent 
organisation when it is deciding whether or not the project officers are people 
who can be trusted with the future of the organisation to any great extent. 
The degree of confidence which the parent organisation has in the change agent 
determines whether or not 'big' projects are given to it.
The event listing has been split into three groups, pre-planning, launching 
the project and ensuring its continued survival. These general groupings are 
those which one might associate with any project. One of the differences for a 
'big' project is the degree of challenge which it will probably meet during these 
stages. If  the 'big' project has been chosen wisely, then it w ill be a challenge to 
the existing order and that challenge will almost certainly involve some top 
level personnel who will have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. 
The status quo will be the world that they have created over the years and they 
will wish to see it survive. Since such people are involved, this means that for 
'big' projects, the power which interested parties have is of a different order to 
that which will be present when the project is less important. People will use 
that power and will block developments if  they think it right to do so. Equally, 
that power could be used to persue someone's own ends. Much of the work in 
'big' projects is concerned with the negotiation with senior people who have got 
power to either facilitate the progress of the projects or to bring it to a halt. 
Of the three groups of general characteristics, I believe that the launch is the 
most vulnerable to these interventions. Pre-planning and ensuring its survival
- 235 -
can be done by covert negotiating. But, "going public" for the first time, i.e. 
the launch, is an event which is bound to attract the attention of opponents. If 
they can do so, the project will be killed at that time.
It  is not possible to encaspulate all of the ideas which are contained in the 
above table in a few descriptive phrases. Careful study of these general 
characteristics does capture many facets of the category 'big'. Most of the 
characteristics are significant inter-actions with other people and groups. The 
words negotiate, fight and fix occur frequently. All of these terms represent 
very active states. Although it does not appear in the analysis as such, a factor 
in all of these situations is once again the system of values of each party to the 
negotiation. The negotiation is not about the trivial details of a change, none 
of which really matter. If  the nature of the 'big' project is important, then one 
is negotiating a change in a way of life and redefining how things ought to be 
done for the best. Beliefs about such issues are held with tenacity. It  is foolish 
to think that other people's beliefs will be abandoned easily. Any process of 
persuasion, or fighting if it gets to that stage, can involve a great deal of time 
and effort.
The category 'big' is concerned with one of the most important parts of 
the RMSO's job and deserves careful study. The above analysis demonstrates 
some of its major characteristics but many other nuances of its meaning must 
exist.
Category 6 - the definition of opportunism
In Chapter 5, two illustrations of opportunistic behaviour exist. It  is 
suggested that there are other occasions on which this type of behaviour occurs, 
but no evidence is produced. Having studied the evidence in the diary, there
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seems to be little  material on which to base a table of its general 
characteristics. However, two remarks do seem to be justified. Opportunism 
is recognising a pattern of events which turns up unexpectedly and which can be 
made to serve a purpose different from the original one for which the event is 
taking place. Secondly, considerable skill and quickwittedness is needed to use 
an opportunity. In Chapter 5, opportunism is likened to changing tracks on a 
train journey. Opportunism was likened to making that change to a parallel 
track at a set of points which suddenly appear and can be used for that purpose. 
Using the same analogy, the crash can be spectacular i f  the manoeuvre does not 
work. Opportunistic behaviour should not be indulged in lightly.
Category 7 -  the definition of maintain
In Chapter 5, it is suggested that the evidence contained in the diary is 
misleading with respect to this category of work. I remain convinced that the 
activities which are missing from the diary would have at least some of the 
characteristics suggested for them in Chapter 5 but there is no evidence to 
present. Therefore it seems best to regard the definition of maintain as not 
having been illuminated by this research.
Category 8 - Facilitate - General Characteristics
P ro v id e  R eso urces
p ro v id e  re s o u rc e s  -  accom m odation
g e t  re s o u rc e s  l o c a l l y
g e t  re s o u rc e s  n a t i o n a l l y
a g re e  u se  o f  re s o u rc e s
f i x  th e  p r o v is io n  o f  re s o u rc e s
Remove o b s ta c le s
d e v is e  a  m echanism  ro u n d  an  o b s ta c le  
move o b s ta c le s
rem ove o b s ta c le s  and  i n t e r f e r e n c e
C a l l  m e e tin g s  
c a l l  m e e tin g s
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Category 8 - Facilitate - General Characteristics
Make ag re em en ts
p u t t o g e t h e r  co m p lex  d e a ls  u s in g  p o s i t io n  
m eet th e  r i g h t  p e o p le  and a g re e  w o rk  program m es  
p e rs u a d e  p e o p le  t o  c o -o p e r a te  
a g re e  t h a t  my p e o p le  can  a c t
a g re e  t h a t  s t a f f  i n  o t h e r  D iv is io n s  w i l l  re s p o n d  
g e t  p e o p le  to  c o -o p e r a te
M is c e lla n e o u s
make th in g s  move f a s t e r
le n d  o u t y o u r  own s t r e n g t h  o r  pow er
ta k e  d e c is io n s
g e t  p e o p le  t o  a c c e p t n a s ty  f a c t s  and  t o  move
make s u re  t h a t  th e  m anagement system  d id  o p e ra te
p r o v id e  a  w o rk  fra m e w o rk
g e t  p e o p le  o n to  my o f f i c e r s  * s id e
t r y  t o  g e t  co m m u n ica tio n s  g o in g
n e g o t ia t e  th ro u g h  n a t io n a l  m a c h in e ry
in fo r m  p e o p le  o f  a c t io n  t o  be ta k e n
It  could be argued that the major function of a senior manager is to make 
it possible for others to carry out their tasks, i.e. to facilitate their activity. 
Power to perform this type of act is derived from a variety of sources, but it is 
generally associated with more senior positions.
The above table does provide an elaboration of the concept and the 
grouping of the characteristics seem to make sense. It  does not seem 
necessary to do more than note the existence of the first four groups.
The miscellaneous group contains items which are equally as important as 
any other. All of the summary remarks in the above list seem to add a little  to 
the definition.
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Category 9 - Control - General Characteristics
F ix  th e  d is p o s i t io n  and w o rk  o f  my own team s
make a  d e c is io n  and o rd e r  i t s  e x e c u t io n  
f o r c e  d i r e c t  s p e c i f ic  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  on someone 
d e s ig n  a  w ork  programme
o r d e r  th e  f o r m u la t io n  o f  a  p r o je c t  w o rk  programme  
r e t r i e v e  m is p la c e d  d e le g a te d  c o n t r o l  
d e s ig n  a  w o rk  programm e
a g re e  l i m i t s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
d is c u s s  and  a g re e  t o  change c u s to m e r r e la t io n s h ip s  
s o r t  o u t a  mess
v a r io u s  ty p e s  o f  d i s c i p l i n a r y  a c t io n  
fe e d  b ack my p e r c e p t io n  o f  a  s i t u a t i o n  
d is c u s s  and d e te rm in e  cu s to m e r r e la t io n s h ip s
D i v i s io n a l  g ro up  m e e tin g  t o  d is c u s s  w o rk  p rogranm es  
Im pose a  d e c is io n
Sum m arise and e n c a p s u la te  a  d e c is io n  
I d e n t i f y  and  c l e a r  up u n d e r c u r re n ts  
N e g o t ia te  and d e c id e  w o rk  b ou n dary  is s u e s
D e t e r M n in g  c u s to m e r r e la t io n s h ip s  
f o r c e  a  s p e c i f i c  r e l a t i n g  a c t
d i r e c t  n e g o t ia t io n  a b o u t f a c t s  and p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
a g re e  a  p r o je c t  t im e t a b le
a g re e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  and  l i a i s o n  a rra n g e m e n ts  
a g re e  a com prom ise
s e t  u p  a  ty p e  o f  r e la t i o n s h ip ,  e s p e c ia l l y  a t  th e  o u ts e t
N e g a t iv e  c o n t r o l  o f  w ork  program m es
F o r c in g  a  r e c o g n i t io n  o f  v a lu e  f o r  money 
D e c id in g  w h a t in f o r m a t io n  t o  r e v e a l  
S t a t in g  c o n s t r a in t s  e s p e c ia l l y  on re s o u rc e s
N e g o t ia t io n  b u t w i t h  r e a l  pow er  
A g re e  w ork p rogranm es
V i s i t s  t o  In d iv id u a ls  and  c u s to m e r g roups  
S ig n a l  im p o r ta n t  m essages  
C l a r i f y  i n e v i t a b l e  u n p le a s a n t  outcom es  
F ix  m e e tin g s  and  t h e i r  p ro b a b le  outcom e
The control of work and disposition of resources is a fundamental part of 
being a manager. Control can have many shades of meaning depending on the 
amount of direction or negotiation involved. In attempting to identify the 
general characteristics of control, the above table groups the activities 
contained in the diary according to the degree of control and authority which is 
being exercised. The groups in the table start with those situations in which 
maximum control is being exerted and move through to positions in which a
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great deal of negotiating about what to do is taking place. However, for this 
particular work category one must remember that even in the weakest 
negotiating position, there must still be an element of real power, otherwise 
control is an inappropriate word to use.
The first group of events are those in which I do have specific power and 
responsibility to exercise my management function. Two such situations exist, 
namely, those in which I have been given control by the Authority for a specific 
job and those within my own Division for which I have been given continuous 
authority and power. The entries in the table are self-explanatory and move 
from ordering a specific course of action, through situations in which I am 
determining only that a course of action has been designed, and on to those in 
which we are attempting to obtain feedback from specific situations in order to 
try to obtain further action.
The second set are situations in which I work with a group of managers 
rather than the individual departmental managers in the division. The purpose 
of the event is controlling part of the work of the Division and making sure that 
the work moves forward in a co-ordinated fashion. Once again the control 
moves from a positive forward planning action through to one in which 
corrective action is being taken by reviewing current situations. An important 
part of this type of group event is to bring into the open those things which 
people would prefer not to discuss and to make positive decisions about their 
resolution.
The design and control of relationships with project customers is the next 
main group. A great deal of negotiation must occur with customers about the 
projects which will be done for them. Within that negotiation there must be a 
recognition of the constraints which exist on both programmes of work and their
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timetables. From a control point of view, relationships which are tending to go 
sour must be identified and specific relating acts must be designed to rectify 
the situations.
As the amount of authority and control which one has in a given situation 
lessens, the constraints on the projects must be spelled out more closely to the 
customer. The next group describes those situations. It is especially 
important to tell customers about constraints that will definitely prevent the 
realisation of their wishes if  they are not removed. It is also necessary to 
refuse to undertake work on the basis that it is not worth doing. Such refusals 
may cause additional problems, but it is clear responsibility of a senior manager 
to say if this is the case because resources are not being used effectively in 
such situations.
The last group concerns situations in which one's power and control is 
severely curtailed. If the situations are still within the control category, 
residual power still exists. That residual power can be used effectively given 
care.
All of the control activities are part of a continium of activities which 
stretch into the other major categories identified in this thesis. As power 
diminishes in a given situation, the control category tends to merge with the 
facilitate category at one end and as control becomes extreme it can merge 
into the troubleshooting and takeover categories. It  is becoming much more 
difficult for a manager to exercise power in the old fashioned manner, i.e. 
without excessive regard for other people, and this affects control. It  is 
possible to negotiate one's way into positions of power and for power to be given 
to you by other people. Such power positions do not rely on the formal one of
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your being in a particular position in the managerial hierarchy. Whatever its 
source the responsible exercise of power is a significant and central part of the 
role of a management services officer.
Category 10 - Oil the Works - General Characteristics
re a s s u re  i n d i v i d u a l
p o in t  o u t a d v a n ta g e s
make i t  up a f t e r  a ro w
s o r t  o u t a  p ro b le m  w it h  someone
d is c u s s  b ou n dary  d is p u te s
ta k e  p a r t  i n  g ro up  a c t i v i t y
The diary does not contain much material in this particular category but I 
feel that many more events of this type actually occur than are recorded. As a 
result, I think that the definition of the term 'oil the works' contained in the 
above table is an inadequate refinement of the original definition.
One comment which is contained and in the analysis in Chapter 5 is worth 
repeating. The activity of pouring oil on troubled waters is optional and I may 
or may not decide to act in that way. I will only take trouble to do this when it 
affects something which is important to me. In most organisations, the 
relationships between people are somewhere between being very bad and very 
good. Staff are rarely satisfied completely by their work and they are often 
confused about its purpose. In most organisations, a level of dissention and 
acrimony exists in some parts of it most of the time. Despite the fact that I 
am aware of this situation, as a senior manager I do not feel responsible for 
alleviating all the troubles of the organisation on a wide scale or inclined to 
take action. Compared with the amount of oil that could be poured on troubled 
waters, the amount this is actually poured onto them is relatively small.
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Category 11 - Troubleshoot - General Characteristics
A v o id a n c e  o f  t r o u b le
a n t i c i p a t e  i t s  s o u rc e  and  fo rm
l i n e  up d e fe n c e  f o r c e s ,  e s p e c ia l l y  p e o p le
t r y  t o  c o n ta in  a  p ro b le m , do n o t  l e t  i t  s p re a d
o b ta in  i n t e l l i g e n c e
N e g o t ia te  a ro u n d  t r o u b le
t r y  t o  g e t  ag re em en t w i t h  tro u b le m a k e rs  
k e e p t  d e a l in g  w i t h  ru n n in g  so re s  
s o r t  o f  a  la c k  o f  x m d e rs ta n d in g  
s o r t  o u t  m u ddleheadedness
A t t a c k  and  e l im in a t e  t r o u b le  
b r in g  i n  s u p p o rt
e l im in a t e  m anagement i n t e r f e r e n c e  
f i x  to p  l e v e l  s u p p o rt
go t o  r i g h t  p la c e s  a n d  p e o p le  t o  s to p  th e  r o t
ta k e  on p o w e r fu l  enem ies
s t r a ig h t e n  o u t m u ddled  w ork  in s t r u c t io n s
c l a r i f y  m a jo r  o b je c t iv e s
move someone o u t o f  th e  way
Implementing management services projects within any organisation is 
complicated. It  can be argued that with adequate planning change it should go 
smoothly. But it does not do so. The extent to which planning can eliminate 
troubles which arise in a project is debatable and it is not clear that one would 
be economically justified in seeking to eliminate more than a reasonable 
proportion of the risks of trouble. It  is inevitable that many projects will 
experience difficulties and management must be prepared to negotiate around 
the problems which arise. The above table of general characteristics of this 
troubleshooting activity is in three sections and these are described below.
If  one accepts that trouble is bound to arise sometimes, then it is sensible 
to try and detect the first signs of it and to try to avoid its worse ravages. In 
some projects, it may be inevitable that the work programme will encounter 
difficulties and one will have to get around them. In other cases, it is simply 
generally known that doing projects of a particular type always tend to have to
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weather particular sorts of storms. The sources of problems are often well 
known. It is sensible to try to assess the probability of trouble and to be 
prepared for it.
Preparing to deal with the trouble, if  that is possible, must be followed by 
actions which will deal with the issues. There are two ways in which this 
occurs. These are contained in the two parts of the table above concerned with 
negotiating and eliminating trouble. The negotiating occurs in both of these 
sections of the table but it is more pronounced in the middle one. The entries in 
the table are concerned with situations in which it is preferable to try to 
eliminate whatever is causing the problem in as speedy a way as possible. But 
inherent in the descriptions are the various uses of different degress of power 
discussed earlier.
There is a third category of trouble which comes into existence quickly, 
cannot be anticipated or prepared for and which has simply got to be dealt with. 
In this third category, some of the actions are quite straightforward such as 
sorting out work instructions and clarifying major objectives. The origin of the 
trouble in these particular circumstances is often the building up of various 
types of misunderstanding, which seems to be characteristic of most large 
organisations. But there is a small part of this section of troubleshooting in 
this part of the table concerned with dealing with enemies, those people who do 
not have sympathy with our objectives and would wish to see the projects fail 
and their originators and supporters eliminated. Not all head-on clashes can be 
avoided and it is the role of a senior manager to deal with issues of this type 
effectively.
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The implications of the laboratory project
In the above paragraphs, the original definitions of the categories of 
activity have been expanded using evidence from the first case study. The 
events which can be given categories in this way are discreet and have been 
taken out of context. In order to form a change agent activity, they must form 
part of a more coherent, larger activity put together to pursue a given 
management objective. One such activity is the Laboratory Project described 
in Chapter 6. In that context, it is maintained in this thesis that a possible key 
to understanding this mixture of smaller events is the set of negotiations which 
occur to decide what the next project steps shall be. In the next section of this 
chapter, the Chapter 6 case study will be used to illustrate this process of 
negotiating order and the factors which seem to influence that negotiation.
However, before considering this further analysis of Chapter 6, it is useful 
to relate the analysis of Chapter 5 above to the model discussed for OR in 
Chapter 2. In crude terms, the OR model was "let us negotiate with our 
customer and determine the more desirable state to which he wants to move 
and then, let us find a way to get there". Suppose that we equate the joint 
discovery of a more desirable state with category 1 to 5 activities and 
categories 5. to 11 plus the unclassified ones with getting there. The 
interventions connected with 'big', category 5, are often associated with 
fashioning the objective and pursuing it at the same time and so the above 
overlap is necessary. For instance, altering the nature of the 1979 Objectives 
did not preclude work on those objectives. Even if the new OR model is 
roughly correct, then the process by which it is operated must be much more 
complicated than appears to be suggested in existing papers. Putting together 
a rational plan and following it, whether that plan be made by optimising
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algorithms, heuristic sensible methods or just plain agreements does not 
correspond in any way to the processes described in the diary. Thus, although 
we can supplement the above OR model by the categories, the definition of the 
process of running projects is still weak.
Conceptually, order is preceded by chaos and the negotiating process 
referred to above concerns the change from one to the other. Although the 
relative degrees of each which exist in any management situation change and 
although managers will have different perceptions of what is chaos and what is 
order, to effect a change from less to a more desirable state of affairs from 
their point of view will be the objective of most participants in a negotiation. 
Before commenting on this process further, it is worth noting that the concept 
of an existing degree of chaos is analogous to Ackoff's concept of a "mess". 
Ackoff does not describe the nature of a "mess" but it may be worth pausing to 
consider the nature of chaos.
I think that the first thing to note is that chaos, or at least the degree of 
it, is in the eye of the beholder. That which is unacceptable in a situation will 
vary from person to person. Each person will have a view on the part of a 
situation which needs improvement most and each will have a different view on 
which parts definitely require remedial action. In so far as there are 
"objective" statements available on the situation,e.g. the throughput levels are 
low, these will be subject to differing interpretations as well. Each person will 
see a different mess and, whatever "objective" analysis of the problem has or 
has not been done, everyone will possess a view on that problem and, most 
probably, a favoured solution. People will relate to each other in that situation 
and, not only will they have views on the situation itself, they will have views 
on the positions and views which are held and on the other people as individuals.
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Any change will affect not only the "objective" side of the problem but it will 
probably change the influence and power of people. A "mess" or "chaos" has all 
of these different facets.
It is within this sort of situation that one must consider movements from 
chaos towards order. One of the first movements towards order within a group 
of managers seems to be an agreement in broad terms that a particular 
different state would be more desirable than their present one. The growing 
concensus that laboratories need automation or that planning models are a good 
thing is a very important agreement within a group and is often the first step in 
a complex set of negotiations. It  is worth examining the nature of such 
agreements.
The emergence and establishment of these broad agreements is the first 
point of interest. Although it is true that such broad objectives can be 
established by rational arguments, I do not think this is probable. The broad 
agreements mentioned in the last paragraph are underpinned by an 'ethos' 
change. Those ethos changes were the result of quiet persuasion mostly on a 
one to one basis. Of course, post hoc rationalisations will exist but most of the 
activities concerned with the launching of these two ideas will be in the low 
numbered categories, create, ethos and relate. These broad agreements tend 
to have a uniting aspect which commands commitment and this is described 
below. The quiet negotiation, letting water drip on the stone, showing people 
that their peers are thinking about the same sort of development, are the ways 
in which this type of agreement comes into being.
Once established, these broad objectives are not questioned by the 
participants in that agreement. For example, no debate among consultants 
occurs over issues concerned with the relationships between the improved
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automated laboratory service and its effects on patient care. The relative 
values of different diagnostic techniques such as X-ray and laboratory services 
are not debated. Within the services provided by laboratories, it can be argued 
that delays in getting reports to clinicians and getting them to act on those 
reports quickly is more important than laboratory automation. But even an 
important body like the Regional Scientific Committee, which one might expect 
to be concerned with wider problems, chooses not to pursue the question 
vigorously. This lack of concern and the related consultant attitudes should not 
be interpreted as a necessarily mischievous conspiracy. Some people will 
believe genuinely that laboratory automation is a top priority issue for the total 
RHA organisation. Others will believe that within their own limited field of 
responsibility it is top priority for them. Still others will believe that whatever 
anyone's priorities happen to be, laboratory automation is the only field in which 
they can take effective action. But the implication for a negotiating situation 
is that participants have a tacit agreement on what broad objectives and other 
limiting factors are to be taken for granted. Substantial challenges to these 
agreements and assumptions are likely to be dealt without pity and will be 
regarded as threatening and therefore unwelcome. This thesis contains no 
evidence to this effect,but if  a challenge to the agreed major automation 
objective had come from outside the laboratory circle, I believe that a wide 
variety of tactics would have been used to nullify its effects. Although not 
part of the diary, it is interesting to note that whenever the newly formed 
Regional Computer Policy Group shows an interest in laboratories, the 
laboratory personnel become very suspicious and defensive. That Group does 
question and determine computing priorities.
This phenomenon of there being tacit and agreed macro-objectives which 
are not questioned is part of a much broader agreement to lim it the bounds of
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negotiation. This broader agreement is even more implied and tacit and part of 
it concerns all the known weaknesses in the positions of the participating 
negotiators. Everyone's position is a collection of possessions, attitudes, ways 
of working and so on, and there exists a whole series of views in the negotiating 
group about the many facets of each individual's position. This theme will be 
developed later specifically in relation to power, but it is wider than power. 
Except in the most kindly way, no one is ever going to comment on the gross 
over equipping of some laboratory. No one is going to be pointed in their 
questioning of professional practice - except in the most academic of 
atmospheres. If  such boundaries were transgressed, retaliation by a similar 
sort of transgression is inevitable. For example, even in private if  I stray onto 
a sensitive area with Dr. Hunt, I will be reminded of the transgressions of "my" 
Computer Department. If  the transgressions are too blatant, which probably 
means that they are not an accident, the negotiation will break down. 
Although not recorded in the diary, the latter stage of the breakdown of 
negotiations between Dr. Hunt and the Computer Department were full of such 
transgressions. For example. Dr. Hunt frequently poured scorn on the use of 
bench marks to test the ALPHA system. This is a direct attack on the 
professional paraphernalia of a computer man and it would never have been 
launched if  the relationship between computer services and Dr. Hunt had been 
better.
However, given the strategic goal of laboratory automation, the project 
objectives are open to negotiation all the time. Although outside the time span 
covered by the diary, the fact is that the first ALPHA system did go into 
Sleeton, first on the old hardware. That hardware was replaced by new 
hardware, a piece at a time admittedly, before any other laboratory operated
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ALPHA. Sleeton laboratory belonged to the man most alive in this field in the 
Region. Despite the fact that all the odds were against him, he has successfuly 
retained the lead. A wide variety of changes in project direction occurred 
before that happened. By a variety of methods, he negotiated the necessary 
changes and achieved his objective. Those changes in the project objectives 
were being negotiated all of the time and it is worth illustrating this in some 
detail.
The laboratory project is split into main sub-themes and sideshows. I 
suggest that all of those different sub-theme goals were present throughout all 
of the period covered by the diary. The concept that a pilot study should be 
done in a quite laboratory never was accepted by all of the participants. 
Paragraphs 17 to 24, page 331 of the diary illustrate the completely different 
attitudes being taken at the same time. One person thinks that before his 
actual need becomes pressing, he will have time to watch the situation develop. 
Another wants to get a second pilot machine in. No one appears to like the 
proposed way forward. The man with the most advanced laboratory can see his 
lead slipping away and so decides not to commit himself one way or the other, 
preferring to carry on fighting for his own laboratory in a different way in a 
different arena. The meeting eventually takes a decision which is overturned 
within a few days. That meeting and the decision taken should have helped to 
progress the objectives of theme 1, giving the contract to a firm to start the 
pilot study, but it did not do so. Most of the objectives of the other sub-themes 
were presented, some in a rather hazy form and others very explicitly at that 
meeting. They were being pursued all the time.
The above paragraph concentrates on objectives which develop into main 
themes in the project and for that reason might be regarded as sensible. But
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there are others which illustrate patterns of behaviour which appear to show 
smaller degrees of sense and reason. Although this is necessarily a personal 
judgement, some of the minor objectives being pursued at various times do 
appear to be distinctly bizarre. The proposition to transfer the failed Ralton 
experiment to Hillbury seemed bizarre. Apart from there being no local 
support in Hillbury for that action, the briefest consideration of local conditions 
rules out a pilot study of any sort. To undertake two pilot studies instead of 
the one which isn't going very well is not reasonable. Attemps to remove whole 
pieces of the pilot equipment for other uses or to transfer it into completely 
different departments seems to be very odd behaviour. The examples, and 
there are others, illustrate the wide range of ideas which people were prepared 
to launch and pursue. Although at first sight, all of these actions do seem 
bizarre and unreasonable, it is much more likely that these actions were 
motivated by schemes which did seem reasonable, or at least worth trying out, 
to the person who launched them. Frequently one's own partial view of a 
situation makes it impossible to f it  together and make sense of the actions 
which are going on around one. But they do make sense in some context to 
some one.
The OR model described in Chapter 2 does not recognise that most 
situations have such a complex set of objectives associated with them. People 
in the case study are only partially committed to common objectives, if  at all. 
Those private ones to which they have higher commitment will be pursued more 
vigorously than the common objective should the opportunity arise or if  it can 
be engineered. The OR model's plan to meet your customer's objectives 
constitutes a partial agreement which may be useful as a bargaining counter in 
the negotiating of project direction at any time, but it does not constitute a
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charter for developing the organisation in accordance with the plan whatever 
happens.
If it is true that moving a project forward is negotiating steps forward 
within the above multi-objective environment, it is necessary to start 
identifying parts of that negotiating process. This thesis does not put forward 
a total, coherent theory of that process of negotiating change; it only tries to 
illuminate some aspects of it.
A striking feature of the diary is the way it moves through a continuous 
series of crises. The initial collapse of the original project, failing to find 
replacement systems, the threat that an important supporter of the long term 
solution will be insulted and so on, are all crises. At a slightly lower pitch, 
unexpected happenings occur frequently. For example, American computer 
companies selling an alternative system become involved with a unit which is 
supposed to be committed to waiting for the result of the pilot study. If  the 
events of this project had to be categorised, "troubleshoot" would have been 
used often. Once a "big" project is launched, one that is bound to bring 
significant changes in management's operational behaviour, an issue seems to be 
whether the progress of the project is going to be characteristically smooth or 
rough. What are the factors which determine this aspect of its nature ? The 
progress of the laboratory project was characteristically rough, even to the 
extent of two of the main actors becoming almost paranoid about it at some 
stages. The rumour that a certain company was behaving in a given manner 
caused another senior manager and myself to take a variety of actions to 
eliminate that intervention which, on mature reflection, were not particularly 
wise. As stated above, the troubleshoot category is very appropriate for this 
project. Troubleshooting demands fast action. A senior manager must be
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careful that the action does not become, in the words of David Owen, "shooting 
from the hip". Fast reaction must not take place in a wild and uncontrolled 
manner.
Crisis and troubleshoot were characteristic of this project, and it is 
possible to identify several ways in which people attempted to negotiate a way 
around crises. The first is the quiet meeting. There are at least three 
accounts of such meetings in quiet pubs at lunchtime when straight talking was 
required. The people at those meetings knew that serious talks were taking 
place and that these would later determine a stand which would be taken, 
possibly formally and certainly in public. Such private discussions did not 
always resolve issues and sometimes the subsequent public event simply 
established the relative and uncompromising positions being taken. For 
example, a compromise on user requirements for the pilot study was not 
fashioned either by private or public negotiation. There were two distinct 
types of private meeting associated with the project. One type can be 
represented as positive collusion, the other as seeking to avoid a confrontation 
or other type of not particularly productive meetings. As my relationship with 
Dr. Hunt improved throughout the course of this project, and since our offices 
are close to each other, private collaboration became common. Thus for 
example, each encounter with the companies and each letter sent to districts or 
laboratories became matters for consultation. Officially, we were usually 
acting separately and independently on these matters. It  is a mistake to 
confuse positive collaboration with friendship or any of the conventional 
politeness which you must observe in any organisation. Collaboration and 
collusion are based primarily on carefully measured out trust, a concept 
developed below in more detail. A second type of private meeting was with 
Area personnel in a very quiet country pub and was meant to exert pressure to
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produce a change in their attitude towards the need to alter a system. We 
were trying to find a formula by which they could accept our position. If no 
solution were found, the crisis was bound to get worse. These meetings could 
have provided a solution.
The second way of dealing with crisis, negotiation within a group, required 
very different sets of skills from those of the private meeting. The meeting to 
get the system specification accepted is a good example. Around the table 
there were very different points of view and the object of the meeting was to 
get them all to agree to the specification. Whatever the provocation, the 
temperature of the debate had to be kept down. By taking the initiative and 
getting the simple case for a given course of action on the table first of all, an 
important part of this negotiation had been completed successfully. It  would 
have been so easy for others to have produced all the counter arguments 
initially, blown up one or two of them into issues of major principle, and then it 
would have been very difficult to have dealt with the situation. Although not 
in the laboratory project, the Christmas meeting of RMSOs with Head Office to 
discuss the National Statistical Review, is a perfect example of being reduced 
to a lose situation in a meeting. As explained in Chapter 5, our position became 
so weak that a hasty withdrawal of the issue for discussion in another arena was 
the best I could do. In the laboratory case, the second that individuals started 
to side with me it became possible to start isolating the known hard core of 
resistance. The best that could be hoped for was for that hard core not to 
oppose the proposed action at this meeting and this was achieved. Active 
support from these people was out of the question. At least one major counter 
argument to the proposal existed, namely, lack of experience on the part of the 
would-be supplier, and that could have upset the balance, but it was never 
advanced decisively. The gentle pressure of a seemedly logical case eventually
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won the day. For the outcome of a meeting to be so uncertain is rare and it is 
a situation which should be avoided. To know that you are following a course 
of action about which powerful people have deep reservations is a dangerous 
situation.
A third type of negotiation must be the frantic action. Suddenly, on your 
desk there is a situation which cannot be allowed to develop. Negotiation is 
usually to decide an action and take it, usually by phone, immediately. Typical 
examples are threats or supposed threats of the withdrawal of support or 
renaging on an agreement. The threatened person can do a wide variety of 
unwise things and he must be persuaded not to do them. Sympathy must be 
given, promises to act as honest broker made, forthright commands not to be 
stupid or threats to take punitive action can be made. Often frantic action is 
associated with a threat to a person of high status or a threat to a sensitive part 
of an action plan. For example, the attack on the ALPHA system designer or 
the unwise act in a tendering situation both caused frantic negotiations to take 
place.
Frequently managers complain about, or at least comment on, the pace at 
which they are expected to work and the pace at which they do work. Whilst it 
is true that managers need to sit quietly and think for some of their time, and it 
is usually very difficult to time-table such activity, it is also true that a major, 
and possibly the most important, part of their role is to act or react in order to 
move things forward. In this thesis, it has been shown that a manager has a 
large number of diverse objectives being pursued by his colleagues and himself 
at any time. Even if it were possible, it is not economic to preplan all 
activities so as to virtually exclude the possibility of mishap. This thesis 
maintains that, in so far as a project moves forward, this occurs as a result of
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almost constant negotiation and it is not possible to exclude the unexpected 
results of other people's actions from the ongoing action. It  is not bad 
management necessarily if  one must react frantically. It is an essential part of 
a fast moving negotiation or set of actions which move a project forward.
Another important factor affecting the need for frantic action is the 
sheer number of things which a manager has going on at any time. As 
suggested above, few if any are in a state of complete control or perfectly 
planned. It is always possible to plan things better but it is foolish to pretend 
that perfection is attainable. The number of uncontrollable factors and the 
number of interacting and conflicting value systems in any situation mitigates 
against this. Whilst advocating that an appropriate degree of planning must go 
into a project, the need to act fast to overcome the limitations of a project plan 
exists as well.
The examples given above are typical of the way events mesh together in 
negotiations. It  is possible to go beyond this and to enquire about the 
underlying factors which shape the negotiation and there are at least three in 
evidence in the laboratory project, power, trust and values.
Power has been defined by Walter Buckley, as "control or influence over 
the actions of others to promote one's goals without their consent, against their 
will or without their knowledge or understanding (for example, by control of the 
physical, psychological or some cultural environment within which others must 
act)". The first thing to note that such power is that it does exist and people 
are prepared to use it. The NHS is in some ways a classical bureaucracy and 
there is a widespread belief that things get done in bureaucracies by committee 
work only. In fact, little  gets done in this way. Most actions get taken by 
individuals who wish to take them for their own reasons. Most committees are
- 256 -
very important methods of obtaining formal approval. Dr. Hunt did possess the 
power to spend capital and to refuse to spend it. He did this at the Ralton 
Laboratory and without that action, and more basically his agreement to it, the 
pilot work would not have started. I wanted a new Company in the tendering 
process and I forced this to happen. The Ralton consultant decided that he was 
unwilling to compromise on his requirements and did not do so. These examples 
demonstrate the reality of power and in negotiating, it is vital to have assessed 
correctly who might act decisively to determine what the next step is going to 
have to be.
If its existence and the fact that people will use it is the first to note 
about power, then the second must be that power to stop progress is much more 
common than power to make something happen. The diary illustrates the need 
to get many people's agreement to a step forward, for example, the transfer of 
the ALPHA system onto the old hardware at Sleeton. The District agreed. 
Wood agreed, the Treasurers agreed, and so on. Fundamentally, I said 'No' to 
Phase 2 of the rescue system. Both were the subject of negotiation, the first 
being a long protracted affair, the second lasting one short lunch hour.
The source of various types of power is important. Much of the power 
used by Dr. Hunt and myself was directly due to our position in the management 
hierarchy and had been given to us. But some of it came from being the 
acknowledged expert in the field. If a computer 'expert' stated that the bench 
mark had demonstrated that the Delta system was unstable, there was little  
that a Ralton pathologist could do about it, whatever position he held in the 
management hierarchy. Having expert knowledge, e.g. knowing about 
computers, also gave one a right to a particular sort of opinion. Thus, my 
opinion about whether or not a particular Company could do a job was deferred
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to and I have to be careful about the way in which I expressed such opinions. It 
was apparent that Dr. Hunt had another sort of power deriving from his long 
term control of capital. It  would have been very dangerous for pathologists to 
have got "across" him in any real sense since their need for his co-operation 
with their plans was important. They are unlikely to agrue too violently with 
him for that reason. This thesis cannot present an in-depth analysis of the 
source of power but the effect of power on negotiation must be noted. In the 
next chapter, a classification of the different types of power is discussed.
One situation in which the use of power is of particular interest is 
conflict. In any negotiation varying degrees of different sorts of power will be 
possessed by the participants. Holding the purse strings, having the right to a 
particular sort of technical opinion, being managerially responsible for the 
operation of the service, are all different sorts of power. In a particular 
negotiation, these types must be used by different people acting together and 
any decision is the result of this interplay. By standing on different ground, 
and arguing accordingly, for example the availability of money and technical 
opinion, two individuals can make it difficult to find a way forward. The 
importance which a participant gives to his view is a choice which he makes and 
he can play something up or down. It may be possible for one participant to 
ignore the views of another in any case. If  conflict occurs, it is often between 
people from different parts of the RHA, e.g. a finance officer and the scientific 
service section. There is little  that one can do to topple the arguments of the 
other, especially if  one of them decides that a particular course of action would 
not fit in with his own global preoccupations at that time. For example, he 
might want to reserve this money for another purpose. The treasurer might 
well be prepared to put up with all sorts of bullying and other tactics and still 
use his veto power in such circumstances.
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Power should never be seen as some sort of master card in the game of 
negotiating. It is an element in the total game, a very important part of the 
pack of cards maybe. But just as it is possible to lose your ace in the last few 
hands of a game of bridge, it is equally possible to fritte r away an undoubted 
position of power by inexpert negotiation. It  is usually unwise to underestimate 
the possible effect of even the weakest sort of power especially if the person 
who holds it is an expert player. If, in the above example, the treasurer is 
bluffing about the financial position and really is keeping back money for a, 
favoured scheme, a clever opponent can and will call that bluff.
"Getting across" a powerful person is a particularly interesting part of the 
effects of power and conflict in negotiation. Relationships within organisations 
are usually stable and will last for many years. Every development in the 
future will probably involve the same people. If  any way forward involves a 
serious loss of face, change in power structure or simply a diminuation in some 
particular aspect of a person's standing, then the negotiations are going to get 
difficult. A possible loss of leadership by the most automated laboratory in the 
Region caused its chief to modify his behaviour over a long period of time. 
There are always many ways in which a relationship can be made less helpful. 
To become involved in a dispute with the person with power of the development 
monies is very unwise. Even without actions which might be regarded as 
"malicious", he will be inclined to favour those people with whom he has an easy 
relationship if  he wishes to do an experiment for example. Put more 
graphically, at the very least, the icing on the cake is always subject to a grace 
and favour type of action and "getting across" someone in power is a sure route 
to eating plain cake in the future.
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Having made the case that only the major objective of any exercise can be 
taken for granted and that all others are subject to change, it must be pointed 
out that some are more stable than others. In the above paragraphs, power is 
discussed at some length. The fact is that the automation of the Eastbury 
laboratory is becoming more pressing as each month passes and Dr. Hunt 
requires a solution. I do not believe that the precise nature of the solution 
matters very much to him, but the fact that a solution exists matters a great 
deal. Althugh not recorded, the various actions being taken in this project are 
being constantly related to that goal. The first two systems, both at Ralton, 
the transfer to Sleeton and all of the action since the diary closed are 
concerned with this goal. Of course, only Eastbury and Dr. Hunt think that this 
is what matters in the end, but Dr. Hunt has the power to cause all actions to 
relate to this particular objective and he will continue .to press people to at 
least pay lip service to it and to act so that we move in that direction. Thus, 
whether he wants to or not. Dr. Jarratt is helping Eastbury all the time. Of 
course, he may have done this in any case, but the fact is that he has no option 
if  he is to protect the future of his own laboratory. The steady movement 
towards an Eastbury solution is going to be protected in all situations and as 
time passes, the pressure to give that objective a higher priority increases. 
That solution is going to have to be acceptable to Dr. Hunt and everyone knows 
that.
In an earlier paragraph, it is suggested that the negotiators establish fairly 
quickly a set of boundaries within which they agree to work and a set of 
assumptions that they agree not to challenge. The existence of areas of 
weakness in each others position was also discussed together with tacit 
agreements not to venture into those areas unless provoked. But there are also 
sets of rocks on which they know that they will founder if  they approach too
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close. I doubt if  many people outside Region and Eastbury really care about 
Eastbury's problem, in fact it is a positive nuisance to them if anything. Its 
solution will consume resources which otherwise might go to themselves. But 
no one is going to challenge the wisdom of having that particular priority. 
Similarly, no one would dream of challenging the status of the Regional Plan, 
and would be very careful about suggesting changes to its form. In general, all 
projects are carried out under similar sorts of constraints. There are always 
powerful negotiators whose primary sets of objectives and values must be 
respected.
If  the exercise of power is a feature of negotiating order, then attitudes 
towards the extent to which other people can be trusted is another. The 
laboratory project contains two almost perfect examples of the way in which a 
set of negotiations changed the level of trust which one party was prepared to 
place in another party. The failure of the Computer Department to put the 
second system into Ralton removed from them most of the power and status 
which they had had up to that point. The effect of that failure was compounded 
by their subsequent actions. The rights and wrongs of their technical 
judgements were in my view secondary to their failure to accept an appropriate 
level of responsibility for their errors. Trust plummeted because their 
integrity was open to question, not their expert opinion, although that might 
have been the case also. A second example was my relationship with Dr. Hunt 
which has been through many phases, and will go through more. Initially, I was 
identified with the Computer Department and all that meant. Slowly, that has 
changed and we now have a more profitable relationship in which deals are 
possible. We check each other's position now as a matter of routine. For 
example, we vet important letters jointly although we are independent agents.
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The extent to which each is willing to rely on the other is subject to constant 
review.
Real negotiation occurs when powerful people make a deal and an 
important part of each deal is the extent to which they trust each other. It  is a 
sign of immaturity to believe that holding an explicit view on the extent to 
which a deal will be honoured is an unnecessary or distasteful part of a 
manager's role. It  is a responsible act and must be based on experience. Any 
suggestion that one should place indiscriminate levels of trust in people with 
unknown performance characteristics, presumably because that is the "nice" 
thing to do, is foolish. Negotiated levels of trust are the only possible basis of 
action. Delegation in particular is a negotiated trust relationship, not an 
axiomatic right of a subordinate manager.
A lack of this type of negotiated trust has significant repercussions. This 
is especially the case if powerful people are involved. The need to negotiate in 
these circumstances is common. Three common practices occur in these 
circumstances. First you can attempt to fix the deal in another arena, second 
you can attempt to lim it what is at risk and third you can prevaricate. All of 
these are subject to a wide range of interpretation but these appear to be the 
fundamental positions which can be taken. None of these actions are immoral 
and some of the ends do justify the means. Real negotiation occurs when 
powerful people of different views must make a deal. It  is unwise to overlook 
the need for form a view on the extent to which a deal w ill be honoured without 
constant wrangling. One is often forced by circumstances to make deals which 
may not be kept. Blatant breaking of an agreement must be rare, but the 
possibility of finding excuses not to carry out obligations is related to such 
events. Most of the agreements in the laboratory project had at least some
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characteristics which made me uncertain about their outcome. But there was 
no alternative to attempting to move forward on the basis of them.
Another important aspect of this type of negotiated trust can be 
demonstrated from my relationship with Dr. Jarratt. My working supposition 
with regard to him is that he will look after his own interests, if  necessary, to 
the complete exclusion of others. This does not imply that any action would be 
in any sense dishonest or dishonourable, but that he will use every possible 
means to further the well being of his laboratory. If I am attempting to 
negotiate anything with him, I spend a great deal of time working out what I 
think his next move will be. During the transfer of Delta in his laboratory, I 
was curious beyond belief to work out how he would persuade Wood to help him. 
I watched him like a hawk and I doubt if  I would have given him much leeway if  
I had thought things were going badly wrong. The expection which you have 
about another person's behaviour is one of the factors which influence the 
negotiating process.
There are many other examples of the influence on negotiation of the 
roles or attitudes which one thinks others will adopt. One of the recurrent 
roles and sets of attitudes which can be seen in the diary are those of the RTO. 
Despite my constant efforts to try to Henry involved in the major decisions on 
laboratories, and despite the fact that I believed that he should be involved, I 
did not really expect him to be helpful. It  seems that one's boss is always at 
odds with a person about the amount of interest he should take and the balance 
is never right. Taking an example from outside laboratory work, I did expect 
my own 0  & M officer to push through the new planning methods, whatever 
opposition he encountered, and he did this. The extent to which I allow him to 
do this without my intervention is a negotiated position. Of course, one can be
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wrong about these expectations too. I was completely wrong in my forecasts of 
the results of my own people doing the laboratory work and the set of attitudes 
which they would take in the face of disaster. But the principle remains 
unchanged. One enters a negotiated process with a set of expectations about 
the way in which individuals and groups are going to behave. That expectation 
is based on past experience of the individual or group and will have had a 
considerable effect on the way you propose to play the negotiation. 
Expectation is very closely related to trust. The key set of expectations which 
one brings to any negotiation is determined by the degree of negotiated trust 
which you have for the people concerned.
One of the important features of both diaries mentioned above, is the 
involvement of our own chief officers in the negotiating processes. There is 
clearly no agreement between Dr. Hunt and myself on the one hand and them on 
the other as to what their involvement should be. Every time the situation was 
very messy, their refusal to participate in the decisions became stronger. For 
example, the diary records several attempts to obtain guidance on the sorts of 
risks which they are willing to take when letting tenders. Although not 
recorded in the diary, one instruction was a very firm direction to obey the 
Standing Financial Instructions of the Authority, which on this issue happened to 
be irrelevant and unhelpful. They did not even refer to that particular 
circumstance. Another specific instruction was that we could not proceed with 
a certain action without the whole-hearted support of many consultants. 
Although this might seem eminently sensible, it was a formula for doing 
nothing. Thus, not only was the RTO's degree of involvement disputed, but the 
responses which were obtained from them seemed to be outside the range of 
what we considered appropriate and helpful. This is an example of an 
expectation not being met, a subject discussed below. It is often the case that
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interventions which are sought for perfectly sensible reasons do not work out. 
Negotiating is full of risks and counting on the usefulness of a given set of 
manoeuvres is one of them.
A series of fundamental conflicts in oneself is associated with these 
negotiated sets of expectations and negotiated trust relationships. Over and 
above what one knows to be the case, e.g. the extent of interest which a boss 
will take in a subject, there exists a very real sense of what ought to be the 
case. Similarly you know, or think you know, what an ideal subordinate should 
be like. Feelings of this nature lead to two different sorts of action. First, 
using the boss relationship as an example, in a very real sense I will try to 
change his perception of his priorities to persuade him to give more support. 
One is constantly concerned to retain, maintain and improve the position from 
which you start to negotiate. Second, frustration seems to lead to game play 
as well. To parade issues which you know will leave someone else completely 
cold, especially a boss, seems to be a ritualistic assertion that "I have got 
important things to say which you are not listening to". A slight derisory 
description of some of these subjects is "hobby horses". But such ritual games 
do seem to be important and are played with commitment.
Although not discussed in this thesis, game playing within negotiations is 
important. It is possible to argue that the particular game with a boss referred 
to above in its many forms is about something very fundamental. For example, 
I do not accept his priorities for the work which he does. Administrative 
adeptness seems to be less important to me than creative management. If  a 
little  chaos reigns, so be it. But that is anathema to my boss. We choose not 
to change our relative positions and these games seem to be there in place of 
outright conflict.
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Earlier in this chapter, the concept of ’frantic action’ is developed in the 
context of ’toubleshoot’. However, speed is characteristic of many actions in 
the diary. The ’typical objectives meetings’ referred to frequently in the main 
diary are full of agreements made at speed. Each encounter with Dr. H unt in 
the later stages of the laboratory project was full of decisions, most of which 
were not particularly premeditated. All would have been shaped to some 
extent at least by the general project background but the detail would be 
decided quickly there and then. Thus, the amount of support which Region 
gave to the transfer into Sleeton was decided on the spot. In Chapter 5, the 
unclassified events accounted for about a quarter of the total number of*events. 
It was established that these events were concerned with the general 
administration of the Division to a large degree. I am sure that the majority of 
those events were dealt with rapidly and that any decisions were taken 
immediately. Deciding the limits of the planning system, getting hold of 
staffing information on computing, agreeing to talk to a national group about 
Natsys, were all instant decisions, or nearly so. Negotiation is about making 
decisions or getting other people to make or agree to them. Those decisions 
are taken against a deadline and most of those deadlines are very short if  not 
immediate.
In terms of the categories developed in Chapter 5, the laboratory project 
is the major example of ’takeover' and a good example of 'control'. To all 
intents and purposes, I have taken over from the Regional Computer Services 
Officer. Whatever the circumstances and however justified it might seem in 
my eyes, 'takeover' is a bitterly resented act, especially when it goes on for a 
long time, as this one has done. In my view, the relationship between 
Computer Services and their laboratory customers was such that effective 
negotiation of any sort had almost ceased, whatever the set of reasons might
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be. Widely divergent views as to what those reasons were existed but the 
effect on negotiation was the same. It would be foolish not to recognise that 
the 'takeover' effects all my relationships with that Department. The 
ramification of most actions spread beyond the area immediately concerned but 
those of a 'takeover' action tend to be more marked than others.
The direct influence of 'takeover' or 'control' on one's ability to negotiate 
is great. In most circumstances, a senior officer is negotiating using some sort 
of briefing. Whether it is written or spoken is largely irrelevant. What matters 
is the degree of confidence which you have in it. When negotiating with West 
Area about possible change to the experimental system to make it acceptable to 
them, I was on very slippery ground. The statement of requirement and the 
estimate of effort required were taken on trust. I had not checked either of 
them at all carefully. Of course, it can be argued that that should be the 
normal position. Senior officers are brought into a negotiation to contribute 
things other than the basic facts. But the degree of control which you have 
exercised, and in 'takeover' that is large, alters significantly one's negotiating 
stance. You are more prepared to deal with 'misinterpretations' of 'fact' should 
they arise. Thus, despite the serious disadvantages of 'takeover' mentioned in 
the last paragraph, there are also many advantages for the negotiator.
The relationship between the two case studies
It is stated earlier in the discussion of my research methods in Chapter 4 
that the two case studies are orientated separately towards the two halves of 
the developed version of the Corporate Activist Model. As explained in 
Chapter 4, and demonstrated in the above section, the principle example of the 
takeover category in this research is the laboratory project case study. It  was
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also explained in Chapter 4 that, although I believed that the event categories 
could have been used on the laboratory data also, their use in the second half of 
my model would have been confusing. Nevertheless, the relationship of the 
categories to the laboratory data is important and I believe that the categories 
do work on it.
It  has not been possible to do a comprehensive mapping of the Chapter 5 
categories onto the laboratory project. The above illustrations in the last 
section do show that the categories work in general. In the first part of this 
chapter, the definition of each category was expanded by developing lists of 
more detailed characteristics of the events used to generate the categories. 
As a partial test of those general characteristics, I have taken the fifty-three  
contained in the 'relate' list and attempted to match them against the 
laboratory diary. I believe that among the laboratory events which I would 
classify as 'relate', at least twenty-seven of the general characteristics would 
be the reason for some of those laboratory event classifications. It  is also true 
that some of the laboratory 'relate' events would have different general 
characteristics from those which have been developed. But this does confirm 
that confirmatory evidence for the categories would be found, at least to some 
extent, in projects not used to develop the categories.
Conclusion
In this chapter, the final form of the Corporate Activist model developed 
in this thesis has been described in general terms. This model corresponds to 
Model 6 of Chapter 2 and describes the role of a senior management services 
officer in the NHS. The model has two parts, the first being a set of event 
categories which typify the sorts of action that such a person might take while 
the second part describes ways in which such events are put together in major
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projects. Essentially this second part of the model has a central theme 
dominated by a negotiating mode of behaviour. I believe that the negotiating 
model of management services and the event categories are more useful than 
the models described in Chapter 2. The general character of the Corporate 
Activist seems to be described by the event categories and the above type of 
negotiating model is a more accurate representation of the process used to 
bring about organisational change. This does not imply that the characteristics 
of Model 1-5 developed in Chapter 2 are wrong or irrelevant. It  does imply 
that they can be supplemented usefully by the negotiating model developed 
above.
Apart from the comparison of this two part model with other models and 
related ideas in the literature, the description in this chapter concludes the 
research. These comparisons and ideas are the subject matter of Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8 - THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER RESEARCH IN THIS FIELD
Introduction
These are the following main sections in this Chapter.
(a) This research attempts to look at the functioning of 
management services as a change agent on a broad front, and 
it makes certain assumptions about the environment within 
which the change processes are taking place, i.e. Strauss' 
structural context. The first part of this chapter describes 
some of the major assumptions which have been made and 
identifies the main effects of these assumptions on the 
research which has been done.
(b) Having developed my own categories it is useful to compare 
them to roles developed in the Mintzberg study referred to in 
Chapter 4.
(c) Chapter 1 states that four books influenced the development 
of this research in a significant way. It was suggested that 
the detailed review of those books ought to refer back to the 
data and themes of this research in order to illustrate their 
relevance. This chapter contains reviews of that type.
Limitations of the research
The research concentrates entirely on the political types of activity which 
are necessary to bring management services projects to a successful conclusion. 
It is assumed that such activity is underpinned by various skills which must be 
available on a fairly wide basis throughout the Management Services Division.
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Among the most important of these are the technical skills, necessary if  project 
work is to be done In a way which would provide adequate solutions for the 
customers. The creation, retention and development of these technical skills 
represents a challenge from a management point of view. The range of 
problems for which a solution is needed is very wide. Making judgements about 
the potential of people to acquire skills during the several years which they will 
be with the Divisions needs very careful selection techniques. Choosing which 
skills will be most valuable and which ought to be developed at what sort of 
expense to the organisation are the top management problems within the 
Division. This problem is particularly acute in operational research where the 
team of people is very small. The range of available skill will determine to 
some extent the types of problems which can be accepted with some certainty 
that they can be solved.
The matching of skills to problems and obtaining right sort of problem also 
present managerial problems. Since it is my policy to move into more 
challenging fields, obtaining skills and matching them to problems is not simple. 
Any implied assumption that the right skill mix is always available within the 
Division is a large one. The procedures for matching technical skills to 
problems produced a very adequate solution for some of the work contained in 
this thesis, e.g. the 1979 Planning Methods, while in other cases the match was 
less adequate, e.g. the laboratory project.
If  one assumes that the necessary skill mix is available, putting the people 
with the skills into project teams needs careful thought. Ensuring that 
adequate project plans exist and are executed efficiently can be difficult. The 
main theme of this thesis has been the negotiation of order. One part of the 
order to be negotiated is the changing set of objectives which projects acquire 
during their lives. When project objectives change, the skills needed to support
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the project can change also. The project plans must be robust while at the 
same time making sure that proposed solutions are sound and are not unduly 
influenced by distorting political pressures.
The personal characteristics which people bring with them to all their 
project work are relevant to this thesis. These influence the personal and 
group behaviour which can be observed in project work described in this thesis. 
A range of these skills is described in Cohen, Fink, Gadon and Willitts (1976). 
These range from simple listening skills through to the most complex group 
skills needed to liaise with people and groups at large. These are particularly 
relevant to those models concerned with implementation in Chapter 2. It  is 
assumed that project officers have the necessary skills in this field to carry out 
their work.
A less obvious assumption concerns the new work which is breaking 
through and extending the boundaries of the Division’s existing knowledge and 
experience. The strategic use of the results of such projects depends on our 
having an adequate research and development philosophy. For example, the 
laboratory work assumed the existence of a way of spreading these systems 
throughout the Region. Another example is the development of information 
systems in the broadest sense. Such information systems are assumed to fit  
into a pattern of management development which will make the Region better 
able to carry out its control, monitoring and planning functions. Research and 
development philosophy and strategy is rarely, if  ever, discussed and most of 
the ideas on this topic exist in only my own mind. Much research and 
development work is done within the NHS against a background of inadequate 
planning of the future use of project results. Although the lack of an R & D 
philosophy and strategy at first sight appears to be a slightly peripheral issue
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for this thesis, it is a major weakness of the Region's thinking and it does affect 
project work.
Throughout this thesis there is much talk of working with groups of 
people. People in those groups have different professional backgrounds. 
Although it is only occasionally referred to obliguely in the text, a major factor 
in group behaviour is the impact of the value systems which different 
professions have. Reference is made on one occasion to the differences 
between the value systems of a medical officer and an administrator. Value 
systems determine many of the decisions which are discussed in the thesis, and 
they cause people to behave in particular ways. The impact of these value 
systems on decisions and actions has never been looked at in any detail. The 
explicit recognition of their importance by the Region might be a major step 
forward. But there is a danger that such recognition would raise issues which 
could not be dealt with adequately by the RHA and would be a step backwards. 
The need to hold the service to patients below the levels which the best medical 
practice makes possible involves a direct conflict between medical ethics and 
financial rectitude. This research is very limited in its discussion of the 
effects of such conflicts on the negotiation of change.
If the thesis is correct in suggesting that good project work and 
implementation relies on negotiation of order and related political activity such 
as that suggested by the laboratory project, the methods by which one creates a 
management services organisation which understands this and has the necessary 
skills to use that knowledge need to be developed. The laboratory project 
demonstrates that most people in the lower parts of the organisational structure 
in the Division, do not seem to give sufficient importance to negotiating skills. 
Nevertheless, many project officers in their late twenties become involved in
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negotiations with customers. The amount of relevant training which they are 
given and which would be of value in carrying out this role is very small. It 
would be helpful to know how to create a learning community within the 
Division which passed these skills on to its members. This thesis has helped 
only to define some of those skills, not how to teach them.
The comparison of roles developed in the Mintzberg study with categories 
developed in this thesis
In the Nature of Managerial Work, Mintzberg (1973) describes research in 
which he investigates the roles of chief executives. This work is described 
briefly in Chapter 4 as part of the general use of diaries for management 
research. Mintzberg uses a mixture of structured and unstructured data, 
together with a review of timetables followed, mail dealt with and the personal 
contacts made by the executives concerned. He then goes on to develop some 
roles which he believes that these managers play. In the analysis, he describes 
how he compared his feelings about this research with those of other people 
doing research in this field. He claims that the ten roles which he has 
developed can also be traced in the work of the other people. Thus, it is 
reasonable to take these ten roles of Mintzberg as a piece of substantive theory 
supported by other research. It  is therefore profitable to try to compare the 
twelve categories developed in this thesis with the ten roles of Mintzberg with a 
view to determining whether they overlap, complement each other or seem to 
differ in important respects.
Mintzberg, in his analysis, states that be believes that the set is 
exhaustive and covers all the important parts of the work of chief executives. 
He claims this on the basis of his analysis of the other work and the comparisons 
which he has made. It  is worth setting out the roles and categories side by side 









































































































































































From the table it can be seen that both sets of categories and roles have 
been grouped together into three sets. It  is immediately apparent from these 
three groupings that the two approaches to the analysis were very different. 
Whereas I attempted to exclude the interpersonal roles of the manager, they 
have played a major part in Mintzberg's analysis. It  is also clear from earlier 
chapters that I was particularly interested in my first group of categories and 
had emphasised that part of the role of the manager above others. It  is 
important to note both studies have found macro groupings of the basic 
categories and roles to be important despite the fact that the groups are 
different. This suggests that both researchers felt a need for a more simple 
and basic description of the managerial role. Both sets of macro groupings are 
grounded theories and emerged from the data. They show that this basic 
approach can produce at least two theories which are radically different ways 
of viewing management.
Although "negotiate" is interpreted in a much narrower sense by 
Mintzberg, it is'still surprising to see it at the bottom of his list in a similar 
place to the other nine roles. In the case of my analysis, negotiation eventually 
emerged as the one key over-riding activity which was used to interpret and 
knit together the other activities of the manager. The Mintzberg analysis 
makes it clear that he is confining negotiations to major activities only and the 
negotiating activity as such seems to be restricted to contact with outside or 
similar agencies. My own wider interpretation of negotiation does feature in 
some of Mintzberg's roles. For example, monitor is described in terms which 
resemble negotiation in that information is sought and attempts to develop a 
central focus of information and intelligence appear to be part of the function. 
Monitor appears also to have some of the features of learning in it as well and 
one must surmise that much of the learning activity in monitoring is done by
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negotiation. But negotiation has not featured to the same extent in the 
Mintzberg analysis as in the analysis in this thesis and this difference is 
important.
There are some relationships between the roles and categories which do 
seem to suggest a fairly precise correspondence. For example, liaison and 
relate seem to have many common features, although they are not all common. 
Liaison seems to be mainly concerned once again with outside agencies and a 
large part is concerned with obtaining from other parties agreements without 
any ability to force or otherwise bring pressure on the other parties. Relate 
does not necessarily have these connotations and in the definition of relate it is 
pointed out that at one extreme the contact is an exceedingly friendly one 
while, at the other, a great deal of harsh forcing of issues might be involved.
There is a less direct relationship between the entrepreneur role and the 
opportunism category. Whilst the entrepreneurial role appears to have in it 
some premeditation, this is not characteristic of the opportunism category. For 
example, it appears that major developments, can arise from being an 
entrepreneur and that these do not have to rely on anything other than the wish 
and the power to make them happen. Thus, as well as relating to opportunism, 
entrepreneur appears also to relate to big and create as well. It is interesting 
to note that the description of entrepreneurship talks about searching and trying 
to find alternatives and one cannot help feeling that there must be strong 
elements of negotiation being used in support of the entrepreneur role.
The most clear relationship appears to be between the disturbance handler 
role and the trouble-shooter category. The definition which appears in the 
tabular presentation of the role, namely, "responsible for corrective action 
when the organisation faces important, unexpected disturbances", corresponds
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very closely to the words used to describe trouble-shoot. It  is interesting to 
note that it is only in the disturbance handling role that the crisis idea appears 
to figure at all strongly in the Mintzberg roles. The analysis in this thesis 
suggests that crisis handling is almost a way of life for manager. In the book as 
a whole, Mintzberg does describe the hectic pace at which the chief executives 
work. He also describes the way in which very little  of their time is actually 
under their control and the way in which their time is taken up by various 
activities which are not in any sense pre-planned. Reading some of his 
descriptions, it would not be inappropriate to describe those events as crises. 
Thus I believe that there should be an important part of the analysis of both 
diaries concerned with crisis and trouble-shoot but this does not seem to be 
recognised in the Mintzberg roles.
The leader role is of interest as well. This seems to have become split 
down much more finely among the change agent categories. It could be argued 
that all of the categories of five to twelve are in some sense a finer analysis of 
being a leader in an organisation. The caveat must be emphasised once again 
that being a change agent is the equivalent of the Mintzberg chief executive 
role categories and therefore the type of leadership which breaks down into the 
eight last categories is concerned basically with the change agent leader role 
and not with the leader role of the chief executive. Nevertheless, ideas such as 
the motivation and the control of subordinates, recruitment and general staffing 
problems do seem to feature both in the leadership role and the last eight 
categories.
It is difficult to see where category seven, "maintains", category ten, 
"pours oil", and category eight, "facilitates", feature in the roles described by 
Mintzberg. They could be regarded as being part of the leader roles for an 
RMSO. But these particular categories do not appear to feature in the leader
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or any other role as described by Mintzberg. This may be due to the different 
levels at which chief executives and RMS Os work.
These differences in analysis illustrate what is perhaps the most important 
point in the comparison of the roles and categories, namely, that the two 
analyses have been approached from completely different standpoints. The 
Mintzberg analysis is after all basically to do with chief executives while that in 
this thesis is to do with a role within an organisation and concerned specifically 
with the role of a change agent concerned with the introduction of numerical 
and similar management techniques into management of the organisation. The 
two analyses start off from very different standpoints. But Mintzberg does 
claim generality for his roles and he suggests that those roles do apply at far 
lower levels than that of RMSO. The existence of the first group of categories 
concerned with creating new entities in the management structure is hardly 
represented at all in the managerial role described by Mintzberg. Equally, the 
really top executive roles such as figurehead and spokesman did not seem 
important in the analysis of the change agent activities. These two differences 
between the analyses seem to illustrate very well the positions from which they 
were both started. The generality of the Mintzberg roles is at the very least 
debatable.
Although there are interesting correspondences and overlaps between the 
roles and categories, it is difficult to support Mintzberg's view that his 
managerial roles are exhaustive. It seems more reasonable to recognise that 
the data on the activities of managers has been approached from very different 
standpoints. Different levels of roles and categories have interested each 
researcher and the net result has been that each presents a different insight 
into the activity of a manager.
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Issues raised by the Mintzberg diary
In connection with his study of the Chief Executive function, Mintzberg 
raises three important questions. The first is whether or not the data which he 
collected was representative of their work, the second was whether the man 
was representative of that particular type of manager and the third was 
whether or not the job of that particular executive was similar to managers in 
general. It is relevant to attempt to answer the same three questions in the 
study of the RMSO role in this thesis and this is done below.
Issue 1 - is the data representative of my work ?
There is no doubt that the work of the Regional Health Authorities does 
change very significantly with time. Apart from the development of medicine 
itself, which has been significant over the last twenty years especially insofar 
as it has become more science based, the NHS seems to have been through quite 
specific short organisational phases. In 1974 there was a major reorganisation 
and in the coming year, 1980, there will be a similar one. At times such as 
these, the work of the Management Services Division is influenced considerably 
by the major management issues which reorganisation raises. But it is also true 
that in each year some major issue is being faced by the service and these do 
seem to have different characteristics. For example, over the last few years 
there have been several major incidents concerned with the management of the 
long-stay patients in hospitals and some of these have caused major scandals. 
Such events bring about major disturbances in the management of the NHS and 
affect management priorities for development of the service. Following 
disclosures of the maltreatment of subnormal or elderly patients for example, it 
is inevitable that major projects are launched to investigate the management of
- 280 -
these particular services in regions which are far away from the actual incident 
itself. Again, certain developments seem to roll through the service and one 
can observe a bandwagon effect. For example, the use of five day wards has 
been gathering momentum over the past five years. Special projects are 
springing up everywhere to investigate the possible local advantages of their 
use. Thus it can be argued that the service itself is undergoing major changes 
of direction all of the time and that these inevitably affect the work done by 
Management Services.
The major project which is followed through in this particular diary is 
probably unique to this time in the history of the Health Service. This 
particular variety of automation in laboratories will probably not occur again 
once it has been successfully accomplished. It  is probably true that there have 
been and will be major developments of this type being undertaken somewhere 
in the Service most of the time. But it is doubtful if  they will involve the 
people who have been concerned with this particular large project and different 
people will operate from a different sort of power base and with different 
expectations of the amount of capital and other resources which they can 
expect to consume. For example, the Mental Handicap Service could never 
hope to have the same consultant support as Laboratory Services with respect 
to the available capital in the Region. For these reasons it cannot be argued 
that this thesis is necessarily typical of change in the NHS. But it might be.
The diary is probably unrepresentative of my general work in some other 
important respects. In the analysis quoted by Mintzberg of the activities of the 
chief executive, three tables of types of events are given. For example, 
Mintzberg in "An Analysis of Chronology Record" quotes the following 
categories. Desk work, telephone calls, scheduled meetings, unscheduled
- 281 -
meetings and tours. Because of its purpose and my own interests my diary 
contains data of a restricted type and, in particular, the above types are 
excluded. A very cursory analysis of my own desk diary shows that that the 
number of meetings and other events which have been left out of the research 
diary is large. The unrecorded events must represent the section of the work 
of an RMSO which goes on relentingly from year to year. The Mintzberg 
analysis might represent very well that type of unrecorded events which made 
up the majority of my activity in the year studied in this thesis.
The diary is selective and unrepresentative in other important ways too. 
Two examples are given below. During the whole of this period, there has been 
a growing need to cut back on the staff requirements. Money from the 
Exchequer has been becoming more scarce. That pressure is not reflected in 
the diary at all. Other major battles have been going on as well. For example, 
throughout this year there has been gentle but important pressure to reconcile 
the RHA to buying a new generation of computers in due course. The diary 
does not reflect either of these characteristics of the year adequately.
Thus it is very difficult to argue convincingly that the activities of the 
RMSO are represented typicallyin this diary. Indeed, it is not clear what a 
"typical" year would be.
Issue 2 - is the data typical of the nature of an RMSO in general
The next question raised by Mintzberg is whether or not the chief 
executives in his study were typical of all chief executives. He claims that 
there was considerable similarity in the records which he kept and draws a 
positive conclusion. It is more difficult to be so positive in the case of RMOs 
in the NHS. No positive evidence to support either view has been collected in
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this diary. This issue is part of the problem of deciding whether or not the 
categories developed in this thesis represent a substantive theory or not 
considered in a previous chapter. No attempt has been made to test the 
applicability of my conclusions in other Regions and it would be difficult to do 
this.
Some salient points can be made however. First, most of the other 
RMSOs come from a completely different background of work experience and 
organisational experience. The majority of other RMSOs have a Work Study/ 0  
& M background, a number have a purely computer background and one has a 
purely OR/University background. To the best of my knowledge, no other 
RMSO has undertaken systematic research into his own activities. Although 
other RMSOs do have mixed backgrounds, I am probably the only one who could 
claim to have major experience in at least two of the disciplines covered by 
Management Services.
It is also true that the Regions differ very markedly in their nature and 
there are considerable differences among the Regional Administrators to whom 
RMSO’s report. Regional Administrators tend to group together into various 
types and that the Regional Administrator in this Region would probably be 
associated closely with only two others I believe that even those three behave 
very differently in their own Regions. Thus the emphasis which has been given 
to any particular variety of work, for example, the planning field, is completely 
different in the separate Regions.
These factors suggest that there are great differences between the 
RMSOs and the Regional Authorities which they serve.
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Issue 3 - are there similarities with other positions
Despite the difference among Regions quoted above, there is no doubt 
that many officers in the NHS are subject to the type of pressures described in 
this thesis. It  must be true that negotiation is part of their way of life. This is 
brought about by two factors.
In Chapter 3 the management structures within which people must operate 
have been described. None of the regional structures contain line relationships 
with their areas and it is inevitable that officers undertake the same type of 
negotiation and suffer from the lack of power to do particular jobs which is 
described in this thesis. Apart from the effect of these structures the value 
systems referred to above are a common part of the working environment also. 
Thus the clashes between the value systems of different types of officer which 
were illustrated earlier in the thesis apply to most other NHS officers as well.
There is, therefore, reason to suppose that the major factors influencing 
the type of negoaition which must be carried out in the NHS operate on all NHS 
officers. Other types of officer must behave in ways similar to some described 
in this thesis.
The influence of these points on negotiations
In trying to answer the three questions which Mintzberg asks, à number of 
differences have been identified which might suggest that the particular 
analysis of negotiation in this thesis may not apply to other RMSOs. However, 
I think it is highly probable that some sort of negotiation occurs in all parts of 
the NHS. Although the thesis contains no evidence to this effect, I believe that 
negotiating is part of the jobs of the other RMSOs and indeed other chief
- 284 -
management services in many other organisations. It is possible that one cause 
of the years of debate in the OR society about the fundamental nature of OR is 
a lack of recognition of the importance of negotiation in the change process. 
The general ideas behind the negotiation of order, especially in its relation to 
change, must have general application in a fairly wide area of industry, 
commerce and public service.
Graham Allison (1971)
A publication which is very relevant to my thesis is Allison's study of the 
Cuban Missile crisis. Allison develops a model of the way in which powerful
people negotiate a way forward in a complex bureaucracy. He sets this model
alongside two other models, "The Rational Actor" and "The Organisational
Process" both of which have strong parallels in the NHS. It is not possible to
discuss this work at length and I propose to deal with it as follows. First, each 
model is built around a key concept and these are discussed in the text. 
Second, it is inappropriate to reduce these models to the key concepts only, and 
so Figure 20 contains their major characteristics. Third, the remarkable way in 
which each model relates to the RHA is illustrated and fourth, their 
relationships to my own models is discussed.
The rational actor
The first analysis of the Cuban Missile crisis relies on regarding both 
American and Russian action as being determined by cool reasoning based on 
their own value systems and world strategies. Rational choice by the actor 
nation has the following components, goals and objectives, options, 
consequences and choice. The sort of objective put forward is "The reason 
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missiles". It is clear that starting from such an objective, the options, con­
sequences and choices can be evaluated. The basis of this model is that such 
strategies exist and that such calculations can be made.
The parallel with a personified RHA is uncanny. For example, the RHA 
as such is often seen as having a whole set of policies which it is persuing in a 
unified way. If  an officer ventures into the Region outside Headquarters, he is 
seen as an agent at the least, but much more likely, as a leading advocate for 
those policies. The components of the rational actor model listed above almost 
constitute the index of the published Regional Plan. In any discussion with 
Districts, Region will assume that Districts have the same sort of objectives 
and have evaluated options and so on. The handling of mental handicap policy 
is being conducted by Region and Districts using this model and each has a 
different set of objectives and supporting strategies.
The rational actor parallels with the management services models are also 
striking. Most of the action coming from models 1 to 5 in Chapter 2 assumes 
that goals, options and choice are the appropriate terms in which to persue 
project work. Management services also tends to assume that even if you 
cannot see your customer very clearly, all of his various "embodiments" which 
make varying demands can be put together into one rational actor. Often there 
is no alternative to making such a simplification if  project work is to go 
forward.
The organisational process
Allison's second model recognises that an organisation is an amalgamation 
of different departments each with an established position. There are many 
important facets of such a structure but one of the most important must be the 
pre-programmed nature of most of their reactions. The airforce provided
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Kennedy with an airforce solution to the missle crisis, the army and navy 
provided their own. The nature of each solution was to a large extent
determined by their history and present capability. Not only is the solution 
determined in this way, but so is the problem. Routine analysis using their own 
basic organisational and military concepts are used. Even if  the chiefs of these 
departments can see the different ways forward and try to change the approach, 
the more junior levels in their departments will transform the new initiative 
into established routine, if  possible.
The parallel with the RHA is very marked. Every policy issue can be 
viewed from different sides. The methods put forward for developing a policy 
say will depend critically on the way it has been launched. If  launched towards 
the Personnel Division, the solution will have a training bias. The Planning 
Division w ill process it through a "wise man giving advice" procedure. 
Management services will tend to start by doing a statistical analysis on 
relevant date - even if only crudely.
With respect to the models of management services in Chapter 2, there is 
little  doubt that the types of management services activity described will 
produce characteristic solutions. Thus the ivory tower dweller does have a 
characteristic set of routines and types of solution which he will produce on 
most occasions. The basis of his solution will be an analytical technique, 
relevant or not. A keen evaluator will investigate the profit and loss account, 
even if  the development is inevitable. The computer department will produce a 
computer solution.
The bureaucratic political model
The essence of this model is that change is a result of political action, 
probably carried out by a few people in positions of power. The action is not
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"the solution to a set of problems" but results from compromise, conflict of 
interests, confusion and influence. All of these forces come together to 
produce a "game" in the Wittgenstein sense. Probably the most important 
influence on the nature of the game is the group of players. All players have 
their own priorities and they will fight for their own view. Their influence 
depends on the position and power which they have. But it also depends on the 
skill with which they play their own game.
Figure 20 makes it clear that this model is much more complex than the 
two described above. Power, compromises, the 51-49 principle, different 
viewpoints, misconception, expectation, communication, reticence, playing 
styles and so on is the terminology of negotiation. These are the type of words 
which I have used to describe parts of my model in earlier chapters. There 
seems to be little  need to explore these similarities in depth. The different 
aspects of the Allison model correspond closely to the parts of a negotiation 
constructed in the last chapter.
The Allison models
It must be recognised that Allison does not claim that one of his models is 
"true", whatever that could mean. The three models are ways of looking at the 
same process. Depending on one's purpose, each has an advantage. A thesis 
could have been written on the standard operating procedures of the divisions of 
the RHA - Allison's second model. It  would have been a partial view in my 
opinion but nevertheless perfectably valid as one aspect of the RHA's work.
F. G. Bailey (1977)
F. G. Bailey (1977) gave a sub-title, "The Folklore of Academic Politics", 
to his book "Morality and Expediency". In it, Bailey looks at the way
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Universities function, the beliefs which academics hold, the type of community 
which they build and their ways of running it and causing it to relate to other 
outside agencies. Folklore, mores, an organisation's way of looking at and 
talking about itself help to determine what effective change activities can take 
place within it. It would be possible to dwell for a long time on this book and it 
is impossible to take out all the concepts which are relevant to my thesis from 
this book. Only a small selection has been chosen - and even these would 
justify more attention.
One of the main concepts used widely in the book is that of a "myth". He 
quotes the Malinowski definition of myth, "myth fulfils in primitive society an 
indespensible function; it expresses, enhances and codifies, it safeguards and 
enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains the 
practical rules for the guidance of man". Bailey explains his preference for the 
word myth in relation to academic politics over and above words like "culture", 
"values", "ideas", "cognitive map" and so on in the following ways. First, its 
Greek root has a primary meaning of the spoken word, and Bailey goes on in the 
book to emphasise the part which direct negotiation face to face plays in 
politics. Second, myth is a nice mixture of that which is sacred and that which 
deserves derision. Bailey goes on to liken myths and mythical characters to a 
set of spectacles through which it is possible to view academic life and to 
interpret actions. He suggests that everyone uses some set of spectacles and 
that any request to start about the "reality" of university life cannot be met. 
All one can do is to change spectacles.
Bailey uses the concept of myth in a variety of forms but two of his 
principal ones concern scholarship and community. He argues forcibly for the 
primacy of the scholarship myth in academic life and demonstrates its 
relevance and power in a wide variety of circumstances. For example, he gives
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a long example of its use to block academic appointment of people who from 
many other points of view would be excellent. Scholarship is the raison d’etre 
of a university and the power of that myth is very great. In the same way, the 
"provision of patient care" has the same sort of mythical significance in the 
NHS. I doubt if  any two people would agree on the definition of patient care 
and what really matters about it, but it is true that the mere ability to parade it 
in support of one's arguments will give one a head start over an opponent in any 
discussion.
It is significant from the point of view of this thesis that Bailey quotes 
"ethos", one of my categories, as a possible alternative to myth. Ethos and 
myth do have the same general characteristics. If  a belief is part of the 
general ethos, e.g. planning is good, then it is almost impossible to challenge it. 
Equally one does not get the ethos of an organisation, e.g. planning methods, 
changed by rational arguments. There is a quality and a power about the NHS's 
belief in planning which is almost sacred and you ignore it at your peril.
Another concept developed by Bailey concerns the private and the public. 
This is connected to those things which he says about committee work and he 
uses seven different types of committee to illustrate various ways in which the 
work is conducted. It  is impossible to review this fully but the two extreme 
cases relate an aspect of my work and negotiations in general. Bailey reviews 
the sort of formality, tasks performed, status and so on which are 
characteristics of his committees. At one extreme the Academic Council is a 
huge, public body. Bailey gives the impression that this is where the major 
rubber stamping, parading of value systems, making of public reputations and so 
on is done. On the other hand the Personnel Committee and in particular its 
sub-group which investigate particular appointments are very private affairs - 
often concerned with the exercise of real power. Bailey contrasts the
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behaviour at these committees. At the first a somewhat pompous show of 
commitment to the primary values of the university is usual while in the second 
such behaviour will probably be interpreted as part of a larger and much more 
devious manoeuvre. The counter parts of these various types of meeting in my 
work are groups like the Regional Scientific Committee and my private sub­
group meeting to resolve particular issues such as how to deal with a particular 
person’s behaviour. Bailey points out and illustrates just how vital it is to have 
a good understanding of the type of group that you are called on to deal with at 
any time.
A very relevant theme from this book is Bailey’s treatment of Arena's,
"those myths which people have about how decisions are taken". He considers
/
four myths:
(a) rational bureaucratic procedures and equity formulae,
(b) baronial politics or competition among strong men,
(c) conflict between central administration and bands of strong 
men, and
(d) patronage.
Bailey considers the sorts of people who are able to participate effectively in 
these different sorts of power struggle. Two interesting parts of this chapter 
concern the position of not making the grade in one or other of these ways of 
exerting influence and dealing with conflict. One of Bailey's examples of not 
making the grade concerns a "courtier" who does not know what can or cannot 
be leaked. Very rapidly his sources dry up. Generalising in this theme a little , 
power and influence having been negotiated are not there for all time and are 
subject to re-negotiation all the time. This is a major theme of the diary.
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Bailey illustrates conflict by using an appointment which is bitterly 
contested due to the fact that the appointee is thought by some not to have 
sufficient scholastic attainment, a direct challenge to a prime myth. The man 
pressing the appointment had administrative and political reasons for wanting 
the appointment. The matter is resolved in private, as one would expect, but 
not before a threat to go public on the issue has been made. The example 
illustrates well the build up through various levels towards conflict of a major 
variety. He comments on the mixture of front and back stage negotiation. 
The conflict builds up until, in a private meeting, the objector threatens to go 
public on the whole matter. Such an action would disrupt the Community of 
Scholars greatly. In Bailey's phrase, this is equivalent to "blowing the whistle 
on the game". Power is there to be used and given sufficient reason, those who 
have it will use it. Conflict is just as much a part of negotiating as being co­
operative and it is often in conflict that the new future is being carved out. 
This same theme was developed in my own study of a long project.
Bailey's book is full of important practical comments on the negotiating 
process. It  is invidious to select only the above, few examples. Despite the 
fact that it is set in the academic world, it is relevant to the Health Service.
I L Mangham (1979)
The process of negotiating order in organisations has been recognised as 
being of importance for some time. Strauss, Schatzmann Danuta Bucher and 
Sabshin (1964) appear to have been one of the first groups to recognise this and 
to attempt to define the concept. The concept was developed more explicitly 
by Mangham (1979) and it is relevant to review that work. In this review, it is 
more helpful to interleave the issues raised with their application to the RHA 
and this thesis rather than describe each separately.
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The book by Mangham describes a variety of concepts concerned with the 
process of management looked at from a "political" perspective. One of the 
first themes developed is the creative participation of individuals in these 
management processes and, especially the influence of the way in which 
individuals and the group to which they belong see the world around them. A 
large proportion of the activity of an organisation follows fairly closely along 
lines which have been "pre-negotiated" in the particular group concerned with 
this interaction. There is a large element of personal choice in the way an 
individual chooses to play a role, but once determined, that method tends to 
remain stable. This set of concepts ties in closely with those set out in an 
earlier book, "Interactions and Interventions in Organisations" (1978), by the 
same author.
There are many examples of the interplay of negotiated roles in the thesis 
and the way individuals choose to participate in the work of the RHA and the 
Division. My own Heads of Departments have worked out among themselves a 
series of roles they wish to play and images that they find acceptable. At one 
extreme there is a person who "gets things done", while at the other is "the 
contemplative wise man" who really does have the ability to think up many 
aspects of a problem which can be overlooked easily. The interaction between 
them, whilst having large elements of mutual respect, is also full of instances 
when each is compensating for the known style of the other. Thus, just as one 
will compensate for the other's probable underestimates of the time it will 
really take to get a job done, so the other calculates the risks he is prepared to 
take in spite of cautions advice which may be given to him. The roles they 
usually play determine many of the roles which I give them. Thus, I would 
prefer to send the most cautions one into a known difficult situation, especially 
with a medical practitioner. But I would not dream of allowing him to become
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involved in a real management confrontation. The need to win would have to 
take precedence over any other motive which I might have, e.g. to develop the 
manager. To use the other person is a better action.
In the earlier book, the roles played by people and the scripts which they 
use are explored in some depth. One of the central propositions of both books 
from the point of view of describing negotiating is that the notion of "se lf is a 
product of social interaction as well as a reflection of some self-determined 
attitudes. Thus, behaviour changes as the scene changes and each actor in a 
scene learns and plays idiosyncratic and often quite specific roles and scripts. 
Often the roles, scripts and associated attitudes belong to a world taken for 
granted, some of the simplest being straight situational scripts following 
relatively boring and highly predictable lines. Thus types of people become 
established and these people behave in typical ways. The process of interaction 
is a two way process in which typical behaviour is expected from all members of 
a group once it is established. Members start to have expectations of other 
people -  even when that expectation is that the "other person" will be 
"difficult". Thus, interactions are not governed and predominated by the idea 
that it is always possible to negotiate and establish an "acceptable" set of roles 
and scripts for members of groups, simply that for the most part, they tend to 
be predictable.
An important concept in this process of interaction is that the process 
determines the rules, and not the other way round. In so far as a set of rules 
exist, it is because individuals have explored the intentions, reactions and 
attitudes of others and have reached an agreement on roles, scripts and so on. 
This initial process of that negotiation, the "sniffing out" as the author puts it, 
are very important. During the initial process, the sort of "se lf that a person 
wishes to be seen as, is presented, accepted or rejected and an infrastructure of
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expectations on everyone's part comes into being. It  cannot be emphasised too 
greatly that the set of agreements are not necessarily to be co-operative - but 
they do tend to be predictable - or at least, people believe this to be the case.
One of the more important explorations and "sniffings out" in the RHA 
must have been those which have led to the powerful Heads of Division group. 
That process continues on each issue of importance which gets decided. The 
process of establishing a new RHA objective is very much this sort of 
negotiation. For example, there are several ways in which the Regional 
Personnel Officer and I can start off and run in a major project. He might 
want one of his people to get a particular piece of experience - I might think 
that I want to have a certain influence. For example, we both had specific sub­
objectives in mind when launching the mental handicap review. He wanted a 
training officer to participate in a particular way and I wanted a particular 
analysis done. Some of those sub-objectives were concerned quite definitely 
with my own image in the RHA, namely being the hard headed "objective" type. 
So we haggled and eventually a set of rules for running that scheme evolved out 
of the process.
It  must be emphasised that such agreements are not for all time and are 
not to be taken for granted. Examples are given of straight refusals to play the 
expected negotiated roles and to fulfil the implicit agreements. Mangham 
quotes the example of an interviewee who caused consternation by refusing to 
answer questions. Few of these agreements are explicit. All of them are 
available for re-negotiation all the time, Mangham maintains -
"All situations, even the most routine and least problematic, are 
created and sustained by the interpretations and actions of those 
involved. Even the most boring and predictable situational script is
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dependent upon and is only kept going by its members and may, 
within limits, be changed by its members."
A second related theme is that though this process of interaction, individuals 
create, change, and maintain definitions of reality for themselves to which they 
are committed tenaciously and which they bring to all interactions and 
negotiations.
One of the outstanding examples of both of the above themes is the 
gradual change which I am bringing about in what I allow Dr. Hunt to say about 
the Computer Department and how I allow him to use their services. When I 
had to intervene in the Laboratory project, I had no alternative but to accept 
whatever he did. A fter the size of mistake which had been made, and taking 
into account all my other objectives, I had to take whatever he chose to hand 
out in order to stay in the arena. The last sentence is a very appropriate way 
of describing a definition of reality which I had to accept. But the minute that 
the pathologists and Dr. Hunt started to rely on my judgement and to need my 
help, it was possible to start demanding recognition for services rendered. 
Personnel have now changed on this project - I have done this. If  anyone 
chooses to comment on the new team, they are now careful to acknowledge 
their usefulness and live within the accepted limits of social life in the RHA. 
Eastbury is now dependent on our goodwill and that demands complete 
rehabilitation of my team. Even snide remarks about the past events are 
becoming rare.
Negotiating order on the basis of the above sorts of interaction is one of 
the main themes of the later book. Joint action is seen as one of the keys to 
understanding organisations and the nature of joint action is important. This is 
graphically described as "pulling and hauling" and "a moving pattern of
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accomodative adjustments between organised parties". This dynamism 
emphasises once again that it is the ongoing active processes in an organisation 
which determine the rules at a given time - and not the other way around.
"The meanings that underlie established and recurrent joint action 
are themselves subject to pressure as well as to reinforcement, to 
incipient dissatisfaction as well as to indifference; they may be 
challenged as well as affirmed, allowed to slip along without concern
as well as subjected to infusions of new vigour .............  It  is the
social process in group life that creates and upholds the rules, not 
the rules that create and uphold group life."
It is emphasised that the image of a rational and ordered organisation is a long 
way from reality. Individuals and groups have different goals and different 
levels of ability to achieve those goals. They do follow their own inclinations 
within limits and such order as exists within organisations is a negotiated order 
and is not determined by rules.
In the above paragraph, some very fundamental issues are mentioned and 
it is useful to relate them to one of the big meta-themes in this thesis. The 
fact is that I do not want to run an ordinary sort of Division as they appear to 
exist in other parts of the NHS. Much of the action described is about how to 
get hold of and do the more challenging projects. "Pulling and hauling", 
"producing accommodation in other divisions", "infusing new vigour" are all 
terms which catch the spirit of the quest for a better place for the Division, and 
of course for me. Doing projects, helping and not threatening others, showing 
management skills, divising RHA objectives were part of the social process 
which changed the rules which defined what a management services division is. 
In a very real sense, the Division is accepted as what it is because it has done
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what it has done. And a major reason for doing those things was that, within 
rules, I was inclined to do those things.
The book goes on to describe the factors influencing the negotiation of 
order and settles first on power.
"If we know the nature and disposition of power in an organisation, 
we are well on the way to knowing whose definition of situations will 
prevail. Power is the common currency of all negotiation and the 
basis of all social and organised behaviour."
Various types of power are identified, the most important and effective being 
those which rely on authority. "The boss is still the boss, even in these 
democratic days" illustrates authority. But power from the ability to reward is 
potent as well and takes a wide variety of forms apart from straight pecuniary 
advancement. Expert power is also widespread and is spreading rapidly with 
the advance of management and other technology. But all types of power need 
to be placed in a negotiating framework. Authority implies the existence of 
those who are willing to be led; expert advice implies that someone needs and 
will take it. "There is little  point in threatening dismissal to a feckless drop­
out", illustrates the complexity of using even blunt authority. In general, power 
is exercised within a constraining set of negotiations which are the essence of 
social interation.
There is a long discussion of power in my own laboratory study. Different 
types are shown to exist, among them, the expert power referred to above. The 
interplay of different sorts of power and the exercise of them in differing 
circumstance is a theme in both this book and my thesis.
It is rarely the case that all power lies on one side of the negotiation, nor 
is it the case that power is necessarily the dominant factor in a negotiation,
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although this is often true. Subordinates, even a storeman, can have sole 
access to certain types of information which gives him almost absolute power in 
a particular case - especially to mount a blocking action. Personal 
characteristics such as assertiveness or extreme submission play a major part in 
determining the outcome of an negotiation. Interpersonal factors such as the 
need to be included in a group, the need to control or the need for affection 
may determine a person's position in an interchange. The range of behaviours 
is illustrated by "The effective operator recognises when to assert, when to 
form alliances and coalitions, when to keep quiet, when to present himself as a 
warm human being and so on". These themes can be illustrated from our own 
powerful Heads of Divisions meetings. Alliances and persuing common 
objectives have been described in my analysis of the diary data. On the whole, 
members of that group present themselves as warm human beings to each other. 
But, each Head of Division can become very assertive if an issue causes 
disagreement.
Mangham refers to non personal factors, such as company policy, which 
constrain the negotiation. His books maintain that these "brick walls" are 
often not as solid as might appear at first sight. But the obverse is also true 
and that which appears negotiable turns out not to be. An example of a "brick 
wall" which I believed existed was the extreme reluctance to use R & D monies 
for evaluation. But it was. Negotiated accommodation for computer staff 
was an intractibie problem that I completely underestimated. Judging what 
can be made possible inevitably gives rises to misjudgements if  sights are not 
being set low.
The discussion of negotiated order takes place in a wide context and it is 
impossible to include all of the points made. But it would be wrong not to
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mention three interpersonal skills which the author sees as vital to being an 
effective negotiator.
The first is given the title  "The definitional or awareness dimension". 
Most people have at least some awareness of what is really going on most of the 
time. Few people "get the wrong end of the stick" consistently. Past 
experience plays a large part in determining our ability to grasp complex 
situations but the skilled negotiator must develop this kind of discrimination and 
awareness. Secondly, it is necessary to be technically competent to "put over" 
a given message. Aggressive behaviour is counter-productive if  it is
interpreted as being petulant or childish. Thirdly, giving the actual
performance in a negotiation is different from being technically competent to 
negotiate "To perform effectively is to realise in action one's definitions and 
one's technical ability".
All three of the above points illustrate the difficulties of being able to
perform in a political arena. That actual process deserves to be researched in
its own right. Managers spend many years trying to develop the necessary 
skills to perform well. Knowing the theory of how to negotiate order might 
help; it certainly does not guarantee success and many managers who do not 
know any theory perform exceedingly well. In the diary there are many 
instances of my modifying my behaviour during meetings. There is a graphic 
description of judging when people had jumped off the fence on my side, 
persuading others to join them and isolating the rest. That performance had all 
of the parts suggested above.
Conclusion
There is a sense in which the last paragraph of the review of Mangham's 
books is a summary of the main problem which is addressed in this thesis. How
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do people actually perform the change agent role ? The elaboration of the 
negotiation of change in this thesis seems to me useful. But, it is the actual 
individual performance which matters.
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IX ■ -  " a i n  l e s z & rc . i  j i a r v
1 : £1 : £3 2^. 11.77 I an on a v is i t  to a ‘Jortnero Region to see RMSOs 1 and 2 aooui 'ia tional S ta tis t ic s  Review.
9y chance I cane across a ll the oocunents to wnich Martin Ri I lia n s  has access in 'lo rtne rr Region. I now wnow wnai his
"R ib le" for v is it s  to Areas and D is t r ic ts  looks l ik e . The fo llow ing questions are a ris ing  in ny n ind :-
(a) Is i t  safe to give i t  to nin? (b) At wnat cost? (c) Re is  doing the wrong joo (d) cut ne oust be nade haooier
2 : £3 25.11.77 jeoartnental Heads nesting.
3 : Talking on Martin ana .Raloh. I nave said that I want fu rthe r thoughts on th is . Is Raloh being used to his cest
advantage?
e; In an atteeiot to get the conversation going on the Martin fro n t, I strayed in to  ceeo waters about Raloh. The casic 
s itu a tio n  was as fo llo w s :-
(a) Salon's presentation o f Care Grouo Monitoring to the HQ audience had been aoysnal.
(b) 1 nad realized that he could not cope with the theory and that I had got to get th is  sack from him.
(c) There are d if fe re n t oiews around o f wnat Ralph wants and what he can contribu te .
(d) The issue is s t i l l  on the tab le. is Salon an e ffe c tive  coniaunication channel w ith Martin?
(e) Ralph believes that Martin w il l  not oe aole to change h is ways.
( f )  We disagreed about the wisdom o f tack ling  STD nenoers separately. I f  Martin won't read, is i t  our 
re s p o n s ib ility  to do something about i t?  etc e tc . His lack of o r ie fin g  is h is fa u lt .
(g) The independent status o f Ralph keeos showing througn:- ( i )  1 am co-ordinated by M artin.
( i i )  I w il l  not s i t  around h is co rrido r l ik e  3arry Hunt ( i i i )  Martin 'uddles
(h) Ralph perceives the same dangers as I do in g iv ing  Martin a d igest o f simple data
( i )  In te resting  to note ;- ( i ) Peter Tioos was w il l in g  to get into deeoer water aoout Martin ana Ralon 
( i i i  lony Peers Jerended Ralpn like  map ( i i i )  Simon was aead uncomtortaole, oojected v io le n tly  and yet 
went on to analyse the Ralph s itu a tio n  much more fu l ly  than anyone. Ralph wants AMO, Ralph needs a r tic le s
b : £4 : 2b.11.7f Luke Downs is making a takeover bid tor Management Services via aud iting . Tony was cross a ll  weekend. 
I have sougnt to undermine Luke Down's position  v ia  Lee toss. Suosequentiy I reao an a r t ic le  on audit in  an accounting 
magazine ootainea from Treasurer's. He is  try ing  to di sol ace monitoring. (iot to decide where monitoring and auditing 
s ta r t and eno.
5 : £b : 2b .11.77 Number I proolem a ris ing  Wayne Cook in West Area.
7 ; £b : 28.11.77 Most or tne problems which I cannot deal w ith come oack to in te rac tions  with the RTO or reactions between 
them. I cannot use a tape recorder i f  I wish to have i t  typed in the o ff ic e . I t  is  fa r too dangerous i f  I wish to record
what I ac tua lly  feel and wnat peoole are doing. The reaction of my Heads o f D iv is ion  is typ ica l (25.11.77). I do not see
how to do a Ph.O co lle c tin g  th is  type o f data.
3 ; One o f my problems is  to establish mechanisms for catching good ideas, e.g. that I get NOSC to have people seconaed to
me fo r Monitoring Programmes to simulate Roy James on Catering. £ ffectiveness is  about catching and using ideas.
9 : £7 : 29.11.77 Meeting Henry Jacques, Luke Downs, Lee Ross, Tony Peers and s e lf .
Agenda: (a) H.Q. terminal (b) 'Computer Strategy (c) Audit
Henry Jacques should have stuck to strategy f i r s t .  I took Luke Downs to b its  fo r usurping my r ig h ts . He w il l  not s tick  to
RHA policy and methods. My anger was up. How can people make a mess o f 3. things in one week? In te resting  to note that 
I do not have any respect fo r the guy.
10 : £ 8  : 29.11.77 I had a session w ith Martin today w ith  Tony Peers and Ralph Rains about the Computer Strategy. I t  is  
going to the RTO on Thursday, Monitoring Committee la te r  and RHA at the January meeting. Martin W illiams is not going to
the RTOÎ He was very complimentary. What one se ttle s  for.'
11 ; £9 : 30.11.77 An example occurred today o f random inform ation. I discovered by accident tha t Payroll was going to
be delayed. Ramifications occur a ll  over the place from National HQ downwards. The National System w il l  be delayed.
The Treasurers' committee are taking decisions they have no r ig h t to take. I am not being kept informed. Why did the
National System management not know earlie r?  I spent the morning try in g  to produce the chapters o f the Monitoring Paoer
fo r which I am responsible. I have a problem persuading Ralph Rains that an important section of care group theory is  missing.
12 : £10 ; 30.11.77 An in te res ting  piece o f reconci1ia tio n .too k  place w ith  Luke Downs. I supolied log graph paper. I
lis tened to ^  University career. Late-at n ight in my co rrido r set the scene.'
13 : £11 : 1.12.77 A typ ica l RTO farce took place th is  morning. They considered Computer Strategy w ithout e ithe r Tony
or I there. I thought that Henry Jacques had asked Tony and I to be there but we were not ca lled . Misunderstanding?
Lack of communication? Result: Waste o f time, fru s tra tio n , RTO reputation takes another dip.
U  : £12 : 1.12.77 In the afternoon, I did a d if fe re n t sort of p o lit ic in g  by ta lk in g  to the chairmen o f a ll  the computer
grouDS in the Region. One important question is  the value o f th is  meeting. Education so that they can use the system.
Getting them onto Tony Peers' s ide. Take the wind out o f th e ir ob jections. Get them to make i t  work.
15 : An in te re s tin g  piece of in te rp lay  between Luke Downs and I occurred. Very gent le reaction in which I tr ie d  to take
over the minute. Equally gently I ins is ted  that there was no lin e  re la tionsh ip  between the Treasurers' Committees -  he
is  going to define i t . ' !
15 : £13 : 5.12.77 I spent between 11.00 and 12.00 w ith Henry Jacques and David Jones e ffe c tiv e ly  taking over from David
the co-ord ination of the development o f planning methods in the Region. This is  the re s u lt or twelve months work. And
Management Services D iv is ion  has now to de live r the goods.' Henry Jacques is probably counting on supoort to have a so rt out 
w ith  Luke Downs. I shall need to consider th is  s itu a tio n  w ith care.
17 : £U  ; 5.12.77 An Objectives Meeting followeo at which we sorted through the lim ite d  1978 objectives. A lo t  o f
communication occurred.
18 : £15 : 5.12.77 Talked to Ralpn about Martin again. We have agreaa to attack Martin an the oasis o f next year's 
objectives orogramme. Snide comments about ’ researcn on ly ’  D iv is ion  a ll  around the place.
i 3 ; 215 . 2 .!2 ..'7  ̂ minor piece of p o ii i ic in g  tooK piece wnen i-iar.ei Dur.n came :o ta lk to Simon Mass and 1 coout the
work which Francis is doing as the HCO paid for North Area.'!
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20 : El 7 : ÎA J2 .77  At tho .'oni to r i r.ç Cor.-.ittss :o:ay, Luxe Downs t r ia i  to net yet another aiuoid version o '  a hor.itorinç
Proçrarre on caoi tal/revenue -on ito rin g  through the oo.ini ttee .
21 : Elo : 14.12.77 Tony Peers ana I took the co.-putar strategy througn the Monitoring Oanni t:ee today. 3ig L^xe "ust 
could not re s is t putting  in his b it  aoout accounting syste.ns and aud it. Chair-an went through i t  ci t oy o i t .  Donnelly 
asxed wny we were at tne cotton o f system suopliers. Martin die not say a wore. Chair-an was surprised at ‘ he narc line  
being taken on s ta ff  con tro l. Surprising how the cancers oicxeo uo c its  a f-ac ting  th e ir own status, e.g. Region's Data 
Protection Grouo is under th e ir influence. We went througn the capita ! and revenue side of the paoer in so-a d e ta il. 
Discussion lasted one ana three quarter hours.
22 ; E2C : 17.12.77 The computer at Newton was bought seconohand at least s ix years ago. I t  has ceen g iv ing  a great ceal o f
troucie due to the -act tha t the nachine is now oosolete, parts are d i f f i c u l t  to octa in . Tne engineers have ceen taking parts
fros another machine in order to keen th is  one running. We have a programme in the strategy to reoiace these tacr.ines by
modern machines. We have not made the case fo r reolacing the Newton nachine through the methods wnich ue nave adopted in the 
po licy .
23 : • We have received froa Luke Downs a Te.no saying that he is not sa tis fie d  w ith the case fo r replacing the Newton nacnine. 
The -act that the way in which cases to the .RTO should be presented has not been specifieo , has given him ample opportunity to 
have a whale o f a tine  and generally to ta lk  about technical d e ta ils  wnich are oui te irre le van t to the main issue. I shall
be forced to .make Tony .°eers carry out the ins truc tions  which we are in the process o f agreeing and I have no douot whatever
that Luke Downs w il l  be as awkward as he can be about the whole th ing . We are bu ild ing  up a g lo rious exa.nple o f how policy 
and methods w i l l  be determined by p rac tice . There w il l  be a great deal of aggro in th is  system u n t il th is  issue is resolveo. 
In th is  p a rt ic u la r case, I am bound to say that Management Services is  f r  blame fo r se tting  up the ru les and not obeying them.
Of course Luke is .making a ll  that he ran out o f th is  s itu a tio n . I susoect that one lesson which we ought to learn from th is
is tha t we must be much more w atertigh t about our whole practice  than we are being at the present time. Tony Peers .may find 
th is  very irksome.
24 : I can a n tic ioa te  already the various reactions o f Tony Peers to th is  s itu a tio n . The replacement machine does apoear 
in the stra tegy. There is  now considerable pressure from Newton to replace the machine since the present one is not 
functioning at a ll  s a t is fa c to r i ly .  We, the HQ set up, are going to get a very bad na.me in North Area fo r messing about in 
th is  way. This w i l l  be another bad example of the present chaotic management arrangements in HQ and the way in whicn major 
decisions are bouncing around the organisation for -'ar too long because of the way in which the RTO does not operate.
25 : £21 : 17.12.77 Sometime ago Luke Downs attempted to obtain a terminal for HQ. I t  was done in such a manner as to
preak a ll  the ru les in existence. He had a spare £10,000 to £15,000 which he wished to spend. flo one had ra t i f ie d  th is .
He had preoared a report h im self and he tr ie d  to push th is  through the RTO. He also tr ie d  to obscure the requirements of
other users. In short, we brought him back onto the tracks very fo rc e fu lly . There was a .major confrontation w ith him with
Henry Jacques using an HQ team to look into the requirement, the location o f the term inal, e tc, etc.
25 ; £23 : 21.12.77 Set up Liaison groups. At th is  poin t in time, we s t i l l  have not managed to set up the various 
groups which we agreed should come into existence an the 1st August 1977. The reasons fo r the delay to the best o f my 
memory are as fo llo w s ; (a) There has been considerable aisunderstanding by the Areas about the functions o f the Groups.
(b) North Area, in p a r t ic u la r , have made a mess o f the no.minations and have put an accountant on a ll  o f the Groups 
including the Works and .Medical Grouos.' (c) We had a ceeting w ith a ll  o f the chairmen o f the Groups at which I explained
the function o f the new major groups. This took an awful long time to set up. In the event, many o f the major
p artic ipan ts  did not turn up. The paper which was promised at that meeting has s t i l l  not been produced by Tony Peers and 
myself.
27 : £22 : 18.12.77 At short notice two RMSOs and I arranged to see Head O ffice  on the review o f s ta t is t ic s .  They mat
before lunch and got h a lf canned! I t  was a very p o li t ic a l meeting. One gave point a fte r po in t a fte r p o in t. I ended
up watching ay own side more than the opposition. •
28 ; £24 : 2.1.78 I s ta r t the .New Year w ith an almost complete lack o f fa ith  in the RTO and i ts  being able to do anything
e ffe c tiv e  to fu rth e r the work o f my D iv is ion .
29 : Martin does not read anything. He does not understand monitoring. He is  committed to back-of-envelopa planning.
He is  committed to one p a g e /d is tr ic t s ta t is t ic s .  He understands medical s ta ff in g  -  I th ink -  and that is  a l l .
30 : Betty -  nice -  w aiting  to re t ire  -  lo s t -  p re tty  in e ffe c tiv e .
31 : Luke stubborn, not c leve r. Dangerous. Takes no notice of v icious rebuffs from Chairman. Power hungry. No subtle ty .
32 : C arl. B it weak. OK re a lly .
33 : £24 : 5.1.78 I am recording three days a fte r the event a disastrous RTO at which I substitu ted fo r Henry Jacques who 
was i l l .
34.: F irs t ,  they abandoned the agenda and insisted on discussing B e tty 's  replacement. G if f  Reynolds was ca lled in . No
warning of what to b ring . Martin complained o f lack o f courtesy in not le t t in g  him have the aop iications - a ll sorts o f
innuendos were about suggesting delays, lack o f openness, etc.
35 : When we did get onto the agenda -  typ ica l stroppiness, Martin ins is ted  on the adm in istra tion of the Oncology
contribu tion  from RHA in North Area - and then he toned down my le t te r !
36 : £27 ; 5.1.78 The 7502 and Patient Admin computer decisions were discussed with increasing i r r i t a t io n  to GO, N itp ick ing
was .not in i t .  I was in  no position  to defend -  i f  the RTO wish to investigate matters at the system designer le ve l. I got
very angry when Tony Peers reported that over a gin swigging evening session a careful financ ia l and medical ju s t if ic a t io n  for 
Patient Admin computer had been perceived to have been possib le. Tony, Luke, Martin -  NOT ME.
37 : £27 : 11.1.78 A s itu a tio n  has evolved o f the utmost complexity.
(a) The RTO is  planning courses o f action and not fo llow ing them regarding Patient Admin computer and 7502.
(b) Tony's o ff ic e  and the expenses involved are being severely questioned by auditors.
(c) Tony is disobeying ins truc tio n  not to involve Luke Downs u n t il I am ready.
(d) I know things about the s itu a tio n  which make me wary.
38 : £28 ; 13.1.73 During the whole o f th is  National Ma.nagement meeting, I was d e f in ite ly  c o n tro llin g  w ith a view to getting
a lo t  more p recis ion  into  the way in which the Natsys p ro jec t was oaing run oy both Dorothy Pine ana ,Henry M artin. There
are numerous enas around which had not been tied  up. Some o f these ends were exceedingly important and concern Heaa O ffice  
ana tn e ir negotia tions w itn s ta r f committees. These naa not seen cone anu i was .ery cross. i t  was also c iaar :r.at
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33 : E2B : 13.1.73 (continued)
neither Dorothy nor 'ia r t in  understood how the decisions were going to sc made :y  Gi *'f and -y s e lf. We are c lea rly  not in a 
oosition o f having that "atsys meeting running at a ll smoothly and I think th is  re in fo rces the case for taxing i t  as a oart 
o f ny worx»
33 : -23 : 13.1.78 Today a Natsys -eeting took olace at wnich G if f  Reynolds seing assent, I took the cha ir. 1 snowed a 
degree of toughness throughout the nesting.
1. An incred io le  nusser of ends jus t are not tied  up and I la id  in to  Dorothy and Henry.
2. Head O ffice have not cleared Natsys o o s it'v e ly  w ith the National Unions. As Tony Peers r ig n t ly  pointed out,
th is  could cost s ix months. Head O ffice  person has le f t !
3. 'Dorothy and .ienry Martin jus t do not unaerstand that GR and GG ars  ̂ the fin a l a ro ite rs  on th is . 'le t re s u lt - 
one extra unnecessary round of national negotiation.'
4. Nat. Sys. Group communications not working.
5. Even the minutes of the meeting were drafted wrongly a fte r I had laboured the tiraetaole.
5. There is considerable c o n f lic t w ith olanning work. Jacques is ove r-ru ling  p r io r i t ie s  fo r Dorothy and Peter Tibbs.
7. Dorothy's wonanishness came out. I was being unreasonaole.' Me!
3. Henry Jacques is ad hoeing too ouch.
3. I have a problem - co n tro llin g  oy power.
40 : E30 : 22.1.78 My main problem is  to get Peter Tibbs doing some work according to plan -  not according to Henry Jacques
ad hoeing. 1977 Plans have not been done according to plan and Peter Tibbs is doing a rescue on some fro n ts . cut he is
supposed to be designing next year's planning methods!
41 ; £31 : 2 8 .1 .’ C Sometime ago, ,e -e ld a monita r in g  seminar at Teacher Training College. The 'p llow ing  notes seen
i-po rta n t even a fte r a very long time.
42 : Martin was absent. Ralph was te r r ib le  (tr.eo ry !). I ta lke-i earnestly to Henry Jacques re. absent fr iends !
Datarmined to get ‘ia r t in  out o f is  corner. He must find  i t  d i f f ic u l t  dealing w ith the r.is to r ic a l backgrounos/olaces of
our peoole. I prised h is 'lorth  Region 3 ic le  out o f h is hands fo r Simon Moss to cooy. Nice Guy. V is it  to Computer Centre.
I need his cacxing on m onitoring. What do I ^  aoout Martin and Ralph?
43 : £32 : 31.1.78 I maoe some notes sometime ago on an intechange which I had with North Area. Most o f th is  concerns
H ill ia a  Lee. I had w ritte n  a paper on L io n e l's  department saying what to me was qui te .obvious. I t  did not a lte r  the fact
th a t. I spent a great deal of time making sure tha t I wrote i t  quite ca re fu lly  so i t  could not be used against L ionel.
I did th is  because I thought that W illiam Lee could use the paper in a ll  sorts o f ways. I t  had been pointed out to me by
Simon that I might have le t cyse lf into a s itu a tio n  which I ce rta in ly  had not an tic ipa ted . In the event, W illiam Lee dia use
the paoer in a va rie ty  o f ways. I t  is  in te res ting  to note that in fac t I got trapped w ith doing that work by not paying
a tten tion  to the consequences of what I said in fro n t o f the DAs and AAs in North Area. C haracteris tics  tha t I noticed in
th is  work was the way in which Wi11iam changed tack in various places. When he said that he liked  the paoer I became 
exceedingly wary wondering jus t what that meant. His use of p o li t ic s  is  great and i t  was quite clear to me that th is  was the
way in which i t  would be useful to him. In suosequent dealings w ith th is  paper I have been exceedingly c a re fu l.
44 : £33 : 3.2.78 The main event th is  week was a Day meeting w ith the three managers and Ralph to discuss the a ffa irs  o f the
D iv is ion . Despite making allowance fo r Simon's f lu ,  the day was a d isaste r.
45 : £34 : 3.2.78 The main argument th is  week has concerned Peter T ibb's work. Henry Jacques has been to ld  tha t there is
only Peter and one s c ie n tis t to do OR work around here.
45 : I have got to w rite  i  paper on MSD Objectives:
(a) enacted ( i f  possible s c ie n t if ic  reproducible change)
(b). Change o f Ethos ( i )  Measurable objectives and ticiescales ( i i )  Science based
(c) Control at a ll leve ls  -  Policy to operations
(d) S c ie n t if ic  in  character
(e) Change to oe obtained
( f )  Hum ility
(g) Careful c la s s ific a tio n  and
47 : £ 35 ; 28.2.78 Immediate past problem is  that my message on research through Tony Peers to the Computer Department
has gone completely astray. The main lesson to be learned concerns control o f the communication. Tony did not understand -  
c le a rly  he has not got the least idea what research is  about.
48 : £35 : 28.2.78 Yesterday, Ralph and I pinned down Martin for a w hile. The top ic was the work programme fo r the
D iv is ion . He lis tened . He made snide comments. He made noises about doctor supremacy in the f ie ld  o f community 
medicine. He fee ls threatened.
49 : £37 : 17.3.78 In 'A t the End o f the Day' page 9, Harold MacMillan quotes R A Sutler o f f  the c u ff p riva te  speech in
Spain s a y in g 'It is  a great shame that Spain has been outside in te rna tiona l l i f e  fo r so many ye ars .' Spanish M in is try  o f
Information issued fu l l  te x t. In B r ita in , a clamour for a debate or vote o f censure.
50 : Result a large number o f PCs plus 14 minutes supplemantaries. -  May 1951
51 : Also remenosr the 'WOG' speech by a D irec to r -  p riva te  lunch -  tape recorder
52 : On the 13 June, MacMillan says 'Far too crude to say sign the Rome Treaty or n o t '.
53 : What fascinating.length 's we were preoared to go to to preserve Commonwealth access -  on no good financ ia l ground for us -
lo ts  o f sentiment. What part does sentiment etc play in the decision making tha t the NHS does? C erta in ly  we lik e  to s tick
to our myths.
54 : £38 : 17.3.78 At the present time Henry Jacques w il l  no^ solve the Computer accommodation problem by tack ling  Chris
Judd re . £1izaoeth Cottage. And i t  is  v i t a l !  He is  incaoaole o f " c o n f l ic t"  and w il l  go to any lengths to avoid i t .
55 : £39 : 18.3.78 Why did I lose the 0 3 M battle?  I t  was lo s t before I got on the scene. Henry Jacques had a bad
experience w ith  some work study oeople in the past, had a very bad encounter w ith Head o f 0 î  M here. D if f ic u l t ie s  with
Areas who wanted them aoounded. I was "faced" w ith the r io t in g  mass on Day One in Wessex - a ll  looking to me fo r an
imwcssible m iracle . Henry Jacques did not back me with AAs ever.
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55 : ï 4 Q ; 20,3. 73 At the Henry .acques -eating :n Objectives todey, ue go; onto .'iiJdle East. i t  is  a g lorious exa.-qle or a 
Henry ^acoues o ro je c t. Goodness only xnous vhat is z riv ing  him. 3u: he has ousned i t  through, against adds to r l i t t l a
aooareot .gain -  at least in i t ia l l y .  Since oe has to "pincn" resources he is a lienating  even l is  lieutenants.' Ane he -ust 
know that ne is doing i t .
57 : Evl ; 23.2.75 he had a -eeting w ith Head O ffice  aoout planning fo r-s . I did not feel lik e  a f ig h t .  ET nas a good
command of ner planning system. I thinx that we juc* carve uo -ou to ' i l l  in these forms ano cuolish them as a special 
volume -or Head O ffice . i t  w il l  cause more aggravation not to do i t .  And so we do i t .
53 : EA2 : 2 0 .3 .’3 A g lorious example of Martin not understanding i'oni ta ring  is around. He is negotia ting Oncology
'loni toning w ith the L 'n ivers ity . A "M onitoring Programme" is a nignly structured e n tity  whicm neither ne nor the 'Jn 'versity 
the 'IRC fellow (who is also getting  involved) unoerstancs. Is he determined to oreak the system? Is he clever enougn to 
think lik e  that? -e is  neaaing 'o r d isaster - w ith tne Chairman and the A u tho rity . fe t he goes on. And yet Henry Jacaues 
claims to be glad that he is using the correct words.'
53 : E43 : 20.3.78 Another episode in the c a ttle  o f comouter s ta f f  accommodation occurred. Henry Jacques is  supoosed to oe
extracting  from Chris Judd the HQ and the El izaoeth cottages. Elizaceth is more important so he extracted Oawn House!
He is  a fra id  o f even asking CJ. So we go from c r is is  to c r is is .  I secretly  hope that the JCG take him to b its  (and i t  d id !) .
50 : [44 : 20.3.78 I have a sort o f love/hate re la tio n sh ip  w ith Henry Jacques. My p rin c ip le  hate is tha t I want a decent 
research team which I cannot get. And yet, he is the best RA in the country.
51 ; E45 : 21.3.78 I went to inspect another Region's Computer bu ild ing  today. How do I get Avon to give us the same? And
do I re a lly  want to do it?
52 : £45 : 22.3.78 I had a long session w ith Tony Peers and Ralph Rains about the re je c tio n  by the National Computer R î  0
Committee of the 3P P ro ject. Despite the fact that i t  had been put together in close l ia iso n  w ith Head O ffice , i t  was
re jected . out there is something more around than th is  I fe e l. I discover that the Professor did not perform well at our
presentation.
53 ; £47 ; 22.3.78 There was a meeting w ith  G if f  Reynolds, David James and Walter Arne yesterday. We discussed bids for 
s ta f f ,  p r io r i t ie s  and morale. My evidence is that Henry Jacaues w il l  not make decisions on p r io r i t ie s .  He w il l  not win 
against Luke and Martin i f  they decide to go fo r s ta f f .  Even th is  remark is  an ind ica tion  o f the morale o f Adm inistration.
At present we have no method o f co n tro llin g  demano to stay w ith in  resources.
54 : £48 I am attempting to get control o f Tony's s ta f f  control s itu a tio n . I feel that I have been subjected to "Dual
Control Maneouvring" and lo s t contro l o f 30 s ta f f  control points as a re s u lt.  I t 's  a clever t r ic k .  Get two inconsistent
control systems and swop from one to the other according to the way in which advantage lay.
55 : £49 ; 24.3.78 I have set down in document A1 and analysis o f Chapter 2 o f H MacMillan's book "At the End o f the Day".
55 : This morning I have tr ied  to analyse "Why I wish to v is i t  Freda Siam before she comes to H ighcro ft". See page 27 of
my Research Notes.
57 : £50 : 28.3.78 The Avon Data P rotection Group has set down p rin c ip le s  governing c o n fid e n tia li ty in Avon. The Treasurers
seem to want to access th e ir f i le s  from terminal s. Luke Downs has been pressing fo r th is  for months but the necessary Codes
o f Practice and other safeguarding practices have not been defined. Henry Jacques wrote o f f ic ia l ly  to the Adm inistrators 
asking for Areas' au thority  to grant th is  permission. The South Area said "No" and some o f the res t said a so rt o f "Yes'.
Luke Downs drafted a "set o f ru le s ' w ith authorisa tion  and got the Treasurers to sign them. Tony argues that he now has
Area Authority to act and has done so. The lines  o f au thority  are not c lea r. The interm code o f p ractice  for accounting
is  inadequate. The lin e  o f au thority  from the ADPG is  unclear.
58 : 3ut a ll  of the above is re a lly  a minor aspect o f the problem. Does Luke Downs see him self as being as help fu l as 
possible or is  th is  a manoeuvre? I f  so, is  i t  stupid or not? How do we reassert the "correc t* lin e  o f au thority  when i t  does 
not exist?
59 : £51, £53, £54 : 28.3.78 Diary Note on the Development o f Planning Methods 1978/79
70 : The background to th is  development is tha t la s t year there was a rad ica l change in the way planning was conceived at the
Regional le ve l. Henry Jacques became d is s a tis fie d  w ith  the level o f conceptualisation which was the background to the planning 
system being used. Taking a book by a man ca lled Argent!, he developed a set o f concepts which involved goals and ways to get 
those goals. Having determined ideal goals, one was inev itab ly  led to the conclusion that these were unobtainable and the idea 
of making a compromise and deciding on something which could be obtained was born. Although there had been attempts to do th is  
by se tting  up investment frameworks as they ware ca lled in  the years previous to la s t year, these ideas had not been developed 
fu l ly .  The la s t stage in the Henry Jacques sequence was to use the interim  goals to determine for each o f the Areas what they 
could have from the projected available c a p ita l. Using th is  projected availab le  capita l a llo ca tion  to each Area, the Areas 
themselves could decide what p a rtic u la r schemes were to be undertaken w ith in  the guidelines which have been set down by the 
Regional t ie r .
71 : I t  is  clear tha t embedded in the centre o f such a way o f planning was the need to develop options from which RHA Members
could choose. A manpower planner had suggested a way of using s ta f f  which was the main revenue consumer, as a way of 
«a lcu lating  what care group development could occur. I t  rap id ly  became clear that although the ca lcu la tion  had been designed 
roughly, there was no way in which various options could be generated fa s t enough by manual methods. This led to the method
being computerised and i t  also led to the co-operation o f other techniques alongside the manpower planning method in the ootion
generation game. The whole process carried out la s t year including th is  la te  development in the Autumn, had begun to make i t  
dawn on Hbmry Jacques tha t the numerical methods being used for planning le f t  a very great deal to be desired. This being the 
case, i t  was ine v ita b le  tha t Management Services started to play a bigger ro le  in developing these methods.
72 : The major step came when i t  waa decided to s p l i t  the planning process in to  two d is t in c t oarts -  namely, the development
o f a Regional plan i t s e l f  and the development o f methods wnich would be used in the generation o f the plan. This la t te r
a c t iv ity  was given wholly over to the Management Ser"ices D iv is ion  and the net re s u lt is  that I am resdonsible fo r co-ordinating
a ll D iv is iona l a c t iv it ie s  on th is  issue. This involves Treasurers, Personnel, Planners and ourselves. The mechanism by
which th is  is oeing done in practice is ^or one o f my lieutenants to o f f ic ia l ly  co-ordinate the a c t iv it ie s  o f these people
from other D iv is ion s . In actual fac t, o f course, we are playing a leading ro le  in th is  and co-ord ination is a s lig h t ly  mis­
leading word. I t  is  in Tact d ire c t leadership and often d ire c t management.
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'3  : The s itu a tio n  s ta rts  to become in te res ting  from an organisational ooint o f view when one s ta rts  to vet th is  process ana 
the worxing group unoer my lieu tenant into the organisation. O f f ic ia l ly  there is a la rg isn  grouo o f senior -emoers o f my level 
and just below who overloox a ll o f the olanning a c t iv it ie s  th is  year and taxe decisions i f  the planning a c t iv ity  is fa llin g  
behind the time. This was thought to be necessary because of the s tra ig h t forward mess that the timetable got into la s t year 
w ith the net re s u lt that everyone was worxing on Christmas Eve and throughout the Christmas holiday try in g  to ccmolete the plan.
It  remains to be seen wnether or not th is  group of people w il l  make any d ifference wnatever to that process. I t  seems to me 
inev itab le  that David ^ames who is in charge of planning and I w il l  taxe the o os itive  decisions which keeps the orocess on time.
74 ; Another in te res ting  b i t  o f the theoretica l decision maxing process is that the RTO w il l  decide between d if fe re n t methods 
for producing the oian. There is now a quite fu l l  timetable o f a c t iv it ie s  up to the end of the year invo lv ing  the RTO at
monthly in te rva ls . The RTO is suoposed to take important decisions on oo licy  and so on which w il l  be the basis of the plan.
The timetable also includes meetings of Members of tne Authority who form the planning oattern. Again, the idea is to keeo 
these peoole Informed so that th e ir wishes come to be met by the plan. I t  is  in te res ting  to note that the main p r in c ip le  
methods of decision have already been taken by myself. I have cu rta iled  develooments to lim its  which I th ink are atta inab le  
and no one is going to argue with tha t decision. I suspect that in the case o f the Committees, we w il l  find that the only 
person who exercises influence is the Chairman o f the Regional Health A u tho rity . 1 w il l  attempt to keep a check on whether 
th is  proves to be the case.
75 : This morning David James and myself were supoosed to meet the RTO and to go through the timetable and sequence of actions 
which they were going to take over the next year as devised by ourselves. The f i r s t  thing that happened was that David James
was hauled o f f  to interview a Planning Nurse. Such an event could have been foreseen months ago but for some odd reason was
not. I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note the set o f p r io r i t ie s  which enable the new Regional Nursing O ffice r to haul David in to  the
interview  process at five  minutes notice and to cancel t i is  important commitment on his p a rt. David 's deputy came in to  the
RTO with me to take the RTO through the paoer which we had prepared.
75 : The sequence o f events in the RTO cannot be recorded because i t  was impossible fo r me to take notes and so I am 'orced
to record a series of impressions. I t  is  in te res ting  to note that fo r the f i r s t  h a lf I saw on Martin Wi 11 iams' copy quite
copious notes demonstrating that he had read and c r it ic is e d  the document. In fa c t some of his comments were exceedingly
in te l l ig e n t and very h e lp fu l. I t  shows that the chap has got considerable a b i l i t y  i f  he chooses to apoly i t .  Carl W. 
latched onto the arguments wnich we have had with Head O ffice over planning methodology » r the la s t few years. He was easily  
re-assured that these d ifferences had been reconciled. In h is  shoes I c e rta in ly  would be much more d i f f i c u l t  to persuade.
In fa c t there is quite considerable d i f f ic u l t y  a ris ing  from our methods and th is  concerns the re la tio n sn io  between a Regional 
S tra teg ic  Plan and the D is t r ic t  Ooerational Plan. Despite the fa c t that Head O ffice  are unhappy about our methods, the only 
possible reason for them not attacking us is  the fac t that th e ir  own methods have got a s im ila r defect embedded in them as w e ll.
Luke Downs was also in quite a constructive mood and only went o f f  at a tangent once. As is usual he plugged the importance of
h is own d is c ip lin e . I agreed w ith some o f the points that he was making but i t  was a p ity  that he had not applied them to the 
wider f ie ld ,  where inc id e n ta lly  they applied equally w e ll. My general impression o f th is  p a rt ic u la r RTO Minute was that i t  was 
a very constructive a f fa ir .  There was l i t t l e  acrimony about, many in te l l ig e n t comments were made. In fa c t, i t  was qu ite  a good 
meeting.
77 : I t  is  in te re s tin g  to speculate on the importance o f that meeting. I t  was purely about obtain ing th e ir commitment to a 
process. In fa c t, they did not contribute anything to the methodology o f very great s ign ificance although some o f the points 
tha t they made about the d e ta ils  were very v a lid . During la s t year when the timetable badly want wrong, acrimony crept in 
during the summer and the autumn. The general analysis o f the problem was tha t as ind iv idua ls  they were not committed to the
process which had been thought up by Henry Jacques in the main. I t  w il l  be in te re s tin g  to watch whether or not th is  careful
and nurtu ring  o f the RTO and orogramming them into a sequence o f events, ootains the commitment which we need.
78 : I t  could be argued that from many points o f view the whole of the two hours spent th is  morning achieved very l i t t l e .  I t  
was needed because the s tructures meant that to delegate re s p o n s ib ility  to e ith e r David or myself would prove to be unacceptable 
to the egos o f the RTO. In the middle o f the discussion there was an in te re s tin g  sequqnce in which we were discussing P e te r's  
ro le  on co-ord inating  o ffic e rs  p a rt ic u la r ly  from Luke Downs' Treasurer's Department. I t  was clear that Luke saw us usurping 
h is  r ig h t to co n tro l. In fa c t 1 spent quite  sometime poin ting  out in a ra the r two faced manner tha t by going to them once a 
month th is  was ce rta in ly  not the case and yet in p rac tica l terms i t  is  the case tha t in fac t o ffic e rs  w il l  be working to the 
programming work which we have designed. I t  is  in te res ting  to re f le c t tha t there is  no one who has got the au thority  to put 
together the working m u lt i-d is c ip lin a ry  team in the organisation by r ig h t .  I t  would only be Members o f the A uthority who could 
order people to form such a team. I t  is  also in te res ting  to speculate on how Management Services, especia lly myself, w i l l  use 
the co-ord inator ro le  which I have been given. In fa c t, 1 w il l  e xp lo it i t  and by a series of threatening a ttitu d e s  convince 
people tha t they must carry out the tasks which have been assigned to them. This is  on the assumption tha t at some stage things 
get d i f f i c u l t .  Maybe they won't but th is  was not the case la s t year. But ce rta in ly  i t  is  a fac t that a t the end o f  the day
I have a ra ther pecu liar sort o f au thority  to make that team work.
79 : E52 : 29.3.78 I went to see Wayne Cook today w ith Tony Peers. I cam away very d isturbed. He is  an Area Adm in istra tor
in h is  m id - th ir t ie s . 1 know that he has never stayed in  a job fo r more than two years. Just enough time to make a splash -
not enough time to make anything work properly. He has cu ltiva te d  a ll the habits o f a tough young manager -  appearance, 
pleasantness, ruthlessness.
80 : The main purpose of the meeting was to discuss West's response to Region's comouter stra tegy. He wishes to set up a 
working party to consider that response. Tony Peers is  to be on that working party . I t  may be that he intends to support that
work. I t  may be tha t th is  working party w il l  generate the committment tha t is  needed to make the strategy work.
81 : We had a long debate about the re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  of Service Departments. In what sense am I responsible for the managerial
effectiveness o f the work o f the D ivision? The log ica l theoretica l argument is  "not at a l l * .  But, in fa c t, managers do not 
o ften possess the necessary s k i l ls  to perform th is  task e ffe c tiv e ly  for themselves. An objective must be prec ise ly  defined in 
measurable terms, w ithout big loopholes, i f  the extent to which i t  has been achieved is to be seen.
82 : I came away w ith  m isgivings. To what extent can, do I want, would i t  be p ro fita b le  to the NHS, to work w ith Wayne Cook?
33 : £55 : 31 .3.78 I spent the morning w ith my Heads o f Department at the monthly meeting. There are few inter-Departmental
a c t iv it ie s  in the D iv is io n . 1 structured the meeting much more in tens ive ly  than h ithe rto  and everyone was a lo t  haopier.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  to note that I out Tony on the defensive r ig h t from the word *go* by poin ting  out that they had not done the
task requested - the only task. A ll sorts o f hot a ir  came out as a re s u lt o f that challenge.
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24 : î5û ; 31.3.73 I .Jent to sae â lizaceth in order to test out an aooroach to Freda "i-.n on Fond ay. I t  «as ’-lorthwhi le and 
reassuring. I snail : I ay i t  openly. Ti;e subject is going to be 2TC suooor: 'or davelooaant uork carried out sy '33.
35 : :57 : 31 .3.73 During our noetinc th is  aorni no, I srought up one issue o ■' the J tv is io n a l ro le  one its  "esocnsibi 1 i ty 'or
-OKing systers work one continue to work. Tony Peers duckad tne log ic  o : the -oni ta ring  aooroacn. This is  not the -ost
in te res ting  asoect or th is  eoisoce. In ract, saving los t sore control to Tony, I a- now ca tting  oac;< c.ha in i t ia t iv e .
3Ô : E58, E5S ; 1.4.73 At a la te r stage in the day, I was discussing w ith Horace Kay, the On S c ien tis t tha t we have got,
the inp iica tio n s  of 1 in i ting  the developnent of the planning nethods to oe used. I was considering in the f i r s t  instance
whether core soonisticated nethods could be nade available and acceetable to the 'iHS Managers throughout the Pegion and wnat
the p ro f it  would ce in so doing. Cne of the cuestions was pro f i t to wnor? '.'ould i : be a se tte r ol an? '.Jould i t  stoo -e
doing none inportant work w ith the 02 s ta ff  that I have got? There is a strong case 'o r  saying that the cost m at I should
do would oe to do the least that would nake the xTO haooy. At the end o f the day, wnat is the i.ioortance o f getting  r ig h t 
the Regional Plan whicn is s t i l l  oain iy capita l resource orientated? I strongly celieve that we need to get stuck in to  oasic 
nanage’ ent e ffic ien cy  in connection with the operational services wnich we are running. The najor e ffe c t o f the present plans
oeing manufactured by the Region is to try  to obtain a s h if t  in resources froo the acute sector into  the deorived care
categories such as the e lde rly  and renta l i lln e s s . I t  could be argued that a quite  sophisticated nathenatical ca lcu la tion  
has been used to underpin a very crude club lik e  blow wnich has atterpted to d ive rt the flHS from i ts  usual course o f g iving 
the acute services a ll  o f the lo l ly .  'Thy was the soph is tica tion  necessary? I t  has ce rta in ly  dressed up the plan in new 
robes and given i t  a status that makes i t  more or less impregnable to the arguments o f the acute service mandarins and yet we 
know that they are not going to le t  that be. There are already signs tha t North Area in p a rt ic u la r  is  preparing an attack 
for getting.back most o f the money into the acute sector. At tha t po in t in time, what sort o f arguments do we apply which
w il l  save the day fo r the deprived care categories?
87 : Any e ffe c tive  argument is going to have to be using the same sort o f gross p o l i t ic a l  too ls that .'lorth Area have used.
They w il l  be arguing that present mental illn e s s  and mental handicao and e ld e rly  fa c i l i t ie s  could be upgraded (to  use the
eupheniso for "neglected") or pernaos that is not a fa ir  comment. Nevertheless these deprived care categories w il l  not get 
the "super duper" treatment that w il l  oe handed out to the new acute hosp ita ls . At the and o f the day is  i t  going to come 
down to an argument aoout who can supply the best so rt of p o l i t ic a l  evidence to make the case of the depriva tion  o f the
deprived care groups and what w il l  be the ta c tics  o f that p a rt ic u la r battle?  C erta in ly  they w il l  not be sophisticated
mathematical models.
8 8  ; E50 ; 1.4.78 Our ears were created open, our mouth shut.'
39 ; I saw Freda Simm today. I wanted to ta lk  aoout the performance o f the RIG and in p a rt ic u la r how i t  is  a ffe c tin g  the
development of management systems in  Avon. I went through the fo llow ing steps in order to get onto th is  d i f f i c u l t  top ic .
(a) I appealed to Freda's sense that the management environment for development was a ll important - especia lly 
at the ';ighest leve l.
(b) I blamed myocM fo r the lack o f success.
(c) I gently explored the Martin i i l l ia o  background - North .Region is not Avon e tc.
(d) I explored ob jec tive ly  what has gone wrong w ith , for examole, m onitoring.
(e) I introduced rl's  weakness -  not reading, not being educated, not lis te n in g  very a tte n ta tiv e ly  -  and talked
about out lack of success.
( f )  I talked about Henry Jacques' strengths and th e ir consequences fo r developnent work, e.g. he expects too
much of other people's lo g ic , power, e tc.
(g) At th is  time the conversation had become p leasantly, construc tive ly  open, rapport established at a p re tty  hign leve l.
30 : Now I had worked fo r tha t very hard by preparation, control in the meeting -  I put on the r ig h t s u it ,  made quite  sure
tha t Freda was treated w ith courtesy and a ttentiveness, came out from behind ay desk, given her the best seat, e tc , then
(h) We talked about 3HA Objectives, th e ir  status and RTO members committment to them.
( i )  We began to hive o f f  into  Nursing.
( j )  A fter some time, we discussed the work programme -  her reaction to i t .
(k) We talked about the contribu tion  which Simon, Tony and Peter could make.
(1) Winding down, we talked about the Peter problem o f wishing to do nursing research. Freda made the very
va lid  po in t that nowadays th is  has got to be headed up by a nurse. I made the po in t th a t, however strongly
Peter is  interested in nursing, the RHA p r io r i ties , are what w il l  be followed? Freda sees the log ic  and the
Peter problem.
(m) Winding down • do come and ta lk  about t  hings more •  close lia is o n  -  coat on -  held by me. Goodbye.
(n) Success!
91 : £52 : 3,4.78 I held another meeting w ith Peter, Dorothy Pines, Frank Sins, Roger Hughes and Simon to co-ordinate 
action and to check d i f f ic u l t ie s .
92 : No agreed work programme ye t, Peter Tibbs is  not worried. Does not consider the repercussions o f th is  on team or
tha t o f his a ttitu d e . Dorothy Pines put on her usual show -  to which I reacted. Peter has got - problems -  he has got to
push the system to get re su lts  -  Dorothy is out there now being as nice as pie to him. Peter has "power" which he is  not 
hand ling .w ell. He resents .my interference -  too bad. I carry re s p o n s ib ility  and I refuse to abdicate tha t ro le . I need 
to th ink about Peter as an example of power.
93 : £53 : 5.4.78 I have been reading 3rian Abel Smith on Hospitals 1800 -  1948. The h is to r ic a l perspective given by 
150 years is a thought provoking experience. What was i t  tha t transformed a meagre p rovis ion  in 1800 to quite a 
comprehensive system in 1970? The amount o f le g is la t io n  is fa n ta s tic . The fig h ts  against conserva tive /puritan ica l ethics 
and various forms o f professional s e lf seeking are numerous. What are the in b u ilt  brakes today and more important what is 
tomorrow's vision?
34 ; £34 : 5.4.78 A Nat.Sys Management meeting occurred yesterday and there was a s ig n ific a n t improvement over the la s t
meeting. Due to pressure from me, a th ird  was knocked o f f  the time to produce the la s t two p r in t outs. Henry Martin is
s ta rtin g  to get a g rip  on th is  p ro jec t at long la s t .  I have slipped up in  that I have fa ile d  to process the memo which 
Henry Marttn sent to G if f  on s ta f f  for phase 2. So much flows across my desk that I have an inadequate grasp o f i ts  
progress. Second, I feel tha t the system is  so complex that the p ro b a b ility  o f i ts  not working is very high and so I have 
got to keep a firm  grip  on i t .  And yet I can 't manage i t .
35 : £55 : 5.4.73 I talked to Gi f f  Reynolds aoout the ef-ects of Luke Downs on the management o f .40 yesterday. Lae Ross
w il l  leave prooaoly because he cannot stana Luke Downs. I do not th ink that th is  should oe to lera ted . Yet Gi f f  Reynolds
is  mot saving "how" - he savs " c a n 't " , " d if f ic u lt® .
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35 ; Z:5 : 'ant to 2 Tacr.r.icol 3uc-Co'mi ttae at 3’JH today - cat three HCSCs. I 'rad orepareo a su-rary of the paners
as sucmittea. The ''a n ti'' sucsiJad duci ng the oeetirg . I introdaced tne summary at a stage when they haa dacidea to
sunmarisa what was wrong with the R i  D paper. I pusned things through on tine and pu ia tly  suggested progress to n it  the
aeaaline. RGSC 1 "suggestaa" that he should get a secretary to type out what was w ritten  uo by RC30 2 on the ocard, lo ts  
of quite good grouo dynamics arouna tne olace.
57 : E57 : 7.4.78 Pub luncn proved useful in that the conversation, led o f f  by RCCO 2, got nouno to important ' ssues. ’ hey
were aspects of top nanagesent - Guest "odel.
53 : Ô53 : 7 .t . 73 Guotation Geoff Vickers value systems and social process "S ta o il ity  took its  place besioe progress".
59 ; Lord Hutchinson, physician, London Hospital "From the in a o il i ty  to leave well alone - good Lord deliver us".
100 : £59 : 10.4.73 Sonetine ago, Martin put forward Oncology Monitoring as one of the Programmes.
131 : £73 : 10.4.78 The Elizabeth Cottage so lu tion  to Computer accommodation croblen is not possio le. Background is
puddle/auddle. The facts are: (a) Accommodation at Computer Centre is legal out to ta l ly  inadequate.
(b) A ni story of abortive attempts to get extra accommodation ex is ts .
(c) Henry Jacques is fixed in his wish to keep pressure on H.Q.
(d) I am beginning to have major douots about S ta ff control management s ty le .
(e) Henry Jacques w il l  not confront Chris Judd w ith need for accommodation.
( f )  Chris Judd having got the wind that H.9. is  interested in Elizabeth Cottage has 
taken i t  uo him self.
(g) Henry Jacques is  now being faced w ith the fac t tha t the Nat.Sys must be closed down.
132 : £71, £72 : 1 1.4.78 Diary note of a meeting with Martin Hi 11 ians and Raloh Rains.
103 : The purpose of the meeting was to keep Martin informed o f what the D iv is ion  was doing and to try  to discuss w ith him
wnat he would lik e  *rom the D iv is ion  and i ts  Work Programme.
104 ; A major part o f the meeting concerned the monitoring of the Oncology Service. I t  was pointed out to him tha t th is  
was not being supported by the Management Services D iv is ion  but was being done fo r him by the U n ive rs ity . Despite repeated 
attempts on his pa rt, I made i t  quite clear that our only oart in th is  was to find  out whether or not a programme had been
designed. He made the point several times that his type o f monitoring would not f i t  into the Avon patte rn . I t  is  also clear
that he has got a bee in h is bonnet about the need to co-ordinate th is  and eventually Ralph agreed, under pressure, to w rite
a le t te r  to them se tting  out some sort o f oojectives and co-ord inating ro le .
105 ; The other major part o f the meeting was dealing w ith Simon Moss and the s ta t is t ic s  programme. We talked for a long 
time about the development o f his l i t t l e  book and he seems to th ink tha t we should be able to do be tte r than the North Region's
version. I must get Simon to go and see him to discuss th is  issue in  the near fu tu re .
106 : 'He agreed to meet again for another hour to discuss the progress being made and I must agree w ith Ralph in about three 
weeks time what subjects to tackle.
107 : £73 : 11.4.78 A meeting w ith Henry Jacques and Peter Peers was inspired by the fa c t tha t domestic monitoring was to
be discussed at tomorrow's Monitoring Committee. Henry Jacques had spent most o f the previous evening w ith the Chairman,
Many in te res ting  points are now s ta rtin g  to come out o f these conversations. I t  is  clear that many of these are Chairman 
inspired.
108 : I t  seems lik e ly  that Henry has become reconciled to the fa c t that he must take an expert on each programme to the
Committee. Hence B. of Ralton and Graham Pate are coming along fo r the Domestic Services. 'He have also made a mistake in
deciding fia t the actual programme is  an aopropriate document fo r the Monitorimg Committee, since i t  is  c lear that many of th e ir
questions were not answered by the f i r s t  part o f the programme and yet we made the judgement that the second part was too 
complex fo r them.
109 : An in te res ting  note is Graham Pate's reaction to 3. being inv ited  by h im self. I t  was also pointed out tha t Henry 
had not s u ff ic ie n t ly  involved the Area in th is  p a rtic u la r piece o f work. I had to send a note to Henry to try  to get th is  
cleared up at lunch time.
110 : £74 : 11.4.78. Oncology has got an incred ib ly  complex h is to ry  in Avon. Some years ago. Head O ffice  set up three 
Oncology Centres in  the country - one o f which was in Avon. Their purpose was to determine whether or not such a service
could provide an additional input to the care o f cancer patien ts  on a Regional basis. The main emphasis was on topics lik e
prevention, research,, and things o f th is  nature. Since much o f the actual care took place by Consultants scattered throughout 
the Region, the Centres themselves were poorly financed in the f i r s t  place but nevertheless attracted  in due course o f time 
Professorships o f Oncology which in themselves tended to provide a power base.
111 : The- treatment o f cancer is in any case a very odd specia lty in the Health Service and depending on how one is  re ferred
in the f i r s t  place, the treatment regime can vary enormously. There is  a lo t  o f ground fo r argument about what the most
e ffe c tive  treatments are and th is  seems to vary immensely w ith the type o f cancer that is being discussed.
112 : A ll of th is  adds up to a complex m e d ica l/p o litica l set up in  which people continua lly  manoeuvre fo r pos itio n s . Thus
the Oncology Centre in Southtown was not provided with beds when i t  was set up and the Professor arrived in post w ith only 
promises o f fa c i l i t ie s  and none actua lly  ava ilab le . Since that time there have been various manoeuvres to try  and sway the 
Region and to obtain Regional backing since i t  is  essen tia lly  a Regional service. Such manoeuvrings have included personal 
v is its  to M artin, v is its  to us to try  and get much more s ta t is t ic a l involvement and the whole series o f manoeuvres o f which 
Oncology monitoring is probably the la te s t.
113 : Oncology monitoring should conform to the Regional system but as yet the people who have become involved in i t  
ce rta in ly  do not understand what the requirements are. Thus we have got a s itu a tio n  in which the epidemiology services in the 
University are being involved in the design o f an exercise wnich they do not understand. One s ta rts  to question whether Martin 
rea lises  that th is  cannot possibly bring about a sa tis fac to ry  d e f in it io n  o f a monitoring programme. One wonders whether the 
Consultants involved are actua lly  worried about th is . The wnole s itu a tio n  is complex beyond measure and , am now s it t in g
on the side lin e  watching i t  develop.
114 : £75 ; 12.4.78 I nad a long chat w ith Steve Todd about the Computer Oeqartment Survey over the phone. '.He discussed 
the oroolems wnich had arisen in the Computer Department and agreed tha t somehow or other we could not allow th is  ton ic to 
become submerged and have nothing done about i t .  The real value o f th is  oroblen is not that i t  is a computer problem, i t  is
that i t  is  the o rinc ipa l development oroblem for the NHS and applies to a ll  systems development o f every type.
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115 : I need *o j e t e n i n e  -ow on e a r t h  to in v o l v e  Ron S.n ith in  t h i s  work.
115 ; I a ls o  d isc u ss e d  w i t h  S teve  the prooiem o f  c ro w n 's  r e c u e s t  f o r  h e lp  from th e  Head O f f i c e  OR 'croup. T h i s  concerns  h is  
Cut P a t i e n t s '  c l i n i c s .  I nave o isc u ss e c  t h i s  w i t h  our  ceve ioom ent  - a n  ana Raioh  R a i n s .  The o o i n t  i s  t h a t  the r e a l  p r o c le n
a r i s e s  when New B u i l d i n g  P^asa 3 ooens and then i t  c ou ld  p o s s i a l y  ; e  c o u n t e r - o r o a u c t i  /e  to nave crown wedded to a s y s te ^  wnich
( a )  would not  worK in  the New B u i l d i n g  and ( d )  c o u ld  c u i t e  e a s i l y  ce not  a c c e o t a c l e  to h i s  c o l l e a g u e s  in  t h a t  O u i o a t i e n T  c l i n i c .  
On the o t h e r  hand,  we jo  n o t  wisn to e x t i n g u i s n  c ro w n 's  e n t hu s ias m .  he c o t a i n s  h i s  c o n - i t n e n t  to t h i s  oy g o in g  to cne o f  
the  head O f f i c e  Study Grouos in  L eeds .  I have p o i n t e d  ou t  to Steve  t h a t  in  f a c t  Head O f f i c e  have o p e ra t e o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  or  
s ee m in g ly  s u c c e s s f u l l y  in  N or th  Area  on a s t r a t e g i c  p l a n  p ro o le m .  On the o t h e r  hand,  they  have o p e r a t e d  very  u n s u c c e s s f u l l y  
j u d g in g  cy l o c a l  r e a c t i o n  in  c a s t  A re a .  T h is  says someth ing about  the way i n  whicn t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  group is  c a o a c l e  o f  
w ork i ng  and p o s s i b l y  someth ing  a co u t  i n d i v i d u a l  memoers such as R, wno i s  the guy o o e r a t i n g  in  E as t  A r e a .  T h is  goes pack  
to .cy view t h a t  in  ^a c t  l o c a l  work r e q u i r e s  a degree  o f  commitment which you can no t  g e t  ou t  o f  Head O f f i c e  OR d e p a r tm e n t  
as p r e s e n t l y  s t r u c t u r e d  and f i t t e d  i n t o  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n .
117 : [76 : 12.4.78 I t  is  the .Monitoring Committee today. North Area have been given a job by Region to so rt out the 
operational problems o f the report on Knightsbury. Hi 11i am Lee had sent a very short le t te r  to the Committee and the 
Chairman blew his top. w illiam  was nauled back from holiday and had to give a fo r ty  minute rundown on th e ir  a c t iv it ie s .
He gave a superb p o li t ic a l display which, considering that he can hardly see, deserves special .mention. The Chairman and
members g r il le d  him but, having had th e ir way and showed th e ir power, they were very well mannered.
118 ; [77 : 13.4.78 I need to w rite  to RM SO 3 about the Regional Planning .Methods which we are developing because he is  on 
th is  National Planning Committee.
119 : An H.O. o f f ic e r  was pressing the need for a standards national control scheme fo r Incentive Sonus work. I need to make
sure that he takes into  account the need to delegate the overall running o f these schemes and th e ir contro l to AHAs.
120 ; T'-e management side o f the Whitley Council appears to be oabating aspects cf bonus schemes includ ing th e ir  con tro l, 
is there any .method by wnicn we can fin d  out .more fu l ly  w.hat is going on?
121 ; I have been askeo to chase the s he e t s  asked * o r  by Head O f f i c e  in  t h e i r  l e t t e r  o f  the 4 th  O c t o b e r .
122 : The Head O ffice  le t te r  on tak ing 'Incen tive  Sonus from the s ta f f  control scheme needs to be watched.
123 : I need to ta lk  to Simon and Ralph about the need to put together the Region's comments on the S ta tis tic s  paper.
124 : I t  is  in te res ting  to note that the RCSOs are preparing a note an the 'X Y Z' paper.
125 : Is i t  possible fo r me to go to a 2 or 3 day seminar on d is trib u te d  processing at 3uxton on 24/25 May?
126 : I need to suggest topics to M.S. Assistant Secretary.
127 : E78 : 13.4.78 The major content o f th is  meeting concerned the Review o f S ta tis tic s  which is being undertaken by the
NHS and Head O ffice at the present time. Sometime ago, the Management Services O ffice rs  worked out a strategy for doing a
major review of what is a .major programme. £ 2 0  m illio n  per year is prooably spent on co lle c tin g  s ta t is t ic s  and other 
information in the NHS. I t  is  widely suspected In the NHS that Head O ffice jumped onto the band wagon ju s t as the tra in  had 
been sent .moving. There were various reasons why they should have done th is  -  the main one being to preserve th e ir own power 
In th is  matter. I t  may have been fo rtu ito u s  but the fa c t is that Head O ffice is running down i f  anything at the moment and 
th is  was one p a rt ic u la r f ie ld  in which some very nice empire bu ild ing  on th e ir part was possible.
128 : Two RHSOs and myself had prepared the paper fo r the Management Services Committee and the idea was that i t  should be
sent through to the RAs who would then set up th is  major review. At approximately the same time. Head O ffice  tr ie d  to steal 
the in i t ia t iv e  by sanding out a la t te r  to the RAs saying that they were doing a prelim inary survey. 'He have attacked them on 
th is  several times. One o f the main in it ia t iv e s  has been to make them come and ta lk  to the three Regions who had w ritte n  
the report during the time that they were doing a prelim inary analysis o f the problem.
129 : Sometime ago Head O ffice  had started to do an exercise on th is  which re a lly  amounted to a simple 0 i  M exercise on
community s ta t is t ic s .  This was a completely inappropriate thing to do because what was needed was a major questioning o f 
the whole apparatus and mechanism for doing th is  job. This o f course adds to the resentment that was f e l t  by the NHS about 
the whole exercise and the way they have tr ie d  to take i t  over. The fac t that th e ir man issued h is le t te r  to the NHS at the
same time as our report was due to go to the RAs, was deemed by the NHS to be machination. 'Hhether th is  is  the case or not
is  not c lea r.
130 : During the MSC meeting, a ll  o f the b righ te r RHSOs spoke up. RMSO 1 got onto his usual run try in g  to go over a ll  of 
the old ground without making any real p o li t ic a l po in t that would s tick  in the Department. RMSO 3 was as usual much more 
constructive but nevertheless on the whole played i t  at a fa ir ly  low key. As usual RMSO 2 did h is  wise man act. I th ink 
i t  is true to say that in fac t only I made some broad te l l in g  points at the meeting and I w il l  describe what is  wrong w ith 
th is  approach in these paragraphs.
131 : I f  a Review of S ta tis tic s  is  to be done then i t  is  a very big job indeed. I t  is  no use ty ing i t  to short term
considerations. I would include in such snort term considerations most o f the present planning system and most o f the 
present ideas on m onitoring, despite the fac t that some o f them are .mine. There is ample ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r saying that 
planning in the NHS tends to have very l i t t l e  real e ffe c t when you get down to i t  and I instanced the fac t that only that 
morning, Healey had announced £4 m illio n  for kidney machines whereas fo r the whole year, the p r io r i t ie s  document had been 
saying that more and .more money must go into community services. I t  is  jus t a fact tha t p o lit ic ia n s  regard the NHS as one of 
th e ir  "play th ings" and i t  is  in te re s tin g  to note tha t David Owen in  h is book "In  Sickness and in Health’  makes ju s t that 
p o in t. This being the case, th is  Review must e ithe r be latched onto operational issues which are not going to change whatever 
the colour o f the Government or they must step r ig h t back and decide what from a health po in t o f view would be useful 
information to have. In a sense and although I have heaped c r it ic is m  on i t  in my time, hospita l a c t iv ity  analysis was such a 
stand back. My main c r it ic is m  o f that system was always w ith tie way i t  was set up and the way i t  was envisaged that people 
would use i t  was never worked out in d e ta il.  Nevertheless, i f  i t  were going to undertake a review of S ta tis t ic s  which might 
la s t several years, i t  is  important that the timescale fo r such a development is  considered ca re fu lly  and taken into account.
132 : £79 : 13.4.78 One o f the fundamental changes which is  about to occur is the decon tro lling  o f I3S s ta f f .  There are 
some o re tty  important p rin c ip le s  around here and unless careful d e f in it io n  occurs :Vom Head O ffice  le v e l, Avon is  going to 
lose out as per usual. The fact that our people are out at the Areas means that they w il l  ;e aole to "acninate and de­
contro l a ll sorts of people who do not work in th is  f ie ld .  At the same time the .Region has no methoo whatever 'or gaining 
any method of working bette r from th is  p a rticu la r exercise.
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133 : Ï 3C  : 1 7 . 4 . 7 3  The C h a i r - a n  is  r.o'.i gunning "or 'lew B u i l d i n g  -  The canments - e r e  i n t a r e s t i n g  a t  O b j e c t i v e s .  Henrv  
. a c c e s s  and D a v i j  were c a t t l i n g  to m a i n t a i n  the r i g h t  o '  c ou th to n  to i t s  super new m o s p i t a l .  They re caooeo  a l l  the  e o l i t i c s  
ana j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  wnich  nad seen u n a e r t a k e n .  I must get  c o o ia s  o f  r e l e v a n t  m a t e r i a l  ' rom D a v i d .
134  : £ c 3 ,  Eel  : I 7 . 4 . T 3  I was "summonea" to Luke Downs to t a l k  to two osooleJ  i n t e r e s t e c  in  ' l a t s v s .  Even they co-mented
on the n a t u r e  o f  the summons. "y  re sponse  was to say "Not ^or te n  - i n u t e s "  d e s p i t e  the f a c t  t h a t  I , a s  m-oe.  P l e a s e  note  
the n a t u r e  o f  t h i s  30  i n t e r v e n t i c n J  The o eo o le  proved to be two f i n a n c e  p e o p l e .  The s u c j e c t ,  the a po ro v a l  o f  Nat.sys 2 .
I a x o i a i n e o  t h a t  the I n i t i a l  Stuoy r e a c y  in  O c t o c e r  was the ITO d e c i s i o n  o o i n t .  Agreed t h a t  an a c c o u n t a n t  and a s ys te . -s  
d e s ig n e r  must work on t h i s .  I s t a t e d  t h a t  I would f i n d  my nan o u t  o '  the d e v e l o o n e n t  team.  And t h a t  I th o u g h t  t r e a s u r e r
ought  to do l i k e w i s e  b u t  t h a t  i t  was none o f  my o u s in es s  where they  go t  i t  * ' r o ' .  Luke r a i l e o  on a oout  the  work t h a t  the
t r e a s u r e r s  had oone.  He was going to the RTO e t c ,  e t c ,  e t c .  So 3G b lew uo and shouteo  pac k .  Cne o f  the o t h e r s  ceme in
and t r i e d  to calm th i n g s  down -  emoarrassed?  s e e in g  ny p o i n t  o f  view? w a n t i n g  p ro g r e s s ?  L a t e r  t h a t  n i g n t  L u k b  passée me on
the  way home. I a c c ep te d  the l i f t .  He a ssured  me t h a t  he had go t  the a u t h o r i t y  from A re a s .  I s a i d  ' g o o d ' and a n o th e r  
bout  o f  r e c o n c i 1 1 a t i o n  began -  t i l  the  n e x t  t i m e .  How do you r e l a t e  p o s i t i v e l y  to h im 'a n d  p r e s e r v e  your  own sense o f  value
( i m p o r t a n c e . ' ) .
135 : £83, £34 : 17.4.78 I had a quite  extreme case o f not a n tic ip a ting  a Henry Jacques reaction today. For two years I have 
been advocating standard system to him. And he knows that we have the national system. The In i t ia l  Study has cone up 
advocating an 11 man team plus accommodation. S tr ic t ly  in lin e  w ith other standard systems. The fact that we are getting
into trouble w ith  Luke's one man fo r IJatsys 2 doesn't help. I should have put i t  into the computer strategy -  Henry says -
althougn the log ic  is questionable. He is  beginning to hate me on accommodation in any case. He is  now going to the RAs to 
check i t  a ll out and to try  to get a d if fe re n t funding method - despite the fa c t tha t I have to ld  him that he w il l  get a flea
in his ear from Head O ffice  and two other regions. To add to our woes, e ithe r Dorothy Pines had not sent or he had lo s t the
Natsys report se ttin g  out user requirements and the oenefits (suosequently " lo s t"  proved "to  be the case).
136 : £85 : 17.4.78 I should have pressed on w ith evaluation aethodology. The objective  se tting  in flHS is  a ttroc ious -  no
measurable ob jective  and no timescale. I now resolve to comoine the Evaluation Methodology, the D is t r ic t  survey of Avon 
systems and my le t te rs  to two DAs in to  a major push forward.
137 : £34 : 17.4.78 During th is  meeting, Henry Jacques promised to resolve the flat.Sys issues in May. We have given a close
down Nat.sys date through lack of committment, e tc . Henry knows th is . He spent the meeting try in g  to work out how to avoid
tack ling  the issue head on. You could see him musing away -  weighing the pros and cons. And yet I bet that we are in for a
gross underspend next year.
133 : £ 8 6  ; 9.4.78 The s ta ff  control system is  a methoo o f c o n tro llin g  the amount o f 'a dm in is tra tio n ' done in  the health 
services. Due to a grading quirk , m.s. s ta f f  are admin - and therefore co n tro lled . For a va rie ty  o f reasons the o .r .
department was caught by the s ta f f  control freeze la s t year and lo s t one person. There has been a va rie ty  o f promises to 
favour the development o f numerical methods. Horace Kay avoided the Plan by the skin o f i ts  teeth la s t year. Profuse 
g ra titude  - marvellous thanks e tc , e tc , et-b loody-cetera. 3ut.' when the chips are down, s ta f f  contro l is  more important 
than decent work. At the end o f the day, pub lic service is  worked on a non-creative system o f obeying ru le s . There is  no 
creative  management.
139 ; £90 : 9.4.78 I as frustra ted  w ith the NHS - The dead hand o f admin - The Computer strategy farce.
140 : £87 : 9.4.78 Sometime ago Henry Jacques "consulted" the Areas on the computer stra tegy. Of course, they ca n 't or
won't pay fo r i t .  Henry has w ritten  to Areas again to clear up a "few poin ts" and uproar has broken out.' " In te rfe r in g .' 
ignorant.' adm in istra tion  " is  one war c ry . "An Admin ploy for doing nothing". "Why cannot he move?". Meanwhile machines 
are going in . And they are wanted i f  not needed. No thought is given to ju s t if ic a t io n  -  how to finance etc -  What to 
measure in the way o f performance e tc , e tc . The pent up anger w ith Henry is fa n ta s tic .
141 : £89 : 9.4.78 I spent another hour w ith Gi f f  Reynolds and Henry try ing  to get a Nat System resource note to Henr/.
He is  s t i l l  try in g  to pretend that an a lte rn a tive  that Avon has is  to not do Nat. System. Log ica lly  maybe - p ra c t ic a lly  
there Is no way to do anything but dip into the old deep pocket and take i t  o f f  the top. 3ut the sheer s tu p id ity  o f the 
pretence k i l l s  me.
142 : £38 ; 9.4.78 NO rang me from Fordhaa today. Chris having le f t  he is faced w ith the question of replacing or not.
And he is  try in g  to use the Avon model. He is cu rren tly  saying no replacement w ithout an integrated D iv is ion . Fordhaa
is  h is to r ic a lly  medically dominated. The present M.O. is  being stupid and stubborn. I bet he wins and keeps contro l of 
OR and inform ation. The M.O. is  a fasc ina ting  study. Fundamentally lacking in every element o f wisdom and yet b ru ta lly  
stubborn. I promised to do anything I could including ta lk in g  to h is members -  i f  i t  would help. Fordhaa were o f f  on the 
old hairy one o f medical control of data. And N. wanted to know how Ralph and I got on. So we to ld  him and thank 
goodness that i t  is  a good re la tio n sh ip .
143 : £91 : 19.4.78 I am frus tra ted  and angry because I cannot see any way o f breaking into the s tu p id it ie s  o f the
bureaucratic system o f management which we have got in the NHS. There is no way o f breaking into th is  system. I t  spells
death to management in i t ia t iv e  and c re a t iv ity  -  This outburst is  based so le ly on the s ta f f  contro l nonsense.
144 : £92 : 21.4,78 I am decorating today on a day o f f .  Tony Peers rang from Head O ffice  today about Nat.Sys funding.
As a very exceptional th ing , they are agreeing to fund 50% o f the accommodation fo r three years. Tony wants Henry Jacques 
to r in g  and say "thanks very much -  how h e lp fu l" . But th is  is  not the Henry problem. Having committed him self hook, line  
and sinker to Nat.Sys in le t te rs  e tc , he is try in g  to play games w ith i t .
145 ; £93 : 23.4.78 I have been reading the BBC and apart from my notes, I was struck fo rc e fu lly  by the c o n f lic t  issue
between Departments. I t  applies to H.Q. Henry Jacques attempts to define Regional Objectives have fa ile d  when the chips
are down. They are admin ob jectives. The c o n f lic ts  between t  he sections of H.Q. reporting  to d if fe re n t RTO members is
fa n ta s tic . Witness the GG/Luke c o n f lic t .  Freda is a way round th is .
146 ; £94 : 24.4.78 I met Henry Jacques today to discuss the Strategy document ^or Computing. For some reason everything
is  s ta rtin g  to c l ic k  in to  position  for him and he rea lises that he has only got several p a rt ia l views down on paper and he is
now wanting to re la te  together fie c o n f id e n tia lity  work, national p o lic y , our p o lic y , resources committment, e tc . He claims 
to have spent hours try in g  to come up with a document s truc tu re . I have to impress on Henry the need to be seen to be doinq
something pos itive  about the strategy on which he has consulted. My P.S. has been given a cu tting  and s tic k in g  job to do
on the document. Why has i t  taken so long fo r him to re la te  these things together and . ta t  ca ta lys t set h ir  going now? 
i t  looks lik e  Nat sys. resources. He is calming down though. I th ink that my advice :o :a'-,a acre how he -akas Nat.sys 
the RAs is working.
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• 7 : £55 : 2 ^ . - . 7 5  Foi  1 swing the s t a r "  b id  ' i  asco -  i s  nor  - . v a i l a o i e ,  I t r i e s  to g e t  G i f t  to s t a r t  to t i s c u s s  wi ti i Ho.nr y
the  v i a b i l i t y  o f  s . i a l l  u n i t s ,  i . e .  t r a i n i n g  ana uR. He ;oss  no t  wis.n to ta k e  i t  up as a s o e c i a i  i s s u e .  I t r in .<  t h a t  we
o ugnt  t o .  G i f "  was a e f e n s i v e  because he f e l t  t h a t  he cou ld  not count  on H e n r y ' s  s u p o o r t .  Ana y e t  he agreed  w i t h  the  l o g i c  
-  b u t ,  he was s e i n g  to lo se  o u t .  People  can no t  aenava r a t i o n a l l y  e s o e c i a i l /  in  l o s i n g  s i t u a t i o n s .
148 : £ 3 9 ,  £190 : 2 5 . 4 . 7 8  Nano, some i m p o r t a n t  o o i n t s  r e l a t i n g  to C o n p u t in g  In Avon.
143 ; I an a c u t e l y  aware o f  tn e  f a c t  t h a t  -'or r e a so ns  whicn I do .not u n d e r s t a n d  I have f a i l e d  to g e t  across  to you some 
i n o o r t a n t  poi .nts  in  tne r e c e n t  p a s t ,  e . g .  p r o o a o l e  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  N a t . G y s .  I have th ou g ht  o f  two o t h e r  con ce rn s  wnich  I .nave 
wnich i t  n i g n t  be o r o f i  t a o l a  to d i s c u s s .
1 : 0  : Four such machines on p e r i p h e r a l  comouters  in D i s t r i c t s  and Areas  e x i s t  and a t  l e a s t  two ' o r e  a re  sch ed u led  t h i s  y e a r .
Cus to m ers ,  e s p e c i a l l y  fay ne Cook,  a re  p r e s s i n g  fo r  these  n a c . ' in a s .  Given  o r e s a n t  r e s o u r c e s ,  the  numcer o f  syste .ns which we 
can w r i t e  f o r  these  n a c h ine s  is  s m a l l .  Any economic e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h a t  w o r k l o a d  w i l l  show, in  ny v i e w , t h a t  fo r  the  n e x t  two 
y e a r s  a t  l e a s t  these  .machines are c o s t l y .  I t  c ou ld  be argueo t h a t  th e  w o r k lo a d  should  be d ev e lop ed  on one machine b u t  the  
o t h e r  customers  would .not wear t h a t .
151 : He have agreed tha t, id e a lly , developments must have measuraole objectives whicn should be monitored over a given 
timescale. I produced the attacned paper. This idea was taxen uo by Head O f^ ice and there is now a body o f l ite ra tu re
which I can suoply on th is  subject. The Avon position  on the d e f in it io n  o f measurable objectives is unsatis factory in the
fo llow ing resoects.
(a) Although Tony is w ill in g  to define timescales, e tc , for the production o f a system to a specified level o f
technical conoetence, he is not w il l in g  and prooably lacks the competence to define customer objectives to an
acceptable level o f usefulness.
(b) I have a difference o f view w ith '.Jayne Cook over the competence of Areas and D is t r ic ts  to define usable ob jectives.
He also disagree over the ro les of the HQ and Areas on monitoring, especia lly insofar as th is  applies to. the
achievements o f benefits from computer systems. I take the view that a .monitoring orogramme in which the H.Q.
has a suDstantial ro le  to play must be designed.
(c) I was in the process of discussing w ith Ron Smith and Steve Todd a p ro jec t to investigate the problem o f D is t r ic t  
knowledge about and committment to the Computer Department work programme. I attach two papers an th is  -  R. 15
(very rough d ra ft)  and R.20. Peter is very keen to follow th is  through. I th ink that th is  type of work with
D is t r ic ts  on objective se tting  (possib ly wider than computer systems) must be undertaken i f  our investment in
computers is ever i )  to pay o f f  reasonably fu l ly  and i i )  to be seen to be ju s t if ie d .
Hould you consider financing a research p ro ject to do this?
(d) You are obviously unhappy (and so am I ) aoout our lack o f d e f in it io n  o f ob jectives. 'He need to agree a set
of objectives in th is  f ie ld  and decide where to get the necessary resources to achieve them. At the present time 
there is  a gaping hole in  our methods at th is  po in t.
152 ; Could we please discuss these issues?
153 : £96 : 25.4.78 Ralph reported the la te s t happening on the Oncology fro n t. Steve Toad, DJ and CJ came to see Martin
at h is  reque st from Southton. Before the meeting Ralph advised DJ to w rite  in  to confirm the d iscuss ion(.') Martin ooens
"Well what's th is  about Robert?*. Anti immediately " I  don 't know' and I can believe tha t ( . ') .  In steps DJ started to take 
the in i t ia t iv e  -  wants money. Martin "How about £100,000 from the new cash"! So much for p r io r i t ie s .  Luke says "You 
ca n 't do th a t* . M bangs the tab le . L argues. M in s is ts . HQ w il l  do i ts  nut.' Planning C goes beserk a fte r the meeting.
There was absolutely no agreed course o f action on th is  matter and yet we have spent an additional £50,000 per year.
154 : £97 Public re la tio n s  Sheila came to see me about c o n f id e n tia lity  today. I chatted and she w il l  w rite .
I went to see Ralph about clearing  i t  with M artin. He says Sheila must do i t .  I t  is  ge tting  to a poin t whan he is  avoiding 
M 1 ike poison.
155 : I t  has taken Gi f f  Reynolds three days to get the Natsys memo in to  Henry's hands!
156 : £101 : 25.4.78 There was an in te re s tin g  Panoraa la s t night in which Callaghan and Schmidt talked to Robin Day and two
others. Two points stuck in my mind. (a) I t  was fascina ting  to see both Schmidt and Callaghan in s is t fo rc e fu lly  and 
persuasively tha t, despite d iffe rences, the Western democracies especia lly Germany, England and the United States have an 
incred ib le  amount in common and need to understand each other. In a longer timescale, they w il l  id e n tify  w ith each other.
(b) Schmidt contrast o f German log ic  and B r it is h  muddling through was fasc ina ting  and he made a v irtu e  of muddling through. 
Contrast Henry Jacques' logic?
157 ; £102 : 27.4.78 On Tuesday, I v is ite d  'X ' Region to discuss the d ra ftin g  on the Report for the Technical Committee on 
the Strategy for Computing. P.L.1 did not turn up. P.L.2 could not make i t  oecause o f a funera l. RCSO 1 made many 
constructive  comments. And ha was p o l i t ic a l ly  adept in much of h is phrasing. However, the major po in t -  How to get a 
major delay, is  s t i l l  to be negotiated.
158 : £103 Four RMSOs met to discuss a corporate view on the development o f OR in the NHS. Three very d is t in c t points 
o f view from my own were around -  and there are ten other Regions. So what do we do? Please see the paper in my loose 
d ia ry  notes which I prepared la te r as a basis fo r ta lk ing  to other RHSOs p r iv a te ly .
159 : £104 : 28.4.78 This afternoon I had the second meeting o f the Planning Methods Team. A ll the issues which Dorothy 
Pines raised were done d ip lo m a tica lly . In fac t Peter and the team are running the p ro jec t on time. The f r ic t io n  at the 
beginning o f the exercise was quite severe. Peter has modified h is behaviour. I do not know i f  by design or not.
160 : In comparison w ith la s t year, the preparation o f methods is exce llen t. Once again the treasurers are behind. But
not fa r . T he contrast w ith la s t year is tremendous. We got the organisation r ig h t .  We got the launch r ig h t .  I do not 
know whether the RTO know what is  going on(!) Today we ide n tifie d  the decisions which have got to be made. I do not know 
whether I can get them made on Tuesday but the heat has gone out o f the s itu a tio n . Minor grumbles is a ll  I can hear.
Maybe next week on decisions is  the crunch.
151 : £105 Peter returned from the Dental Committee today. The GPs have agreed to allow access to th e ir  major f i le s  - 
and th is  represents a major breakthrough. We can s tick  a Research Tag on th is  and so get round the s ta ^ f contro l hang-up. 
Peter is  hesitan t because i t  might prove re s tr ic t in g  in  the longer term. But, the fa c t is  tha t we have no short term at a ll
a t present.
162 : £106 : 2.3.78 A very pleasant D Committee on Peter's Planning Paoers 1 - 15. KA had climbed down on a nuncer o f 
issues, especia lly the a lloca tion  o f Regional, Area and D is t r ic t  overneads to care groups. His only current jnhaopiness is 
about the re la tiv e  importance o f age and geography re . the value o f a s ite  to service to pa tien ts . Planning doctor, whom 
i aflmire sees ihe passing o f h is age c f planning. ^^3 -  througn his ceap set eyes ne looxs very .nhappy. And yet ' 
know tha t he is well balanced, fishes, e tc. G lf f  Reynolds started by pra is ing  the papers. He intervened w ith some very 
pointed comments.
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1:3 : But.' 1rs fact is  that wa are easing a cc 'o le te  new olanning r.ethoiology into olace. The paoers go to Planning Panel
and PTC next. I t  w il l  ce in te res ting  to see what trey nake of then.
154 : £107 : 2.5.78 I have jus t hao the usual fru s tra tin g  exoerience o f try in g  to get hold of Henry. Between aoroo:, his 
National cosni ttments ano his Regional s tu f ' ,  the position  is almost i.ioossio ie . Tnat are his P rio r it ie s ?  <hat toes ne want?
Of ne in  p a r t i c u l a r ?
155 : £108 : 2.5.78 The paoers for the OiR National Cosinittee cane today. A renarkacly da,no scuib. Having 'a ile d  acysnal 1/ 
to get CS funded in Avon, I suooose tnat 1 was hooing for a miracle. In ^act, a ll that i t  proposes is a neeting twice yearly
to oronote co-ord ination o f CR in the NHS. So what.' And yet one tore door pangs to on e r 'e c tive  co-operation am getting
anything done. I suooose that I was an id io t  to exoect more from the cornaittee than th is  - especia lly in present circunstances.
But - 'wnat do I do?
155 : £109 : 2.5.78 Reflections in the early morning. I am reading Crossman phi losoohising aoout having lo s t friandshio of
Fred Lee by winning over on b i l l .  Nota - "Poor Fred Lee". He is considering the 'pros and cons' of weighing in on an issue
and eventually hopes tha t "w ith  a great deal more caution than five  years ago" he w il l  weigh in ra ther than be cool and
ca lcu la ting . As Crossman says its  possible to be ca lcu la ting  in a nasty way "Co as to get oneself onto the mao" but equally,
ju.mping in can be fo o lish  and r is k y . I feel tension here because I desperately need a more considered action from Henry and 'Co.
And yet I need them to weigh in . i t  depends on some o f the underlying values. A fter some considerable thought, I have on
the paper in fro n t o f me;
Calcu la ting action Considered action Weighing in  (considered and i l l  considered) Random action 
II I  concerned action Thoughtful action Positive action F a c ilita t in g  action Ethos action
157 : Yet another analysis which I must do comes from Crossman admitting depression at having achieved so l i t t l e ,  iso la tio n .
(5 .11.54).
Crossman GG
Wilson - imoossible tasks Henry rew rite  Computer Policy
Oame Evelyn Her m in is try  run Her way Tony
No progress on Crossman's B il l  OR
A to ta l fru s tra tio n  is  occurring for both G iff  Reynolds and myself. We are both concerned with the future and we see no way 
of creating i t .  The fact is  that our value system is in c o n f lic t with the e ffe c tiv e  value system o f the Region.
158 : There is a te l l in g  remark about Grossman and Sob H e llish , men from opposite ends o f the social spectrum. And M ellisn
is working for him. "As long as I am successful, he w il l  be loyal to me". Successful in Bob H e llis h 's  terms? How do I
re la te  th is  to Tony Peers whose loya lty  is on the wane. As opposed to Peter. Why the d iffe rence . Success for Peter is
even worse than for Tony.
159 : £110 ; 4.5.78 I have a severs proolem in the D iv is ion  re la tin g  to Peter's work and the way i t  re la tes  to Simon ana Tony. 
Apart from the demarcation issue, Tony has a major ind u s tria l re la tio n s  problem at the Computer Centre. E a rlie r a lienation
is being fu rthe r aggravated by the Henry uacques indecision on accommodation, Nat.sys. e tc . The RTO state is beginning to feed 
back to the lower leve ls .
170 ; £111 ; 8.5.78 I have jus t spent the day re w ritin g  the Computer Policy and Strategy. To what purpose I would not know.
I suppose tha t there w il l  be available a document se tting  out in a very precise English a pos.ition which makes Henry haopy.
But the re s u lt o f a new sort of document incorporating much o f what has gone before plus some’ new somewhat contentious material
is  hard to forecast.
171 : £112 : 8.5.78 At D iv is iona l Heads th is  morning there was a very contentious argument about the e ffec ts  o f the computer 
replacement and the new build ing  on H.Q, plans. David James was doing his usual t r ic k  o f tim etabling the la s t possible decision 
time. G lf f  Reynolds was try in g  to ease things through re lu c ta n tly  coming to 'a  crunch poin t which he does not l ik e .  Walter 
Arne was getting  down to brass tacks saying that a choice on the use o f cap ita l has got to be made. Eventually, having been
a ll around the subject, i t  was put on next Monday's Objectives meeting. Yet we a ll  know that Henry w il l  k ick i t  for touch.
So I have ju s t instructed  Tony to take the b u ild ing  etc r ig h t to the lA B r ie f stage w ithout Henry's permission.
172 : £113 : 12.5.78 1 spent the la s t two days away froo the o ffic e  p o li t ik in g .
173 : Pat Robert's has joined the national OR Committee. I went to see him in  Essex over lunch. I prepared what I was going
to say quite  c a re fu lly  yet w ith the re a liz a tio n  that I would have to play i t  by ear in a c iv il is e d  way. The main messages were
(a) Jock does accept any re s p o n s ib ility  for OR in the NHS
(b) He is  not interested in Social Engineering
(c ) He despises NHS OR Units
(d) NHS OR is  in a mess
(e) Most RMSOs know nothing o f OR
( f )  Most Region's RTOs know nothing o f i t
(g) The s itu a tio n  is  te r r ib ly  fu l l  o f vested in te rests
(h) The p o ten tia l o f OR in the NHS is  enormous
174 : We had lunch together. Football and the waiter occupied time and i t  was clear that Pat needed time to maintain his
contact w ith the b u t le r , Brighton FC matches, e tc. We slowly went round the subject. Things got bette r once my creden tia ls  
got established, i .e .  5 years w ith Toch, five  w ith RT3 and I knew what Pat said at Oxford las t year. I knew Donald H. And
so we could get down to brass tacks. Pat ventured that Jock wanted a quie t time in  his la s t 18 months. Quite a surprise to me
- I'd  guessed at f iv e  years. I re inforced w ith heart attack, gently and c iv il is e d .  Jock must e ithe r take the re igns, do the
social engineering and s e llin g  and le t  someone else do i t  and take the c re d it.  We discussed the OR entry problem because I know
tha t Pat is a top leve l small team man. He knows why I favour a lower level approach and we understand each o ther. Odd comments.
175 : I made i t  c lear that I understood tha t he could not become involved r ig h t up to h is neck. He responded by saying that
outside s tra te g ic  in terventions were possible. He suggested that our ta lk  should be p riva te .
176 : £115 : 12.5.78 The next day I went to the National OR Committee. And I went on the attack a fte r the paper *rom OHSS.
F irs t I got the MSC involved -  despite Jock's opposition. Second I got Jock to accept tha t he must take a re s p o n s ib ility .
177 : £115 : 12.5.78 Another Committee -  Computer Technical took place also. RCSO 7 got out forward. I ta.: argued with
RMSO 5 on th î ':eleonone that i t  was nacassary to get p r inc ip les  not p o li t ic a l behaviour coning out o f th is  committee.
RCSO : 's  comment was tha t " th is  is  too easy" when no one argueg. 'That has happened?
178 : £116 : 12.5.78 1 had lunch with Martin Williams and Barry Hunt th is  week and Martin got to sermonising aoout Avon. His
tiraoe was fa n ta s tic  snowing a il or h is si ite r  .-esentment against Avon. No laaa from Region - ana th is  cssp iie  tne cocx jo on
Northam teaching H osp ita l. He wants Newton hospita l more heavily used - or so he says - whether p rac tica l or not. Patients
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178 (continued)
to core from Oldtown and D is t r ic t .  Does he s ta rt to rea lise  how d ir '- ic u lt  to negotiate that would oe.' He hates the Plan 
cesoite the 'a c t that he nas gone along w ith i t  - No ootion. Chairman like s  i t .  re is now saying that IS D iv is ion  -ust do 
service planning. He was going on acout H.O. ins truc tions  to spend cash on sc ien ti f ic  ecuionent in a p a rt ic u la r -anner.
Fuelleo oy Barry who is  not exoert at any of these things.
173 : £117 : 12.5.73 I an going round in smaller and smaller c irc le s  at present. Here are so-e reasons:-
(a) No accepted ro le  fo r Hanagsnent Services (b) RTO -ess jo (c) Irresoonsicle  way in wnich Payroll is being run
( d) ,'leeu to feed cack to Tony Peers
150 : £113 : 15.5.78 For some ood reason which I do not understand, Henry has cecone reasonaoly co-ooerative over the new
Computer Centre. He nas twisted the aporoacn so as to detach the case fo r the Centre fron the case fo r the reolace.ment
machine. I t  s c lear tnat he thinks that th is  avoids a major set to w ith the RHA, which, despite i ts  necessity is pound to
go fo r the new machine. I can see that Henry has played an "Ace" but I am not sure whether he is deceiving h in s e lf or not.
I cannot believe that he th inks that the A u thority , especia lly the Chairman, w il l  accept th is  argu.ment. Co why is he 
suddenly calm?
SI : £119 : 15.5.73 Another fascinating ins igh t is that he wants a tr ic k  to so rt out fu ture financing o f computing.
Negotiation w ith Areas over Strategy have shown him that they w il l  not cough up s ta ff .  And so he argues that our presentation
is a ll  wrong. AA's don 't unaerstand the issue - or so he claims or ra tio n a lis e s . He hates the argument that R ju s t takes i t  
“o f f  the top" -  i t s  against his p ub lic ly  declared p rin c ip le s  and p rac tice . Front stage s tu ff .  Yet he admits and declares in 
p riva te  tha t the RHA could and w il l  do i t  - i f  necessary. But he says -"Go away Graham and try  to th ink o f a way round i t " .
And i f  I do, he w il l  be very g ra te fu l.
182 : £120 : 15.5.78 He also does not l ik e  tbe C lien t Groups. Because they are uni d is c ip lin e . Yet he has declared p u b lica lly  
that he does not want a Steering Committee. Again h is public face is at stake. So he comes up w ith new names fo r Grouos 
borrowed from another friend .
183 : £121 : 17.5.78 Paul from the Mental Handicap research team came to ta lk  Moni ta ring  today. He has got a research man's
a ttitu d e s  through and througn. But I th ink that he mignt devise and design a gooa Progra.mme. I must try  to support and ta lk
to him. But dear old Ralph succeeded in confusing many issues by ta lk in g  aoout an e p id e m io lo g ica l/s ta tis tica l approacn wnich
is not on when you are ta lk ing  about 2CG0 s tr ik in g ly  d iss im ila r cases in the Region.
184 : £122 : 17.5.78 A most incred ib le  thing happened at JCG today. When confronted oy s ta f f ,  Henry said tha t he had no 
idea that accommodation at the Computer Centre was such a major problem. We (HA and I)  must have had 5/7 meetings w ith him.
I must have a dozen memos to him an my f i le  plus three possible so lu tions . Two Questions. is i t  re a lly  true that I fa i l  to
communicate to th is  extent? How can he do that to me in public?
185 : £123 : 17.5.78 By his interference in Nat.Sys, Henry has created a completely uncontrolled s itu a tio n . On 31st May 
RA on Policy Committee and Henry are meeting senior o ffic e rs  "to  tes t* fJHS "committment to Nat.Sys.". Formerly we have been 
through a ll  the hoops to get that cocmittment. There are mavericks around and jokers in the pack. And Henry Jacques has
given these guys a national stage on which to perform. He must be naive to th ink that there is  some s p ir i t  o f tru th ’, honesty
and pub lic  school v ir tu e  f i l l i n g  the whole beings o f alj^ o f his adm in is tra tive  colleagues which w il l  ensure tha t tru th  p reva ils .
186 ; £124 : 17.5.78 fle il Moore (HO) raised at Nat.Sys the fac t tha t Region 6  are now ra is in g  the whole business at Chairman 
le v e l. Region 5 competed fo r Nat.Sys and we won. They have not got a standard system nor do they run SPS e tc . They are 
parading under a "'Taste o f Public Money* banner.
187 : £125 : 21.5.78 Martin W illiam 's reaction to Planning in 1978 The background to th is  paper is that Henry Jacques has 
imposed on Avon a method o f planning which appeals to h is  log ica l mind. In Region 2, Martin carried out another type of 
planning which was altogether d if fe re n t. He has been used to ge tting  r ig h t -down to the " n i t ty  g r it ty *  o f deta iled planning 
and being able to specify p recise ly what goes into  every hosp ita l, every room, e tc , etc. M artin 's  planning has been a typ ical 
theoresque type in te rven tion  in the development o f the service. Martin believes that he knows what is r ig h t .  On the other 
hand, Henry has provided in the Regional Plan, a p a rt ic u la r framework fo r the development o f the services.
188 : The real po in t o f th is  note is  to record the fa c t that at lunch time in HQ, Martin came and sat by me. I was alone,
although there were various people sat at other tab les. Martin came and a fte r a few n ice ties  obviously started ge tting  on his
hobby horse about the way Management Services should be acting in re la tio n  to plans, e tc . He drew himself up to h is  fu l l  
height in the ch a ir, he out on his sort o f hurt grinny type look. He put on his preaching voice and refused to l is te n  to 
anything I said. From his side there were various lectures on the theore tica l nature of the Plan and i t ' s  lack o f d e ta il,  e tc.
I said to him fo rc e fu lly  that I did what the RTO to ld  me to do. I f  he wanted i t  changed -  change i t . '  The s itu a tio n  was one 
in which he was not lis te n in g  to a word 1 said. He was jus t try in g  to get o f f  his chest h is  frustra tion. Now we are hell 
bent on grumbling, grumbling, grumbling.
189 : £125 : 21.5.78 I did not go to the Planning Committee w h ic h is  a Member Comm, which considers a ll aspects o f planning.
I am to ld  that a t tha t meeting Martin sat there 'g r in n in g  lik e  a Cheshire cat* when various members made comments about the 
theore tica l nature o f the plan. He completely ignored a ll  o f the other Members who said that th is  was the type of framework 
which allowed them to consider s tra te g ic  a lte rn a tive s . I t  is  a fa c t tha t at both the previous meetings of the RTO and in the 
Committee i t s e l f ,  M artin , despite h is senior pos ition  in the organisation, has not intervened to change the method o f planning 
in  Avon. To the best o f ay knowledge he has not even objected to i t .
190 ; £127 : 23.5.78 1 have supplied Henry w ith comments on the R i  0 Computer Strategy which he has elaborated into the
Regional comment. He has drafted h a lf a dozen more comments. Perhaps he is  co rrec t.
191 : £128 : 23.5.78 Martin collared me fo r one hour th is  morning on an intensive care u n it computer for Eastbury. The 
£17000 computer had slipped througn on the equipment l i s t  for the new hosp ita l. H.O. had approved i t .  Region not having 
noticed i t  on the way through. RSO picked i t  up second time through, re fe rred  i t  to Tony, got i t  stuck in Computer po licy 
and delayed everyth ing. The Consultant is  not pleased. Martin said " I t ' s  my judgement that counts and th a t's  th a t" . Ana 
yet in the next minute he acknowledges that he does not know how to make tha t judgement.
192 : £129 : 23.5.78 I now have major problems w ith computing s tra tegy. I Jo not tru s t Tony's judgement. I th ink that he
does not manage hard enough. Henry is in s is tin g  on re w ritin g  i t ,  to what end?
193 : £130 : 23.5.78 I am due to see Henry about my s ta f f  assessment, I have got major problems.
(a) He Jo not communicate e ffe c tiv e ly , e.g. Natsvs. resources, H innall cu ild ing
(b) Certain major nrojects 'o r  Henry, e.g. policy ana strategy seem to be l is d ire c 'e o
(c) I do not know in s tra te g ic  terms wnat Henry wishes to do or what h is v is ion  o f management services is
ro) I cannot get a sansioie oasis ror coing worx estaoiisnea in tne Region
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13A : E l 21 : 2 5 . 5 , 73 At the end o f  the m e e t i n g ,  Henrv  in  a gooJ -ood w i t h  two l a r g e  g i n s  to he in  th i n g s  a lo n g ,  I asxea him -'or
"wo sta f -^  H.O. wants  to g i v e  us .  "Hao 1 got room -  7es.  C u t s i J e  c o n t r o l ?  Yes .  F in e  Graham". I . a s  on too o f  th,at one.
.host e x t r a o r d i n a r y .  I hao o r e d i c t e a  v as t  o ro o le m s .
135 : E l 32 ; 2 5 . 5 . 7 8  D u r i n g  the  week F re da  S l - n  cane to v i s i t  us.  She went ro und a l l  the o f f i c e s .  I t  was a v e r y  good a i t  
o f  F. .R. A f t e r  t h a t ,  , ° e t e r  ana I agreed a s e t  o f  o r o j e c t s  w i t h  her a.na I in te .nd to launcn  them w n i l e  henry  is  a c roa d .
155 : El 33 : 2 5 . 5 . 7 8  I took the  s t a f f  o u t  to the ouo. hy image needed to oe r e s t o r e d  a b i t .  I t  was my o i r t h c a y  do ana 
went ve ry  w e l l  in d e e d .
137 : E13A : 25.5.73 A meeting with Henry Jacoues to discuss National committment to the Natsys.
138 : henry Jacques ana Luke Downs sat oooosite each other at the end o f a long tao le . Gi f f  a.na Dorothy sat aooosite each
other across the tao le . Lee Ross sat next to Henry. Myself sat next to He.nry. Tony sat between Gi f f  and Lee.
139 ; I f  you w il l  re fe r to my d ia ry, you w il l  find that over the la s t "ew weeks Henry has Been getting  more and more concerned 
aoout commitment to and finances for Natsys p ro je c t. He went up to the RAs la s t week w ith a most extraordinary idea that they 
should contribute to the cost of Natsys, despite the fac t that they were already making vast contribu tions to the cost o f other 
standard systems. The log ic  o f Henry's position  cannot oe denied, i .e .  that people should pay for the things to which they are
committed and which other people are producing for them but i t  is  a complete c.hange in the ru les .
200 : I t  has now become quite clear that h is main concern is that he cannot get the whole cost through the RHA. ,4e does not
seem to th ink that however he dresses i t  up. Chairman w il l  go along w ith th is  p ro je c t. Perhaps he is r ig h t .  He went through 
once again a ll  o f the various ways in which the Natsys p ro jec t has been designed. Dorothy has now co.me o f f  her statement that
in fac t the Natsys II p ro ject is not what she requires and has gone on to another tack - namely, that there are a set of
p r io r i t ie s  in Natsys which determine the way in which i t  should be produced. This is a much more reasonable a ttitu d e . During 
the meeting G iff  was exercising a ll the s k i l ls  that he could to try  and summarise the conclusions o f the meeting from time to 
time.
201 : During the meeting, Luke made the very fo rce fu l point that Avon was going to be worse o f f  as a re s u lt o f Henry's 
in te rven tion , which is undoubtedly true. On several occasions out came .Henry's ourish log ic  and said that he did not mind th is  
'a c t i f  ju s tice  were being done and that i t  were bette r for people l ik e  the Chairman and the RHA to see the real costs.
Gi f f  and I both made the point strongly that in order to make a ra tion a l decision, one had to assume that a ll  o f the people at
the meeting that was being ca lled next week by Henry, did know what Natsys was about. I t  was pointed out tha t despite the fact
that they had been in  on Natsys and tha t one of th e ir o ffic e rs  had lia ised  c losely with Dorothy that th is  was a most un like ly  
state o f a f fa ir s .  So Henry eventually agreed that the meeting should be prefaced by a short statement o f the benefits o f 
Natsys and the way in wnich I t  would perform its  functions. Henry more or lass ins is ted  that at the end o f the day, whether 
at the meeting or whether afterwards by post, a ll  o f the Regions should commit themselves to a £10,300 contribu tion  to make up 
the cost o f Natsys.
202 : During the meeting, various extra ordinary suggestions were made as to the way in which Natsys could be managed and 
produced in the NHS. These ranged from people lending us systems designers and programmers which we know they do not possess, 
to oeoole using th e ir  own s ta ff  in th e ir  own Region w ith Tony try ing  to co-ordinate a ll o f th e ir work. The p o s s ib i li ty  of
ge tting  anything done in arrangements lik e  the la t te r  is  n eg lig ib le , while in the former -  considering that we are the best o f f
Region for s ta f f  at the moment, there is no hope of people g iving us s ta f f .
203 : During the meeting, Henry Jacques tested out strongly whether or not th is  system was the system that people actua lly  
wanted. This was despite the fa c t that people had explained to him the ways in which th is  system had been designed. I t  was 
also despite the fa c t tha t people had explained to him that Dorothy had au thority  to put in and to take out whatever she wanted.
204 : One o f the most important parts o f the meeting was an interchange on the a v a ila b il ity  o f the standard payro ll system.
At the end o f the day, no one would stand up to Tony when he said that he did not require  a working standard payro ll system u n t il 
the middle o f next year. He also stated ca tegorica lly  that the timetable would only s lip  by three months which is extraord inary. 
'Te s t i l l  have not got accommodation for these extra s ta f f  and the recruitm ent o f i t  w il l  be very d i f f i c u l t .  Luke and Lee would 
not move from th e ir  pos ition  that the Natsys payro ll system could not be implemented ea rly . I ins is ted  tha t Tony should consider 
whether or not resources could be brought in early to get a t r ia l  payro ll system working sooner. I ins is ted  on estab lish ing  at
the meeting that whatever Tony said, i t  would be advantageous to do th is  fo r everyone concerned. I t  did not go down at a ll well
when Henry discovered through the meeting that he did not yet know what the to ta l commitment for payro ll was and that people 
were pu tting  up the estimates o f the manpower required d a ily , such as an extra  15 per cent required at the D is t r ic t  le v e l. I 
sympathise a lo t  w ith  Henry on th is  p a rt ic u la r aspect o f the problem. I do not th ink tha t anyone has put forward even a guess 
of what resources would be required. This is  appalling.
205 ; The d isp lay o f a ttitu d e s  and s k i l ls  at the meeting was very in te re s tin g . Tony looked as i f  he was cheesed o f f  most o f 
the time. He came back exceedingly strongly as he is  won't to do on frequent occasions, using his pos ition  o f technical 
au th o rity . I t  is  a very unfortunate stance because I am quite sure tha t he loses Henry's sympathy by doing i t .  Gi f f  on 
occasions got qu ite  cross w ith Dorothy. His main contribu tion  was to exercise many o f h is group s k i l ls  including summarising 
the conversation at various po in ts. I an sure tha t Henry got up Tony's nose when he kept saying "Let me play th is  back to you 
to make sure tha t I understand". I f  anything, Luke was re a lly  quite sensible about the wisdom o f doing the th ing at a ll  but he 
got nowhere w ith  Henry. Henry was obviously determined to override Luke come what may. Dorothy was very contro lled  fo r 
Dorothy. We only had two outbursts which were quickly contro lled  and put out by G if f .  Perhaps he had said tha t he was going 
to do th is  to her beforehand - I do not know. My main contribu tions were to try  and bring out important points to make quite 
sure that they had gone home to Henry.. In a sense th is  was complementing G if t 's  a c t iv ity .  Lee had various excursions into 
using his old professional expertise but on the whole he kept to his own f ie ld .
206 ; The meeting as a whole was a very orderly a f fa ir .  I t  was quite c lear that G if f ,  Tony and myself did not agree with what
Henry was try in g  to do. i t  was also quite clear that Henry was not going to pay any a tten tion  to that and tha t he was determined
to go througn w ith i t .  Everyone played the meeting coolly  and lo g ic a lly . Henry ins is ted  at the end that he was going to have
an orderly  meeting in  London th is  week and that he was quite hopeful that he would come back with a ll  the Regions' agreeing to
cough up the money. I do not believe th is . Unless he has got some inside information and unless the RAs agree to co-operate
in a way which they have never done before, th is  jus t is  not going to happen.
207 : E l35 : 4.5.73 Another important issue is ra is ing  i ts  head, namely Henry's national report on 'Recruitment and T ra in ing '.
I have o ic ta ted  a long memo on th is  on the Deoart.mentai Heads meeting.
208 ; I am genuinely concerned that i-lSOs should be treated as second class adm in istra tors.
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239 : E123 ; 5 . 5 . ' 9  7ha Henry Jacques O b j e c t i v e s  M e e t i n g  o r  5 June 1973
210 : D o m e s t ic  S e r v i c e s  M o n i t o r i n g .  I r a i s e d  w i t h  Henry the o roolem s  o f  in o u t i n g  the neces s ary  t r a i n i n g  to  tne lower  l e v e l s  
o f  nanagsment ' o r  t h i s  e x e r c i s e .  G i f f  s t a t e i  t h a t  the S a l t a n  ja . -ooree  caul  J o r e s e n :  ' a i o r  oroolems  and t h a t  ha .o u  I t  o r e ' e r  
to p i c k  o f f  tne Union t r o u o l e s  a t  Newton ano p o s s i b l y  e l s ew he re  in  a none s t r u c t u r e d  way. ! oust  g e t  P e t e r  to see G i f f  aoout  
t h e s e .  The o a s i c  p roblem  is  t h a t  we s t i l l  have not  g o t  over  the  s i t u a t i o n  in  wnich ro n i  t o n i n g  is  re g a r d e d  as baa news.
211 ; Henry  m ent ioned  a p ap er  by K l e i n  on 'The C o n t r o l  o f  the NHS' which  I must o c t a i n .
212 ; G i f f  r e o o r t e o  on o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  r e v i e w s .  P o s s i b l y  o t h e r  p eo o l e  a re  ve ry  t i g h t  about  not  s ee in g  r e p o r t s  which ment ioneo
them p e r s o n a l l y  b e f o r e  a whole o t h e r  s e c t i o n  sees t h a t  r e o o r t .  I c annot  ne Ip  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  I a gree  w i t n  Alwyn James.
lie t a l k e d  a oout  the  s i z e  o f  an OR team. Henry  i s  now la t c h e d  onto  the ' a c t  t n a t  we neeo a p o l i c y  fo r  OR.' The c e n t r a l  p r o d e m
i s ,  as i n  the case o f  c o m p u t ers ,  to o e c id e  p r i o r i t i e s .  One o f  the f i r s t  OR p r o j e c t s  which  we m ig nt  c o n s i d e r  i s  how to
s t r u c t u r e  the p r i o r i t y  problem in  the NHS. I need to c o n s i d e r  w h e th er  I g e t  to g e t h e r  w i t h  P e t e r  to w r i t e  a paper  a bout  wnat
OR can d o .  Henry  i s  s t i l l  keen on u s in g  the p l a n  fo rm a t  fo r  e v e r y t h i n g .
213 ; £137 : 5.5.78 I must t a l k  to V a l t e r  Arne a oout  the S an a tor iu m  and the i n t e r i m  accommodation p ro o le m .
214 : £138 : 5.5.78 Henry stated ca tegorica lly  that the 'Vest and East computers could only go ahead i f  they coughed uo the
s ta ff  to run and develop them. In order to make a case fo r them, i t  would be necessary to submit the fu l l  range of
app lications on that machine to the RTO, together with our comments on them before going ahead. I need to ask Tony once again
to so rt out what he must buy with the allocated monies.
215 : This morning we had the long expected ta lk  between Tony, Peter, Simon and myself on the problems o f the in terface  oetween 
the various departments. These have come about because Peter continua lly  works on systems. He not only creates them but 
people come to him when they ought to go to Tony. Over the la s t few months Peter has been approached by Dr J in Southtown.
DCJ has talked to Peter about trans fe rring  A I E  systems into  Avon from other places. At the same time, OCJ has raised the 
same issue at the Computer Steering Committee at D is t r ic t .  This sort of benaviour is  another example of spray management such 
as Martin uses. In th is  p a rticu la r case, I th ink that DCJ and Dr J comoine to produce th is  type of e ffec t a ll over the place. 
Of course Tony's people get annoyed about th is  because they regard Peter as trampling on th e ir preserve. At the same time,
they do not recognise th e ir  own lim ita tio n s  asceing one o f the main reasons why people w il l  p e rs is t in going to Peter.
215 ; Another part o f th is  problem is the in terface  between Peter and Simon. Simon regards himself as being a s ta t is t ic ia n  
and although he behaves in  a very p u ris t manner, takes offence when other peoole do .management jobs which he can lay claim to. 
Examples o f th is  are work which Peter has done on nursing and the work which he has done on monitoring cars groups. Simon 
has got some cause fo r concern because some of Peter's use of data is  a b i t  rough and ready. On the other hand, Simon gets 
things done.
217 ; The meeting was in te re s tin g  becuase i t  was gentle. Ve agreed that there should be another section in the monthly 
•management meeting in which we try  to review a ll  o f the p ro ject work which we are doing. At that meeting we could a llocate 
tasks to p a rt ic u la r  departments and determine the contribu tion  which would be expected from everyone. Ve agreed that Peter 
must be p a r t ic u la r ly  carefu l about operating ins truc tio n s  fo r h is systems and that he must obey the standards which Tony has 
set in computer se rv ice s .. The d i f f ic u l t y  re a lly  arises when an experimental system o f Peter's becomes operational and actua lly  
works. There is  a d i f f ic u l t y  here because there is no doubt that during a fast development by Peter, things can be done in a 
ra ther unsystemnatic way in  order to save time. 8 u t the need to experiment in th is  way is v ita l and I cannot possibly in h ib it  
th is . I t  was in te re s tin g  to see them a ll  working together. Simon was sat in the .middle o f them obviously uneasy at various 
times but nevertheless at the and o f the day acknowledging that he had no real cause for concern unless he could make a much 
more suostantla l case.
218 : £140 : 5.5.78 As a re s u lt o f Henry's v is i t  to London w ith G if f  and Dorothy about Natsys, Dorothy is now preparing a
paper fo r the RTO. A very peculiar circumstance has occurred in which Henry has a rb it r a r i ly  decided that he is w il l in g  to
ask the RTO fo r another £10,000. At the meeting in London, Henry did not obtain any commitment in cash to Natsys, although 
he did es tao lish  c le a rly  tha t a ll but one o f the Regions were committed to the whole o f i t .  The other in te re s tin g  thing was 
that the timescale during which they would require Natsys was fa i r ly  elongated. 'Ve have now entered into a bargaining position  
on resources. Henry seems to think tha t Head O ffice  w il l  cough up much .more money than they have been prepared to h ith e rto .
I th ink that he is  kidding him self. Henry also seems to think that by the end of the year other Regions w i l l  have agreed to
pay considerably more o f the b i l l .  This means that whoever foots the b i l l  would then form an inner ring  o f Regions to control
the development o f Natsys which might well be a good th ing . I was a b i t  rough w ith Dorothy who had w ritte n  a very ordinary 
paper fo r the RTO in  which she had seemingly camouflaged the consequences o f what they were doing and the re su lts  which they 
could expect to obtain from the various options which she lis te d . Eventually she agreed to th is  and a c tua lly  came back la te r 
in the day w ith  a re -w ritte n  much clearer version o f i t .  I took the wise step o f going to ta lk .to  HM and he has agreed that
he w il l  ta lk  to Dorothy tomorrow morning and so we are once again in a quite complex Natsys s itu a tio n .
219 : £141 ; 5.5.78 In the afternoon, Henry carried out an assessment o f .me. This was cut short by the Chairman who
interrup ted  us at s ix  o 'c lo ck . Henry was v is ib ly  embarrassed at not being able to complete th is  but I cannot see i t  being 
done now.
220 : £142 : 10.6.78 Dorothy has obtained £10,000 fo r Natsys and is now fid d lin g  the books to buy three s ta f f  w ith i t .
Va lter is  now going out to commercial property for 2,500 s q .f t .  Henry has le f t  fo r the States. Cor, stone the crows.'!
Dorothy put on her fas t ta lk in g , get things done face. A ll I've  got to do is approve i t  a l l !
221 : £143 : 10.6.78 An important random thought occurs to me. Henry states that tie Chairman is  allowed two bees in his
bonnet per year - cu rren tly  flu o rid e  and abortion.
222 : £144 : 10.5.78 I have had a quiet day today working at my own p ro jec ts . In J Enoch Powell's "Medicine and P o lit ic s *
I have been struck by two sets o f statements along the lines (a) the health demand and fee ling  o f " r ig h t"  by the public
is ir ra t io n a l and lud icrous and b iza rre , (b) The service denegration by i ts  own employees is unique, aosolutely inev itab le  
and to ta l ly  s e lf-d e s tru c tiv e .
223 : Equally i t  is  fasc ina ting  to note that Powell says that Health employees always ta lk  to M inisters and P o lit ic ia n s  about 
lack of cash and never about how well something has been done.
224 ; £145, £146 : 19.5.78 I spent most o f the day qu ie tly  working. Although I cleared two i.moortant issues.
( a )  I t r a n s a c t e d  a d ea l  w i t h  G i f f  t h a t  he would  e x p l o r e  w i th  SG the  use o f  G ar ry  K ing as a h a l f - t i m e  t r a i n e r .  The snag is
we b e a r  the  c o s t .  out  G a r ry  King does n o th in g  f o r  us even now. But  the f a c t  is  t h a t  he c o s ts  us a bono by b e in g  an
i n e f f e c t i v e  top manager .  He i s  so h ig h  uo the l e a d e r  t h a t  even l e n a i n g  him to someone is  d i f f i c u l t .
Tb) I ta lked to C olin Moss and Valter aoout extending my secretary 's job. I need to do a deal w ith Ralph f i r s t .
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225 ; E U 7  : 1 9 . 5 . 7 3  The main e v e n t  was an argument w i t h  G i f t '  and V a l t e r a a o u t  accam.moaat ion.  Gi ' '  oushea nard  to squeeze  the  
s t a f f  i n t o  a se t  o f  n o le s  a l l  o ver  tne o l a c e .  "The RHA w o n ' t  a cc so t  the  case -  u n le s s  i t ' s  u a t e r t i g n :  -  as i - they a re  ever
t h a t  c r i t i c a l . "  I f o ug h t  l i k e  a c a t .  M 'a l ter  Arne c a - e  cown on my s i  oe -  a f t e r  the e v e n t .  -'e la c x s  tne  gu ts  to t a x e  an
i n a g i n a t i / e  d e c i s i o n .  me does not  see t h a t  tne s e c o n a - i  n - l  i nes are -  a t  the enJ o r  the aay -  the p eo o l e  wno d r i v e  th in g s  
t h ro ug h .
22d ; E lv 3  : 2 1 . 3 . 7 8  Tony went to see F ree  a S i m  -  a f t e r  consi  c e r a c l e  di  f ' i c u l  ty  in  a r r a n g i n g  a m e e t i n g .  Tony o la n n e d  to 
j .moort a nurse a l l o c a t i o n  system i n t o  E a s to u r y  w i t h o u t  F r e o a 's  o a c x i n q .  I had to more or l e s s  p i t c h  Tony i n t o  n er  noon.
Tony ooened "Good v i s i t "  -  h i s  s ta n d a r d  open ing  -  th e n ,  " F re o a  was a n t i  a t  ' i r s t  c u t  cane r o u n a " .  I do no t  t h i n k  t h a t  Tony
can get  below s u r f a c e  o u t s i J e  hi  s narrow f i e l d .  Tony i s  good w i t n  o e o o le  so I would n o t  oe s u r o r i  sed i f  he were s u c c e s s f u l .
I Chal lenged  him on G ar th  B o l e s .  "But you must re re mcer h e ' s  a o a t c n a lo r  -  m o b i l e ,  d i f f e r e n t  from u s " .
227 ; El 49 : 21 . 5. 78 D o r o t h y  has w r i t t e n  y e t  a n o t h e r  ■‘ o o l i s n  memo to Tony r e .  h i s  con.mi t t m e n t  to Head O f f i c e  s t a t s  ana
N a t . s y s  i n  Avon. I h i t  the  r o o f  w i t h  G i f f  and he agreed t h a t  D o r o t h y  was s t u p i d  s o n e t im e .  Honour r e s t o r e d . '  By d e s i g n ? !
228 : E15Û : 21.5.78 Sometime ago Head O ffice allowed Regions to out payro ll computer s ta f f  up the scale. Now having
persuaoed our people that i t  was not r ig h t,  are the only people out of lin e  in the coun try .. A ll he ll could break out soon.
G if f  does not even know about the Head O ffice le t te r !  One Region is being sued. What p rice fa irness!
229 ; E151 : 21.5.73 I spent the whole day try in g  to avoid re w ritin g  the Gomputer Strategy.
230 : E152 ; 21.5.78 I also decided to sort out my secretary 's job.
231 : E153 : 21.5.78 Myth: A genuine use of a ayth occurred w ith Ralph and computing in laoora to ries. Ralton have been
bought o f f  by Barry Hunt w ith a £3,000 peak-picking m ini. Raloh came in w ith "9ut what about Patient Care at Ralton?"
He genuinely thought that th is  should carry weight w ith me and de flec t ay course of action - forget p ra c t ic a l ity ,  etc.
Of course, buying o f f  Ralton is pure p o lit ic k in g  - or so Barry sees i t .
232 : E l54 : 22.6.73 Equipment Group. I was inv ited  to th is  meeting to introduce the working papers on planning and a paoer
by Barry on computing.
233 : The f i r s t  squabble occurred when the Minutes o f the las t meeting were reviewed. The Committee had given some advice on
where p a rticu la r sorts of equipment could be put in smaller hospita ls and low and behold Barry was negotia ting to out i t  into 
Forest. There are loads of these hospita ls around and i t  is  quite clear that the boys want to conserve the cap ita l fo r th e ir
main departments in the OGHs. PI opened up w ith a barrage to the e ffe c t that is  the Region going to take the advice of th is
Committee or not or are we a ll wasting our time? Why is not Or William here? - he should be. (Martin and Luke arrived h a lf 
an hour la te ) . There was a real show o f medical power with Barry taking major s tick  In the aosence of M artin. P2 eventually 
joined in and defended the Regional pos ition , poin ting  out that the RHA could not possibly commit themselves to taking 
everyone's advice a ll o f the time. In fa c t Barry did not say a word in defence except to say that no las tin g  decision
had been taken. Eventually i t  was agreed to minute as "The Region would take note of the Committee's comments". Several 
consultants joined in to the e ffe c t that they did not intend to waste th e ir  time unless the advice were taken.
234 : An in te res ting  paoer on X2 was next on the Agenda. I t  was fasc ina ting  to hear the way in wnich the paoer had been
drafted. A ll o f the recommendations were p os itive . There ware never any suggestions that X2 would be encouraged - resources 
perm itting . Martin came in during th is  paper. A myth remark from P2 was that no one would quibble w ith the fact that patien t
care would be enhanced by X2. The Chairman threw in several remarks which backed some o f the more outrageous claims by opening
up *1 am sure that you w il l  accept". There is not a flin c h  at the way in which the reoort was drafted u n t il in fact Martin 
started watering the th ing down by suggesting that the D is t r ic t  "might give favourable consideration to " ra ther than "accord 
p r io r i ty  to ". As he pointed out -  " p r io r ity  over what?". A fasc ina ting  poin t about the document was tha t despite the fact 
tha t i t  had bean drafted in such powerful persuasive language, they s t i l l  had not noticed that they had put in  two paragraphs
3 and that there was a general jumble about the arrangement o f the paper.
235:: We then'got onto the laboratory computing which Barry introduced. I joined in  much more on th is  one. I spent quite
a b i t  o f the session correcting misleading comments by JJ. He gave one impression of the Avon produced laboratory system 
which suggested that i t  did not work - I immediately corrected him by saying tha t although working to sp ec ifica tio n  i t  did not 
meet current requirements. JJ claimed that ha was going to transfe r in a system -  I immediately countered saying that we would
attempt to transfe r in taking into  account that th is  was d i f f i c u l t  and had not been done before. They talked about the
Northern system and I had to poin t out tha t North were putting  in major changes. JJ stated ihat the System 2 was fu l ly  
documented -  I stated that no one had examined the documentation o f System 2 and so on. I spent quite a lo t  o f time picking
up the l i t t l e  points tha t they were ju s t dropping here and there but I was very careful indeed to give c re d it where i t  was due.
At the end o f the discussion we were congratulated on having produced a paoer which was short and to the po in t.
236 : Going back to the X2 paper, i t  was fascina ting  to note that Martin put in several minor d ra ftin g  amendments which I am
sure could be made q u ie tly  outside the Committee. I t  is  typ ical o f the man that he niggles about things l ik e  tha t.
237 : I go t  some s t i c k  on the  p la n n i n g  p a p e r s .  S e v e ra l  o f  th e  c o n s u l t a n t s .  D r  X  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  c r i t i c i s e d  many o f  the
s t a t e m e n t s  and i i e r e  was no doubt  t h a t  they  a re  p o l i t i c a l l y  i n e p t .  I had to  d e fen d  by s a y in g  t h a t  these  were  w o r k i n g  pap ers
and t h a t  the Commit tee  had asked to be k e p t  in fo rm ed  and t h a t  th e y  c ou ld  n o t  e x p e c t  s p e c i a l  p a o ers  to be w r i t t e n  f o r  them.
I tr ie d  to put things in context f i r s t  o f a l l .  I do not know tha t i t  did an awful lo t  o f good. The Chairman got ra ther
im patient. I t  was a thoroughly foo lish  move to take papers l ik e  that but there is not any clear a lte rn a tive .
238 : Going back to the f i r s t  item, I have got several choice comments to record. Dr NM used prhases lik e : "a gross breach 
o f the advice* when he was ta lk in g  about Forest. The Chairman said " I w il l  have to take up the status o f our advice with Or
W illiam ". JJ said "We ought to take steps to monitor the use o f our p o lic y *. (Note: not the RHA). The Chairman said "No
doubt memoers w il l  maintain a watching b r ie f  of th e ir Areas o f concern*. Barry said " I might add that your p o lic ie s  are 
brought to the a tten tion  of the planners at regular in te rva ls * . The Chairman said "Please note that in the planning tim etable, 
we were not included*. Barry said "RMG apologises for th is  ornmission*. An in te re s tin g  sat o f comments from Dr NM: *'We
consider that 'X ' is  su itab le . I t  is  not necessary to provide 'Y '* .  We use phrases lik e : " 'X ' w il l  re qu ire ". We orandish
statements l ik e : "The radiology legal requirements*. Dr JC did not hesita te  to make clear that he was the Secretary o f a 
National Working Party on X2. For X2, members said tha t the evidence was overwhelming. NM uses phrases lik e  " I t  is  a question
o f pa tien t care which is being improved and not a question o f the costs being kept down*. This is another example o f the use
o f a myth to push forward an unreasonable and uneconomic course o f action.
239 : In the middle o f the X2 discussion, i t  appeared that a Heaa O ffice  reoort poooed out o f nownere. No one had seen i t ,  
everyone tnougnt i t  existed, people were quite c r i t ic a l  of i t  and thougnt that i t  could not possibly be a good one and so on.
?iO : I need to c o n s i d e r  c a r e f u l I v  a mvth to do w i t h  m edica l  power as shown in  Com m it te es .  I t  does not  f e a t u r e  in  any o f  my
t h o u g h t s .
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2+1 : E155 : 2 5 . 5 x 8  I was c a l l e d  to see ' l a r t ' n  t h i s  s o r r i n g  as a n a t t e r  o f  some u rg e n c y .  Then I g o t  t h e r e  in  ' a c t  i t  was a
c o m o l e t e l y  u nu rg en t  n a t t e r  concerned w i t h  the o o l i c y  oaosrs  o r  the C o n n i t t e e  on C o n o u te r s .  In - a c t  i t  was v e r y  kin's o - h in  to
t h i n k  t n a t  t h i s  would se u s e f u l  to r e .  The pao ers  have ceen s i + o l y  s i t t i n g  around in  n i s o f f i c e  and cou ld  have seen very
u s e f u l  to Tony and s y s e i f .  He was v e r y  soncernea  asout  the f a c t  t h a t  I snould  not r e a d  a n y t h i n g  t h a t  was g e n u i n e l y
c o n f i d e n t i a l  and t h a t  I should  a c t u a l l y  s e l e c t  i t  o u t  and r e t u r n  i t  to him. 1 agreed to so t h i s  and to send th e  p a o e r s  sacx 
to him in  any case.
242 ; 'We then got  onto the usual  t o p i c  o f  p l a n n i n g .  I t h i n k  t h a t  the guy has go t  a g enuine  c on ce rn  fo r  ny own w e l l  b e in g .
He uses phrases  "a  g rave  w arn ing  to n e " ,  " I  nave seen dragged i n t o  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h i s  y e a r " .  te is  " c oncerned  aso ut  the
r e a c t i o n  o f  the C o n s u l t a n t s  to  i t " .  There i s  no doubt w ha te v er  t h a t  he nas a case in  t h a t  th e  commitment o f  o eo p l e  to the
p l a n n i n g  methodology l e a v e s  a vary  g r e a t  deal to be d e s i r e d .  'What I found u t t e r l y  i n c r e d i b l e  was the f a c t  t h a t  he s t i l l  sees
n i m s e l f  as b e in g  i n c a o a o le  o f  s to o p in g  the show. Henry  i s  in  A m er ica  and y e t  M a r t i n  c annot  g e t  h i s  own way. The Pre ss
O f f i c e r  came in  a t  . t he  end o f  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  and I saw him a f t e r w a r d s .  He was u t t e r l y  amazed b u t  the o o i n t  about  re s p o n d in g
q u i c k l y  to M a r t i n  d e s p i t e  the  ' a c t  t h a t  i t  annoys me, is  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  i t  g e t s  me i n t o  h i s  room t a l k i n g  to him on my own te rm s .
243 ; cl56 : 27.5.78 I talked to Oavid Jones today about the Committee. He made some in te re s tin g  comments about 
"Normative Planning". Seemingly i t  was the to o lk it  o f the early 1960s. I t  was developed to a fine  a rt - even to the exment
o f having tabular representations to ca lcu late  what was "needed". Martin unoerstood that i ts  in lin e  w ith his "3 ib le " .
I t 's  a frigh ten ing  commentary on Martin -  not to have moved for the oast 15 years. And i t  figu res .
244 ; E l58 : 29.5.78 A Management Services D iv is ion  seminar occurred today in which Managers gave ta lks . My point in 
s ta rtin g  th is  note is to record d isqu iet which I feel continuously about Tony. In ta lk ing  about computing in the fu tu re , he
turned to the subject of high level leadership at RTO Level. And then compared i t  to outside which he claimed was re a lly
clued up. 3ut what is the purpose of saying these things to a large group?
245 : £159 ; 29.6.73 The Seminar i t s e l f  was a snambles. The shambles started when Simon and Raloh discovered that a meeting
o f CPCS meant that they had to give i t  a miss. Thursday is an RTO day and is subject to in te rru p tio n  by them. Peter got
dragged o f f  to ta lk  planning. Because of Simon (whose CPCS date got cancelled at the la s t minute) I "discussed" cancelling
the Seminar, found that the next possible date was September, and did not cancel. Stats Department thougnt i t  was cancelled, 
Tony's Managers went to th e ir  meeting, the room was big enough for twice the o rig ina l audience and got h a lf o f i t .  The 
discussions at the end were d isastrously n on -pa rtic ipa tive . So I had a "s tra ig h t"  discussion about the shambles w ith Heads
o f Department next day at the monthly meeting.
246 ; £160 : 29.6.78 Foolish ly I have not been recording our monthly meeting with any prec is ion  because I suppose that I am
p re tty  ashamed of them. I have restructured them and given them a formal structure to transform them in to  a work group. I
am having a major b l i t z  on the co-ord ination of work w ith in  the d iv is io n . The fact is  work patterns in th is  D iv is ion  have 
changed. More projects now corss Departmental boundaries with the re s u lt th a t, although the potentia l o f the D iv is ion  has 
increased, the opportunity for f r ic t io n  has also gone up as w e ll. So we have in s titu te d  a work review session at which to 
discuss the major work p ro ject and in the f i r s t  instance to have a major b l i t z  on those which require c la r if ic a t io n  now. In
fa c t we spent three quarters o f the morning exchanging information and ta lk in g  p o li t ic s .  3ut we did c lear the f i r s t  two p ro jects .
247 ; E l61 : 29.6.78 A couple o f major p o li t ic a l issues concern moving Garry Kay out o f h is too job in computing and getting  
him to do something more usefu l. The guy was appointed in panic by Henry in 1974 because Henry was convinced by some id io t 
tha t computing was about to fa l l  around his ears. I have sh ifted  out Bert Toombs and over the past three years have tr ie d  to 
make Garry e ffe c tiv e . I t  is  s ig n ific a n t tha t the Agenda item was "Use o f senior people in the D iv is io n ". Garry fancies
himself as an eduactor and to be fa ir ,  he might be quite good. He has taken a degree -  fo r which he deserves a lo t  o f praise.
His main fa u lt is  that he has not got d rive , cu tting  edge or something in that lin e . Everyone knew the Garry problem 
although su rp ris ing ly  Simon had not interpreted the agenda item c o rre c tly . .He agreed on a l i s t  o f tra in in g  packages and I 
have a mind to give him some general adm in istra tion to perform as w e ll. So I have re a lly  accepted the Garry problem onto
my own p la te .
248 : E l62 : 29.5.78 The content o f the p o l i t ic a l  part o f the Heads of Department was to the p o in t. I am in  the process of
stepping up the work drive in the D iv is ion . Having got objectives set fo r the year, I have moved to a work appraisal system
based on three monthly reviews in  depth as opposed to a monthly skate round every th ing . So despite d iscussion, minutes and 
memoranda, we coma up to the f i r s t  report and out come the excuses. The one genuine one is that the workload is so high that
s i t t in g  down w rit in g  reports is  a waste o f time. I do not believe tha t th is  is the case. They wanted me to forget the
June report but I said 'N o'. I have got to get d is c ip lin e  into work at a level which does not in h ib it  c re a t iv ity .
249 : E l63 : 29.6.78 I discussed P rivate and in confidence and Tony got the message r ig h t  away and brought i t  out in to  the 
open. Tony said "You're ta lk ing  about the Seminar and my ta lk  yesterday*. Simon took the po in t fa s t. 3ut Tony went on to 
say tha t he had th is  so rt o f open session/discussion w ith h is people and I f e l t  unhappy.' Now the reason fo r tha t is  tha t
fundamentally I do not th ink that Tony understands the nature o f the NHS or that h is basic entrepreneurial and d riv ing
a ttitu d e s  are in 'c o n f l ic t*  w ith what is  re a lly  e ffe c tiv e  and there are a ll sorts o f a ttitu d e s  and so on at the back o f that 
so rt o f remark.
250 : E l64 : 29.6.78 Another important topic is  ge tting  missed from th is  d ia ry . The re p lie s  to the R & D Computing 
Strategy le t te r  have gone to DHSS and so has the Technical Committee comment. Henry has sent in (w ith RTO approval seemedly) 
a s tinker o f a re p ly . Not from my poin t o f view but from the "adm in is tra tion* viewpoint. Other Regions have said "No" but 
most have said "Yes please*. I t  is  a to ta lly  incred ib le  s itu a tio n  ^  in the midst o f a ll  th is , the R 4 0 Committee is
calmly steering i ts  po licy  through. Now how do I take account o f th is  lo t  in my research?
251 : E155 : 3.7.78 Heads of D iv is ion  Meeting
252 ; The meeting started by people coming in la te , during which Oavid Jones and I started ta lk in g  about the 19 papers which 
have oeen produced by Peter and his team. David said that th is  was the best documented piece o f work which had been done.
Key in te res ting  set o f papers -  very valuable. Dead keen on the inventory o f stock plus the value system going from -.3  to
1.0 . He described the speed at which new p r in t outs could be obtained by grunt, grunt, grunt and there i t  was three seconds
la te r w ith everything changed. He re a lly  is incred ib ly  enthusiastic about what has been produced and we have a friend  for
l i f e  there.
253 : He reported on the fact that Martin was now having consideraole misgivings about th is  so rt o f thing and I suggested to
him tha t we must in v ite  Martin to use the model to feed in  his own thoughts. Various asides occurred concerning Martin and 
his reaction to th is  p a rticu la r work. I t  is  incred ib le  to note tnat David sees th is zocel as a d ire c t development of the 
investment and frameworks wnich he has been ta lk ing  aoout for years ano I suppose that in a sense th is  is so. As a means of
ma.King i t  .more dccepiaoie ;o nia i '  is increa io ly powerful.
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25+ : There were q u i t e  a b i t  o f  p o i i t i c i n q  kn o ck in g  around e s o e c i a l l y  on the  n e a i c a l  " r o n t .  I t  cecame q u i t e  ci e a r  t h a t  ia r  t i  n ' s
a d v i s e r s  hao oeen warning o f f  ' l a r t i n  V o n  Or C . P .  and the guy who aooeareo to nave power was Alan Don. T h is  was in  c o n n e c t i o n
w i t n  the c a o i t a l  p l a n n i n g  o c c to r  t h a t  M a r t i n  is  a f t e r .
255 ; There  a re  s e v e r a l  examples  o f  p la n n i n g  r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y .  The two whicn come to mino a re  tne argument which  I nao w i tn
D a v i d ' s  No. 2 a oout  the r o l e  o f  the  RTO in making d e c i s i o n s  aoout the  c o n p u t e r  c u d g e t .  E v e n t u a l l y  D av id  wanted the  extended  
'O '  c roup to nave an a d v i s i n g  t h i n k  on the a dv ic e  g iv e n  them oy the  new Computer S t e e r i n g  C om m it tee .  Cne i s  l e f t  w i t h  the  
oroole.P o f  w onder ing  j u s t  what p r i o r i t i e s  the RTO is  supposed to oe s o r t i n g  o u t .  I f  i t  i s  not between th i n g s  l i k e  R eg io na l
S e r v i c e s ,  R eg io na l  S c i e n t i f i c  e c u i o n e n t  and R eg io na l  Comput ing b u d g e ts .
255  ; There  was an i n t e r e s t i n g  s e s s i o n  in  wnicn D av id  r e p o r t e d  t h a t  the  RAs were g o ing  to d is c u s s  the  s t a f f i n g  and a c c e l e r a t e d  
growth  th ro ug h  the s c a l e s  o f  c on p u te r  men. I t  was a lm os t  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  D a v i d ' s  ' io. 2 snould  a b r e a c t  to t h i s  s u g g e s t io n ,  
rie used words l i k e  "a  s p e c i a l  p l e a d i n g "  in  a g i v e n  tone o f  v o ic e  and s udden ly  he was s e t  upon by a l l  the o t h e r s  who p o i n t e d  out  
t h a t  we c ou ld  not  a f f o r d  to lo s e  h i g n l y  t r a i n e d  peo p l e  o n l y  18 months a f t e r  j o i n i n g  the S e r v i c e  ana t h a t  a c c e l e r a t e d  deve lopm ent  
was a o s o l u t e l y  n ec es s ary  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  D av id  has got  the  i n t e r e s t i n g  g lo s s  on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  is s ue  t h a t  i t  i s  a t  
t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  in  t ime  and t h a t  as our s l a r i e s  move ahead o f  the p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  n e x t  t ime round the f a c i l i t y  should  not  
be used -  wnich  i s  a very  f a i r  p o i n t .
257 : During our review o f ob jectives, our work on the Mental Handicap came up. I t  would appear that one o f the Consultants 
is about to s ta r t w rit in g  to newspapers aoout some o f the issues which he fee ls have oeen overlooked in th is  p a rt ic u la r c r is is .
One of the main points being made at the meeting was the fact that i f  our own managers did decide to break ranks, then the whole 
thing was going to crumble about our fee t. Seemingly he is about to s ta r t w rit in g  to journa ls . Seing an indepdendent 
contracto r, there is next to nothing which the organisation can do to ac tua lly  stop him doing th is . On the report i t  appears 
that the Chairman is  s t i l l  agitated w ith North Area aoout doing nothing and he is now stymied unless he somehow seexs to act 
via the Authority lin e  to get something done. Of course he is absolutely r ig h t - North Area w il l  'd i I ly  d a lly ' and try  to pass 
the buck s tra ig h t up to the Region. The determination o f the Chairman to actua lly  do something on th is  issue w il l  appear -u ita  
soon and i t  w il l  be in te res ting  to see what tr ic k s  he gets uo to to use the system to h is advantage.
258 : Ve are now in an in te res ting  s itu a tio n  w ith Unions on the subject o f secure mental un its  o f which we have one in North
Area. and goings on at 'X ' are now saying that they cannot ex is t on mental illn e s s  s ites  but need to be taken o ff
them and maoe in some sense more secure - whatever that means. I t  is  a fasc ina ting  l i t t l e  b i t  o f pressure being place an the 
system by a m ilita n t union.
259 : E l6 6  : +.7.78 Tony did not turn up for one o f "my important* meetings and I was l iv id .  He came to my home and we sat
in the garden ta lk in g  over the problems. He sweetened me up in two seconds " I 'v e  been hijacked by Simon*. In fact althougn
I keep fe e ling  as i f  I'd  been had jus t a l i t t l e  too much, I cannot put my finger on anything. E ither Tony is more cleverer 
than I give him c re d it fo r , or I'm more stupid.
260 ; E l67 ; 10.7,78 The other meeting which I wanted to re ca ll was the Technical Group which met on Thursday. The main thing
which I pursued in that meeting was the sorting  out o f the Natsys 1 system. I played a ll  the tr ic k s  in the book. I stood on
p rin c ip le s , saying that th is  Committee have got to take the job o f co-ord inating standard systems seriously . I t  was our joo and 
despite the fac t tha t we have no lin e  authority  to 'X ',  i t  was s t i l l  our job to sort i t  out. They know damn well i t  is  d i f f i c u l t .
Eventually I got the Chairman and RCSO from Region 5 going up to 'X' in  the near future to try  and sort out what the main issues
are. I also ins is ted  that what we were ta lk ing , about was the a u th o r it ie s ' re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  in th is  matter and not th e ir RCSO's.
0 made remmrks lik e  the wrong a ttitu d e  being shown by 'X ' which I i.mediately leapt in . I also singled out two other factors and 
stuck to them as being things which that Technical Committee could not allow to pass. This was a piece of technique using 
lo g ic  against them. I made MB of Head O ffice squirm lik e  mad because he knows the d i f f i c u l t  pos ition  tha t he is  in  from the Head 
O ffi ce and so i t  went on.
251 : E l6 8  : 14.7.78 This morning I met my managers to complete our business meeting i .e .  to get through the pro jects being 
done across the D iv is ion . And i t  was very constructive. They are s e tt l in g  down into the new regime and have a much more
constructive re la tio n sh ip . A few claims to te r r i to ry  occurred! Tony said he must be D iv is iona l co-ordinator on two standard
p ro je c ts . Simon was completely non plussed to find tha t Peter is  completely w il l in g  to hand over care group monitoring lock 
stock and b a rre l. Simon has bean sniping at Peter for eighteen months -  mainly on the q u a lity  o f data but also on the general 
"quick and d ir ty *  aspects o f th is  work. So I drew up a few o f the monitoring ru les there and then. The fu l l  model has got
to be pursued and i f  that means using ro tten  data w ith reservation - th a t's  what we do! This is anathema to Simon. The basic
method 'notes and commentaries and invo lv ing  areas has got to say*. How many of the digest and monitoring exercises do you want
Simon? Cough s p lu tte r . I ' l l  le t  you know in 2/3 days. And he w i l l !
262 : E l69 : 14.7.78 I saw Neil and W ill from Head O ffice today obviously ta lk in g  to Tony re . Aldermoor. And so I took the
opportun ity o f saying to him that three people are v is it in g  the RHA to so rt Natsys.1. Neil said Natsys.I (h is  baby) is OK,
i t s  the customers who have got i t  wrong! But how come that his boss has not to ld  him about the Natsys. 1 v is it?  Maybe they
have not seen each other and maybe devious Charlie is up to some game.
263 : E170 : 20.7.78 I t  is  now more or less the closed season for a c t iv ity  (less so in Avon than in Region 1).
1 went to H illbu ry  to meet the ANOs with Tony th is  week. Alison was there too. Freda wishes to get control o f nursing 
development co-ordinated. I an vary happy to go along w ith the idea -  there were some in te re s tin g  features.
(a) i t  was very lady like  - especia lly the lunch overseen by DNO (Marchioness) of Hi 11 bury. Her regal conduct o f meal
in Scottish aceent and humour and conversations about not pu tting  the custard on the 2nd course were very funny.
(b) On the previous day, Peter had dragged Freda out o f a National meeting to press her to discuss his la te s t nursing 
p ro je c t. She's a b i t  upset and has mentioned th is  to me twice already. Freda fee ls quite  r ig h t ly  that she wants a 
nurse in the d riv ing  seat on th is  one and has said that Peter cannot seem to get th is  message. She is obviously very
concerned at not having a research nurse. Ph.D nurses are getting  quite  common and she wants one! She is concerned
(and so am l) that Peter w il l  "overpower* people by h is fa s t ta lk in g .
(c) Winni fred Black is going to chair a meeting to try  to determine p r io r i t ie s  fo r nursing. She's quiet and I wish to 
get to know her b e tte r. I an going to go along to her meetings. This is  going to put Peter's nose out o f jo in t  
and I have a major teaching e ffo r t  to put in on Peter to get the message over tha t control is  re tu rning  to me.
(d) ANO from South Area talked to me aoout the Data Protection paoers and a v is i t  that she wants me to make. Freda
things that i ts  a waste o f my time and should not be contemplated. In a sense th is  re fle c ts  an ineresting view of 
P r io r i t ie s .  Data Protection is a major national concern and the 3MA have jus t been jumping uo and down on Child 
Health records. And yet I suspect that the RTO doesn't re a lly  give a damn aoout i t .  And when you look at the vast
range o f management oroolems "acing them, wno is to say that they are not righ t?  That price •'reedom ana arivacy -
wnen peoole die througn lack of care!
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2 54  : E l 71 : 2 7 . 7 .  73 Luke came iown t h i s  a f t e r n o o n  w is h i n g  to s e t  up a new c r g a n i s a i i o n  '^ar a c c o u n t in g  a o n o u t i n g .  He wants  
to c r i n g  in  a c c o u n ta n ts  and to s e t  j o  j o i n t  teams.  he jo es  not  ni nd where the c o n t r o l  is ! . ' . '  I t ' s  u r c e n t .  out  N a t s y s . 1 ano 
N a t s y s . 2 have seen in  a ness f o r  y e a r s .  He i s  c r a s n l y  n a iv e  -  FCHCCG cane o u t .  OK so h e ' s  c o n ce rn e d .  SO 4" : .  ' I need a 
s o l u t i o n  no t  nore t a l k .
255 : I t  i s  g e t t i n g  near the  h o l i d a y  season .  I soe nt  the day c l e a r i n g  - y  desk and w r i t i n g  a l l  s o r t s  o '  -e.nos.
25c : E172 : 2 5 . 7 .  73 D o r o t h y  has j u s t  ceen ' 'eec ing  bac:< fron  h er  Nat sy s  u s e r s .  They a re  c e in g  n a s t y  and r u d e .  D o r o t h y  ' s
r e a l i s i n g  t h a t  a COR, e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h o u t  N a t s y s . 1 cones in  ’ or a l o t  o f  s t i c k .  Of  course  we a re  used 'ey a l l  the o t h e r  R eg io ns .
257 ; £172  ; 2 7 . 7 . 7 3  I have j u s t  emerged from the  most c n a o t i c  RTO i n a g i n a o l e .  Two hours  a f t e r  s t a r t i n g  they  had j u s t  got
th ro ug n  m a t t e r s  a r i s i n g  and nenos no t  on the a genda !  Luke nas " d i s c o v e r e d "  t h a t  we a re  s h o r t  o f  s t a f f  in  c o n p u t a r s ,  t h a t  the 
N a t s y s . I  i s  n o t  w o r k i n g  t h a t  p a y r o l l  ana a c c o u n t in g  is  ap p ro ac h in g  a " c r i s i s " .  He w ishes  to b r i n g  i t  to the a t t e n t i o n  o f  a 
D e o .  Sec .  and th re e  ( j /S ec s !  The f a c t  t h a t  we have been p u r s u in g  the p roolem  f o r  t w e lv e  months seems to have escaoea h i s  n o t i c e !
268 : They were s p l i t  r ig h t down the middle on HG's two evaluation men. Martin stated co rrectly ' that there were two issues
involved re . the national payoff and the local D is t r ic t  payoff. I played up the payoff ''or the local d is t r ic t .  Martin got
on to his R J D anti p la tform . So did Luke saying that th is  is  not a p r io r i ty  issue. I t  uses up -anagement resources!
Luke launched into h is irre le v a n t d ia trib e  several times. Martin said "Do tha t on your own in i t ia t iv e  i f  you want ^  no 
backing from th is  RTO".
258 ; £173, £174, £175 ; 27.7.78 I went to the RTO today to try  to get througn the le t te r  4-om H.O. allowing us to re c ru it
two peoole fo r evaluation work. E ssentia lly  what they want us to do is to measure two very good systems which lin e  uo w ith  the 
experimental applications which H.O. have bean running for the la s t 10 years or so. They asked us to select two hosp ita ls  
in which he could measure eight o f these app lication  over the next 18 months. RTO discussed th is  la s t week and as a re s u lt o f 
th e ir  discussions kicked i t  for touch and said they wanted to do i t  again th is  week w ith me there.
263 : I turned uo at the RTO. The f i r s t  thing I did was to sketch in the background quite  c a re fu lly . I also tr ie d  to make
sure that they understood that not only H.O. but the two D is t r ic ts  concerned would get considerable oene fit from th is  measuring
exercise. From the poin t o f view o f th is  research the in te res ting  things were especially Martin Hi 11iam's a t t i  tuoe towards
the whole experimental programme o f computer p ro jects  from H.O. He was intensely interested that we did not get enmeshed in 
th a t. He was also dead keen that in some sense our management resources were not d ilu ted  so that t.he Avon work did not receive 
i ts  due a tte n tio n . I said quite ca re fu lly  that in fa c t the dim inution o f our management e f fo r t  would be n e g lig ib le . The 
in te re s tin g  thing is that the real reason that Martin is adopting th is  a ttitu d e  is that the guy is not ge tting  what he wants out
o f the MS D iv is ion . I stuck to my guns. Freda and the RWO were obviously quite  d e f in ite ly  on my side. Freda was try in g  to
cool things o f f ,  easing things through - saying how much the c lin ic ia n s  would value things of th is  nature and countering M artin 's 
argument tha t th is  tiae  w ith the new Consultants' contract they would probably not be in a very co-ooerative mood. This is 
p e rfe c tly  true .
270 : The RWO joined in the argument and was on our side, adding one very good r id e r ,  that in ^act i t  would be best i f  we could 
choose a s ite  where a new DGH was contemplated so that in fact we could use th is  data to our own advantage in th is  planning way.
He suggested Southtown but that is  out because there are too many computers around Southtown for us to measure a good manual system.
271 : Luke Downs joined in  the argument and kept on bring ing in the ir re le v a n t issues mncerned w ith his in a b i l i ty  to get
Natsys's done. This was compunded by the fac t that he insisted on getting  a memo onto the discussion as w e ll, concerned with these 
two topics and his own bothers that in fact he was going to be le t  down by the Computer Department not being able to keep and get 
s ta f f .  The f i r s t  part o f a long debate which we had been having n a tiona lly  on pay scales and so on and wastage rates on which 
I have been up to the Department. i t  is  the problem that Luke has jus t "discovered* as I have said e a r lie r . The fac t that 
everyone else has been ta lk in g  aoout i t  fo r 12 months is  nothing compared w ith the fa c t that Luke is going to solve i t  by magic. 
There were some very keen interventions by other members of the RTO along the lines  -  what precise ly do you want us to do Luke? 
Martin intervened to say that i f  Luke went to any Depty or Under Secretaries, then ha was doing i t  on h is own behalf and not 
w ith  any backing o f the RTO. Everyone was making the poin t tha t th is  simply was not the way to deal w ith a c r is is ,  even i f  
one did e x is t.
272 : We then dea lt w ith the le t te r  to East Area and to H 'th from 8 arry Hunt and that was tha t.
273 : I missed the tra in  to London. I t  took 1 hr 40 minutes to deal w ith these three items. They had not even got onto the
Agenda at 11.40 a.m. People often c r i t ic is e  the RTO fo r th is  so rt o f behaviour but i t  is  not a ll  a ll c lear to me tha t the
problem is  not much deeper than th is  and that i t  has got something to do w ith the nature o f the NHS business. A ll the issues 
which they were ta lk ing  about were very important ones. In fa c t, during the discussion o f the H.O. le t te r ,  some very basic 
items o f philosophy were coming up. There was no reference framework w ith in  which i t  was possible to discuss these Issues.
I t  could be that one of the p rinc ipa l problems o f the MHS is  that the complexity o f the business is  such that teams o f o ffic e rs  
simply cannot cope w ith th is  degree of complexity e f f ic ie n t ly .
274 : This morning I went up to see Freda fo llow ing the meeting o f the RTO yesterday because I am exceedingly concerned that in
the end we get the H.O.evaluation men in . I talked to Freda -  a most Important discussion -  about the ways in which th is  could
best be done. She was very sympathetic. There is no doubt whatever that whatever else Freda might be, she is a very wise
person. She does not su ffe r fools g lad ly and she objects v io le n tly  to being trodden on by the system, especia lly when i t  is 
part o f the doctor system. The outcome o f the meeting was that she agreed to see what could be done outside the RTO. At the 
same time tha t I saw Freda, I managed to get hold o f Martin and we then had another longish discussion.
275 : E177 : 27.7.78 During the day I made two singular mess ups o f memos and i t  could have something to do w ith the po in t
I have ju s t ra ised. WJ, whom I d is lik e  intense ly, sent me a memo sometime ago via  David Jones and I had switched o f f .  The 
net re s u lt was tha t I sent him one back which was complete nonsense, which was then read out to a Working Party whom WJ claimed 
treateo i t  w ith in c re d u lity  - th is  may have been the case. I suspect tha t when I rep lied  to WJ, I had decided that he was 
w itte r in g  on again aoout the national scene and the fa c t that we had not got a representative on the National Working Party.
This caused a switch o f f  in me and the net re s u lt is that I bungled the whole th ing .
276 : Another memo from 9arry Hunt about Eastbury had not been dea lt w ith e f f ic ie n t ly .  I had fa ile d  to re fe r i t  to Tony in  the
f i r s t  place and I cannot re a lly  re ca ll what he asked me to io about i t .  Now the reason for a ll th is  could be that I am
completely pre-occupied by other things at the moment. I badly want to get Freda and Martin on the side of Management Services
and I keep soendinq a lo t  o f time th inking about how to do th is .
277 : £179 : 27.7.73 Once again Martin was ooviously personall y  concerned about me and my oroolems and we had a very very
reasonaole oiscussion. The guy is making the point that there are other sorts o f issues wnich he sees around as oeing
important and which no one w il l  do anything about fo r him. He is  confused or at least he appears to be in my eyes about the 
ro le  o f Planning D iv is ion  in the question at norms ana now mucn we snould oe provia ing ana cnings o f th is  nature. Ha is
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277 ( c o r . t ' d )  s ay in g  very  s o e c i f i c a l l y  t h a t  the  s o r t s  o f  - e a s u r e s  which we a re  u s in g  '’o r  o v e r a l l  o l o n n in g  ra v e  not  r e c a i v e o  The 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t n a t  they  ougnt  t o .  He ra x es  th e  o o i n t  q u i t e  r i g h t l y  t h a t  - o s t  o f  the n o m s  wnicn  a re  around a t  the  o r e s e n t  t i ' e  
a re  to do w i t n  p a s t  h i s t o r y .  O f t e n  they  a re  j u s t  s u r .na r ies  o f  what p e o p le  have a ch ie ve d  in  the o a s t  anU a re  in  a sense c e i n g  
used as a l e v e l l i n g  uo o r  p o s s i o l y  in  ext reme  cases  as a l e v e l l i n g  down d e v ic e  f o r  r e s o u r c e  p r o v i s i o n .  He q u i t e  r i g h t l y  says  
t h a t  wnat we need i s  a m edica l  view or  any o t h e r  s o r t  c f  v iew o f  wnere we should  be go in g  and some s o r t  o f  cos i  t i  ve s ta t e m e n t  
a oo ut  the s o r t s  o f  p r o v i s i o n  t h a t  we ought to be - a x i n g  in  view o f  t h a t  ju sg e m en t .  He was g oing  an a c s u t  tne ' a c t  t h a t  
c e r t a i n  s o e c i a i t i e s  ougnt to oe d e c l i n i n g  and o t h e r s  ougnt to oe g rowing and t h a t  we ought  to oe c o n t r o l l i n g  t h a t  g ro w t h .
He was a ls o  going on aoout  the r'act t h a t  ne has o e f o r e  him r e q u e s t s  f o r  t h r e e  C o n s u l t a n t s  f o r  work in  c an c e r  -  a l l  a lo n g  the  
N o r t h  Range i n c i d e n t a l l y .  He makes the o o i n t  t h a t  we have got  no e v i d e n c e  w h a te v e r  t h a t  the se  p e o o le  ano t h e i r  methods have  
got  any i - p a c t  on the i l l n e s s  p a t t e r n s  and t h a t  t h e i r  work does not i n c r e a s e  1 i ' e  e xp ec ta n cy  a t  a l l  -  or  a t  l e a s t  we do not  
know t h a t  i t  does.  'low a l l  o f  t h i s  i s  v ery  c o r r e c t  1 s u s p e c t .  F a r t i n  sees t h i s  s o r t  o f  issue  a g a i n s t  a oackground o f  our  
o e in g  i n v o lv e d  in  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h  which he has go t  ve ry  v e r y  l i t t l e  sympathy and the re a s o n  o f  course  i s  t h a t  th e y  a re  no t  h is  
i d e a s .  "ow i t  c ou ld  w e l l  be t h a t  we have g o t  to do the sane th in g  to M a r t i n  t h a t  we have j u s t  done to Henry  J a c q u e s ,  namely ,  
to g e t  the bees o u t  o f  h i s  bonne t  so t h a t  we can g e t  to some o t h e r  w ork .
273 : E180 : 27.7.73 The issues wnich come to my mind in re la tio n  to what Martin has raised is the issue wnicn was impressed
on me by R some weeks ago. This is that the fac t that we have got a problem does not necessarily imply tha t we have got a
so lu tion . The issues which Martin is ra is ing  are very va lid  ones. Over the la s t 30 years, the ‘IHS has mudoled through on
these matters. Martin claims that in North Region, examination o f th is  type o f issue die occur. I th ink that the f i r s t
thing we need to do once again is  to find  out the tru th  o f that comment. Again Martin claims that he has not had sa tis fa c tio n  
on the business of the populations and catchments and so on for the various D is t r ic ts .  I found th is  incred ib ly  puzzling and 
I aannot help fee ling  that i f  Martin feels l ik e  th is  then at least we ought to know what the pos ition  is and I am not convinced
at th is  moment that we do know that position  adequately. One of the o rganisational d i f f ic u l t ie s  which there is  around th is
area is the fac t that the Planning D iv is ion  ought to have made Martin happy on th is  issue. I t  could be tha t tha t is  an
impossible task. I t  could oe tha t they are under such pressure from Henry Jacques to produce p a rt ic u la r sorts of plans and to
do things in p a rticu la r sorts o f ways that i t  is  not on. I t  could equally well be that they have not got the information or 
the technical advice to do what he wants.
279 : £181 ; 27.7.78 As part of a fevered a c t iv ity  on the evaluation men, I went down to see Lionel Dunn th is  afternoon and 
try  to clear with him the use o f hospita ls in Hampshire. I also rung up Granau Pate regarding the p o s s ib ility  o f using the 
3ath s ite  for th is  work. He advised me not to trouole Vally Andrews u n t il  Thursday o f next week out that whatever else I 
might do I must feed th is  through Rally Andrews. Now that is an in te res ting  statement because sometime ago I could quite 
easily have used h is assistant as a channel. 'Rally Andrews has been away for three weeks.
280 : £182 : 28.7.78 During the past week I have been try in g  to stra ighten out catering monitoring. I s tro lle d  over to 
Region's catering man to get the p icture  from him. For him, he was in a p re tty  dejected mood. Areas are playing him up on 
the Raste Food and Patient Services part o f h is work. The Programme has slipped six  months. South Area w ill
de live r accorOing to the revised tim etable. North Area might w ith h is help -  and I oOjecto to that -  and 'Rest w on't. 'Rayne 
Cook objects in p rin c ip le  to Avon monitoring -  i t  goes into  too much d e ta il -  he would lik e  to see Regional Commentaries 
reduced to p la titud inous statements. One of the main reasons fo r not being able to do the job is H illb u ry 's  lack o f DCM and 
th e ir  Rally Andrews independent a ttitu d e s .
281 : So I have ju s t been up to see David to arrange to tackle the AA's on Thursday and to b r ie f  the Chairman. David does
not want to go to the Chairman without a s tra ig h t ta lk  to Areas. How th is  goes w il l  be in te res ting  because, fo r once, I
w in  be in on i t .
282 : David and I commiserated on RTO la s t week. I have contacted Chris Judd about measuring Oldtown DGH on evaluation work.
283 : £185, £185 : 1.3.78 In the 'Essence o f Decision* Graham 8 . A llison  describes the "s ig n a llin g *  that went on between 
U.S. and USSR over the re s u lt o f pu tting  m issiles into Cuba. Graham Pate and I have been doing a b it  o f undercover ac tion / 
s ign a llin g  over Catering. 'Rest Area, having agreed to take part in i t  -  according to the departeo AA -  are not co-operating.
Hi 11 bury have not done a damn thing on the 3rd and Ath areas of th is  to p ic . Graham te l ls  me that the Area Members wish to 
monitor "care*, "Waiting L is t*  etc. H illbu ry  o f course are using the excuse that they have no DCi -  th e ir  decision. Graham 
is f ra n t ic a lly  te l l in g  me to avoid confrontation . I am fra n t ic a lly  te l l in g  him that our Chairman w il l  not be put o f f .
284 : £187 : 1.8.78 Yesterday David and I met the AAs or th e ir sub's. 'Re talked ca tering , Lab. computing and computer 
p o lic y . A fter a ll  'Rest Area's comments, p u ff and smoke.' 'X ' caved w ithout a word. Of course I c a re fu lly  brought in 
South Area f i r s t  -  our good boy who d u t ifu lly  showed fo rth  his se lf.righteousness p ride , etc -  then, I dealt w ith North
and South and agreed that w ith help he would do i t .  I then shut up and the room obviously expected something from 'X '!
Rhen do you want it?  Sulk, su lk! 'Rail Committee is  mid October and agendas have got to go out - 'X ' Well OK aid- September 
i t  is !
285 : E188A : 4.8.78 On computer policy d ra f t,  the matter was very d if fe re n t . Up came a ll the old ob jections. 'X* got onto 
q u a lity  o f HAA. Must explain po licy  in two pages. PR Man must w rite  a pop version. I got stuck in and said i t  was about
time that they to o k -th e ir re s p o n s ib ilit ie s  seriously -  the burden was not a ll  mine. OK I w il l  f ix  a seminar or two.
286 : £189, £191 : 4.8.78 D iary Note on a v is i t  by Freda Simm and Winni fred Black to discuss the formation o f the Nursing
Steering Group for the development o f work.
287 : We covered the fo llow ing to p ics :-
288 : Re need a resume of what problems are presently seen as ex is ting  in the nursing area.
289 : Within these problems, we need to establish somehow or other a mechanism fo r se tting  p r io r i t ie s  and the reafte r monitoring 
against these p r io r i t ie s ,  objectives and so on.
290 : Freda has suggested tha t we use some of the money that is  available in the research budget for a programme o f v is it s .
291 : In connection w ith these v is its  throughout the country, Winnifred has suggested tha t we have got to get clear in  our
minds what questions have got to be asked.
292 : As an aside, Freda mentioned that Southtown DNO has in fa c t dealt w ith some of the problems which Winni fred thought 
were insuperaole.
293 : I agreed to see whether there were any -'orms fo r Region 3 arouno and whether there was a day on which I could go to that 
p a rt ic u la r conference to deal s p e c ific a lly  w ith nursing and I must fo llow  that up qu ick ly .
294 : Among tne proolem s  wnicn  were seen to pe i m p o r t a n t  -  ni d o l e  management t r a i n i n g  ano numeracy once a g a in  come up.
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295 : le neea to g e t  a c o n o r e n e n s iv e  l i s t  o f  what is s ue s  are c u r r e n t l y  kn o ck in g  a t  the d oor .  The ones t h a t  we c o u ld  t h i n k  o f
were nurse  a l l o c a t i o n ,  c o n n u n i t y  re c o r d s  ano our  F a t s / s .
23c : I t  was agreed t h a t  we neeo a s o a l l  g ro uo ,  wnich  i s  b e in g  d a t e r i i  ned tooay o r o b a c l y ,  wnich  would r e o o r t  the w.'iGs. F reoa
i s  keen t h a t  I s h a l l  get  on i t .
237 ; So.xenow or  o t h e r  sore  T e r rs  o f  R e f e r e n c e  f o r  t h a t  '3rouo need to oe s u g g e s te d .
238 : I o r o r i s e d  to p roouce a p aper  t h a t  k r i t s  t o g e t h e r  a l l  o f  the acove t o p i c s  ana s e t s  o u t  a o r o g r a - r e  o f  v i s i t s .  'R in n i r re d
a ls o  s a id  t h a t  she would l i k e  someth ing  on c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  o f  da ta .
239 ; Freoa  nas a grees  to g e t  in f o r m a t i o n  v i a  Pan L e s t e r .
200 : The - e e t i n g  tooK o la c e  i n  ny o f f i c e  and ii . and F .  care down. The - e e t i n g  was t h o r o u g h l y  c o n s t r u c t i v e  from s t a r t  to
f i n i s h .  I t  was v e r y  u s e f u l  in  t h a t  I had a c r i b  s h e e t  f a c i n g  r e  on the  o l a c k o o a r d ,  e x a c t l y  o p p o s i t e  ~y e y e s ,  w i t h  a l i s t  o f
t o p i c s  on i t  to t a l k  a o o u t .  F re da  k e p t  the m e et i n g  to the p o i n t  q u i t e  g e n t l y  o u t  f i r m l y .  A ve ry  c o n s t r u c t i v e  m e e t i n g .
301 ; E130 : 7.3.78 I saw Peter today on h is re tu rn  from holiday. T fed back to him the fac t that he had not done h in se lf
any gooa by his reacting w ith Freda in the way ne had. He has accepted that Freda wants me on her Steering Committee.
302 : E192 ; 7.8.78 Peter obviously has decided that he wisnes to make his name with Planning having returned from holiday 
fu l l  o f enthusiasm and vigour. I have been very cautionary about th is  but I now rea lise  tha t i t  might not be a bad idea to
encourage th is  idea at a l l .  In fact i t  could s u it my books very wall indeed.
303 ; I have been th inking about my Patient care myth and I th ink tha t I ought to s ta r t w rit in g  a paoer on i t .
303 : E193 ; 7.3.78 I had a v e r y  p re g n a n t  t h o u g h t  a l i t t l e  e a r l i e r .  I t  amazes me how ' r e p u e n t l y  one p ra n d is h e s  a s a n c t io n  in
the "IHS. And y e t  I have n o t  seen i t  a c t u a l l y  used in  e a r n e s t .  The RHA has j u s t  ducked the  s a n c t i o n i n g  o f  o u r  E n g i n e e r s .
we have brandished sanctions at R ilts h ire .
304 : E194 : 17.3.78 I must make a note o f the sabre r a t t l in g  and waiting l i s t  antics going on regarding the closure of TML.
The Newtown consultants have now joined the oand - te lev is io n  today. (P.S. Everything is running down for holidays).
One of my meandering thoughts is the way in which the Line re la tionsh ip  between A u tho rities  is  avoided. Examples.
(a) Head O ffice and Avon on Planning. (b) Region and "orth  Area on Mental Hand cap Review
(c) GG and 'Rest Area on monitoring (d) Speculate the circumstances of i ts  use
(e) Region w il l  decide b i t  of computer policy ( f )  Avoidance o f I9S Monitoring
(g) Henry's conspiracy to avoid c o n f lic t  (h) Technical Committee on Natsys.1
305 : El95 : 11 .3.78 I got back from holiday th is  morning and so there are no d iary notes over the la s t month.
306 ; Tony Peers rang me early th is  morning. The main message he had was that Natsys 2 was not going to be delivered in the
Spring o f 1979 and that 1 must get in touch w ith Luke Downs as soon as possible. This I did by v is it in g  him. He was occupied
and he la te r  came down to see me. The basic reason wny Natsys 2 is  not on is that the documentation is s t i l l  not ava ilab le .
'Re have got huge problems bu ild ing  up as a re s u lt o f th is . E ffo r t in the Computer Centre is not around. Over the next five  
years, we are going to run into  considerable tim ing problems because of the new machine and i t  is  h igh ly improbable that we can 
get Natsys 2 onto the 1900 before i t  goes out and then i t  seems that the 2900 is  not compatible w ith the 1300 -  so we are playing 
lo ts  o f s i l l y  games.
307 ; Luke came to see me in quite a happy sort o f mood. I to ld  him the news. He then sympathised but nevertheless said that
ne must fo llow  th is  through and we are meeting tomorrow w ith Tony Peers and Lee Ross. 1 have some sympathy w ith Luke because
we never seem to have a so lid  timetable available to us fo r getting  any o f th is  work pushed through. He is  quite  r ig n t that we
have got to probe and probe hard to find out whether th is  can be pushed through and at what so rt o f speed we can get i t  in .
308 : £196 : 11.9.78 This afternoon twe- people- from ORS came to see me about the East Area p ro je c t. We had a longish ta lk  
with AMSO present -  on Regional views. I t  is  another in te res ting  example o f the discussions which the Department have got to
have to make sure that they c lear things w ith Region. I t  also transpired during the meeting that we of course have got a ll
the problems o f non-com patib ility  between th e ir  planning system and ours which raised th e ir  ugly heads during th is  discussion. 
AMSO sat there fee ling  most uncomfortable that in fact I was going to take a Regional in i t ia t iv e  on some o f the issues when the
Area have not been consulted or th e ir  views taken into account, e tc, e tc. I t  is  fascina ting  how th is  view can occur and yet I
do not th ink tha t he has any reason to suppose tha t I would do anything o f the so rt. Obviously though ce rta in  facts came out 
on which I am bound to act and i t  is  reasonable that th is  should be done as quickly as possib le. Nevertheless, we have got the
bureaucratic system in which an Area is  quite d e f in ite ly  resentfu l o f the action which Region might take on i ts  own in i t ia t iv e ,
however "reasonaole* i t  may be.
309 ; £197 ; 13.9.78 Diary note on the Technical Committee
310 : I t  is  worth re fe rr in g  to the Agenda o f th is  meeting since i t  i l lu s tra te s  the fact that the actual hard business o f th is
Group is  confined to a very few items in the f i r s t  place and there is  nevertheless a lo t  o f extra  s tu f f  put there by H.O.
The f i r s t  item an the Agenda was the action to be taken on the present national standard systems and we had some reports
aval l a : le  to us in quite a good format. A fter the Committee had made various suggestions on b its  o f add itiona l data which 
need to be included -  a ll o f which was quite constructive. RMSO 4 attempted to push th is  lo t  through as i f  they were just 
there fo r note. I t  took me and two others quite sometime to ac tua lly  estab lish tha t i t  was the business o" the Committee to go
through these in d e ta il and state whether or not we were s a tis fie d . RMSO 4 was a ll fo r k ick ing  th is  fo r touch and we had
to be very pers is ten t indeed.
311 : One of the main things tha t we achieved on th is  p a rt ic u la r issue was to get RCSO 5 to s ta r t w rit in g  down the standards 
by which we were go in g to judge these p ro jec ts . From the point o f my research, th is  is another good example of the ro le  
which I th ink that H.O. wishes these committees to carry out. I t  allows them to say to th e ir  masters that they e x is t and
at the same time by making them behave in th is  way, l i f e  can s t i l l  be quite comfortable.
312 : On the payro ll we had to be exceedingly in s is te n t that RMSO 4 did not co-ordtnate his a c t iv it ie s  w ith the Treasurers 
Users Panel which is v is it in g  the Centres of R esponsib ility  sometime in the next s ix months and that we did actua lly  get him and 
RCSO 4 and Neil Moore up to Region 4 as quickly as possible to investigate the issues which had been ra ised. It  is  u tte r ly  
incred ib le  that a fte r two months since our la s t meeting, nothing whatsoever had been done on an urgent matter. What has 
happed in the f ie ld  is  that things have gone quiet because we are now away from the end o f the year which causes a ll payro ll 
trouble and because we are in the mid-year l u l l ,  everyone is try ing  to pretend that they do mot have to 'ake e ffe c tive  action
to avoid the same trouole in 1979. As RCSO 5 pointed out, another rounp o f pay amenaments and so on is already on its  way 
out and i t  is  appropriate to act now.
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3 13 :  Another  f a s c i n a t i n g  p a r t  o f  the m e e t i ng  was the way in  which  S.MSO '* t - i ? a  to dea l  w i t h  the l i s t  o f  p roolem s  wnicn the
T e c h n ic a l  Commit tee must t a c k l e  o ve r  the n e x t  c ouple  o f  y e a r s .  Two l i s t s  o f  p roolem s  e x i s t ,  n am e ly ,  those wnicn  we have
o u r s e l v e s  g e n e r a t e d  and some o t h e r s  which  have oeen p u t  o u t  ay the P o l i c y  C om m it tee .  RMSO 4 a g a in  wanted to ta k e  back g e n e r a l
v ie w s  an t h i s  and not to s t a r t  a l l o c a t i n g  these p roolem s  o u t  and to d e t e r m i n e  ways in  wnich  they s hould  oe t a c x l e d .  Again  
t h e r e  was an argument o ver  i t .  I Co not  know w he th er  RMSO 4 is  in  can oo ts  w i t h  ,4.0. ove r  t h i s  b u t  as an e f f e c t i v e  Chairman
g e t t i n g  some a c t i o n  on t e c h n i c a l  i s s u e s ,  he l e a v e s  a v e r y  g r e a t  deal to be d e s i r e d .  The r e s t  o f  the  Agenda was r e a l l y  about  
f u t u r e  i tems and i n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  v a r io u s  t y p e s ,  none o f  whicn  s t r u c k  me as b e in g  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  but  
i t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  formed a nuge amount o f  pad o ing  and took q u i t e  a b i t  o f  t ime  in  the m e e t i n g .  Aga in  t h i s  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  
l o t s  and l o t s  o f  these  n a t i o n a l  c om m it te es .
314  : E198 : 1 4 . 9 . 7 8  D i a r y  note  fo r  the  p r i v a t e  m e et in g  o f  the r e g i o n a l  management s e r v i c e s  o f f i c e r .
315 : The .most important fa c t is  that there were only six o f us there and we had a long discussion about the fa c t that this had 
happened yet again. I ended up taking the Minutes because the Minutes Secretary was not there. i t  is  incred ib ly  d i f f i c u l t
to get across to the RHSOs that i f  they wish to oe an e ffe c tive  body th«n they have got to co-ordinate action in  th is  way at 
regular in te rva ls . In fa c t RMSO 6 and I (acting  as Secretary and he as Chairman) pressed through lo ts  o f actions which are 
going to be taken whether or not the m ajority o f RMSOs were there. RMSO 7 joined us for the f i r s t  time.
316 : E199 : 15.9.78 Tony has been brandishing before my eyes the sigh t o f North AHA going 0 IRECT to RHA about i t s  d is ­
sa tis fa c tio n  over Computer Plan.'
317 : E200 : 18.9.78 Two important meetings today -  one with the Heads of D iv is ions and the other w ith Henry Jacques.
318 : With the Heads o f D iv is io n , we discussed many things -  the most important o f which was the accommodation problem at H.Q.
and in the Computer Centra. A course o f action was agreed in which i t  was made p la in  that we were going to te l l  Henry the
facts o f l i f e  or so we thought. In p a r t ic u la r , i f  te  accommodation problem at the Computer Centre is  not solved, there w il l
ce rta in ly  be abreaction at the next jCG and things could get even worse.
319 : In the Henry Jacques meeting we went through a ll  o f the objectives fo r the RHA as agreed and a very in te re s tin g  meeting
i t  was. On the issue of s ta f f  accommodation, in fa c t, we did not get very far at a l l .  I t  was le f t  u n t il the la s t five  
minutes because Henry arranged i t  that way and then we Just s lid  over i t .  The net re s u lt was tha t I sent G if f  Reynolds back 
to see Henry w ith a message that the Unions would ce rta in ly  h it  h is unless something was done which showed tha t the RHA meant 
business aoout solving the accommodation proolem at the Computer Centre.
320 : At both the Senior O ffic e rs ' Meeting and the Objectives Meeting w ith  Henry Jacques we discussed m onitoring. I opened 
up the report on the hunning of the monitoring programmes by declaring quite  intensely that the whole thing was one mess from 
beginning to end, i l lu s t ra t in g  th is  by the example of domestic services monitoring which badly needs much more backing from the 
AAs. We also talked about the things which North and East Area. i .e .  ambulances and CSSO, are doing poin ting  out that nothing 
at a ll  was happening. Henry re ite ra te d  his po in t o f view very strongly tha t monitoring was exceedingly important and that in 
fa c t he was going to sort th is . I had been getting  onto Oavid behind the scenes and I think that Oavid wants to make a bid for 
monitoring and I want to help him as much as I can. The extent to which Henry w il l  actua lly  face up to the issues which are 
involved remains to be seen. He has got two problems -  that o f m otivation by the D is t r ic t  and Areas and tha t o f pu tting  in the 
necessary e ffo r t  to administer a system at H.Q. I t  is  clear to me that the f i r s t  problem is the main one and we are going to 
have to solve i t .  He was in  a very good mood having jus t cons back from abnoad and h is holiday. He is  obviously fu l l  o f
l i f e  -  having learned a lo t  I gather from abroad. He was, nevertheless, back onto h is  old theme o f getting  out tim etables and
objectives and so on. I t  remains to be seen whether he w il l  cope w ith the other aspects o f the problems which we have got, 
such as the s ta f f  re la tionsh ips  and carrying through issues w ith Members o f the RTO who do not see things the way he does.
321 : E201 : 26.9.78 Henry has returned from abroad and has been back a week or so. One o f the things which he asked me to
do before he went (and there are notes on th is  on the f i l e )  was to get the plan through various stages. The f i r s t  th ing was
to d ra ft i t  up to a given level and In p a rt ic u la r to incorporate ce rta in  b its  o f committee work which s im p lifie d  the e x is ting  
step. He then asked me to carry out various stages o f consultation lik e  sending i t  to Areas and D is t r ic ts  g iv ing  i t  to the 
consulta tion groups and asking the RTO what they thought o f I t .  I have done a ll  o f these except in the case o f the la t te r .
I t  has been quite  impossible to ac tua lly  see the RTO. I t  Is claimed that th is  report is  causing a rumpus throughout the 
Region. The Treasurers are the most incensed. We are now to ld  tha t North ATO wish to come and see the RTO over the report 
and yet at a meeting o f Adm inistrators la s t week, a t which they had the opportunity to discuss th is  report for h a lf an hour, 
not a 'd icky  b ird * was sa id . Henry has now come back and he wants to remove a ll  committees from the o f f ic ia l  s truc tu re .
As fa r as I can see, th is  is  going to be an absolute d isas te r. He is  re d ra ftin g  the report along the lines  that.he has 
suggested. I shall have to go and see him and say tha t on mature consideration, I do not th ink that he is  r ig h t in  th is  
respect. He Is back once again onto the log ic  o f the lin e  s tructure  in management that ex is ts . This is  to turn upside down 
a l l  the h is to r ic a l ways in which the Service has been managed. I t  is  to impose a set o f concepts that he-has acquired from
Management School. I t  is  to ignore people completely. The fa c t is  tha t we nee d the customers to feel involved in some ways.
He say not l ik e  the various mechanises that we have got from a log ica l po in t of view or from a managerial s tructure  po in t o f view 
but they work and the ones which he Is suggesting w il l  not work. How I can persuade him that th is  is  the case, I do not know
but I am going to have to have a go and i f  he does not, I am going to have to see what other people th ink and make sure that
th e ir  thoughts on the matter are made very very c lear indeed. I t  is  re a lly  quite  incred ib le  how Henry has got ce rta in  lin e s  
o f thought on issues o f th is  nature. He hates committees. I th ink tha t one o f the reasons is  tha t on the whole he hates
people and emotion and a ll  o f the trappings o f confrontation , open debate, pa tting  people on the back and so on. He is  a
conceptual th inker and th is  is  where his strength is .
322 : E202 : 26.9.78 The other main th ing tha t is  knocking about at the moment is  a real f i r s t  class mess and bother and 
row about the p ayro ll and accounting standard systems. The programme is  s lipp ing  a ll  over the place fo r a va rie ty  o f reasons.
A chap has gone o f f  fo r s ix  weeks and i t  seems that th is  is  a major cause o f the delay. On the other hand , Region 2 say that 
i t  is  possible to implement Natsys 2 using the documentation which they have cu rren tly  got and that my people say tha t i t  is  
not. What do you do when two technical experts fa l l  out and behind i t  a l l  you can see a va rie ty  o f reasons why the technical 
reasons could be being used as excuses fo r fo llow ing various courses o f action which they ehemselves wish to follow? Of course 
'excuse* is  a very strong word. Indeed, I am sure that they would resent any suggestion that they are dragging th e ir  feet or 
doing any such thing but the fa c t is  that from my p os itio n , I am faced w ith a set o f factors o f varying degrees o f complexity, 
a ll  o f which lead to a g lo rious *mish mash* in which I am try ing  to sort out a course o f action.
323 : On top o f a ll th is , I have got dear Luke Downs raving around the Region saying stupid things about the p lan- and mixing
i t  up w ith the programming and tim etabling proolems on the payro ll and the accounting system and generally heating up the 
s itu a tio n  by in je c tin g  loads and loads o f irre le van t destructive emotion into  i t .  We are back in the Henry Jacques s itu a tio n  
re fe rred  to aoove. With th is  sort o f in tervention  by Luke Downs -  in  fact he described the plan as "semantic crap* in  the
. a i0 0 l e  o f  ,' lo r th  A rea  and t h i s  has caused a m a jor  row,  t h i s  s o r t  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  the  l .as t  s t ra w  and y e t  i f  I am a b s o l u t e l y
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323 ( c a n t ' d ) :
hon es t  1 t h i n k  t h a t  the p ro g r a n n i n g  and t i . a e t a o i l n q  a b i l i t y  which i s  b e i n g  shown oy T on y 's  d ep ar tm e n t  l e a v e s  a l o t  to be d e s i r e d  
and I q u e s t i o n  w heth er  they  a re  f i t t i n g  these  t i m e t a b l e s  i n .  A s i x  weeks d e l a y  because a man i s  i l l  seems to oe r e s u l t i n g  in  
a c l a s n  between t i m e t a b l e s  o f  N a t s y s .  2 ano I wnich  i s  p r o b a o l y  g o ing  to mean th a t  one has go t  to s l i p  oy 12 months .  Now t h i s
does not  seem s e n s i b l e  to me, even i f  you a re  w ork i ng  on a s h o e s t r i n g .  Tony now says t h a t  the ' r a c a s  o f  t r y i n g  to o u t  both
systems i n  a t  the same t ime w i l l  be more than he can stomacn and contend w i t h  and I can u nd ers t an o  t h a t  t h a t  m ig n t  be the  case
b u t  was n o t  t h i s  ' o r e s e e a b l e  a lo ng  t ime ago and do you r e a l l y  t i m e t a b l e  work on t h i s  s o r t  o f  o a s i s ?  Ano y e t  Tony i s  an
i n t e l l i g e n t  person  and he must have f o r e s e e n  i t .
324 : E203 : 26.9.78 During the whole o f th is  summer, there has been a major row going on about the accommodation problem at 
the Computer Centre. There have been two confrontations in the jCG between Henry Jacques and Garry Kay. In the f i r s t  one 
(wnich I described e a r lie r )  Garry put forward a good case. Subsequent to that we searched for su itab le  properties in Oldtown 
to lease and we found one and everyone was enthusiastic and there was a stupid in tervention  then by the RTO saying that th is  
lease was too long, e tc , etc. I t  was done in such a way as to make sure that everyone including the computer s ta f f ,  in 
p a rt ic u la r, re a lly  got het up. This led to Union backing on the accommodation issue. I t  also led to a confrontation on the 
JCG between Garry Kay and Henry Jacques in  which Garry Kay more or less ca lled Henry Jacques a l ia r .  Now i t  jus t so happens 
that in fa c t th is  has brought the RTO to th e ir  senses and that they are now taking the problem seriously and that we do seem to 
have negotiated a higher rent for XXX for a five  year lease but is  th is  the way to carry on? Why on earth have we got to get to 
th is  level o f confrontation? What is wrong w ith the sorts o f communication which are going on w ith in  the organisation to allow 
th is  to happen? The sad tru th  is tha t th is  so rt o f issue is  not being faced fa i r ly  and squarely and i t  comes back at the end
to whether or not Henry Jacques wants a responsive organisation or whether ha re a lly  does th ink that he can take on people in 
th is  sort o f way.
325 : E2Q4 : 26.9.78 During the summer, I have been through the process o f getting  Garry Kay out o f Tony's ha ir and I am a fra id  
to say i t  but into mine. He was put into his present joo and whatever q u a lit ie s  he may have had and he has got some very good 
ones, they are not re a lly  su itab le for h is present job. Over the years, Garry has never taken charge of and been in command and
th is  is  essential because such s k i l ls  as he has and such in te res ts  as he has are not re a lly  in th is  f ie ld  at a l l .  It  is
absolutely clear that something has got to be done and two a lte rna tives  face us. Either we take such action as we can to imorove 
Garry's ta len ts  and we have done a lo t  already and then make i t  absolutely clear that a level of performance is  required which
he must d e live r and a ll the consequences which fo llow  from that or we try  and f i t  him in to  another s lo t .  This la t te r  course of
action involves g iv ing him an education tra ining/personnel ro le . I t  is  wellknown that people do go along and ta lk  to Garry and 
cry on his shoulder and that he is very interested in tra in in g  and so on -  okay so he has not had the help which a professional 
person has had and so when he gets compared with RETO tha t comparison is unfortunate but what we have done is to set up a 
secondment w ith a sp ec ific  set o f jobs fo r hie to do and these are re a lly  to produce tra in in g  packages for Natsys. I and 2 and 
the l ik e . I am hoping that in th is  way he can so impress peoole around the organisation that they are w il l in g  to take him on,
give him some helo, get him going and so on. I have talked to Tony very ca re fu lly  about how best to give Garry the sort o f
opportunity which he needs i f  th is  escape route is going to mean anything to him. In adding to my own burdens and I am ta lk ing  
about burdens with people in p a rt ic u la r , I hooe tha t in th is  case the experience w il l  be rewarding and helpfu l to Garry Kay.
326 : E205 : 26.9.78 Peter has ju s t managed to get the much more complex model fo r the planning process working. The whole 
th ing th is  year has performed at a much higher level than was the case la s t year. The working o f the in te r-d iv is io n a l team 
under Peter has been quite successful and I think that Peter deserves considerable c re d it for having made i t  work as smoothly 
and as well as ha has done. Of course he had got the r ig h t p ro ject and the r ig h t degree of excitement and everything else was 
there but having said th a t, he has done a good job. Yesterday was in te re s tin g  in two respects. F irs t o f a ll  we went along
to Henry Jacques as a group saying here is the sort o f output which you are going to get from your new toy -  how are you going
to use it?  What sort o f decisions are you going to sake? Who is  going to look at the numbers? How are you going to reconcile 
th is  down to D is t r ic t  level because whether you lik e  i t  or not, th is  tool integrates the operational and the s tra te g ic  plan from 
D is t r ic t  level through Area level to Regional le v e l. This has got immense im plications because i t  means that people w il l  be 
unable to get away w ith nonsense statements about closing beds, opening beds and so on but as the whole lo t  has got to f i t
together in to  some sort o f implementable plan,over the years. I t  has also got another in te res ting  feature in tha t by breaking
down below Area,s i t  ac tua lly  does not permit amalgamations o f figures at Area level which cover up huge programming problems 
and huge fa c i l i t y  problems at the D is t r ic t  level and th is  is re a lly  very fasc ina ting . I t  is fasc ina ting  because the mechanism 
by which th is  is sold is  going to have to persuade the Areas and D is t r ic ts  tha t we have not taken away th e ir  operation planning 
ro le  and yet we are ins is tin g  that whatever they do w il l  be consistent w ith some overa ll s tra tegy. Now th is  re a lly  is  a very
d i f f i c u l t  th ing to do because in fa c t they get away w ith murder at the moment. I th ink that the team under Peter has produced
a ll o f the r ig h t leve ls  of information and the r ig h t leve ls  o f breakdown o f the service to put th is  edge into the whole planning
process and yet I th ink that the organisation i t s e l f  is  u tte r ly  incapable o f moving away from i ts  former ways and in a way to
impose consistency on the lower etchelons o f the NHS is  a ra ther u n fa ir th ing to do. There was a huge cap ita l jump between
la s t year and th is  year. There could quite  easily  be a huge capita l f a l l  between th is  year and next year. The e ffe c t o f th is
on s tra te g ic  planning and operational planning is  overwhelming but the in te re s tin g  thing about yesterday was tha t i t  made Henry
face up to ce rta in  operational type problems in  the Service and to face them with the fa c t that he has got a new sort o f
in teg ra tion  and a new sort o f issue on h is  hands, a new sort o f adm in istra tor knocking around, a new sort o f power is  knocking
around and he has got to come to terms w ith th is . He ac tua lly  created th is  beast by in s is tin g  that planning was one o f the
main functions o f the RHA. Now tha t is fine  and you can have an easy l i f e  as long as you don 't mean that statement but once 
you s ta rt in s is tin g  that people actua lly  do plan then l i f e  gets d i f f i c u l t .
327 : E206 : 26.9.78 For some odd reason I decided to go on an appeal today to widen my managerial experience. I must have
been stupid but i t  is in te re s tin g  to see the papers. Apart from the technical side o f the Appeal i t s e l f ,  i t  is  qu its  clear
tha t what I have in fro n t o f me is two u tte r ly  opposing views o f the problem - a management and a Union one. Mainly th is  is
inev itab le  in th is  p a rt ic u la r case but I cannot help fee ling  tha t i t  is  up to the management to get a thing l ik e  th is  much more
clear and not to land i t  on the laps o f three Appeal people l ik e  myself.
328 : E207 : 17.10.78 I must not forget the in te ra c tio n  that went on in the RHA concerning the X -s ite  re po rt. Basica lly they
wish to take action to c lear up personnel management problems concerning a doctor and nurses. There were several reactions 
from the o ff ic e rs  -  to do w ith  ju s t ic e , to do w ith what you could or could not do p ro fess iona lly , to do w ith the e tiqu e tte , to
do w ith whether i t  was proper to make ce rta in  types o f a llegation . Another set of issues was the d iffe rence between professional
and adm in istra tive functions which a ce rta in  doctor carried out and whether one could or could not separate these th ings. It
seemed to me that ce rta in ly  some o f the points being raised were n it ty  g r it ty  legal issues and others were devices for avoiding
the issue o f pinning the plame.
329 : I t  was in te res ting  to note tha t nevertheless the members were quite in s is te n t tha t they were going to take action. I t
was th e ir  p r iv ile g e  to nake judgements on the type of action that should be taken and i t  was 'hen uo to ^he o ff ic e rs  ‘ o 'ind
some quasi le g a lis t ic  way o f getting  th e ir  way implemented.
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330 : E208 : 23.10.78 There are notes on D iv is iona l Heaos today. Fascinating conversation about in te rac tion  w ith RTO.
331 : E209 : 23.10.73 Henry Jacques came back from abroad having " lo s t co n tro l'  and determinedly got i t  back by ins is tin g
on report back quarterly reoorts - "Why is n 't  ay PA s it t in g  s t i l l  in her outer o ff ic e . I want cover in the outer o ffic e .'. '"
332 : E2I0 : 23.10.78 I got the conversation round to the extent to which we should meet those demands. Just 'ace Henry 
w ith  costs -  no one else has i t .  He must be got o f f  the bureaucratisation o f th is  p lace /la rk .
333 : E211 : 23.10.78 Wall y Andrews says Henry is control orientated cut puts up a facaae of "consu lting" e tc. Martin has
accused Henry o f oeing two faced on th is  one. Henry ignored a ll the A/0 comments which hao been sought on computer plan.
334 : E212 : 23.10.78 Martin is  s t i l l  going on about the research which are doing on planning. And at the same time ne
is considering Peter generated options.'
335 : E213 : 23.10.78 There is a lo t  of aggro around because next week in h a lf term and both G iff  and I have had brushes with
Henry on "cover*. Henry took three months o f f  in the summer.' What aoout our leave? (5 weeks course on ly ).
336 : E214 : 23.10.78 I got an in te res ting  p ic ture  o f Henry reporting  back RTO business from G if f .  Henry said that G if t 's  
paper went well -  Luke and Martin to ld  G if f  "There was a hell o f a row®. I wonder what they did say about the Computer Plan!
337 : E215 ; 23.10.78 Walter Arne says that Henry is  f lo a tin g  the Deputy idea. Shouts from the res t "No go* e tc. I had a
te r r ib le  job to persuade them to see i t  as an opportun ity.
338 : E215 : 23.10.78 Wally Andrews says that Henry cannot te l l  people what he wants. Henry never paints in the background 
and has a lovely habit o f summing up and saying "Well th is  Is what they want*.
339 : E217 ; 23.10,78 A remarkable discussion occurred about the way the Chairman is transforming the Monitoring Committee
into an executive committee. On X he had the Group o f three led by one of h is pals. Was i t  fixed beforehand? Probaoly!
340 : E218 : 3.11.78 The day before, I went up to Region 4 to discuss the career development reoort w ith three RHSOs.
i t  was a very usefu l, constructive meeting. The comments which w il l  come out w il l  be exceedingly level headed - going s tra igh t 
to the heart o f the problem and saying quite  b lu n tly  that we oo not agree w ith the underlying hypothesis about the structure  of 
the adm in istra tive function. I t  was an incred ib ly  purooseful meeting for which I th ink RMSO 5 snould take a lo t o f the c re d it.
341 : E219 : 3.11.78 Over the past few months at Henry Jacques' behest we have constructeo a computer olan which amalgamates
a ll o f the various b its  o f the things we have put together on computing these past few years. This was taken to the AAs. I t
was the most incred ib ly  gentle session that I can imagine. Nothing was said that was highly contentious -  even William Lee was
in a mood that explained the d i f f ic u l t ie s  which we had ra ther than try in g  to make any p o li t ic a l noises out o f them. I did not 
understand tha t, because according to Tony, he is  about to b las t the RHA w ith his reoly and comments on the Policy i t s e l f .
342 : E220 ; 3.11.78 The most useful b i t  o f the t r ip  to Sal ton was the lunch which I had w ith the new DA from Newtown, who 
is c lea rly  unhappy about h is own committee at the present time. The new structure  o f committees seems to have taken them 
somewhat by surprise and when i t  was clear that I was emphasising th e ir  re s p o n s ib ility  to say what i t  was that they wanted.
On the whole, a very very uneventful meeting, in view of the importance o f the plan and the reaction which i t  is  supposed to 
have caused.
343 : E221 : 6.11.78 Today I returned from holiday. I was met by Henry Jacques in  a state about the Computer Plan. He had
been try ing  la s t week to find someone in Management Services to answer his questions about the plan and was in ,a  r ig h t state
because he thought that there was no one in  charge. I gather from Tony tha t Caesar got very angry about the way he was so rude
to him and the net re s u lt was that Caesar did not choose to ring  back. This le t  me in fo r a load o f trouble and was a vary
unwise move on h is  pa rt. I got a fiv e  minute lecture  from Henry on h is pet adm in istra tive  subject, namely, cover. A topic
which makes me thoroughly s ick .
344 : E222 : 5.11.78 At King's Fund on 7 November', 1 talked to Wayne Cook. Henry Jacques had not seen him over the monitoring
programme. I emphasised to Wayne (as did Peter) so that he fe l t  tha t he was tru ly  being g o t-a t, tha t i t  was essential that
someone takes action over that p a rt ic u la r programme of work.
345 : E223 : 8.11.78 During the la s t two days since coming back from holiday, Henry has been try in g  to complete ^  version o f
the Computer p o licy . S its  and pieces were missing and both Tony and I have been out fo r Tuesday and Wednesday and Henry wants
his b its  and pieces doing. Henry does not re a lise  ju s t how switched o f f  we are, both of us.
346 ; E224 : 8.11.78 I went to the Technical Committee today. I t  has improved g rea tly . We even got a repo rt from Reg. 4 
I did more than a b i t  o f pra is ing  fo r the RCSO 5 paper on standards o f a p a rt ic u la r type.
347 : E225 : 9.11.78 G lff  and i  discussed the Natsys Pro ject problem I f  John leaves. I t  is  agreed that he should have
Scale 14. Both G lf f  and I f e l t  tha t Tony would not co-operate w ith our deal. But I phoned him and he was co-operative.
We both feel tha t he is  looking fo r a job. I had to in s is t w ith G lf f  tha t although as a Natsys Manager only he could pursue 
confrontation courses, I could not.. He re a lly  accepted th is  but i t  was a try  on.
348 : £225 : 13.11.78 At the present time Henry Jacques has reverted to type and Is in  the middle o f a session in which he
is desperately try in g  to persuade people to take f i l in g  systems, English, e tc , e tc , more se riously . What he has not cottoned 
onto is  the fa c t that th is  Is not the time to do tha t so rt o f exercise. The RHA has got qu its  severe problems on motivation 
at the moment, once again and to s ta r t in on th is  p a rt ic u la r thing re a lly  is  not on. I have spent two or three hours with 
various members o f the RHA, including G lf f  Reynolds in  p a r t ic u la r , who is  most dismayed at th is  development. I am dismayed as 
well in that I th ink that i t  is  symptomatic o f the fa c t that having run out o f planning and monitoring work, Henry is 
desperately try in g  to th ink o f something el se. I have suggested to G lf f  that we must d ire c t that lin e  o f thought and that 
th is  is  our opportun ity , not our death.
349 : I t  was quite  incred ib le  the other evening to go in to  a room with G lf f 's  people and see the amount o f despair Henry has 
managed to create. I th ink that there is  a degree o f disappointment and d is illus ionm ent on the cost cu ttin g  exercise and on 
the lack of fo res igh t on the tra in in g  fron t and I have a great deal o f sympathy w ith them. M made some quite  re levant 
comments about myself and the degree o f fru s tra tio n  which I have had w ith Henry over the la s t twelve months and yet at that 
meeting I was prepared to defend him. Quite c lea rly  they were not.
350 ; E227 : 13.11.78 I also had another fle e tin g  meeting yesterday w ith Personnel Nurse in which I pinned her down on th is
morning's meeting an Nursing Services. I t  is  qu ite  clear that South ANO is going to attempt to ride  roughshod over the
meeting 'o r her Community Nursing work, ra ther than try  and order the odd dozen or so subjects. I made some very strong 
points to X about the need to set up adequate c r i te r ia  for making th is  judgement and aoout the need to take a look at the 
next decade and decide quite cool y what problems are going to h i t  us. One o f them is quite clear even now and th is is 
nurse snormage. in tnese circumstances, , tninx tnat to concentrate on even the best management information system which has
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350 : £227 : 13.11.73 (cont'd )
got no relevance to nurse s ta ff in g , is  vary fo o lish . Later on the same subject, I spoke w ith Freda Simm on the phone and 
once again exceedingly quickly she had got a ll of ty messages and I am quite sure that they are going to oe re a lly  very 
e ffe c tiv e , despite the -'act that she spends -ost o f her time outside H.O.
351 : £223 ; 20.11.78 Meeting o f Heads of D iv is ions . Ihe meeting was concerned w ith the fact that we had to 'ormulate 
Objectives 'o r next year. This discussion took place against a background o f Henry having been rather fo r+h righ t aoout his 
need fo r oette r f i l in g ,  bette r cover, e tc, e tc. In fact a recession into  adm in istra tive mode. I t  was a very s ig n 'f ic a n t
meeting because we a ll  agreed that we had got to get out o f th is  ru t and get a more p os itive  d ire c tio n  in to  how the RHA was
oehaving. I t  was agreeü tnat we nad got to taxe the in i t ia t iv e  in order to set that new d ire c tio n . I t  was agreed that on
the whole that p a rticu la r group was the only power group that could a c tua lly  manage to do th is . There was a great deal of
discussion aoout the p a rt ic ip a tio n  whicn could be expected from various members o f the RTO in doing th is . We also talked 
about the need to line  up our actions w ith the exoressed policy o f the RHA and the in te re s ts  of members.
352 : I t  was agreed that we wanted to adopt a very integrated approach to whole subjects and in the and what has come out is
a l i s t  o f s ix  care groups. The in ten tion  is that we actua lly  adopt the whole paraonernalia of planning, monitoring, 
reviews and so on and try  to produce an integrated attack on these. The suojects were mental handicao, mental illn e s s , 
information systems, primary care, p os itive  health and orthopaedic services. I agreed to ta lk  to Ralph Rains about these
so tha t we could get a fee ling  of commitment and so on from him and I have also undertaken to ta lk  to my own people on these 
subjects;
353 : The meeting was p rim a rily  o f in te re s t in  that we were prepared to discuss the need to take the organisation and give i t  
o rie n ta tio n  by using 1979 Objectives in th is  way. I f  we can achieve th is  then I th ink tha t a major break through has occurred.
354 : £229 : 20.11.78 I saw Tony today and a note ex is ts . He took up the whole contro l o f cross/department p ro jec ts , 
namely, nursing and engineering control system on the term inal. CSD seem to get the wrong end o f the s tick  on purpose. I
to ld  Tony that th is  was my opinion and tha t both pro jects would come up at the Heads of Deoartment meeting next week. Tony
is now openly saying that he w il l  probably have gone by next Soring. At a meeting w ith G if f  and Tony i t  transpired that in 
the e ffo r t  to upgrade PA, Tony had not been consulted aoout the new job sp ec ifica tio n .
355 : £230 : 20.11.78 I am try in g  to get a major p ro jec t launched on inform ation. Information consumes £15 mil Iion/£20 M.
per year in the NHS and I am convinced that most o f that goes down the drain as fa r as i ts  e ffe c tive  use is  concerned.
During the Summer I tr ie d  va lia n tly  to get Henry concerned about th is  on a national scale and fa ile d  u t te r ly .  During the
w rit in g  o f h j^  computer po licy  i t  became clear that he could not define a GOAL for i t  over the next ten years. And To! he 
worked i t  out that th is  was because NHS managers did not know what they wanted SURPRISE, SURPRISE. 9ut, whereas a £15M spend 
did not merit real support, lack of a GOAL did and so i t  got w ritte n  Into po licy as something to be sorted by July 1979.
356 : E231 : 20.11.78 I took the bu ll by the horns at D iv is iona l Heads and got i t  onto the l i s t  o f 1979 RHA oojectives with
GG in co n tro l. Hy reason for doing th is  is  tha t I can see a Comeittee ge tting  hold o f i t  and then nothing gets done.
357 ; E232 : 20.11.78 I came back and launched I t  w ith Peter and a fte r some explanation, i t  was OK. Talked to Tony about 
i t  and up went a ll the shutters. "Yes provid ing i ts  done properly* e tc , etc. How defensive can you get?
358 : £233 : 20.11.78 We are jus t emerging from a summer of discontent on Natsys. A fte r a ll the mess tha t Henry caused
we are now back w ith a clear 3 phase p ro je c t. Henry Martin has been up to H.O. Committee a ll  over the place to persuade
people that what we are doing is  what they want done.
359 : E234 : 20.11.78 At the Technical Committee we discussed the need fo r more adequate contracts between COR's and the
NHS. Neil Moore came down and tr ie d  to hustle the management team in to  a ll sorts o f committment. He made w ild  statements
about the technical design o f Natsys -  which although not pressed, i t  would have been hard for him to ju s t i f y .  He tr ie d
to claim that we are committed by a ll tha t CSSC had said -  God fo rb id .' He would not respond to G if f 's  overtures to come
and ta lk  about h is d i f f ic u l t ie s . '  We know that he does not get on w ith  h is  bosses -  who would? And his w ife  died from
cancer some time ago.
350 : £235 : 20.11.78 For the past few months, s ta ff in g  in computing and to a lesser extent in I 8 S, has been becoming 
c r i t i c a l .  I t  w il l  be reca lled  that the RCSOs true to form went behind everyone's back to get the problem to s ta f f  and 
management side o f W hitley. The RHSOs got th is  to the RAs who bottom drawered i t  and then kicked i t  for touch. Now the 
thing is  in  limbo -  God only knows when I t  w il l  emerge from that state o f a ffa irs  and in  the meantime we play out a drama
in which the computer service goes to pot.
361 : £236 : 21.11.78 I prepared a b r ie f  fo r D iv is iona l Heads on the 1979 Information Pro ject and then talked to Ralph 
aoout s a ilin g  a pos itive  health sub-project as part o f the Regional Objectives. He was dead pleased, especia lly  as he
has worked in the f ie ld  already. That means that I have worked on G if f ,  HCOs and my chaps re . p os itive  ob jectives in  1979.
362 : E237 : 24.11.78 Before th is  the D iv is iona l Heads met to consider Objectives 1979. G lff said we'd done a great 
job on h is paper fo r Henry Jacques. David got the praise fo r many o f the things I pot in  i t . '  I an tic ipa ted  trouble 
w ith Henry at 10.00 and so did the others. We worked out a careful confrontation stra tegy especia lly on the issues of 
vis ion  and In tegra tion  across boundaries. But i t  went lik e  clockwork. We were a ll  w aiting  fo r him to p u ll h is usual fas t 
one -  pat, pat, pat on the head, now le t 's  ta lk  about my version o f th is . But i t  d id n 't  happen. I t  was in  fact a perfect 
Henry paper. We made sure tha t he accepted our two poin ts . But in fa c t he made some excellent po in ts . C erta in ly  le t 's  
work through the boundaries -  but tha t means d e f in it io n  of ro le  and re s p o n s ib ility  -  not fuzzing them. And i t ' s  a 
p e rfe c tly  va lid  approach. And he accepted tha t what we were ta lk in g  about was taking our planning monitoring too ls and 
tra in in g  and problem solving which are sp ec ific  RHA s k i l ls  and producing an implementable stra tegy fo r the fiv e  deprived 
care groups so that they achieve the goal over the decade.
353 : We were pleased.
364 : Over lunch G if f  brought uo the po in t that Henry had not accepted the consequence that we would therefore be out a lo t
more in 1979 and he, in best s ty le , wanted to get him to accept th is . I was pu tting  the case that he could not win ano
that he was paid 32 to put up w ith the aggro. He's so ft to pretend lik e  th is  and I put my view fo r th r ig h t ly . So we had 
a good go.
365 : £241 : 24.11.78 The main point o f lunch was to establish with Oavid James tha t he was going to have to take over 
the O.R. aodels.
366 : £242 : 31.11.78 I spent two hours w ith Tony and Henry discussing se tting  up the new computer group.
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367 : £244 ; 5.12.78 Oavid is  d ra ftin g  a short oaoer for the ATO oy the 13 jscerber 1978. He w il l  be incorporating a ll o f
the planning options for next year insofar os they are defined. In terns o ' ‘ ethcdology for the plans, I th ink that the
important ings are as fo llow s.
368 : I would l ik e  Peter to have examined the structure  which we w il l  be leaving b as ica lly  unchanged next year and to have 
id e n tifie d  those parts wnich need changing and those oarts which do not need cnanging. I would have hooed that by the end of 
January 1978, we could have Iauncned the S tra teg ic Regional Plan and peoole would nave started to gather together some of the 
parts of i t.
359 : 3y the and o f March 1978 I would have liked  a ll methods for the 1978/9 Plan to be there in b r ie f and by June 1973 a ll
o f the methods including in p a r t ic u la r, the computational devices - be they computer programme or not - should be availab le .
370 : One of the unknowns about the oresent methodology is the comparison methods to oe used in re la tio n  to the Area Plans 
as they come up next Autumn. I t  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  important that we know how we w i l l  compare those Plans to our guide lines.
371 : A p a r t ic u la r ly  important b it  o f th is  process is to get Simon's con tribu tion  to i t  c lea rly  specified a long time in
advance. I include in th is  the m odifications to AAWP which seem to be connected w ith FPC matters next year.
372 : £244 : 10.12.78 I went to the Newtown Computer Steering Committee. The OA had inv ited  me up to I t  fo llow ing the
v is i t  to him. We established that the Plan was misleading. I t  was estaolished to my sa tis fa c tio n  that Newtown did ^  
understand what the 7 Items in  the 1979 programme meant -  le t  alone the ones up to 1983. I estaolished tha t the machine 
would not be over-loaded.
373 : £245 : 21.12.73 We are in to  the Christmas s p ir i t  w ith awengence. I use the parties  unashamedly to make my number 
w ith various people especially our middle managers and scale 14.
374 : £246 : 21.12.78 Henry has done another Christmas 1977 on the Plan. Has woken up at the la s t minute and become 
involved, is  s h if t in g  whole massive chunks from main text to Appendices. Dorothy, Oavid and Peter are swearing at him - 
He should have done i t  three months ago e tc, e tc. I t  might be true. Peter has jus t greeted someone with h is booming 
'good morning* a fte r a day o f threats a ll day yesterday. I t  is  wrong th e o re tic a lly  o f Henry to intervene in th is  way.
I t  is  a lack o f a d e fin ite  theory of using his subordinates. 3UT that is  the way he behaves.
375 : £247 : 21.12.78 G iff and I have talked about the information p ro jec t -  He is  anxious (a) NOT to lose the medical work 
tha t we have done on monitoring and (b) is  anxious aoout the Martin AMO, OCP combination on the committee.
376 : Because 1 have aoandoned work for th is  week, the so ft information flow has become overwhelming. Ralph having missed
out, is  very anxious about the oresent pos ition .
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APPE'SIX 2 -  The Laooratory P ro ject Diary
1 ; 1.2.78 Tony Peers oronised me the case 'o r  getting r id  o f the Delta coaouters (DC).
2 : 15.2.78 The National Ca.aoany make proposal that we buy six macnines.
3 : 17.2.73 The Avon Regional S oecifica tion  based on Ralton is ready and oeing discusseo througnout the Region.
4 : 5.3.78 Oldtown send in lengthy aaendments to the spec ifica tion  ( le t te r ) .
5 : 7.3.78 Newton accent the Regional spec ifica tion  - out add comments ( le t te r ) .
5 : 7.3.78 Eastbury agree to spec ifica tion  with reservations ( le t te r ) .
7 : 13.2.78 A consolidated version of North Area comments is c irc u la tin g . Attached to these are fu rthe r undated North Area
comments. (Robert Jones found i t  necessary to id e n tify  th ir ty  four seoarate points in that paoer.' Was he meticulous?
Was he p la in  defensive? Or, was i t  a bad soec?).
3 : 13.3.78 3arry Hunt is  try ing  to get me involved in a big way.
9 : 15.3.78 Sarry Hunt said that North Area pathologists accept the Regional spec ifica tio n  except for a few minor d e ta ils
(a ll  34 I presume).
10 : 1 .4.78 3arry Hunt is  s ta rtin g  to gun for Computer Services in  a big way. Trying to blame them for a D elta decision.
11 : 5.4.78 3arry Hunt is  try ing  to bu lly  me.' State who is responsible fo r recommending Delta.'
12 ; 14.4.78 The f i r s t  note of a telephone conversation (w ith Barry Hunt) regarding Lancaster followed by a ll  sorts o f
inform ation and gossip.
13 : 20.4.73 John J a rra tt is  complaining b it te r ly  about not ge tting  his Phase 2.
14 : 20.4.78 Tony Peers is  strongly recommending National.
15 : 20.4.78 Tony Peers says he has a uthority  to design a standard system fo r Region. He claims that i t  was agreed in
November 1977. Barry Hunt does not agree, Tony sends me a long, long memo to try  to force National.
John J a rra tt gives a grudging acceptance to Phase I .  But goes on to press fo r Phase 2.
16 : 3.5.78 Throughout th is  period. Head O ffice are making a ll  sorts o f o ff-s tage  moves.
17 : 4.5.78 Meeting w ith North Area Pathologists to try  and get National Comoany Spec, accepted. Tony Peers was not there.
I could feel the d is tru s tfu l eyes of Garth Boles and Robert Jones on me a ll  the time. ' V i I I  he back us?*. How on earth do you 
get in to  a meeting lik e  th is  on a spec, agreement w ithout the th ing cut and dried? Barry Hunt was said to be anti-spec a ll the 
time. He played a typ ica l hand " D i f f ic u l t  to get through RHA.' Not sure I can accept a ll these amendments. D i f f ic u l t  to 
get capita l in th is  year.*
18 : Max Hart sat grinning lik e  a Cheshire cat -  pretending tha t he could le t  the whole matter flow over his head. He was
ready to fend o f f  anyone try in g  to prescribe a system for Eastbury.
19 : Alec Johns from Ralton (base of Regional Spec) muebled and grumbled about waste o f time.
20 : I played the game o f gently getting  the people to agree. Eventually, Pat H il ls  came o f f  the fence and then the others 
followed so fa s t I t  was not true. Only canny John from Sleeton said *1 can 't decide because I've  not had tim e .'
21 : For some odd reason Pat H ills  wanted us to buy two systems.'
22 : In the car park afterwards, Sam the technician grumbled lik e  he ll about Barry's behaviour in  the meeting.
23 : 4.5.78 I attended a meeting o f North Area path, people today to try  and get the soec. agreed fo r the f in a l time.
Tony Peers should have done th is  already. Sarry Hunt played the Regional game. M 3 if f ic u lt to get through the RHA.
Not sure that I accept a ll  these amendments. Attacked by colleagues. Capital in  th is  year. Max Hart sat there grinning 
lik e  a Cheshire ca t. *1 don 't have to decide ye t* - but watching and ready to pounce or assert h is au thority  in Portsmouth.
Pat H il ls  was the most sensible man there but wanting to get ahead and spend the cash th is  year. Can't we buy two systems?
GG in s is tin g  tha t tha t is  not on. Barry Hunt says *Got to go through the capita l hoop again next year*. A ll sorts o f 
assertions o f power by Barry. Fundamentally re in fo rc in g  his pos itio n .
24 : 8.5.78 Robert Jones sets out a deta iled rep ly  to North Area's comments.
25 : 12.5.78 I had lunch w ith Martin Vi 111 am and Barry Hunt th is  week and M artin got to sermonising about Avon. His tirade 
was fa n ta s tic , showing a ll  o f h is b it te r  resentment against Avon. No lead from Region -  and th is  desoite the cock up on 
Northern Teaching Hospita l. He wants Newton Hospital more heavily used -  or so he says -  whether p rac tica l or not. Patients 
to come from Oldtown and d is t r ic t .  Does he s ta r t to rea lise  how d i f f i c u l t  to negotiate that would be.' He hates the Plan, 
despite the fa c t tha t he has gone along w ith i t  -  No option Chairman lik e s  i t .  He is  now saying tha t Management Services 
D iv is ion  must do service planning. He was going on about Head O ffice  ins truc tio n s  to spend cash on s c ie n t if ic  equipment in  a 
p a rt ic u la r manner. Fuelled by Barry who is not expert at any o f these th ings.
26 : 15.5.78 Barry Hunt says London Co. spec cannot be accepted.
27 : 19.5.78 Barry Hunt came in early th is  morning to announce tha t ^  had decided the London Co. Laboratory system could not
be accepted. He is  convinced that a lte rna tives  might be available  next year. I am convinced tha t he is  power mad. At a
meeting la s t Friday, a ll  but one o f the Region's labora tories said 'ye s ' to the Regional spec. V ithout real re s p o n s ib ility
or power, Barry is  taking action against the recommendation. He says he is  w il l in g  to buy National or despite
the fac t tha t Tony advises him not to take the action . I f e l t  tha t he was try in g  to take advantage of me and to put me at a
disadvantage. I found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to deal w ith Barry.
28 : 21.5.78 I try  to persuade Henry Jacques to support London Co. on the basis that we cannot lose.
29 : 23.5.78 Martin and Barry and I talked computing. I t  was obvious that Martin had been got at by Barry since I heard
everyone o f Barry's arguments coming out o f M artin 's  mouth. I f e l t  l iv id  -  maybe hurt pride at being out manoeuvred. No one
except Tony Peers re a lly  fee ls that London Co. are the 'r ig h t '  firm  fo r the job, although they can orobably do the job. I wrote
out a case g iving the log ica l case for doing the job through London Co. by turnkey contract. O f f ic ia l ly  we cannot lose.'
Area's
30;: Barry Hunt keeos ta lk in g  about the major mistake to prepare a spec and so ge tting  r ig h t up Vest/ nose because i t  is  th e ir  
spec.'
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31 : I think Graham Pate must be aeeved beyond measure a fte r a ll that West Area has lone. I have agreea to ta lk  to West Area 
Committee. I try  to get Henry Jacques involved in London Co. decision.
32 : 23.5.78 On laooratory comouiing, I had an equally bad time with Martin. Sarry had got at Martin and Martin tro tted  out 
a ll  the arguments. And there is no douot that there is a oanooly of them to be argued. No one exceot Tony is  confidant that 
London Co. can do the joo, althougn they prooaoly can. I have w ritten  a note on f i le  that sets out the case. 3ut ly  in s t in c t 
te l ls  me that trouble is round the oend on th is  one. Barry Hunt has alienated the West Area grouo wnich designed the soec.
by re fe rr in g  to i ts  "major West Area mistake* and not ta lk in g  to i t .  This is  yet another examole of Tony's lack o f judgement.
33 : Granao Pate, wno has shepherded the West Area aoo lication  through consideraole storms, is ju s t i fia o ly  peeved beyond
measure. I have agreed to meet West Area.
34 : 23.5.73 Memo : Oevelopment of Laboratory Comouting in Avon.
35 : There are two .major parts o f laboratory computing:- (a) The d ire c t control of and reading from laboratory instruments,
and (b) the data processing o f the resu lts  obtained in (a) to produce usable reports fo r c lin ic ia n s .
Other a c t iv it ie s  such as cumulative reoorts and archiving are often combined w ith (b) to produce a quite  coaolex data orocessing 
a c tiv i ty .
36 : In the early days o f laboratory computing, attemots were made to combine (a) and (b) into  one system and very mixed resu lts  
were obtained. Following the development o f mi n i-computers, i t  became possible to bu ild  (a) into the analysers themselves:
thus leaving (b) as the major problem area in labo ra to ries . Developments in Avon have concentrated on the (b) proolem.
37 : Following the collapse o f the H.O. Project at Sleeton, a spec ifica tio n  o f a (b) type system was prepared and has been made 
to work in the laboratory according to sp ec ifica tio n . Currently attempts (which w il l  probably succeed) to remove an unforeseen 
snag are being made. I t  w il l  be d i f f i c u l t  to find resources to improve th is  system due to i ts  lim ite d  l i f e  and aop iication  
throughout the Region.
38 : On the basis o f the Sleeton exoerience, and on the basis o f other work in the country, a Regional sp ec ifica tio n  has been
prepared. I t  is  basica lly  an 'Alpha* system with add itions. Alpha was developed at the XY2 Hospital using a National computer
another laboratory in the H.O. Laboratory P ro ject. At a meeting on 12th May, i t  was decided that th is  sp ec ifica tio n  was
adequate for a ll labora tories, except Sleeton, for which a reserved position  was taken.
39 : For various reasons, Sal ton Laooratory was the f i r s t  laooratory requ iring  th is  type of support. Tenders were sought and
a Delta Computer was bought. One o f the main reasons fo r th is  choice was that i t  was thought that supporting software for
laooratory apolications would be availaole on th is  computer -  the source being Region 7 where several such systems have been 
bought. I t  has transpired that that b e lie f is  not well founded. S im ilar support was sought from Surnage where a Delta has 
also been bought. The system appeared to work also and plans to use that software were made. However, that system collaosed.
40 : There are only two ways o f avoiding errors o f judgement o f th is  type. Either the Computer Services Department in s is ts  on
buying only fu l ly  documented properly supported systems or contracts fo r such fu l ly  documented systems are entered in to  with 
suppliers. There is  a r is k  in  any arrangement, but e it 'ie r  o f these sourses of action should reduce the r is k  s ig n if ic a n t ly .
The relevance o f th is  becomes clear below.
41 : Two courses of action are possible fo r the Delta computer. E ither i t  can be sold or i t  can be stored u n t il a system can 
be optaineo from Burnage. The la t te r  course o f action is  fu l l  o f hazards in view o f the probable lack o f support from Bur nage.
42 : The present s itu a tio n  appears to be as fo llow s. (a) Of the Companies aoproached at the time o f tender, only London Co.
has offered a package deal. (b) The Alpha systems appear to be available on National equipment from XYZ but is not fu l ly
documented. The equipment is  expensive. (c) Limp ton laboratory in conjunction w ith Region 8  and Orion are trans fe rring  
a s tra ig h t copy o f Alpha to Orion equipment. I t  is  not documented although th is  is  said to be being undertaken. Hayoe a 
transferable system w il l  be available in the Spring o f 1979.
Note: There is  evidence that a ll  the 'Alpha systems* are developing d if fe re n t ly  from the User viewpoint. I t  is  uncertain
exactly what might be available  next year.
43 : I t  should not be thought tha t insistence on adequate documentation Is a computer man's qu irk . To the best o f our 
knowledge, the Avon Specifica tion  is  the only comprehensive statement o f what a system is  required to do - even i f  much o f i t  
has been cu lled  from elsewhere. I f  the system and programs are not documented, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  i f  not impossible to change 
the system. Wheter th e o re tica lly  necessary or not, the fa c t is  that input and output is  geared to p a rt ic u la r  hosp ita ls  and • 
labora to ries . Without Computer Department support fo r th is  fine tuning work the systems w il l  not match the d if fe re n t requ ire ­
ments and good documentation is essential to that a c t iv ity .
44 ; The problem facing the Region is  to determine a course o f action which w il l  give i t  a maintainable system over the next ten 
years. I t  should have the potentia l to provide a comprehensive service , e .g. to include haematology at some stage. I t  must be 
adjustable to f i t  a ll  the s itua tions in the Region and a po tentia l to develop must be present.
45 : I t  has been suggested that there is no immediate requirement to f u l f i l l  an urgent need at th is  time. This may be so but
i t  is  important to decide how fa r more pressing needs in  larger labora tories w il l  be met In the fu tu re . A foundation o f
knowledge concerning laboratory coeouting e x is ts . I t  may be very unwise to delay and so r is k  s lipp ing  back from our present 
s ta te . I t  is  not c lear that delay w il l  provide a bette r way forward next year. I t  seems ce rta in  that the Orion could be
the only viable Regional a lte rna tive  -  and that is  unproven.
46 : There is no cast iron way forward, but i t  is  our opinion that nothing can be lo s t and much could be gained by negotia ting
w ith  National the possible purchase of one machine on the basis o f the attached le t te r .  A b ette r contract w il l  probably be
possible. I t  is  thought possible to negotiate w ith National a contract which w il l  provide a fu l ly  documented system capable 
o f adaption fo r any laboratory in the Region. Although the National hardware may not be as modern as some other, there is  no 
doubt that the extensive use of that hardware throughout the world w il l  ensure adequate National support fo r a very long time.
There is every reason to suppose that N ationa l's present acquaintance w ith  Alpha should ensure that they are cpaols o f
producing the systee. Providing that a ca re fu lly  negotiated acceptance clause forms part o f the contract, i t  appears most 
l ik e ly  that the Region w il l  possess at least one fu l ly  working and supportable system by March 1979. This course o f action is 
recommended.
47 : In our view, the consequences of not fo llow ing a pos itive  course o f action at th is  time w il l  be. (a) A loss of 
expertise in  Avon, especially in the Computer Deoartsent. The value o f th is  is considerable.
(b) Sowing seeds of d isillusionmenz among patholog is ts . ( c)The not n eg lig ib le  r is k  o f not having a bette r base to work Tom 
next yaar and (d) i f  an option to take more than one system is not negotiated, the disposal o f the Deltas w il l  be d i f f i c u l t .
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- 8  : 25.5.73 I have today sent a recomcencation to the RTO on the laooratory system and I feel vulnerable. Despite everything 
done by Tony Peers, the pathologists do not feel happy aoout the London Co. equipment. The case fo r waiting for Orion is , on 
the face o f i t ,  very strong. But Head O ffice are wary. The costs to Avon are quite high in any case. But the case for waiting 
w il l  carry because i t  avoids peoole maxing nasty aecisions.
43 : 25.5.78 I am s t i l l  try ing  to get Henry vacques involved. Orion put forward th e ir  f i r s t  hardware proposal.
50 : 25.5.73 Laooratory Comouting in Avon.
51 : I am not here next week. i t  a clear way forwara on laboratory computing is not available by the end of May, I shall have 
to redeploy s ta f f  on other work las tin g  a minimum of three to five  months.
52 : Subsequent to w rit in g  th is  -e ro, Ralton Laooratory has asxed that the requirement o f th e ir  new laboratory equipment be 
catered for by th is  package. 'we believe that th is  can oe done.
53 ; The main snag about the London CC proposal is  that i t  is not clear how we get haematology and other laboratory a c t iv it ie s
onto the system in due course. E ither we have got to set up a team or London CC does i t  for us at a yet to be determined p rice .
The snag is obvious in th is  la t te r  course o f action but we believe that a system could be provided by Avon.
54 : I f  the RTO cannot see i ts  way to contracting for more than one system, subject to complete sa tis fa c tio n  on the part o f
Avon w ith the f i r s t ,  then the London Co. o ffe r is  lass re levant. A price for one system only could be negotiated and we 
estimate that i t  would be about £ r  . 4  In our opinion, i t  is  un like ly  that London Co. would undertake the development work 
w ithout some contract from Avon.
55 : 5.6.78 Barry Hunt was in today and I was try in g  desperately to avoid him. In the event i t  transpired that a ll  he wished
to arrange was a v is i t  to XYZ and Limpion. He had fixed th is  and by good fortune I have managed to a rrive  on the same tra in
to Limpton as Pat H il ls .  This should give me an advantage in that Pat H il ls  is  ra p id ly  emerging as one o f the forces in
laboratory computing in the Region. I f  we can have a good ta lk  on the way to Limpton, nothing but good can come o f th is  time.
However, i t  is  an awful long time to f i l l  w ith someone whom you know only s l ig h t ly .
56 : 8.6.78. Max Hart, Barry Hunt and I v is ite d  XYZ and saw a remarkable display o f h is  National Alpha Laboratory. I t  
covered biochemistry, haematology and was being extended to cover m icrobiology, etc. They had transferred the system to new 
equipment. I t  was a real time system -  /DUs in both labs and on a ward fo r enquiry only.
57 : He had h is  o ffic e  in  a lab and made coffee for you h in s e lf. T a ll, obviously cared fo r him self. Barry said a p o li t ic ia n .
Not a nasty one. Barry said he wanted the system in  another lab -  a nasty remark re a lly . His conversation was a t r i f l e
brusque but he listened ca re fu lly  and sympathetically to what one said. He joked about Derby Day to a complete stranger in the
loo . He got us a simple lunch in h is  lab. He demonstrated the system w ith  expertise - knew the command words, edited w ith 
s k i l l  on a WO. He reminded le  o f syse if w ith the AF2 model.
58 : Max talked to the operator, got impressed and genuinely f e l t  pleased at being there.
59 : Barry put on h is show afterwards. Could not understand Tony, e tc , e tc . Max was pu ttin g  on a show -  th a t's  what I want.
For no good set o f reasons.
60 : 5.5.78 A bid is  made to put Delta in a Physics Deoartsent.
51 : 9.6.78 Today I went over to West Area at the express in v ita tio n  o f Graham Pate, to th e ir  Path Working Party at Squarevilie.
Graham, PC and lab people were there. I acted out the wise man again. Put the a lte rna tives  to the meeting. I picked up the
ira te  comments. 'We haven't seen the London spec.*.
52 : PC asked me to note what he was saying tw ice. But expressed sincere fa ith  in me personally.
63 ; 10.6.73 I have w ritten  various notes on lab computing which are on f i l «  and which are important.
64 : I fin d  myself w ith the fo llow ing dilemmas on my hands.
(a) I have no good reason but I d is tru s t the advice being given by my own people to go to London Co.
(b) I d is tru s t Tony's bias towards London Co. (c) 'We are to ta l ly  London Co. o rien ta ted .
(d) Ralph says that Barry Is not to be trusted and has not got the support o f h is  consultant colleagues.
(e) I t  is  said to be wellknown that consultant
( f )  Garth Boles and W illy  James w il l  probably leave. And then we w il l  be in a mess on the other fro n ts .
(g) The v ia b i l i t y  o f the whole Department is  questionable.
(h) Barry Hunt pays l ip  service. ( l )  Martin is  completely incapable o f coming to a decision. *Go away, th ink again, 
agree something w ith Barry.*
( j )  Barry does d ia ls  that he does not te l l  you about, e.g. promising some more equipment to David James.
55 : 12.6.78 : Memo: Comments on the v is it s  to XYZ Hospital and the West Area Steering Committee.
6 6  ; I th ink that i t  is  useful i f  1 put down my fee lings on both o f these v is it s  fo r you so that we are aware o f each o the r's
pos ition .
67:: There is  no doubt that the d isplay put on by Wood at the XYZ Hospital was very impressive. I t  should be borne in  mind
tha t that system applied to XYZ and was designed fo r th e ir  purpose. There is  no way o f knowing at th is  po in t in time that
that system does f i t  Sleeton*s requirements. Although I am sure Dr J a rra tt was impressed by the display which Wood put on and 
the ra te at which he could operate the system, i t  is  s t i l l  a fa c t that Dr J a rra tt has not studied the de ta il o f tha t system.
This is  due to the fa c t that there is  no system spec ifica tio n  for him to study. The enthusiasm o f both Dr J a rra tt and Dr
Max Hart in Eastbury fo r the XYZ system is  not based on a thorough understanding o f the jobs which the system w il l  do fo r them 
but on the very superb display which Wood provided.
6 8  : There is  a serious question to be answered as to whether or not the hardware in the Sleeton Laboratory is  adequate to do
the job which 'Wood does. An investiga tion  o f th is  needs to be undertaken. I t  goes w ithout saying that i f  there is any need 
whatsoever to buy additional National hardware fo r the Sleeton Laboratory for th is  experiment, th is  would be a major drawback 
as fa r as the Region is  concerned.
69 : Wood very k ind ly  offered to support the transfer to the Sleeton Laboratory, even to the extent o f w rit in g  some o f the
programmes which Dr J a rra tt requires. 'We need to check very c a re fu lly  the extent o f these programmes and I do not th ink that
i t  is  s u ff ic ie n t to assume tha t i t  only concerns Or J a r ra tt 's  card system. A thorough check and costing of tha t work needs to
be undertaken.
70 : You are undoubtedly aware of the fa c t that Tony Peers over the past year examined a ll  o f the Alpha systems and 'las some
:oomen*s to make on the s u ita b i l ity  o f the XYZ system for the Sleeton Laooratory. I have asked tin  'o orovide you w ith a
complete l i s t  o f the comments wnich he co llected during that period o f time.
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71 : I am sura that you would agree w itr ce that any transfer o f tha Alpha system from XYZ to Sleeton must be based an a 
thorough understanding of the costs and consequences o f doing th is . Everyone would wisn for th is  to be successfuJ but i t  would 
be fo o iisn  not to ca re fu lly  count the c o s ts  and s lo t the way of doing th is  before the exercise is  unaertaken and before any
e x p lic it  proaise is nade to Dr ja r r a t t  that th is  w il l  be undertaken by the Region on h is behalf.
72 : I an sound to say that I was somewnat surprised at the West Area meeting to fine that the need for the Ralton equionent 
had disapoeared so d e f in ite ly  and so oersuasively. This ooviously makes a huge d ifference to the need fo r a London Co. system 
at th is  time. Nevertheless, I th ink that you must aopreciate tha: tnere are more factors involved than the c lin ic a l need for 
the Ralton system.
73 : Whatever system comes into the Region, i t  is  my view that we are going to have to provide suoport 'o r i t .  I have 
inforaed you that I th ink that one of the major consequences of a decision not to go anead, however reasonaole i t  aay apoear, 
w il l  be the disappearance o f the people who are capable o f supporting such a system in the Computer Department. I th ink i t  
only fa ir  to point out to you that I oo not think that we w il l  be able to replace these senior people. A recent report has 
shown that NHS sa laries are now fa l l in g  well behind the computer salary market and the comouter press is now fu l l  of advertise­
ments fo r s ta f f .  I t  may see# strange for the oreservation o f adequate comouting expertise to be the major reason fo r going
ahead with the ICL purchase at th is  time but I feel bound to warn you that i t  may be d i f f i c u l t  to go ahead w ith any equivalent
development at a la te r time, say next year, i f  the oresent s ta f f  leave. One o f the fundamental questions which you w il l  have 
to answer is whether the cost o f working the National Co. system is  too great a p rice  to pay fo r the possible maintenance of 
adequate support expertise in  the Region.
74 : I t  is  not only a question o f adequate support fo r laboratory systems, these are the people who we re ly  on fo r th is  type 
o f computing. They have, fo r example, done such o f the work to support the three peripheral computers in the Region, 
especia lly that at Newton. The seriousness of losing th is  s ta f f  should not be under-estimated on any account.
75 : 12.6.73 Need fo r West Area system disaopears.'
75 : This appears to have been my main reason for abandoning London Co.
77 ; I te l l  Barry Hunt and Martin that whatever Aloha comes to Avon i t  w il l  have to be supported.
78 : 14.6.78 : Diary Note on a v is i t  to Limpton w ith Dr Pat H il ls ,  Garth Boles, Barry Hunt and John J a rra tt.
79 : Over the past few months, we have been try in g  to negotiate a way forward on computing. During that time, the Alpha 
system in the XYZ Hospital has become a contester for the pos ition  o f Regional standard system in competition w ith the London 
Co. package. I have described elesewhere the various goings on on the London Co. package and the way in which a very comolex 
s itu a tio n  has developed. This consists o f a ttitudes o f people on the shop flo o r towards London Co, things which Barry Hunt 
is doing to s h if t  the timetable in Ralton, and due to the insistence of Barry Hunt, we have been up to Limpton for two days - 
namely, the 14th and 15th June 1978 in an attemot to assess the Limpton system.
80 : I went up w ith Pat H il ls  and Garth Boles. My in ten tion  was to try  to corner Pat H il ls  fo r the whole journey. Garth's 
presence did not allow th is . The second thing was tha t the tra in  uo to London was crowded and in fact I had to s i t  there 
ta lk in g  about nothing. I did not an tic ipa te  th is  -  maybe I should have gone up to Newton to ta lk  to Pat H il ls  by himself in an 
atmosphere which I could control e n t ire ly . The journey up to Limoton was somewnat more successful. In the actual 1st class 
carriage I got Pat to s ta r t ta lk ing  coolly and sensibly with Garth Boles lis te n in g  to the fact tha t we have got no a lte rn a tive  
but to l is te n  to the Alpha at Limpton being described. Pat H il ls  was obviously a respected person. He talked quite  
sensibly about the pathologists and th e ir  commitment and topics re la ted to th is  sort o f th ing . He was q u ie t. I f  anything his
pos ition  had been established by his declaration that he was in favour o f the London Co. and he ac tua lly  tripped o f f  the
acceptance by the pathologists o f the Computer Department's proposal.
81 : 1 was astonished at how r ig id  Garth Boles was. I f  th is  is  a ll  the tra in in g  and a ttitu d e  changing tha t we have been able
to incu lca te , I have got to ta lk  to Tony about him. On the way up I also discovered that Pat H il ls  was a TA reserve doctor who
want o f f  on camps a ll  over the place se tting  up hospitals.and so on. I also discovered that Garry Kay was a member o f the 
s ignals set up who spent h is  weekends in 'dug ou ts ' watching for planes and so on.
82 : I did get Pat H il ls  to myself over lunch. During the meal I talked re a lly  qu ite  openly about some o f the problems which
I had w ith tha s ta f f  and .............  He obviously knew that side of the problem quite w e ll. I asked him to ta lk  to the ch ie f
when i t  was possib le, in order to try  to get them to th ink ob jec tive ly  aoout the s itu a tio n  and recognise that despite th e ir 
seeming lack o f progress. In fact consideraole progress has been made. Somehow or other they have got to coma to terms with 
the re s u lt o f the D elta . This they are going to find  d i f f i c u l t  because they are ra tio n a lis in g  lik e  mad to try  and get out
from under and make i t  a ll  acceotable to th e ir  own minds.
83 : We went out to the hotel in Limpton -  a long way out In a taxi driven by a nurse who had to work two nights a week d riv ing  
ta x is  to make ends meet. His w ife drove tax is  another two nights a week when he stayed home. I was struck by the d if fe re n t 
image which he presented to tha t o f the normal nurse as we p ic tu re  him. 'The angels o f mercy flo a tin g  around'. The contrast 
was exceedingly great. Here was a guy who was being pushed to a ll  sorts o f l im its  wha re a lly  was a rough diamond -  not a 
smoothy at a l l .
84 : In the hotel that n ight we sat d rinking u n t il one o 'c lo ck , in the middle o f a dance flo o r o f sons so rt -  having been ousted 
from the bar by a coach party who were doing the 'can can' round the place. The S c ie n t if ic  O ffice r from a Northern Region, 
together w ith a computer chap was there. I purposefully and in s is te n tly  put the questions which had got to be answered in  the 
presence o f John J a rra tt and Barry Hunt ano the other character from Northern Region. These people claim to be s c ie n tis ts .
One o f the best methods o f getting  hold o f them is to take them on the s c ie n tic ic  set o f values to appeal to th e ir  s c ie n t if ic
nature. I pointed out gently the fa c t that they did not know what the Alpha was about. That they did not know whether i t
f i t t e d  th e ir  laboratories or not. in the quietness o f the evening, d rinking  p in ts  round a brass tooped tab le , issues which 
they knew about were gently pressed home. Pat H il ls  went to bed early . He is  a very nice character. His manners are
superb. He is  gracious, making sure that you always get offared things. He is  gentle.
85 : in the morning, i t  became clear tha t the Limpton people had la id  on a demonstration which was the best that they could
possib ly do. in a sense they had been preparing for an exh ib ition  in September and th is  was a sort o f f i r s t  run at i t  to try
and get some o f th e ir  own thoughts s tra ig h t. A person from the MS deoartment in North Region, John, picked me uo in the car
together w ith Garth Boles and the other systems designer from Northern. In fact the poor chap got g r il le d  in the car r ig h t
in to  town. I desperately tr ie d  to d ive rt the conversation onto the greenery around us but could not re s is t the opportunity
to g r i l l  the guy a l i t t l e .  I also maoe sure that my profuse aoologies got back to RMSO 5 because I hao not managed to contact 
him before going up there.
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8 6  : Two of RMSO 5 's peoole turned up -  a systems designer and a g i r l .  The q ua lity  o f the s ta f f  was p re tty  high. The g ir l  
was d e lig h t fu lly  Northern coming *>om Middlesoorough and having soent a ll of her l i f e  in  that part o f the world. We were 
talked to during the morning. Rather i t  would be fa ire r  to say that they atterpted to ta lk  to us and they got themselves 
interruoted at frequent in te rva ls  by a ll of us. They did th e ir  very best to answr the questions which we ra ised. The thing 
which emerged quite c lea rly  is that our conceot of a simole transfer of ALPHA to Limpton was very far from the tru th . They 
were trans fe rring  the inoortant part of ALPHA. They were leaving other b its  to a la te r stage. They were obviously planning 
even at th is  stage to change ALPHA quite  substan tia lly  to f i t  in with the Limpton D is t r ic t  Path Service. Harry Peers, the 
Consultant Patholog ist, was exceedingly proud o f what they were try ing  to do. Afterwards both John J a rra tt and Sarry could 
not re s is t making remarks aoout the level o f work in the Limpton laboratory which is obviously quite low in comoarison with 
our big ones but not so low compared w ith Ralton. The remarks varied la te r  in  the day from "coming in at ID to going at 4" to
'Holiday camp'. I am re a lly  quite in trigued by th is , because in a sense i t  snows the fac t that they find  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to be 
re a lly  nasty and they were le f t  in some d if f ic u l t y  because o f the apparent naivety and openness and pleasure which the man 
showed. He was gracious in many l i t t l e  ways and yet there was no doubt tha t ne cannot possibly oe more than an average 
Consultant.
87 :Two other actors on the stage were two Regional S c ie n t if ic  O ffice rs . One man was a very quiet guy. Ha talked to us and 
tr ie d  to explain Regional p o licy . He gave ra tiona l answers. Barry's opinion o f him was tha t in fac t he was not te r r ib ly  
e ffe c tiv e . The obvious contrast between him and Barry Hunt in the way tha t they would approach any matter might count fo r th is . 
He did say that he was going to go to the a u th oritie s  to get fu rth e r resources fo r th is  p ro ject in  September and i t  w il l  be 
in te res ting  to see whether or not th is  happens. I f  i t  does, b u lly  fo r him and another comment on dear old Barry. The
other Regional S c ie n t if ic  O ffice r from Northern Region was a very pleasant hearty fe llow  whom i t  was impossible not to I lk ? .
He had obviously done his homework and got quite a b i t  o f work dona on th is  subject by h is own 0 S fi people. He obviously 
knew what had been going on in the res t of the country and could ta lk  coherently about i t .
8 8  : I made sure that a ll the major technical questions were asked. F irs t ly  those which concern the basic f i l in g  system.
I t  is  in te re s tin g  that I should be the one asking these sorts of questions. There are two reasons fo r doing th is , in a meeting 
o f th is  so rt. F irs t to find  information and second to impress on people lik e  Barry Hunt and the pathologists the importance 
o f these sorts o f issues and to get them into the ways in which they th ink . I th ink tha t they have started to appreciate at 
long la s t tha t some of the technical issues and issues lik e  documentation are important in a p rac tica l sense to themselves and 
i t  is  c lear that Tony and h is people have simply not managed to communicate th is  so rt o f issue to them.
89 : At lunch I ins is ted  on co lla r in g  one o f the two jun io r technical peoole and s it t in g  by her. I very c a re fu lly  balanced 
a cross-questioning of the technical b its  o f the system w ith c h it chat about herse lf and Limpton and her ch ild ren  and her 
home. Apart from being very pleasant, i t  revealed to myself certa in  o f my own ch a ra c te ris tics . The lunch is  exceedingly 
useful in tha t i t  ce rta in ly  managed to cement a re la tlo n sn ip  there. One can be qu ie tly  confident tha t in due course they w il l  
transfer tha ALPHA system onto the Orion software. One can be ra ther less confident tha t a fu l ly  documented system w il l  evolve.
90 : During the afternoon, demonstrations of the b its  which were cu rren tly  working were given to us. I looked at the displays 
fo r a few minutes but in fac t I spent most o f the time quizzing people p r iv a te ly . A great deal o f d isqu ie t was exoressed about 
the way in  which London Co. were dealing w ith th e ir  commi tment to Alpha -  changing horses, doing a ll  sorts o f things exceot to 
get th e ir dates fo r  commitment. Not a very happy scene at a ll  in  ay view. I also renewed my acquaintance w ith  Alan Whitlow
of Orion and talked to th e ir people. Alan is s t i l l  the same epen, qu ie t, somewhat naive in  some respects. I t  obviously is not 
appropriate to go on at length, a ll  I did was re a lly  to chuck out a few facts  on the costs and ca p a b ilitie s  fo r expansion o f the 
system and renew our fr ie n d ly  re la tionsh ip  -  ta lk  about old times, e tc . I t  also became clear that Tony S lsse tt was quite  an 
important character in Orion, so perhaps I w il l  try  and get Tony interested in th is  a f fa ir .
91 : An in te re s tin g  side issue was th e ir  view o f the NHS as being an organisation w ith which i t  is  very d i f f i c u l t  to deal. They
had not thought up methods o f doing I t  and in  a sense th is  tie s  in  with the image which I have got o f tha t p a rt ic u la r  company.
They could break in to  the NHS market so easily  i f  they tr ie d .
92 : And so the day drew to i ts  close and we were taken to Limpton Station and safely got onto the tra in .  Barry Hunt, John
J a rra tt,  myself and from Preston Garth Boles sat together. John is  in f in i te ly  more clever clever I suspect. Inev itab ly  in
circumstances l ik e  th is  a lo t  o f the time is f i l le d  by te l l in g  s to ries  which demonstrate persp icac ity , wisdom and th ings o f 
th is  nature. John and Barry re la ted  how they had been adventurers in to  the unknown buying equipment fo r labo ra to ries , taking 
important decisions which i f  they had gone wrong would have exposed them to a l l  sorts o f r id ic u le ,  e tc , e tc . Barry talked about 
the need to balance service against research against making people happy and the in f in i te  wisdom which he uses in  th is  process 
and I have no doubt tha t in a sense a ll  o f these things are being done and yet In another sense the so rt o f top level th inking 
tha t ought to be d ire c tly  such a c t iv ity  -  the a n ly tic a l th inking -  simply is  not there. Sarry ine v ita b ly  went back and talked
about RJ's re ign  in  Avon. I t  was then clear tha t John walked round the Region lik e  the King -  he thumped the ta b le , people
put out the red carpet and people knew that they had to do th is . The way in  which he combined th is  w ith his own sense of 
humour and sat o f values in a sense accounts fo r the fa c t tha t he was given a gong. But then Sarry Hunt desribes us as
operating on the basis o f h is fee lings using judgements, e tc , e tc . I have a suspicion that ha is  fundamentally wrong. I
doubt i f  RJ ever had any real ana ly tica l a b i l i t y  but he c e rta in ly  had considerable acumen and judgement and knowledge o f people 
and how to get things done in OHSS and so on. On the journey one had the in te res ting  s igh t o f Barry and Dr J a rra tt b a ttlin g
around in  th is  pool try in g  to get some o f the g lory rubbing o f f  on themselves. I am not being unkind. I am quite  sure that
Ja rra tt in p a rt ic u la r is  a h ign ly competent guy but operating at th is  sort o f level is  not his fo rte  and yet he wants to do i t  
so badly. I bought the drinks and in is ted  on doing th is . I also gave them a ll a l i t t l e  lecture on the s tructure  o f getting  
things done. I t  was fasc ina ting  how Barry attempted that he had not analysed th inks lik e  th is  but immediately re-asserted that 
he s t i l l  operated as e f f ic ie n t ly  using h is 7th or 8 th sense and ............................
93 : On the way from London I took the opportunity o f try in g  to ta lk  to Garth Boles about some o f the lessons which we lea rn t
and how he ought to be try in g  to analyse the s itu a tio n  in order to do th is . I said some quite hard things quite  n ice ly  to him.
With a drink in  fro n t o f him he was in a mood to l is te n . Over the period o f about 50 minutes I went through some o f the main 
features o f th is  case w ith him. I did not hesita te to go into  areas in which he was bound to be ra ther sensitive  and I talked 
about them q u ie tly  w ith a view to ge tting  him to analyse and face r e a l i ty ,  pu tting  aside h is own fee lings o f resentment and 
hurt and facing uo to the fa c t tha t at the end o f the day the DELTA recommendation had been wrong. I talked to him about th e 
lack o f confidence that the pathologists had got. I talked to him about the fac t that taking a system from X was in fac t 
re ly ing  on things they knew aoout and X was a gooo cnao whatever else he was. I talked to him aoout bias and about peoole's 
need to re ins ta te  themselves in th e ir  own eyes and the lengths to which they w il l  go to do th is . I talked to him about his 
own obvious resentments and oointed out to him that in the circumstances he was incaoable of seeing and learning about what
he had done and that In these circumstances he was incpaole of becoming b e tte r. So I suppoes that that was an hour's 
counselling which I hope had some e ffe c t. I t  is  a ll  the more e ffe c tive  because I was drinking h is beer.
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94 : 14.5.78 : 3arrv Hunt thanks le fo r jy  co.iirents on Poole. Garry says that Pal ton reouiresient has ^  disaooeared.
95 : 14.5.78 : 3arry Hunt teso says fundamental reason that London Co. not on is that ^  is not convinced.
96 ; 14.5.78 : London Co. try ing  to get contract.
97 : 21.5.78 : Barry Hunt tr ie d  to enhance our colusion. ! am going to the Regional S c ie n tif ic  Committee tomorrow. "Le t's
get together in a nice puo in Hi 11 bury to ta lk  to Region 5. Lonoon Co. have ju s t sent in a quotation for one system. I t  is
hign. I t  oecaae " r iv e tts  in London's c o ff in " .  Come to a meeting with AiC on Region's 6 ALPHA.
98 : 20.6.73 : I say one las t try  at Ralton.
99 : 21.5.78 : 3arry Hunt asks fo r my opinion of London Co.
100 : 21.5.73 : I had another meeting w ith Barry Hunt. He talked about h is 60 year old colleague from Region 7 and the other 
from Northam. The la t te r  has heart troub le . What do you make o f comments on people - none of them generous? Yet the guy 
has power and one has got to do a deal w ith him. And I th ink that he would be genuinely disturbed i f  he thougnt he was not 
respected.
101 : 22.5.78 : Regional S c ie n t if ic  Committee
102 : I was inv ited  to th is  meeting to introduce the working papers on planning and a paper by Barry Hunt on computing.
103 : The f i r s t  squabble occurred when the Minutes of the las t meeting were reviewed. The Regional Committee had given some
advice on where p a rtic u la r sorts o f X-ray equipment could be put in smaller hosp ita ls  and low and behold Barry Hunt was
negotiating to put i t  into 3. There are loads of these hoso ita ls around and i t  is  quite clear that the boys want to conserve
the capita l fo r th e ir main departments in the OGHs. McN opened up w ith a barrage to the e ffe c t that is the Region going to
take the advice of th is  Committee or not or are we a ll wasting our time? Why is not Or Williams here? - he should be.
(W illiaas  and Downs arrived h a lf an hour la te ) . There was a real show o f medical consultant power wHh Barry Hunt taking major
s tick  in the absence o f Martin W illiams. PO eventually joined in and defended the Regional p os itio n , poin ting out that the
RHA could not possibly commit themselves to taking everyone's advice a ll o f the time. In fac t Barry Hunt did not say a word
in defence except to say tha t no las tin g  decision had been taken. Eventually i t  was agreed to minute as ’ The Region would
take note of the Committee's comments.*. Several consultants joined in to the e ffe c t that they did not inteno to waste th e ir 
time unless the advice were taken.
104 ; An in te res ting  paper prepared by a Sub-Committee on Endoscopy was next on the Agenda. I t  was fasc ina ting  to hear the way
in which the paper had been drafted . A ll o f the recommendations were p o s itiv e . There were never any suggestions that
Endoscopy would be encouraged -  resources perm itting . Martin Williams came in  during th is  paper. A myth remark from FO was 
that no one would quibble with the fa c t that pa tien t care would be ennanced by Endoscopy. The Chairman threw in  several 
remarks which backed some of the more outrageous claims by opening up ’ I am sure tha t you w il l  accept*. There is  not a flinch
at the way in which the report was drafted u n t il in fact Martin Williams started watering the th ing down by suggesting that the
D is t r ic t  *a igh t give favourable consideration to* ra ther than * accord p r io r i ty  to *. As he pointed out, * p r io r ity  over what?".
A fascina ting  point about the document was that despite the fac t that i t  had been drafted in such powerful persuasive
language, they s t i l l  had not noticed that they had put in  two paragraphs 3 and that there was a general jumble about the
arrangement o f the paper.
105 : We then got onto the laboratory comouting which Barry introduced. I joined in  much more on th is  one. I spent quite a
b it  o f the session correcting misleading comments by John J a rra tt.  He gave one impression o f the Avon produced laboratory 
system which suggested that i t  did not work -  I immediately corrected him by saying that although working to sp ec ifica tio n  i t
did not meet h is current requirements. Dr J a rra tt claimed that he was going to transfe r in the X system - I immediately
countered saying tha t we would attempt to transfe r in taking into account tha t th is  was d i f f i c u l t  and had not been done before. 
They talked about Limp ton and I had to poin t out that Limp ton ware pu tting  in major changes. John stated that the Socsys 
system was fu l ly  documented -  I stated tha t no one had examined the documentation o f Socsys and so on. I spent qu ite  a lo t  of 
time picking up the l i t t l e  points tha t they were jus t dropping here and there but I was very careful indeed to give c re d it
where i t  was due. At the end o f the discussion we were congratulated on having produced a paper which was short and to the
poin t.
106 : Going back to the Endoscopy paper, i t  was fasc ina ting  to note that Martin put in several minor d ra ftin g  amendments 
which I am sure could be made q u ie tly  outside the Committee. I t  is  typ ica l o f the man that he niggles about things lik e  tha t.
107 : I got some s tick  on the planning papers. Several o f the consultants. Or JC in  p a r t ic u la r , c r i t ic is e d  many o f the 
statements and there was no doubt that they are p o l i t ic a l ly  inept. I had to defend by saying that these were working papers
and that the Committee had asked to be kept Informed and that they could not expect special papers to be w ritte n  fo r them.
I tr ie d  to put things in context f i r s t  o f a l l .  I do not know that i t  did an awful lo t  o f good. The Chairman got ra ther
im patient. I t  was a thoroughly foo lish  move to take papers l ik e  that but there is  not any c lear a lte rn a tive .
108 : Going back to the f i r s t  item, I have got several choice comments to record. Dr McN used phrases l ik e : a gross breach 
of the advice* when ha was ta lk ing  about S. The Chairman said *1 w il l  have to take up the status o f our advice w ith Dr 
W illiam s.* John J a rra tt said *We ought to take steps to monitor the use o f our p o lic y *. (Mote: not the RHA). The
Chairman said *No doubt members w il l  maintain a watching b r ie f  o f th e ir Areas o f conern®. Barry Hunt said *1 might add that
your p o lic ie s  are brought to the a tten tion  o f the planners at regular in te rv a ls * . The Chairman said *Please note tha t in the 
planning tim etable, we were not included*. Barry Hunt said *RMO apologises fo r th is  omission*. An in te re s tin g  set o f comments 
from Or McN: *We consider that 'X ' is  su itab le . I t  is  not necessary to provide *Y*. We use phrases l ik e : * 'X ' w il l  requ ire *. 
We brandish statements l ik e ; *The radiology legal requirements*. Or JC did not hesita te  to sake clear that he was the 
Secretary o f a National Working Party on Endoscopy. For Endoscopy, members said that the evidence was overwhelming. McM
uses phrases lik e  * I t  is  a question o f pa tien t care which is  being improved and not a question o f the costs being kept down*.
This is  another axamole o f the use o f a myth to push forward an unreasonable and uneconomic course of action.
109 : In the middle o f the Endoscopy discussion, i t  appeared that a OHSS reoort popped out o f nowhere. No one had seen i t ,  
everyone thouoht i t  existed, oeoole were quite c r i t ic a l  o f i t  and thought tha t i t  could not possibly De a good one and so on.
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110 : I need to consider ca re fu lly  a ?yth to co w ith medical power as snown in th is  Commi ttae and meoical power genera lly. I t  
does not feature in any of my thoughts.
111 ; 22.6.78 Tony Peers says he does not lik e  my interference.
112 : 23.6."8 9arry Hunt asks me to ask National for nelp Sleeton transfe r.
113 : 25.6.78 3arry Hunt is try ing  to get John J a rra tt involved in a Regional decision.
114 ; 25.6.78 I talked to parry Hunt again today about the computing for laoora tories. He noted that in fact we do not have
the support o f the consultants. He was o f course apologising fo r the going over at the S c ie n tif ic  Committee la s t Friday.
He said that in fact whether we liked i t  or not, the "wheeler dealer" approach of RJ to planning was orooaoly ju s t as a ffe c tive  
and at least commanded a lo t  more respect throughout the Region and he maybe r ig h t .  He made another comment to the e ffe c t that
at least he was a person who was expert on aoout h a lf the topic on which he was supposed to advise, namely, pathology. He
then talked about the other medical adm inistrators in p a rticu la r but other adm inistrators as well and pointed out that most of 
these people were not experts in the fie ld s  to which they applied themselves. He made the novel suggestion that in fact what 
we ought to be doing was creaming o ff  the consultants in th e ir m id -fo rtie s  to run the show. I can see a crude log ic  in what
he says because there is  no doubt whatever that the one thing that the adm in istra tion and management o f the MHS does lack is the
respect o f the consultant in the f ie ld .  There was one example o f a pnrass where I made a s lig h t s lip  and Barry Hunt was on i t  
immediately, poin ting  out that I had said that adm in istra tion commands l i t t l e  respect. The context was ignored and Barry Hunt 
ac tua lly  used the remark another way. However, i t  is  in te re s tin g  to note that your remarks can be taken in th is  way and used 
completely d if fe re n t ly .  Care needs to be exercised.
115 : I set Barry Hunt in the co rrido r jus t now. I t  was inev itab le  that we talked aoout our v is i t  to Limpton and developments.
Why on earth Barry Hunt should want to in v ite  John J a rra tt on the excuse of h is being able to pressurise the Region for more
money, I jus t cannot imagine.
116 : Or R, Oldtown, tr ie s  to steal a Ralton iOU.
117 : 27.6.78 ; An increasingly obvious reaction from Computer Services is  that they want to get out from beneath OELTA/PAC,
So they ask me to a meeting w ith the obvious in ten tion  on " g r i l l in g *  expressing coneern, b u lly in g , ’ te s tin g " me. They made
a b a lls  up of the NOVA decision. Tony Peers defends them!!! I cannot a fford to lose them. The consultants are anti-Lonoon
Co.. What worries me is that they prooably have reason. But I cannot say so! Ralton have allowed themselves to be bought
o f f .  No h u rry ! !!  I must support Orion - somehow. Advice - D on't do anything i f  you don 't have to.
118 : Tony Peers is try in g  desperately to get from beneath a Public Accounts Committee on DELTA.
119 : 28.5.78 : I get g r il le d  by Computer Services.
120 : 30.5.78 : AlC enter the arena.
121 ; 30.5.78 : Recommend to RTO a) Sal ton trans fe r. b) DELTA — Ralton la s t time
c) Co-operation w ith Region 5.
122 : 3.7.78 ; AlC salesman known to me w rites about Oxford AlC System.
123 : 4.7.78 : I saw Martin w ith Barry today about the RTO decision on Path (see memo in D iary Notes). My main concern was 
to make sure that Martin understood the caveats, e tc , behind the memo. But, I was once again surprised by M artin 's  concern 
fo r me and mine e.g. 1. ’ Sure you're happy to abandon London Co.?* 2. 'How about your chaps -  What can we do to
a lle v ia te  the e ffec ts?" Barry came to see me again afterwards and was ta lk in g  about h is power over John J a rra tt i .e .  had his
m erit award fo r comment. I can control J a rra tt by his fu ture equipment. I went down to East Area and sorted the mess.
I'm single handed, so some get away. But in h is own p o lit ic k in g  way he is  genuinely try in g .
124 : 4.7.78 : GG pushing Orion.
125 ; 10.7.78 : There have been two meetings, one w ith the Computer Department s ta f f  regarding laboratory computing. Present 
were;- Garth Boles, W illy  James, Garry Kay and Tony Peers. The purpose o f the meeting was a d ire c t request tha t I should 
explain the current s itu a tio n . They feel that I have le f t  then out. They do not accept that th e ir  advice has been taken and 
that decisions are now being made at a p o li t ic a l level and not a technical le v e l. I tr ie d  to explain to them some of the 
c r i te r ia  which I was using In th is  encounter and the sorts o f things which I was attempting to bring about. There is  a 
tremendous amount o f resentment about the way in which the whole thing was being handled. Garth Soles, in p a r t ic u la r , has got 
some wierd ideas about the way to get things done and the part tha t technical matters play in fundamental decision making.
W illy  James kept going on about professional ism and the fa c t that I am not seeking th e ir  advice. 1 pointed out to them tha t I 
got information o f f  people in  North Region who were at least equal in  status to them regarding National Co. and they were 
exceedingly resentfu l tha t I should seek advice not only through them. I pointed out that I did not th ink that they had 
persuaded th e ir  customers to fo llow  th e ir  lead very well and tha t they must in some sense take blame fo r th is , despite the fact 
tha t Barry Hunt was a very d i f f i c u l t  person to deal w ith . Garry Kay chose to get on h is  high horse at several points about 
lack o f consultation and he took the cue from a ll  sorts o f other people that he had to attack me. This is  very foo lish  o f him 
in  view o f the fact that he is  exceedingly dependent on ms. Tony Peers went on about people have th e ir  own standards to 
maintain and that they themselves were the most important people in  the world to them and they would have to consider th e ir own 
position  ca re fu lly  in re la tio n  to what had been said. They resent enormously the fac t that I could easily decide to give some 
support to the Orion work in view o f the fact tha t three or four Regions are interested in th is  development. There is 
absolutely no chance whatever o f pu tting  the standard Regional system onto a National Co. machine and they ought to rea lise  
th is . The rate at which they allowed th e ir ind ignation to be shown and the rate at which they allowed th e ir own ideas to cloud 
the issue about what was going to happen and that we had los t our la s t chance, e tc , e tc , to get the Regional standard system in . 
They do not rea lise  that they never had a chance to get i t  in under those conditions. I shall get i t  in by s te a lth . When I 
suggested that i t  was s t i l l  my goal to get the Regional standard in they did not accept th is  e ith e r. They were exceedingly 
resentfu l aoout Sal ton and the fact that I had committed resources. They do not acceot that they had le t  le cown by not 
providing me w ith the reasons why i t  is  not going to work. They do not rea lise  how powerful i t  would be i f  the th ing actua lly  
■'ai lea ana so we go on. Garth Boles got "uriously ira te  anddemonstrative saying that I was not +akinq th e ir advice, that I
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125 (co n t'd ) ; was going behind th e ir bacx, double dealing with Barry Hunt. He declared oui te openly that he would resign, as 
i f  that was going to make any difference whatever to my course of action. I t  would be unfortunate but ce rta in ly  not a 
catastropne in my view, I would much sooner have, I suspect, H illy  James in tha t p a rticu la r pos ition . I had not anticioated 
some o f th e ir  reactions in that they accused me o f jumping on the Crion bandwagon too qu ick ly . I slipped up wnen I openly said
that I was quite w ill in g  to pay casn to encourage the Orion/Region 4 thing i f  need be by getting  people upgraaea, I
eventually got out o f th is  by pretending that one o f them was a University person out I aid not know whether i t  was true or not.
I th ink in ^act Garth Boles got me o f f  the hook inaovertently oy giving -a the necessary lead that th is  <as tne case. However,
tnat was d is t in c t ly  a faux pas, Tony Peers cw.onstrated h is loya lty  to tne.- -nd not to me by siding with tne-: througnout the
interview , I io not know why he does th is . whether he s t i l l  takes i t  seriously that h is main job is to stay on th e ir side
and not the side o f the organisation. I was incred ib ly  surprised to see Garry Kay huffing  and puffing  aoout h is p rin c ip le s , 
esoeci a lly  those concerned w ith professional ism and not mixing p o li t ic s  into th is  technical decision. He re a lly  made quite  a 
lo t o f noise, a ll oeing quite surpris ing  because he re a lly  does not have anyone's respect down there and I am aoout to rescue 
the guy from him self,
125 : By pure coincidence, on the way up to London, I met Martin on the s ta tion  at Oldtown. This was fortunate because I had 
jus t had an idea on how to get round the laboratory proolem, namely, to get our own system w ritte n  on the Orion and to use the 
North R. work in order to do th is . The advantages could be that we would have an insurance system with the ALPHA at 
North Region in due course and at the same time I could appease ay own chaps by getting  th e ir  work done. Of course they w ill 
not re ad ily  acceot the Orion but l i f e  is  l ik e  th a t. Somehow or other I haye got to persuade everyone that there is s u ff ic ie n t 
in  common between the ALPHA and our own system to make th is  worthwhile and I th ink that there is a great deal o f p o li t ic in g  
necessary to achieve th is . I ca re fu lly  to ld  Martin that I was having d i f f ic u l t y  with the s ta f f  and he is  obviously concerned 
about th is . This was preparation for the basic message which I wish to get across. He did not l ik e  ta lk in g  about people in 
the carriage and i t  was funny the extent to wnich he went to avoid using anyone's name. I t  was in te res ting  to note the
d iffe rence in our a ttitu d e s  because as fa r as I could sea we could have discussed th is  matter purely in terms o f us, the RHA,
taking a wise course o f action and people need not have got involved at a l1. M artin 's  perception was ooviously d if fe re n t . His 
a b i l i t y  to de-personalise something was d if fe re n t from mine. At any ra te , Martin jumped at the opportunity o f try in g  to find a 
compromise between Avon and North Region and Barry Hunt and everyone else, I also took the opportunity w ith Martin o f re in fo rc ing  
the fact that John J a rra tt w i l l  have to perform a miracle to get the Sal ton laboratory system to work, I re-assurred him at the 
same time that we would s t i l l  have our own Avon system there available to run. I also re inforced with Martin the message that
we s t i l l  had no very good grounds for doing anything at a ll at Sal ton other than a minor ameridment to Jonn J a r ra t t 's  work. The
real po in t o f th is  note from the research poin t o f view is  that i t  was purely g ratutious that I managed to get Martin to myself
for h a lf an hour outside the o ffic e  and I had not seen th is  opportunity coming my way. Opportunism is  a very important part o f
the s k i l l  which I operate.
10.7.78 Letter to John J a rra tt says Yes to tra n s fe r.
12.7.78 I ask Tony Peers fo r h is l i s t  o f ALPHA fa u lts . The H.O. man gives h is opinions o f a ll  ALPHAs.
127
128
129 : 14.7.78 In my other d iary notes, I have recorded machinations with Martin and Barry on Laboratory computing. Having seen 
Martin on the tra in  and launched my comoromise, I suggested to Tony Peers that he might l ik e  to consider ge tting  a version o f
the Avon system onto Orion for th is  purpose. S p lu tte r, sp lu tte r - but he agreed - Got to get in tenders properly. I've  been
through a ll  th is  w ith a s o lic ito r  friend  and a PAC is on the way,' In fa c t, i t  is  a Tony Peers tr ic k  to dangle PAC's and
professional Ism and sch re la ted things in fro n t o f people and expect them to take f r ig h t .  That is not say that I do not take a
PAC serious ly . I think that I could ju s t if y  a ll  o f my actions.
130 ; However, Barry came to see me before I could get into him. I t  was obvious that he thought tha t I had pulled a fa s t one
by ta lk in g  to Martin w ithout him, despite the fa c t th a t, as I pointed out, i t  was fo rtu ito u s . So Barry said, 'P rov id ing  the cost
o f the premium is  not too high he'd go along w ith i t * .  And I said i t  was £25,000. Shock pretended by Barry. Cost to GG?
No cost to RHA and Martin coughs up the answer.
131 : P.S. Tony Peers was at pains to poin t out that I was way out on my own. Got to get in tenders from everyone else who 
tendered la s t time.
132 : 17.7.78 : Barry Hunt s ta rts  to ta lk  to Martin about the basic proposals from Texco.
133 : John J a rra tt w rites to Barry Hunt to say tha t Woods w il l  support his trans fe r.
134 : I am s t i l l  try in g  to get a l i s t  o f problems on the ALPHA transferred.
135 ; I have again to ld  Barry Hunt about the d i f f ic u l t ie s  of the trans fe r.
135 ; Or H from Sal ton is  try in g  to obtain the ALPHA from Or Hunt again.
137 : Or J a rra tt at Sal ton is  try in g  to get 8k o f core stored from the old National computers, despite the fa c t that he has
not got room fo r i t .
138 : The Sal ton pathologists and Garth Boles go to Bunton. They find that Bunton is  not running in the lab and that i t  is 
u n like ly  to do so u n t il early part o f 1979 but they do discover one more fa c i l i t y  which they want to add to the system, namely, 
hard copy p rin te rs  w ith a ll the flUs.
139 : 1 waste quite a lo t  o f time w ith Or Hunt c learing up that John J a rra tt cannot have another 8k core,
140 : 20.7,78 John J a rra tt opens up the bid to transfer ALPHA in to  Sal ton on his National hardware,
141 : Harry Peers (Limpton) is  try in g  to make local capita l out o f the Avon in te re s t to gat more support fo r h is own Northern 
system.
142 : I have tr ie o  to amend the Regional S c ie n tif ic  Coanittee Minutes to get in my statement that the transfer into Salton w il l
be a m iracle.
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143 : 21.7.78 Or Hunt and 1 are in a hustle on many occasions try ing  to negotiate the terms and conditions on which the 
Sal ton transfer w il l  be allowed. This incluoes terns for Woods and our own fa llback positions. I t  is  a r ig h t n it  oicking 
exercise. We also inform the Treasurers o f the costs of the transfer.
144 : 27.7.73 David Janes (Acting RA) raised with the RA o f North Region the o o s s io ility  of inter-Regional co-ooeration on ALPHA.
145 ; We eventually get the le t te r  o f f  the OA of Woodbury s ta ting  the conditions on which we w il l  suooort the Sal ton transfer.
Dr Hunt also wrote to Woods asking hin Her h is help with the transfe r.
146 : i.8 .7 8  Tony Peers - out o f the olue - wants to put the DELTA into Hi 1Ibury.
147 : 4.8.78 On Laboratories, I went through the whole n a tte r, having to say that Robert Jones had jus t said that ALPHA
night work.
148 : 9.8.78 The HE o f OHSS reports on what they know o f Limpton s itu a tio n .
149 ; 17.8.78 Meeting with Garth 3oles and Robert Jones on 17th August 1978 - the d ifferences between the ALPHA system and 
the Ralton requirement.
150 ; The spec ifica tion  number o f the systems appear to be to ta l ly  d if fe re n t in that Ralton tends to re f le c t the o r ig in  o f the 
request and tends to t ie  up much more close ly w ith the pa tien t id e n tity  as used on the ward, by the G P , etc.
151 : Ralton have got an XYZ with a micro computer attached to I t .  I t  generates output which does most o f the q u a lity  control 
wnich they think that they require and that output is  not in lin e  w ith the usual XYZ output which ALPHA would take. We would 
thus have two forms of qua lity  control in the lab -  one from the XYZ computer and the other from the ALPHA and i t  is  possible 
that they would contradict each other.
152 : Ralton do appear to want cumulative reports but the form tha t they require them is  not availaoie  on the ALPHA. I
cannot help fee ling  that I have got th is  the wrong way round, despite ay own note.
153 : Ralton pathologists wish to keeo th e ir  s ta f f  doing sons o f the ca lcu la tions manually which the ALPHA computer would do 
for them autom atica lly. This would need to have an automatic routine taken out o f the ALPHA system.
154 : Robert and Garth assured me that there was quite  a fait o f work in a ll  o f these th ings. They were not sure whether the 
l i s t  was fu l ly  comprehensive because they had not studied the ALPHA system.
155 : Garth and Robert agreed to obtain as much re levant documentation from ALPHA as possible and to s ta r t work on i t .
156 : The action Is w ith me in  that I need to contact West Area and Or Hunt to decide what action/pressure can be put on Ralton
to fa l l  in to  lin e  w ith ALPHA. I need to contact Graham Pats on th is  as soon as I get back from holiday.
157 ; I was assured that in fact the pathology labora tories would be much more in lin e  w ith the ALPHA system than the
Ralton ones and that in any case enthusiasm at Ralton was now fa l l in g  o f f .
158 : Report received 4.11.78!
159 : 23.8.78 Woodbury ra ise the overcharging issue and quotes an agreement o f 29.5.76. ( th e ir  notes o f course).
150 ; 27.3.78 I try  and give a b r ie fin g  to Robert Jones and Garth Boles o f what I want them to w rite  about Ralton.
151 : 29.8.78 Hugh Robins accepts the terms fo r the Sal ton transfer w ith a b i t  o f an argument. He then brings up the cost o f
Salton in i t s  f i r s t  year. Please note that during th is . Or Hunt renews h is vendetta against Computer Services.
162 : 29.8.78 Woodbury eventually accept the transfer o ffe r .
153 : 7.9.78 Scolland is complaining about the service obtained from London Co. This is  a confiden tia l le t te r  to H.O.
Lee Ross is  getting  involved in  the Woodbury costs and behaving lik e  a true Accountant. He was not in  on the Regional deal.
He tr ie s  to apply a ll  the nonsenses o f a ll  the overhead ca lcu la tions to an experimental p ro jec t. He does not consult me about
the wisdom o f th is . He does not consult Barry Hunt e ith e r.
164 ; 11.9.78 Garth Boles has gone to the e xh ib ition  and is  now busy po in ting  out a ll  the fa u lts  in the ORION demonstration
which we knew was lim ite d  in  any case. This is  a long memo and i t  is  noticeable that Garth does not praise anything whatsoever
in the ORION s itu a tio n .
155 : 12.9.78 I agree w ith Or Hunt that we should try  and get the Region 5 to jo in  the ALPHA club and for us to co-operate with 
them. We agree on v is it s  to Hi 1Ibury and North Region.
166 : 14.9.78 Garth Boles produces an over view o f the ALPHA system for which he was not asked. He also proposes to benchmark
the DELTA system. Again, for which he was not asked. Barry Hunt te l ls  L i l ly  o f Hi 11 bury that he cannot have the Ralton
DELTA fo r his Physics Department in  Hi I Ibury.
157 : 20.9.78 We a ll  go to Hi 11 bury to try  and arrange co-operation w ith the Region 5. I had lunch beforehand with Tony to 
try  and get things straightened out. At the meeting, both RCSOs are anything but h e lp fu l.
158 : 21.9.78 As an aside to a ll  th is  sto ry, we get involved in the H.O. account o f what sorts o f computers we have got. The
NHS can 't even co-ordinate i ts  a c t iv it ie s  at th is  very rudimentary leve l.
159 : 21 .9.78 Dr Hunt, out o f the blue, te l ls  ne  that TEXCO have comole ted a survey in Salton and wisn to o ffe r us a system for
£92,000. Having also produced a huge spec ifica tion .
- 339 -
170 : 25.9.73 Tony Peers is s t i l l  investiga ting  the o f f  charging of Woodbury, raised at least a nonth ago. Lee Ross is involveo.
Please note that ve s t i l l  have not resolved th is  issue on the 22nd Novemoer.
171 : Garth Boles claims not to have understooo ay o rig ina l reçuest ^cr information on Ralton. He nakes remarks lik e  - i t  is
clear that y o u r  perceotion of the meeting an the 17th August was d i'fe re n t from that o f Rooert Jones and oyse lf. I make short
s h r if t  of 0 0 th of th e ir oojections but I s t i l l  do not get that reoort u n t il November.
172 : Before I went away on holiday, I saw Garth Boles ana Rooert Jones on the suoject o f lacoratory cosouting. I tr ie o  to
oer’̂ ora that meeting in as fr ie nd ly  a way as oossiole. There were many issues and I suggested that qui te a few of them were
fa ir ly  minor and that we ought to concentrate on the two major ones. I was under the imoression that they had gone away to
■seal with the two major issues and to give me a reoort on them. I thought that I had made i t  clear that the thing 1 wanted 
urgently was a meeting at Ralton to decide whether or not a laooratory snould adaot i ts  ways to take DELTA as i t  e x is ts ,
whether in fac t we ought to put the changes in  or whether we should withdraw the system altogether and yet I come back and find
"them try ing  to out i t  into  Hi llb u ry  which was th e ir  o r ig in a l suggestion. I find  them not having produced the reoort which I
sp e c ific a lly  said I wanted - not on the basis of a deep investiga tion  but on the basis of p r in c ip le . I phone them uo and say
I want i t ,  I want i t ,  I want i t ,  and I get a memo back saying you can 't have i t .  I have to go and see Tony and say s p e c ific a lly  
- not Hi 1Ibury. Three things are irre le van t - I want a report on two. I personally have intervened to make sure that a
meeting is  set up in Ralton in the very near future to resolve these issues. Now is  th is  .my job or not? Because i t  seems to
me that i t  is  important to decide the sort o f ins truc tio n  which I can give and expect to be carried out. In th is  p a rtic u la r
case, I am delving in to  a subject at far too deep a leve l. I am doing th is  on purpose because I fee l that I cannot do otherwise
and expect to have other than a mess on my hands or the ins truc tions and wishes o f the RHA not being followed.
173 : On the same subject o f laboratory computing, I am try in g  desperately to get some form o f co-operation going in te r -
fiegionally so that a common system can be backed. It  w il l  have to be an e x is ting  system. I t  w il l  probably have to be the
ORION system because I want departmental backing to the development and that is  the easiest p o l i t ic a l ly  e tc. There are a ll 
sorts o f oenefits which can be had jus t from getting  i t  going down that way - p o l i t ic a l  considerations not technical ones.
The fac t is  that techn ica lly  I am quite sure that ORION can d e live r the goods on th e ir  hardwareand i t  does not ac tua lly  .matter
whether i t  is  the best -  whatever that may be as long as i t  has got p o li t ic a l muscle and backing oehtnd i t .
174 : I took Tony out to lunch near Hi 1Ibury before having a meeting w ith the Region 5 and I tr ie d  to se ll th is  idea to him.
He is  much too in te ll ig e n t a man not to go a long way down the path with me but I found i t  d i f f i c u l t  when you s ta r t coming up
against a ll  sorts o f blockages. How on earth do I deal with th is  problem o f try in g  to te l l  these people and not only te l l  them,
get them to act accordingly? How on earth do you persuade them that in the business o f change, technical considerations are
only a part o f the arguments which have got to be followed through to a conclusion?
175 ; 27.9.78 Or Hunt in rep ly ing  to Hugh Robin in Woodbury, makes i t  clear tha t:
(a) I t  is  h is  business to ourcnase s c ie n t if ic  equipment as confirmed by RHA oo licy
(b) He confirms again the agreement on the transfer costs
(c) He points out tha t the Salton hardware must be made to las t for 4 to 5 years and
(d) He is  not prepared to ta lk  costs in a le t te r  so le t  us meet.
176 : 5.10.78 : Or Hunt arranges a meeting w ith TEXCO to discuss th e ir commercial system.
177 : 11.10.78 : . In a le t te r  to RSO o f Region 5 p r io r  to a v is i t ,  we explain the Avon a ttitu d e s , ask for which bids on ALPHA
they are taking and th e ir  a ttitu d e s  toward documentation and support. We also asked whether they intend to spread throughout
th e ir  Region.
178 : 20.10.78 ; The. RA in  Region 6 , sends us a re p ly . The most important po in t is  that Region 6 is  not w ill in g  to be a
Centre of R esponsib ility  and that they do not have any well thought out philosophy fo r spreading ORION in  th e ir  Region.
179 : 24.10.78 : Today Dr Hunt was to ld  tha t Woods cannot support Salton even during the transfer o f ALPHA. Or Hunt was
flabbergasted and was a fte r Wood's blood. Fundamentally, 1 cannot say that I am surprised BUT I do not want Barry attacking
Wood, removing Emperor's c lothes, e tc , e tc . T yp ica lly , Barry phoned back to John J a rra tt and to ld  him to keep i t  quiet and
promised to do likew ise . John wants SOCSYS.'
180 : 26.10.78 : An abortive v is i t  to North Region which I have to abandon, having got up early to go.'
181 ; I . I I . 78 : I am on holiday. Last week 1 cnased Tony fo r the Ralton Lab. report -  could not get him. Got Robert Jones
and was to ld  i t  had been sent a fo r tn ig h t ago. He said i t  would be sent immediately -  la s t Friday a repeat copy. I phoned
H.Q. today to see i f  i t  had arrived so tha t I can take i t  to H illbu ry  -  we are seeing Ralton on Monday. Tony was not at the 
Centre, Robert was not there -  I got Garth Boles and he to ld  me tha t he was ju s t checking the typing.'.' I asked him to bring
me a copy to .my house in the morning and send one to Graham Pate and Barry Hunt.
182 ; .A le t te r  from Woods to J a rra tt makes i t  c lear that he is committed to a Salton tra n s fe r. But there are problems,
technical ones o f maintenance, e tc. Woods th inks National w il l  support the software.
183 : 3.11.78 : D iary Note on the meeting with Area Adm inistrators.
184 : The day before tha t I went over to H illbu ry  with Barry Hunt to meet the Region 5 people on laboratory computing. In 
essence, they are exploring the s itu a tio n  in ALPHA and when they have made up th e ir  mind, we w il l  come back and decide how to 
manage a jo in t  venture. Perhaps the most important thing that happened was that I met Tony Peers over lunch. I t  was a 
pleasant meeting but there is  no doubt that I was laying down the lin e  on laboratory computing and Tony disagrees.
185 : 5.11.78 : I went to Ralton today to ta lk  to the laboratory people about th e ir  DELTA computer problem. Barry Hunt,
Tony Peers, Robert Jones and Garth Soles were there. The purpose o f the meeting was to discuss a report by Garth Boles on the 
necessary amendments to the DELTA system fo r Ralton's use. I t  was a very quiet eeting in which both Barry .Hunt and I
explained to Ralton tha t we simply could not put in 300 days work. They explained to us tha t the amendments which had been 
specified were the minimum required and that in actual fact to e lin in a te  the cummulative reporting  would be a retrograde step 
fo r then. There are good reasons fo r having sympathy with them i f  that is  the case. I have come away from that meeting 
believing that somehow or other we ouoht to trv  and make i t  oossible for them to have the DELTA comouter.
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135 : I talked to Graham Pate suosaouently at tne meeting at the Kings Fund today (7 Novemoer) and he is going to try  and look 
into ways of making e ffo r t availaoie from Salton.
187 : 5.11.78 ; Today I returneo from Holiday. I was met oy Henry Jacoues in a state about the Computer Plan. He had oeen 
try in g  la s t week to find someone in Management Services to answer his questions about the Plan and was in a r ig h t state because 
ne thougnt that tnere was no one in cnarge. 1 gather from Tony that Caesar got very angry aoout the way he was so rude to hin 
and the net re s u lt was that Caesar did not cnose to ring  back. This le t  "e in for a load of trouole and was a very unwise move 
on his p a rt. I got a fiv e  minute lecture  from Henry Jacques on his pet adm in istra tive subject, namely, cover. A top ic  which 
makes me thoroughly sick.
188 : in the afternoon I went to Ralton to discuss with 3arry Hunt and Ralton people the DELTA over there. At long la s t I had 
managed to get out o f the system a report on the essential amendments and others for the Ralton work. As well as the amendments, 
I got a whole lo t  o f other s tu f f  in the report which I had not requested and which must have consumed one he ll o f a lo t  o f s ta ff 
time.
189 : The meeting got down to 'ac ts  fa i r ly  quickly and i t  transpired that Ralton were not w il l in g  to modify th e ir  requests for
300 days work on the DELTA system before putting  i t  in to  the Ralton laboratory. This was despite the fac t that we pointed out
to them tha t the p o s s ib ility  of getting th is  work done was fa ir ly  neg lig ib le . But the fact o f the matter is tha t they do not 
seem a ll tha t bothered because the laboratory is a fa i r ly  quiet place. They are in an over cap ita lised  pos ition  and can cope 
w ith th e ir  workload. They w il l  put a u ffic ie n t pressure on the DMT to re c ru it  additional operational s ta f f  when the time comes.
I f  they do not get a ll that they want, they are in  a sense "making a s a c r if ic e * . As a whole we in Management Services are now 
in the pos itio n  in which s ta f f  cannot be recru ited  and so there was a general a ir  o f despair and not caring very much and so on. 
The 'outcome o f th is  means that they agreed to consider once again the requests as deta iled  in  the report and to send us a fin a l 
le t te r  on the subject. We agreed to go back and consider i t .
190 : I am loathe to abandon th is  work because I th ink that the e ffec ts  of doing th is  w il l  be very unhelpful on the morale and 
so on o f the s ta f f  concerned. At the same time I feel that they do not care a ll that much. They are not a ll  that committed 
to the Region. They are not a ll  that committed to anything in p a rt ic u la r. I t  is  in te re s tin g  that th is  note probaoly 
re fle c ts  some o f ay fee lings.
191 : 13.11.78 : I met Barry Hunt today. We discussed two subjects. John J a rra tt has once again changed his pos ition  on the 
Poole Laboratory transfe r, in that fo llow ing Woods' le t te r  (or ra ther his conversation w ith him) he has decided that he w il l  take 
Woods' system as i t  stands. This is  a quite incred ib le  aove. He says that he w il l  do th is  temporarily at f i r s t  but he is
obviously quite  determined to get h is  hands on ALPHA and i t  is  quite  illum ina ting  to see the level of compromise that he is 
prepared to go to in order to achieve th is .
192 : The second issue was the Ralton trans fe r. Barry Hunt and I have met twice in the co rrido r th is  week -  each rushing r̂om
place to place and I have twice indicated to hin and once s it t in g  in his chair in h is room, that I th ink that we must try  and
support Ralton, i f  i t  is  at a ll  possib le. In fa c t, I am now in the middle o f negotia ting the sorts o f comoronises which would
allow us to do th is . Such as West Area paying fo r a large part o f i t ;  H.O. chipping in : our keeoing down our con tribu tion  to 
what we said at the meeting. A ll th is  o f course pre-supposes that we have got the e ffo r t  in any case.
193 : 20.11.78 ; I talked to Barry Hunt la te r . John J a rra tt had been try in g  to get our man to support the Salton tra n s fe r.
Tony Peers claims tha t he is the wrong man for" the job. I assured Barry that Tony Peers wishes to support John J a rra tt
although the extent o f tha t support Is not c lear to me. I must get West Area to push fo r the Ralton system. Barry had a cold
so I f e l t  sorry fo r himv With computer s ta ff in g  degenerating at i t s  current ra te , i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to see that we are going to 
be able to do anything in any case.
194 : I am going to f ix  tne West Area le t te r  tomorrow.
195 : 21.11.78 : As an interlude in the laboratory saga Woodbury descended on H.O. today w ith three operational problems.
(a) They had been charged the lo t  in the Salton development year and thought that th is  was a b i t  much. Barry and I
d is t in c t ly  remember the Region being generous over th is  to a poin t o f fo l ly  in  the rescue. Lea Ross and Woodbury
OFO put on th e ir  worst accountants' hats and argued about b its  -  I gave Woodbury £20,000.
(b) We then got in to  the same stupid set o f arguments about Woods' ALPHA. You bead over backwards to be generous
and encourage these people and then you get squeezed. I was fee ling  p re tty  cheesed by the and o f i t  a l l .
(c) John J a rra tt did not bring up support for Woods' ALPHA but we are going down there tomorrow.
Tony Peers played the old swan song o f no s ta f f ,  e tc , e tc , and he claimed not to know what we were discussing.
Over lunch I saw Graham Pate at our favourite  behind the scenes pub in Salton. I fixed  tha t Wayne Cook would pressurise 
Henry Jacques to put p r io r i ty  on Ralton. In the afternoon I b rie fed Henry tha t i t  was coming.
196 : 22.11.78 ; Today, Barry Hunt and I v is ited  John J a rra tt to see how the transfe r was going -  w ith my Local man looking on -
(Why?), I t  was in  John's lab. We again explore support from Computer Services and I p a in fu lly  emphasised tha t we could do
l i t t l e  to help. Yes, we would say i f  i t  was an ALPHA fa u lt  or National Co. Yesy I would persuade Tony Peers to spend h a lf a
day to make sure tha t s ta r t up was possib le. Yes, we would take copies of Avon system. John J a rra tt,  have you got an 
implementation programme w ith Woods? Well not exactly. Has he got necessary amendments done? Well, no. What is  he doing?
Well he's trans fe rring  haematology to S.O. on new National equipment.'.'.' Woods won't need Sleeton a fte r th a t. We might get the
Sleeton transfer done in  March. I t  then blows Barry Hunt's philosophy sky high.
197 : 23.11.78 : Barry Hunt came in  and surprised me as I was w rit in g  a Review o f Laboratory Computing. I h u rried ly  turned over
the sheets. I am determined to push through an economic case fo r comouting in Avon and to make i t  surface at RTO. I have now
w ritte n  i t  postdated to tomorrow. I have started the argument w ith Barry in the f r ie n d lie s t terms. I even le t  Barry scribb le 
on the blackboard knowing fu l l  well tha t I had a ll  the figures on a piece of paper in fro n t o f me. BUT we are s t i l l  on good
terras. Barry is s t i l l  saying that the c lin ic ia n s  would tru s t me even i f  they did not tru s t my guys.
198 : 24.11.78 ; 1 went to Henry Jacques with my review more or less forcing i t  onto an unw illing  Henry. The c o n f lic t  o f
approach was tremendous. I put a lo t  o f s k i l l  in to  s im p lify ing  the issues and getting  to the main po in t, namely, that there
was £5 m illio n  difference between getting  pusned into a coramerciai system and having the w it to do our awn th ing . Henry did
not even want to lis te n . What we need to do is  estab lish who's responsible. To he ll w ith the business o f £ 7  m ill io n . We
waste that sort o f figure  re g u la rly . I don't re a lly  want to read the paper. Must I re a lly?  Yes.' You must. Then at
least I have done my job -  even i f  you don 't care about the £ j m illio n . We got quite stroppy. He's got the paper.
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139 : 31 . 1 1 .78 : Following my provocative long memo to Barry Hunt, I got an ira te  one back. Having put the ba ll ilrs t ly  in n is 
court, we now got down to the hard negotia tions. Barry Hunt pretended that £7 m illio n  was nothing - los t and gained that sort 
o f money a ll  the time. But I stucx to i t  that to my humcle mind, th is  important. Barry Hunt said that " d  under­
estimated i t .  I insisted that £ 7  m illio n  was s ig n ific a n t and he acceoted that we must avoid i t  cut we oust cneck the 
commercial p rice . I ins is ted  that John J a rra tt would need support and that to support the 3 year old ALPHA sade sense. I
insisted that Oldtown would pick uo Ralton DELTA. Pooh-pooh they're  do i t  yourse lf merchants. No, no too a ttra c tiv e  an 
o ffe r , I sa id . Sorry my memo was v i t r io l i c  out you did confuse revenue and maintenance. Agree that Sleeton is irre le van t 
but we must suoport i t .  Barry Hunt eventually agrees. But ALPHA needs 3 men to suoport. Can't say that yet Graham. But
Barry - the t-J- m illio n  and ALPHA does worx - OK. What aoout Ralton? Chuck i t  out. But Barry - mud on ay face - economic
case - i ts  economic - so what? How about compromise 50% from Area 50% from Region. Phase I now Phase 2 asap. Well, 
economics - no mud - OK.' Can't go to RTO? "Got to" Hugh - "time pressing". "They're only interested in Plan and Mental
handicap. Perhaps go in January*. Then Hugn le t s lip  that he's already talked to 'William - He got a raspoerry -  lik e  I got
o f f  Henry.
200 ; Later today, I gave atr expurgated version o f th is  to Tony Peers. And he fe l l  in lin e  too. So I keep then apart and 
a l l 's  OK.
201 : Barry'went on and on about pathologists not tru s tin g  Computer Services. Later, Tony Peers said tha t Pat H il ls  
is  w il l in g  to take DELTA as i t  stands now and supply two people seconded to Computer Services to amend i t  la te r . How's that 
for taking the o is c u it.
202 : 7.12.78 : Yesterday, I became quite  ira te  in the morning to find that Tony Peers was not v is it in g  Texco w ith us. Not 
only was th is  not happening but Robert Jones had disappeared in to  the midst o f Portsmouth w ithout trace. Barry Hunt claimed 
to have inv ite d  Tony Peers and therefore took the opportunity to go on and on about th is . I asked Barry Hunt for h is report
from J a rra tt on the shortcomings of Texco system. He did not have them but did not aoologise at a i l .
203 : What was J a rra tt going to ask -  d id n 't know. Phone J a rra tt. Fix clandestine meeting w ith J a rra tt in pub on way to Texco.
204 : I le f t  early found the pub. Missed Barry and J a rra tt who found th e ir way in to  a bar past me. J a rra tt produces his
master questions (they were never used). And so to Texco.
205 ; Here we were given a frugai/Americal type treatment but we quickly established that Texco was a no go. Sure i t  worked but 
i t  was bas ica lly  not o rientated to B rita in  and not oig enough fo r our purpose. And the big one wnich we re a lly  need is
£250,000 and the maintenance is  8%. So a ll my figures underestimate the case against commercial system.
205 : Because I was making the running techn ica lly  Barry kept getting  me in . Then he insisted that Texco w rite  i t  a ll down
and send i t  to us. I 1 e ft during the demo which showed jus t how much Englishing i t  needed.
207 ; Next morning I saw Barry. C learly he is now preparing a cast iron case fo r going ALPHA. He made i t  quite  c lear that the
data from Texco had got to be exhaustive so that not one square mm o f Barry's hide is  showing. And he's probaoly wise to avoid
a ll  the flame throwers tha t the pathologists w il l  turn on him. He hasn't any love coming from them on the ALPHA issue.
208 : I went to the Newton Computer Steering Committee.. The D.A. had inv ited  me up to i t  fo llow ing the v is i t  to him. 'We
established tha t the Plan was misleading. I t  was established to my sa tis fa c tio n  that Newton did ^  understand what the 7 items
in the 1979 Programme meant -  le t alone the ones up to 33. I established that the a/c would not be overloaded.
209 : Peter H il ls  placed a le t te r  an the table making a bid for the DELTA as i t  stood. Robert Jones asked me to state the
Region's pos ition  which I d id . I t  was pointed out that the financ ia l consequences o f the move had not been put on the table
and that DMT ought to agree that D is t r ic t  supported the move. Barry made an In tr ig u in g  set o f remarks.
1 . I came to Avon to lead Path and was getting  very frus tra ted  at lack o f progress. •
2. I th ink tha t I w il l  get a m/c over Barry's dead body.
3. I cannot control uptake o f tests  at present but I could i f  I had a machine.
4. He stated that i t  was essential that someone in  Avon jumped in  with b n tk fe e t.
5. He expressed great confidence in  Computer Services.
My frie nd  afterwards said tha t Barry had not chance whatever o f getting  the case through DMT.
210 : Afterwards Peter H il ls  ca re fu lly  collected in a ll  the copies o f his le t te r  - on ouroose. I was s it t in g  next to him so
there was no way in which I could keep a copy.
211 : In the morning, I phoned Graham Pate to get the cards on the table and to ld  h is  tha t the best I could o ffe r  was s ix  months 
work. I to ld him that Wayne had not lobbied Henry. He to ld  me that he had and that Henry had made his usual statement
"Yes I see tha t, I must get involved". We both sympathised with each other regarding our fence s i t t in g  Adm in istra tors. He had
promised to coma back to me in two days.
212 ; 10.12.78 : I have ju s t phoned our friend in H.O, about a grant for Peter H il ls  in Newton to do Lab research - Deal on.
I have talked to Ralph and he wants me to sort Newton on the admin, net. The DCP is  useless. So I must f ix  the OA.
213 : Barry and I have been co llud ing a ll  morning on and o f f  on Orion and v is i t  to Eastbury on 8/9 January. Eastbury pathologist
s t i l l  cannot make the meeting. We are try in g  to get Region 5 to come in . Someone ♦ from Eston must come. I have fixed to
have a p riva te  chat to ORION when they are down here.
214 : Why and how did Texco get an entry into  Salton? E.J. one o f th e ir  team used to work at Salton.' But Barry Hunt must have
colluded with Salton and Texco. And he never admitted th is  openly.
215 : Today in a h a lf drunk s ta te , Barry said that he had w ritten  to physic is ts  saying no m/c for them YET. I've  heard him give
tha t DELTA away to them a dozen times. But he s t i l l  hates Peter H il ls .  Weak, " I  could kick him and he'd thank me".. He is the
most queer m ixture.
215 ; Christmas
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217 ; 2.1.73 : i now back. A fter the usual rouno of riaooy New yearinq, 1 se tt:ao  :own for one ana a h a lf hours with
Barry Hunt to sort out: (a) the v is i t  oy OR I ON to Eastbury (b) the v is i t  oy National and (o) the le t te r  to Ralton
218 : Sarry has got me into a position  in which I w rite  to Ralton. I don 't think ne did i t  malice aforethought cut i t ' s  a
very sticky w icket. Margaret took down notes on a ll three issues and gave me a copy.
213 : Barry was in h is snowkit, having jus t oug h ia se lf out of 5 *oot o r i f t s  - so there was a lo t  o f irre le van t c h it chat
going on as w e ll.
220 : 3.1.79 : In the afternoon, I got the West Area le t te r  on laoora tories s tra ig h t. I intend to make sure tha t Barry
agrees th is  before i t  goes. The squall which i t  w il l  cause w il l  be te r r i f i c .
221 : 'We met National today to discuss th e ir a ttitu d e  to ALPHA. They are going to document and market i t .  At long la s t they 
appear to have seen the lig h t on th is  one. The meeting was a good one.
222 : Tony came down heavily on support o f National and Barry reacted immediately. I spent a longish time w ith Barry 
afterwards explaining why Tony might have changed his position  on National. But Tony is  very e rra t ic  in  h is judgement.
223 : 8.1.79 : ORION came down to Eastbury laboratory. Oue to the petro l s tr ik e , Barry Hunt and I went together down to 
Eastbury. We toured both labora to ries, including the one In the new lab. I met both haematologists and Max's ass is tan t.
I was not impressed and rea lise  tha t th is  judgement Is w ithout any backing and is  ir ra t io n a l but such is  l i f e .
224 : On the f i r s t  day ORION saw the layouts and got the necessary s iz ing  s ta t is t ic s .  R eally, a ll is  peace and quiet now on 
the lap fro n t, i t  being made clear tha t I intend to motor th is  one through. Tony and Robert came to the second day and 
acknowledged the usefulness of i t .  Various o its  o f unpleasantness occurred - mainly concerned w ith my determination to cut
corners. I am steering towards a corner cu tting  approach which w il l  cause problems. Afterwards Tony to ld  me o f Region 4
getting  into a hassle because they did not open tender for the replacement for th e ir  system - stupid RCSO.
225 : Barry Hunt has arranged to take National down to Eastbury on the same basis as ORION. I decided not to go.
226 : 10.1.79 : Barry Hunt came in today about a le t te r  to Southton. The OA is  pressing us to look at th e ir preferred
commercial system from abroad. He is rep ly ing  d ip lom a tica lly  asking Southton to provide fu l l  system s p e c ifica tio n . I do not 
th ink that they can do that so i ts  re a lly  pu tting  a block on i t .  But we cannot keep looking at everything.
227 : One o f the things ca re fu lly  established about ORION yesterday was the nature o f th e ir hardware modern or not. Tony has 
been saying that i ts  seven years old which i t  is n ' t .  Tony ana Robert went on and on about the need for a proper system 
investiga tion  for the contract and I am determined to keep i t  to a minimum.
228 ; John J a rra tt and h is OA phoned Barry today to say tha t XX w il l  mount the Sleeton system on 23 January and stay fo r one 
week to make I t  work. Barry is  t ic k le d  pink hoping and praying i t  works so tha t i t  is  one in the eye for Computer Services.
229 : I saw Graham Pate a fte r the v is i t  to Wayne Cook today. He said a ll  the things I would expect about my le t te r .  I gather 
that he is  feve rish ly  seeking views fo r his re p ly . Negotiatetsfore le t te rs  to avoid confrontation .
230 : 11.1.79 : I have jus t been through the most exacting b it  o f negotiating w ith Hunt about lab computing. On the basis of 
the ORION v is i t  we agreed a set o f actions to get through to a hard contract. As part of tha t process, I agreed to phone H.O. 
to find  out more about the National position  in  p a rt ic u la r and to try  to engineer pressure on ORION to come up w ith  be tte r 
goodies. Of course, in extracting  th is  inform ation, I did a trade o f what was going on in Avon. At the end o f the 
conversation, our H.O. man gently dropped a rock in the pool. H.O. Supplies D iv is io n , a contract orientated group, were going
down to Ralton to ta lk  about Texco.
331 : I could well believe that Ralton, having been "disappointed*, had started a deal going on the side. So we took action 
weighing up the pros and cons e tc . What could we do? Eventually Barry got on the phone to Texco and I phoned Graham Pate to 
try  to warn o f f  troub le . We sent a le t te r  from Martin to the AMO. And Luke, who got Involved over lunch telephoned the AMO. 
Eventually, not being able to unearth anything Barry telephoned Ralton who disclaimed a ll  knowledge. Eventually we traced the 
c a ffu fle  to the technician who had asked a HO man o f same name down to ta lk  Texco. Barry Hunt blew him up fo r not te l l in g  
him about the v is i t .
232 : So a whole heap o f senior o ffic e rs  had wasted the afternoon on what was e ssen tia lly  a red herring -  dragged across a very 
touchy s itu a tio n .
233 : And I passed up the chance to do sons research.
234 : 12.1.79. I went to Medical User in Southton today to p a tie n tly  explain the lab s itu a tio n . I played the bat s tra ig h t.
West's DCP was up to h is old cynical t r ic k  regarding Sleeton. I p a tie n tly  went through a ll  the Regional p o s itio n . Due to
a mess up adm in is tra tive ly  Price came la te  so I had to recap my statement. I t  covered DELTA, evaluating commercial vs ALPHA,
size considerations, e tc , e tc . I was amazed to see the quietness w ith which Southton took a probable 'No' to commercial.
A ll going reasonably u n t il up popped PHLS on microbiology and the guy was going i t  alone. Money from non-NHS resources was 
talked about. I was put in a corner on system design resource lack o f i t .  I emphasised several times the data base aspects 
o f ALPHA concept. I also play hard on the need to cut down c le r ic a l support and th is  depends on in teg ra tion  e tc , e tc . Here 
we have another example o f how a d if fe re n t source o f cash can allow people to play ducks and drakes w ith the NHS and its  
p r io r i t ie s .
235 : 16.1.79 : Barry Hunt and I saw New Co. today. They had w ritte n  to us g iv ing  us a load o f inform ation which led us
r ig h t up the garden path regarding th e ir c a p a b ility . In fac t they flew in someone from France, having previously phoned in
from the States. They offered at give away orices - so one smells a ra t .  The system sounds good. Barry and I were 
knocxed sideways so we asked then to send more d e ta ils .
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236 ; The iirpl ications of th is  are enoroous nationa lly  and over a long period o f t in e . We went to see Martin to try  to get
guidance on the approach. Martin opted fo r "ge tting  the best" ana hang the consequences. He was s is iling  ru e fu lly . G3
opting exanple c f a jiassive couider oeing thrown into the pond olus top level p o li t ic s  cc iino  into a fa ir ly  low decision.
23/ ; 17.1.7s : I nave oeen oessinq aoout with Sarry Hunt try ing  to get / i s i t  to L iio ton  Mxeo. iecause o f r a i l  s tr ik e . I
am NOT being driven to Lancaster oy Barry Hunt in th is  weather. We did not got to Limpton eventually due to r a i l  s tr ik e .
238 : 18.1.79 : I have soent huge parts of yesterday and today with Barry Hunt getting  out a summary oaper for today an the 
three bids. Barry drafted i t  f i r s t  and then I did a whole lo t of p o li t ic a l d ra ftin g  an i t .  Barry aopeareo determined to get 
himself into a mess. A ll three bids were based on d if fe re n t suopositions. Cur objective  was to Yame a paper for tomorrow's
meeting with patho log is ts . We asked about five  questions which are supposed to represent the essence o f the AHA p o lic y . I
was try ing  hard to sake sure that the answers weren't there too.'
239 : Over the past three days, the bids from ORION, New Co. and National are in showing various degrees of in te re s t,
committment and a ttitu d e . You feel lik e  teaching some o f them th e ir business.
240 : The paper is ready *or an in te resting  meeting tomorrow.
241 : I need H.O. badly to know whether or not they would support Orion in the same way as National. But w ith s trike s  e tc , I
have not spoken to him. I also s t i l l  need to know i f  he has got the measure o f New Co! Surely he must have ano why did he not
te l l  me about them?
242 ; 25.1.79 : Refer to Hunt paper. X did not come. H il ls  was on a course.
243 : Fascinating to watch them s p li t  - J a rra tt leading the ALPHA mob, Barry plays down New Co. -  but oeing aver so ca re fu l.
Max saying "no experiment", "must have the best", "blow ouy B r it is h * . I am fascinateo to see wnat Barry makes o f i t  a l l .
244 ; Southton grumbled on about AlC and th e ir Foreign comoany, Barry took several d ire c t swipes at them, along the lin e
"You've not given me any pos itive  information so -  get lo s t*  Oh but "Region" knew. Barry "But d id n 't* .  I t  is  amazing
that the teaching D is t r ic t  simply cannot pu ll rank, weight or anything else a ffe c tiv e ly  in th is  f ie ld .
245 : 27.1.79 : V is it  Haematologist at Southton. A very d if fe re n t lee ting  from the Chemical Patholog ists. Or Hunt was a 
cnemical pathologist and so he handled them such more confidently  and i t  showed. He turned up la te  which d id n 't  do him any 
good due to the snow on H.Q. car park. The Chairman was much more dominating due to a b lu f f  'co n fid e n t' nature. As a group 
they had not taken the same in te re s t in computers -  except for two o f them. Gently, with very l i t t l e  "guidance" they followed 
our lead and so we have th e ir blessing.
246 : 1.2.79 ; Hunt has sent out to Pathologists and Haematologist notes confirm ing the discussions w ith them - covering his
backside very ca re fu lly ,
247 : Garth Boles is going so how we deal with New Co. I ju s t don 't know. I met Barry in  the co rrido r -  w ith ' f lu .  I can 't
help lik in g  the guy and fee ling  sorry for him.
248 ; March 1979 : P ostscrip t. The diary fin ishes here. The p ro jec t actua lly  wandered on slowly to in v it in g  tenders for 
ALPHA from ORION, National and AlC.
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